The Russian-Ukrainian War: The Politics of a Complex Peace

The Politics of a Complex Peace
by Cam Rea

Since the Russo-Ukrainian war began in 2022, we’ve witnessed one negotiating proposal after another. Russia presents its demands, Ukraine presents its own, and outside actors, including the United States, Great Britain, and European governments, have their say in what should or should not be accepted.

At times, it has appeared that both sides were moving closer to some form of settlement, only for negotiations to stall or collapse. The negotiations in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2022 are perhaps one of the more interesting examples, especially given the involvement of outside powers and their influence on the negotiating process.

Over the past year, I’ve paid particular attention to the grievances, demands, and political objectives expressed by the various parties. Eventually, you begin to notice a pattern. And frankly, nothing about it is particularly surprising. Much of what we’re witnessing is exactly what one would expect when competing national interests collide.

Negotiations at this level are complicated not only by disagreements between the belligerents, but also by the political, military, economic, and strategic interests of those operating outside the immediate conflict.

This is why I think it’s important to begin with the negotiating process itself before examining what each party wants, what it might be willing to concede, and what it would ultimately consider a successful outcome.

When explaining what a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine might look like, we first have to ask ourselves: What does each state actually want? Not necessarily what it publicly demands, but what are its underlying strategic objectives?

Once we identify those objectives, we can begin establishing negotiating positions. What are each state’s opening demands? These can often be maximalist positions intended to create bargaining room.

In turn, this lets us determine each side’s leverage. What does each side have that the other wants or fears losing? Territory, economic pressure, military strength, sanctions, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Once we’ve determined each side’s leverage, we can begin identifying the limits. What are each side’s red lines? What concessions are politically, militarily, or economically acceptable? What’s unacceptable?

When these have been somewhat established, and I say somewhat because nothing is ever truly set in stone, we can begin exploring possible exchanges. What can one side offer in exchange for something it wants? This is where the bargaining begins.

Once these exchanges begin and certain concessions are agreed upon, we can start constructing a possible agreement. What specific commitments will each state make? Who withdraws? Who guarantees security? Who lifts sanctions? And in what sequence?

This is the tricky part. This is the delicate part.

Once an agreement is reached, we can begin monitoring compliance and enforcing its terms. Basically, once the signatures are on the dotted line, how will compliance be verified? And most importantly, what happens if someone violates it?

Ultimately, all of this comes down to power dynamics at every level: political, military, economic, and social. These dynamics shape negotiations, but they don’t necessarily determine every outcome.

The Strategic Objectives of Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union

When analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian war, I think the most important distinction is that all four actors can claim some measure of success while pursuing fundamentally incompatible objectives.

Looking at Russia, we see that it can gain territory without achieving its larger geopolitical objectives. Ukraine has shown that it can lose territory without losing its sovereignty. The United States can facilitate a settlement without resolving Europe’s security problems, and the European Union can preserve Ukraine as an independent state while failing to establish a durable security agreement.

This is why, when describing what is happening on the ground, we cannot simply describe Russia as winning or losing. That would be analytically insufficient. The same applies to Ukraine and its Western supporters.

The issue is that we have to separate four things: political objectives, military objectives, strategic minimums, and measures of success.

What are the political objectives? What outcomes does each actor ultimately want? We’ve already touched on this in the introduction.

The military objective concerns what each actor must achieve through military action to support its desired political outcome.

Strategic minimum? Well, that comes down to what each actor could accept without suffering what it considers an unacceptable strategic defeat.

Which brings us to the measure of success. What developments would demonstrate that each actor’s objectives are being achieved?

Overall, it comes down to what Carl von Clausewitz argued: “War is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means.” In other words, the ends must justify the means, at least in the eyes of those pursuing them. Politics is fickle precisely because the relationship between ends and means remains in a constant state of uncertainty.

Through realpolitik, one must wade through the dynamic chaos of grievances to find a semi-equilibrium.

The Strategic Picture at a Glance

We’ll now examine each actor, its principal strategic objective, and the possible minimum it might be willing to accept.

Russia
First, Russia. What is its principal strategic objective? At the moment, it is to secure its borders, establish a buffer zone with a grey zone extending beyond it between Russia and the West, constrain Ukraine, consolidate territorial gains, limit Ukraine’s military alignment with the West, and preserve Russia’s regional influence.

I say “at the moment” because, while these objectives reflect Russia’s current strategic position, the changing nature of the war means that the political and strategic calculations behind them may also change.

