Ever since the start of the U.S.-Iran war, or conflict, however one wants to describe it, the situation has placed a tremendous amount of pressure on China. That pressure comes from several directions: tariffs, technological restrictions, energy insecurity involving oil and other resources, and declining access to certain markets.
Because of that, I have started reconsidering the usual way we discuss the Thucydides Trap, or at least the way it is commonly presented.
Now, in no way, shape, or form am I saying that the Thucydides Trap is wrong. The trap is still the trap. I am simply looking at it from a slightly different direction, which I will explain in a moment.
The danger may not come only from an established power fearing the rise of a challenger. That fear may also come from the challenger itself. China’s fear may not simply be that it cannot keep up with the United States. It may be that its own rise is slowing, which in turn creates the impression that its strategic window is closing. If that happens, then its opportunity to achieve its objectives, whatever those objectives may be, could begin to disappear.
Professor Graham Allison uses the term Thucydides Trap to describe the increased likelihood of war when a rising power, such as China, threatens to displace an established power, such as the United States.
However, I personally see it somewhat in reverse—or, rather, as a reversed Thucydides Trap. Frankly, it is still a Thucydides Trap regardless, but the reversal identifies which side of the power transition feels the greatest urgency.
The classic formula is that a rising power threatens an established power, and the resulting fear makes war more likely. However, both sides can experience different versions of the same trap. The established power fears displacement and may act before the challenger becomes unbeatable. At the same time, the rising power may fear that its rise is stalling or reversing and act before its best opportunity disappears.
Those pressures can operate simultaneously. The United States may fear that China will become too powerful if left unchecked. China, however, may fear that containment, tariffs, energy vulnerability, demographic problems, technological restrictions, and other pressures will prevent it from ever reaching its strategic objectives.
Each side interprets delay differently, but dangerously. Washington may believe that waiting strengthens China. Beijing may believe that waiting weakens China.
This is not really a separate trap moving backward. It is the same competitive mechanism closing from different directions.
Another way of putting it is that the Thucydides Trap in reverse occurs when a rising power, such as China, fears that its rise is stalling, its strategic window is closing, and delay will leave it permanently weaker. Instead of war emerging only because an established power fears being overtaken, conflict may also arise when the challenger fears it may never achieve its objectives or realize its true potential. It therefore believes it must act to defend its position before that position deteriorates any further.
In that sense, the trap is reciprocal: the established power fears the challenger’s continued rise, while the challenger fears that its own rise may be arrested before it can achieve its objectives.
In a nutshell: The United States fears the China of tomorrow. China fears it may never reach tomorrow.
Further Reading
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