This brings us to Russia’s possible minimum. If Russia cannot achieve its maximalist demands, a possible minimum would be to retain control of key occupied territories, prevent Ukraine’s NATO membership, and obtain restrictions or assurances concerning Ukraine’s future military posture. This would give Russia some political leverage in securing a long-term settlement while allowing Moscow to portray the outcome as protecting Russia’s interests in relation to Ukraine and the West.

Ukraine
For Ukraine, the principal strategic objective is, frankly, to preserve its sovereignty, restore its territory, and secure protection against future invasion, along with the ability to defend itself.

As for the practical minimum it may ultimately have to accept, that would be to preserve its independence first and foremost, remain a militarily viable state (if allowed), and obtain at least credible security guarantees, even if some territorial questions remain unresolved.

United States
The United States’ principal strategic objectives are, basically, to end the war on sustainable terms, limit American costs and escalation risks, preserve strategic influence, prevent a wider European war, and maintain NATO credibility.

As for the practical minimum, frankly, that would be achieving a sustainable cessation of hostilities that preserves Ukraine’s independence without requiring direct American military involvement. Any proposal involving American boots on the ground would likely face Russian opposition. At the same time, such a settlement would ideally avoid open-ended American military commitments. The American people themselves would probably be reluctant to support American troops being stationed in Ukraine to provide security.

The European Union
As for the European Union, its principal strategic objectives are preserving European security, Ukrainian independence, and the principle of territorial sovereignty.

As for the possible minimum it would accept, that would be to prevent Ukraine’s collapse, maintain European security, and avoid a settlement that leaves Europe exposed to future aggression. Preventing Ukraine’s collapse is one thing. Preventing its potential balkanization is another matter entirely.

Russia: Territorial Consolidation and Revision of the European Security Order

Russia’s political objectives extend beyond acquiring Ukrainian territory. Moscow seeks to establish a security environment that prevents Ukraine from serving as a Western military springboard against Russia, whether directly or indirectly. We’ve already discussed Moscow’s stated objectives. However, Putin has increasingly framed negotiations as a question of security for Russia, Ukraine, and Europe together.

The November negotiating proposals reportedly revived demands to restrict NATO’s eastern military posture. With this in mind, Russia’s larger strategic objectives can be divided into three categories.

Territorial consolidation
Russia wants recognition and control of its claimed regions, including Crimea, and seeks to secure territory that Ukraine continues to hold. Beyond the land itself, controlling these territories expands Russia’s defense in depth, secures transportation corridors and access to infrastructure, and enables Russia to shape Ukraine’s future military geography. The key point is that territory is both an objective and a tool of leverage. Russia may first seek to turn Ukraine into an anchor, buffer, or dependent state before using it as a catalyst for broader Russian influence.

Strategic neutralization of Ukraine
Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from developing into a militarily powerful, Western-aligned state capable of threatening its interests. This is where military restrictions, NATO exclusion, and opposition to Western troops become interconnected. The goal is not simply to defeat Ukrainian forces, but to constrain the military capabilities it could develop afterward. In other words, they want to hamstring Ukraine.

Revision of the European security order
It is without question that Russia wants a larger role in determining Europe’s security arrangements. Its demand for a return to NATO’s 1997 military posture indicates an ambition to restrict Western military developments near Russia and renegotiate the security conditions established after the Cold War. That demand serves two possible purposes: a genuine strategic objective and leverage to obtain concessions on Ukraine. The two are not mutually exclusive.

Military objectives
While Russia’s military objectives have already been summarized for the most part, they remain subject to change. Its military role is to translate continued military pressure into favorable political circumstances. The war is fluid, both kinetically and politically, and a change in one can fundamentally alter the calculations in the other.

Operationally, this involves holding occupied territory, attacking Ukrainian defenses, degrading infrastructure and military capabilities, all the while maintaining enough pressure to influence negotiations.

But territorial advances alone aren’t sufficient to establish a strategic victory. They certainly contribute, and under certain circumstances could establish one, but that seems unlikely here. Therefore, Russia must also consider whether its military gains justify their costs.

How Russia may measure success
This is the tricky part. But the measures Russia might use to determine success aren’t exactly a secret.

If the measure is territory held or acquired, it tells Moscow whether military operations are delivering tangible geopolitical gains. If we look at Ukrainian military degradation, well, this tells Moscow whether Ukraine’s ability to resist is being reduced.

If we focus on force regeneration, this indicates whether Russia can replace personnel, equipment, and ammunition at a sustainable rate.

The measure of Western political cohesion tells Moscow whether allied support for Ukraine is becoming more divided or conditional.

As for sanctions resilience, this indicates whether Russia can sustain its economy and defense production despite Western pressure.

If the measure is negotiating concessions, this tells Moscow whether military pressure is producing favorable political results.

And lastly, domestic stability. If that is the measure, then the question is whether the Kremlin can sustain the war politically, perhaps indefinitely, or at least until it considers its objectives sufficiently achieved.

However, here’s the critical point. Russia could win more ground and still fail strategically if Ukraine emerges with stronger Western security guarantees and NATO becomes more militarily consolidated along Russia’s borders. Period.

Conversely, Russia could accept less than all its territorial demands and still claim strategic success if Ukraine’s long-term military alignment is sufficiently constrained.

Which brings us to Russia’s possible strategic minimum.

My assessment is that Moscow would seek some combination of territorial consolidation, restrictions on Ukraine’s military alignment, and a settlement that preserves Russia’s regional influence.

The precise trade-offs Moscow would accept are unknown. Its current public negotiating position remains more demanding than this hypothetical minimum.

This is where the price anchoring interpretation becomes relevant. A government may announce maximalist objectives that exceed its reservation point: the least favorable settlement it would be prepared to accept.

Ukraine: Survival, Sovereignty, and the Prevention of Another Invasion
Ukraine’s declared political objectives remain preserving its independence and sovereignty, recovering territory, and acquiring credible security guarantees.

However, according to Reuters, Zelensky rejected a proposal that Ukraine withdraw from Donbas in exchange for NATO membership, while indicating that a comprehensive agreement could potentially be presented to a national referendum. Of course, by the time this article is published, who knows how much may have changed behind the scenes?

Nevertheless, three objectives are especially important.

Preservation of the Ukrainian State

Ukraine’s foremost strategic interest is remaining politically sovereign. That means retaining the ability to determine its own foreign policy, maintain armed forces, conclude international agreements, and govern without Russian control.

This is distinct from recovering every inch of territory. A state can lose territory while retaining its independence, although that loss can seriously damage its long-term security and raise political questions, whether arising from internal or external pressures.

Preservation of Military Viability

Ukraine needs a military capable of deterring future Russian invasions. It also needs access to ammunition, air defense, intelligence, military technology, and, frankly, any outside assistance it can obtain.

A peace settlement that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty on paper but leaves the country militarily defenseless is nothing more than a country trying to fight its way out of a wet paper bag.

Long-Term Security Guarantees

As for long-term security guarantees, Ukraine obviously wants arrangements that discourage Russia from ever invading again. This includes NATO membership, with its binding collective-defense commitments, European military assistance, or other security agreements.

The specific arrangements, or I should say the specific agreements, matter enormously because guarantees are only as credible as the parties’ willingness and capability to enforce them.

Military Objectives

Ukraine’s immediate military problem is to expel Russian forces from its territory while preventing further advances and future invasions.

Its military objectives include maintaining defensible front lines, preserving personnel and equipment, protecting infrastructure, and inflicting sufficient losses to limit further Russian advances.

Ukraine must also preserve the capacity to continue fighting if negotiations collapse. This creates a dual requirement: sustain resistance while keeping a political settlement possible.

In other words, Ukraine must negotiate a possible armistice while the war continues.

How Ukraine measures success


As for how Ukraine measures success, the priority is preserving sovereignty, because it tells Kyiv whether Ukraine can retain its political independence.

If it can retain its political independence, the next question is whether it has defensible territory. This indicates whether the remaining state can be militarily protected. Do you have enough territory? Do you have enough space? Do you have enough time? And, most importantly, can Ukraine stabilize the front and prevent further Russian advances?

This brings us to Ukrainian force regeneration, which determines whether Kyiv can sustain long-term military resistance. Can Ukraine continue replacing its personnel and equipment losses at a sustainable rate?

That question was raised back in 2022 and remains relevant to the present. Ukraine immediately looked to additional help in the form of foreign military assistance. The question now is whether Ukraine can maintain access to those essential military capabilities.

To sustain all of this and prepare for whatever may come in the future, Ukraine also needs to assess its security guarantees. This tells Kyiv whether a peace settlement could deter another invasion. What those guarantees might look like remains anybody’s guess and subject to interpretation.

And lastly, we come to economic and demographic recovery. This is the tough one because Kyiv has to ask the hard question: Can Ukraine remain a viable state after the war, or will it be divided piecemeal and eventually balkanized? Or could it simply balkanize from within?

The day after will tell us a lot.

Ukraine’s possible strategic minimum


As for Ukraine’s strategic minimum, what would it be willing to accept? This is where I distinguish a preferable outcome from a survival threshold.

Ukraine’s declared preferred outcome is restoring its territory and securing credible security arrangements. Its practical survival threshold could be remaining an independent, functioning, and defensible country, even if the territorial dispute remains unresolved.

That doesn’t mean Kyiv is prepared to surrender territory. In fact, its current position rejects such concessions, at least for now. It means that the survival of the state and the restoration of all its territory are distinct strategic measures.

If Ukraine preserves its sovereignty but loses territory, the result is mixed. If it recovers territory but lacks the means to defend itself afterward, the victory may prove temporary. In other words, Ukraine could emerge politically weak and militarily unstable. A recipe for disaster, both internally and externally.

United States: Ending the War While Maintaining Strategic Flexibility

It is no surprise that American strategic interests do not align perfectly with Ukrainian interests. They may overlap in important respects, but they aren’t interchangeable. Washington must consider European security and NATO credibility while avoiding escalation with Russia. It must also consider its own military expenditures and the long-term strategic competition with China.

The Trump administration has made it clear that it seeks to end the war through a negotiated settlement. But that objective operates within a larger strategic framework.

Political objectives


If we look at the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), it places American homeland defense, deterring China, greater allied burden-sharing, as in making NATO members pay more of their fair share, and defense-industrial capacity among its principal priorities.

The NDS also describes Russia as a persistent but manageable threat, while emphasizing that European allies should assume greater responsibility for their own conventional defense.

This alone suggests four interconnected American objectives.

Terminate the war without direct American military involvement


First, it comes down to ending the war without direct U.S. military involvement. The U.S. wants to negotiate an outcome that ends major combat operations and reduces the danger of confrontation between nuclear powers.

While an agreement that merely postpones renewed fighting may be beneficial, it is less valuable strategically than a durable settlement. Therefore, the administration must balance the attractiveness of a near-term agreement against the risk of producing an unstable peace. However, a near-term agreement could also establish the foundation for a lasting peace, provided both parties remain sufficiently satisfied with its terms to uphold them.

Reduce American strategic commitments in Europe


Washington has an interest in European governments taking greater responsibility for their own defense, and they should. However, this does not necessarily mean NATO will dissolve or that the United States will withdraw from Europe. Both remain possibilities, but whether either will happen in the foreseeable future is still in question.

Rather, the United States can seek to redistribute responsibilities, leaving European governments to provide more of the conventional military capabilities required for continental security.

Preserve freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific


Shifting defense responsibility to European governments and NATO allies allows the United States to focus more attention and resources on its strategic competition with China.

The United States has finite military resources, industrial capacity, diplomatic attention, and financial commitments. The United States is a nation of warehouses, laboratories, research facilities, factories, and tool shops. Resources concentrated in Europe cannot simultaneously be assigned elsewhere without trade-offs.

Ending the war on acceptable terms could improve Washington’s strategic flexibility in the Indo-Pacific.

However, the counterargument is that a settlement seen as rewarding territorial conquest could weaken America’s credibility with its allies in Asia, making strategic competition with China harder.

Perhaps. But I think this also depends on the administration in charge.

Preserve American influence over Europe’s security arrangements


However, even if Washington reduces its strategic commitments in Europe, it still wants to preserve its influence over European security arrangements diplomatically, militarily, economically, and institutionally.

The current administration has been examining the possibility of negotiating a broader European security arrangement alongside a settlement with Ukraine. According to 11 November reporting, American negotiators wanted to pursue both tracks simultaneously, while recognizing that Ukraine and European governments must agree to arrangements that affect their security.

In other words, there’s a lot of give-and-take that must happen before anything can truly move forward.

American military objectives


The United States is obviously not a direct belligerent in this war. Its military objectives are principally indirect. Its goals include preserving NATO’s defense, avoiding direct conflict between American and Russian forces, maintaining deterrence against attacks on NATO territory, preserving sufficient American military capability for other strategic theaters, and finally, supporting a postwar security agreement that does not depend on indefinite American military intervention.

There is an important difference between supporting Ukrainian resistance to constrain Russia and treating the degradation of Russia’s military capabilities as an overriding American objective. The former can serve American interests. The latter may create costs or commitments Washington is unwilling to sustain indefinitely. The U.S. cannot afford to overplay its hand.

How the United States measures success


Now, when it comes to measuring success, the first indication would be the end of major hostilities. This would tell Washington that diplomacy has ended the immediate conflict, which brings us to the settlement’s durability. Will the agreement prevent another costly war, or merely postpone one?

It also raises the question of direct American military exposure. Has Washington avoided direct military involvement while keeping the risk of escalation contained?

Furthermore, European defense contributions come into play. This tells Washington whether its allies are assuming greater responsibility for their own security and whether NATO’s collective defense arrangements remain effective.

This brings us to the availability of strategic resources. Has Washington gained greater flexibility to redirect military, economic, and political attention toward China and other strategic priorities?

As for American influence over the settlement terms, this shows whether Washington’s diplomacy shaped the outcome or merely facilitated an agreement without securing its broader strategic interests. After all, negotiating an end to the fighting is one thing. Ensuring that the resulting political and security arrangements serve American interests is another.

America’s possible strategic minimum

In my assessment, the Trump administration’s practical minimum would be an arrangement that terminates major hostilities. This could, in turn, reduce the risk of renewed war, preserve essential American security interests, and avoid an indefinite military commitment.

But there is a complication.

A diplomatic settlement can succeed for an American administration without being strategically successful for the United States over the long term. In other words, it does not matter if you lose the battle so long as you do not lose the war, for strategic endurance outweighs temporary tactical setbacks.

An agreement could end the fighting and deliver an immediate political achievement, yet create military vulnerabilities that require considerably greater American commitments later.

However, the reverse is also possible. An imperfect settlement could free resources and reduce the danger of escalation while preserving the broader European balance.

This is why an administration’s political success and a country’s strategic success must be evaluated and weighed separately.

European Union: Containment of the Conflict and Preservation of European Security

Of all the positions examined, the European position is perhaps the most complicated because the EU is not exactly a sovereign state with a unified military command. Its member states have different geographical vulnerabilities, military capabilities, economic interests, and political considerations. In other words, it’s a gaggle of competing interests, even if they are all aligned toward the same outcome: peace. The disagreement lies in how to achieve it.

Furthermore, the EU and NATO are different institutions. Not all European NATO members are in the EU, and not all EU members are in NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has established several common strategic objectives.

Political objectives


The European Council has committed itself to Ukrainian independence and internationally recognized borders. On 13 November, European Council President António Costa reaffirmed that Ukraine must decide questions concerning its own territory and sovereignty, while European governments must participate in decisions affecting the continent’s security. European leaders also agreed to establish a negotiating team involving EU institutions and five European countries from the Coalition of the Willing.

As a result, four principal European objectives emerge.

Prevent the war from expanding into European Union territory


This is probably by far the most immediate security concern, and understandably so. European governments will want to prevent a wider conflict involving Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, or other countries. For the eastern member states, Russia’s military pressure is not an abstract security issue; it directly affects their defense planning.

Preserve Ukraine as a buffer against further Russian expansion


This part requires careful wording. Ukraine is a sovereign country, not just a buffer state. However, a militarily viable Ukraine occupies strategically important territory between Russia and NATO’s eastern members.

From the European Union’s standpoint, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian military pressure helps defend Europe’s eastern approaches. That relationship exists regardless of whether European governments publicly describe Ukraine as a buffer.

Prevent territorial conquest from becoming an accepted method of changing European borders


The EU has argued that international borders should not be changed through force. This is simultaneously a legal principle and a strategic concern. If conquest becomes an effective way to obtain internationally recognized territorial concessions, European governments fear the precedent could encourage further attempts to redraw borders by force. This also raises questions about EU member states’ military capabilities and their ability to respond collectively.

Increase Europe’s strategic autonomy and military capacity


The ongoing conflict has caused the European Council to call for greater defense readiness by 2030. This includes stronger defense-industrial capacity, protection of critical infrastructure, and reduced strategic dependencies.

This tells us that these objectives extend beyond Ukraine, and they should. European governments are attempting to prepare for a security environment in which American commitments may become more limited or conditional.

However, this is easier said than done. The problem is that not all member states have equal capabilities. As a result, some will have to pick up the slack for others. Some may lack the economic strength, while others may have strong economies but insufficient industrial capacity. Still others may possess the industrial base but lack access to the necessary resources or face regulations that restrict their ability to develop the military apparatus required not only to defend themselves but also to conduct offensive operations.

European military objectives


Remember, the EU still has objectives. But the EU has not established a unified military force. NATO provides a collective defense framework for many EU member states, but the two institutions are not interchangeable.

Nevertheless, European governments seek to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses, expand European military production, reinforce vulnerable fronts, and increase their ability to deter Russian military action.

The strategic purpose is obvious: prevent Russia from translating its gains in Ukraine into a larger military advantage over Europe, whether kinetically or politically.

While buffer zones are desirable, the gray zone may be even more valuable. In this clandestine environment, European governments can conduct intelligence, cyber, and other covert operations to defend their interests or undermine an adversary, often without the public knowing what is happening. Russia is doing the same thing.

However, this competition is already taking place. Once the fighting ends and the smoke clears, the strategic landscape will change. Both sides will have a clearer understanding of the buffer zones that have emerged and where gray-zone competition can be conducted. Both Russia and Europe will seek to exploit these arrangements to their strategic advantage.

How Europe measures success


The first European measures of success are the survival of the Ukrainian state, the continued independence of a critical partner, and the containment of the conflict.

As for Russian military capacity, this tells the EU whether Moscow can still threaten other European countries.

European military readiness will be an indication of whether the EU can defend itself with reduced American support.

Defense-industrial production tells the EU whether its member states can sustain military operations and assistance.

Perhaps the biggest measure of all is EU political cohesion. The question is whether member states can remain united and on the same page while maintaining common strategic positions and pursuing common objectives, whether defensive or offensive.

Ukrainian reconstruction will indicate whether postwar Ukraine can become economically and politically stable again, and if so, how long that recovery might take. And if it does recover, what will the spheres of influence look like? How much influence will each side retain, gain, and lose?

Which brings us finally to European influence in negotiations. How much influence does the EU need to shape the outcome? How strong is Europe, really? And does it need outside assistance? Ultimately, only European governments can answer those questions.

Europe’s possible strategic minimum


So what is the minimum? Based on observation, the minimum would likely involve preventing Ukraine’s collapse, preserving European security, and ensuring that any settlement doesn’t create immediate military vulnerabilities along NATO’s eastern flank.

But Europe’s minimum acceptable outcome is not necessarily uniform. Poland and the Baltic states may attach greater weight to deterring Russia. Other governments may place more emphasis on ending hostilities, stabilizing energy markets, reducing financial commitments, or restoring European economic predictability. In other words, normality.

These differences give Russian diplomacy opportunities to exploit disagreements, and vice versa. However, they also complicate Washington’s efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to Europe as a whole.

Where the strategic objectives collide


This is where the conflict becomes especially interesting from a classical realist perspective. The parties aren’t simply fighting over territory. They’re naturally attempting to establish political and military arrangements that will determine their future positions relative to one another.

Image by Cam Rea

Notice the contradiction between Russia and Ukraine. Russia wants security by limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukraine wants security by maintaining those capabilities. Both can describe their objectives as defensive. However, each side’s preferred security arrangement can make the other feel less secure. It’s a classic security dilemma.

Russia’s invasion and territorial claims also involve coercive revision of the existing order, not merely defensive reactions.

Washington’s problem is different. It wants to reduce its commitments without necessarily reducing its influence. Europe wants to maintain American protection while becoming less dependent upon it.

These objectives are not impossible to reconcile, but they create competing incentives that can shift as certain terms are negotiated and agreed upon. This could restart the entire negotiating process, even over the most minute details.

What Constitutes Victory or Defeat?


This is a tough question, and I think it’s best answered by distinguishing five dimensions of success rather than relying on a single battlefield measurement.

The first is tactical. The principal question is: Who’s winning individual engagements?

The second is operational. The principal question is: Who’s achieving campaign objectives and controlling the ground?

The third is strategic. The question here is: Are military operations producing the desired political conditions?

The fourth is economic. Can the state sustain the conflict and recover afterward?

And finally, the fifth is political. Can the government preserve its legitimacy and alliances while securing an acceptable settlement?

A military can succeed tactically and operationally while failing strategically. Likewise, an army can experience considerable battlefield setbacks without losing the political independence its government is fighting to preserve.

Hypothetical Outcomes
A: Russia retains substantial territory, but Ukraine survives and joins NATO
Russia achieves territorial success. Ukraine suffers a territorial loss but secures a major external security guarantee. The United States and NATO extend their security arrangements, while Russia faces a strengthened Western military presence along its borders.

From Moscow’s standpoint, the outcome could represent a substantial failure of its broader strategic objectives despite its territorial gains.

B: Russia retains territory, Ukraine remains outside NATO, and Ukraine accepts military restrictions
Russia achieves many of its preferred strategic objectives.

Ukraine retains its independence but accepts significant constraints on its future military capabilities.

Washington helps end major hostilities, although the settlement’s durability remains uncertain.

Europe may view the agreement as having reduced immediate danger while creating longer-term security risks.

C: The war ends in an armistice along approximately existing lines, with no final territorial settlement
Russia retains de facto control of occupied territory.

Ukraine retains its sovereignty, military capabilities, and territorial claims.

The United States helps end major hostilities.

Europe gains an opportunity to reinforce its defenses.

However, the underlying political conflict remains unresolved.

This third scenario illustrates something important. It shows that an armistice can end large-scale military operations without producing a strategic victory for either belligerent. Stalemate.

Conclusion
Overall, four conclusions are worth carrying into a future discussion, if any discussion at all.

First, Russia does not need to defeat NATO to achieve a strategically favorable settlement. It needs sufficient political, territorial, and military concessions to improve its position relative to the situation before or during the war.

Second, Ukraine does not need to defeat Russia militarily to preserve its existence as a sovereign state. However, survival alone would not fulfill Ukraine’s declared territorial and security objectives. To consider survival alone a complete victory would be an error.

Third, the United States can achieve its diplomatic objective of terminating the war while leaving the larger conflict between Russia and Europe unresolved. Whether this constitutes strategic success depends on the settlement’s durability and consequences. This could be seen as a mistake or a blessing.

Fourth, Europe can preserve Ukraine’s independence while remaining strategically vulnerable if it fails to develop the military capabilities necessary to sustain its preferred security order.

And that raises another question underlying the entire war. Are these actors measuring success against their original objectives, their present circumstances, or the consequences of an alternative outcome?

I recognize these are three different standards, but they’re also three legitimate ways to measure success.

A government that initially sought complete victory might eventually accept a settlement far short of that objective, especially if the alternatives have worsened. However, that does not automatically transform the settlement into a strategic victory, or a victory at all. It may simply represent the most favorable attainable outcome under changed circumstances.

This connects with an argument I made some time ago about Russia’s maximalist demands. The Kremlin’s opening position may define what it wants, but its willingness to concede particular demands would reveal considerably more about what it regards as essential. What is essential to the Kremlin may not be essential to Kyiv, Brussels, or Washington. And the same reasoning applies to the negotiating positions of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.

I think the measure of strategic success is, frankly, not simply what a state gains or loses, but whether the ends ultimately justify the means employed to achieve them.

Was it worth it in the end?

And that is another question for another time.

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Neo-Siege: The State as Its Own Jailer

Neo-Siege
by Cam Rea

With the Trump administration expanding its operations against Iran through Task Force Iron Gate, we may be witnessing the development of another form of strategic siege warfare.

We all know what a siege is, but what’s a neo-siege? First, there’s really no such thing as a neo-siege, at least not as an established concept of warfare. But we might be witnessing one developing.

Neo-siege applies traditional siege principles at the strategic level through sustained multidomain isolation, using military, political, and economic means to deny an adversary the ability to sustain or regenerate its power and to coerce a desired political outcome without physical encirclement or territorial occupation.

Siege warfare isn’t fundamentally new. Nor have its principles changed. What has changed is how they’re applied. Historically, an army surrounded a city, cut off its supplies, restricted movement, and attempted to exhaust the defenders until they surrendered or could no longer resist. The objective was denial through attrition.

The same principles apply to an entire state. Technically, we’ve already seen forms of state sieges in modern history, particularly following the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq is a good example. Sanctions, no-fly zones, maritime interdiction, military pressure, and economic isolation were all used to restrict Iraq’s ability to restore power. However, the twenty-first century has introduced additional means of applying those same principles on a much broader scale.

Sanctions could be considered a form of siege, though I would distinguish between a soft siege and a hard siege. A soft siege relies primarily on economic and political restrictions. A hard siege goes further. It combines economic attrition with military pressure, employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), cyber operations, and other technological capabilities to enforce isolation and deny an adversary the means to circumvent it.

This is where neo-siege comes into play.

You no longer need an army physically surrounding a country to impose siege conditions. You can do it from afar through multidomain isolation. ISR, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and other instruments become extensions of what an army traditionally accomplished on the ground. Instead of physically occupying territory to restrict an adversary’s freedom of action, you’re using those capabilities to impose restrictions without necessarily having boots on the ground.

In a sense, you’re technically occupying them through digital means.

But there’s another dimension to this, and perhaps a more interesting one. You’re turning the besieged state into its own occupying force. You’re making them do the job for you.

Consider what happens when sustained economic, cyber, and military pressure begins affecting a country’s ability to function. Its economy deteriorates. Resources become increasingly difficult to acquire. Communications, financial transactions, and commercial activity become vulnerable to disruption. At some point, the government must respond.

It may impose tighter restrictions on its population, industry, and resources. It may centralize economic authority, increase domestic surveillance, restrict communications, and deploy additional security forces to maintain order. Military and economic resources that could otherwise be directed toward external defense or rebuilding capabilities must now be diverted toward internal security and maintaining essential functions to keep the peace or what’s left of it.

The country begins occupying itself.

And the interesting part is that the government may not even recognize, at least initially, that it’s helping maintain the very siege being imposed against it. From its perspective, it’s responding to threats and attempting to preserve its authority. Yet those responses can compound the pressure already being applied from outside.

If the economy continues to deteriorate, public discontent may grow. Eventually, people may protest or rebel. The government responds by sending in the police or military. That requires additional resources, placing further pressure on an already strained system. Restrictions increase, surveillance expands, and the government becomes more concerned with controlling its own population than confronting the external adversary.

It becomes its own jailer.

And if you can produce another threat within that environment, what happens? You could potentially create a chain reaction. One restriction leads to another. One security measure creates additional economic or political consequences, requiring still more security measures. The state becomes increasingly occupied with containing the problems developing within its own borders.

This is a potential mechanism of indirect control. The besieging power doesn’t necessarily control the government directly. Instead, it puts the government under enough pressure that its own decisions begin reinforcing the restrictions imposed on it.

In effect, the besieger transfers part of the burden of maintaining the siege to the besieged state itself.

To be fair, states can become their own prisons without anybody imposing a siege upon them. North Korea and the Soviet Union are examples. Both developed extensive systems of internal control without an outside power imposing those conditions. However, under neo-siege, external pressure could produce or intensify similar conditions. The difference isn’t necessarily what the government does to its own population, but what causes it to do so.

This doesn’t require the targeted government to cooperate willingly. Quite the opposite. It may believe that every action it takes is necessary for its own survival. But the more resources it commits to internal control, the fewer resources it may have available to sustain or regenerate its power.

That is where denial, attrition, and coercion come together.

Iran presents an interesting contemporary example of how such a strategy might develop. American military, economic, and political operations to disrupt Iranian supply networks could create conditions resembling a modern strategic siege. Rather than attempting to occupy Iran physically, the United States can attempt to isolate it, restrict its economic activity, and deny it the resources necessary to rebuild its military capabilities.

But whether that pressure eventually produces the internal consequences described here is another question entirely.

We don’t know.

Iran’s institutions may adapt. They may absorb the pressure, find alternative ways to sustain themselves, or keep resisting despite the economic and military costs. Conversely, sustained pressure could lead to tighter internal restrictions, deeper economic deterioration, and a growing commitment of Iranian resources to maintaining domestic security.

We’re about to find out how this develops.

And that’s why neo-siege should be understood as a strategic theory rather than a prediction that Iran will collapse or surrender. Applying siege principles doesn’t guarantee the desired outcome. A besieged state can resist, adapt, or outlast the power attempting to isolate it.

The besieging power must also endure. Maintaining economic restrictions, military operations, intelligence networks, and continuous pressure isn’t necessarily inexpensive. The longer the siege continues, the more it may consume the besieger’s own resources, military readiness, and political will.

Ultimately, the objective remains what it has always been in siege warfare: to deny an adversary the means to sustain resistance and coerce a desired outcome.

The methods have changed, the geographical limitations have changed, and the instruments available have expanded considerably. But the principles remain recognizable.

What makes neo-siege particularly interesting is the possibility that a state can be besieged so thoroughly, without physical occupation, that its own government begins performing some of the functions traditionally carried out by an occupying army.

You’re not simply besieging the state. You’re creating conditions in which the state may begin besieging itself.

The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street: The Strategic Value of Chaos in Wait

Policy in Wait
by Cam Rea

Midterms are coming up, and there is speculation about just about everything, from military installations becoming more self-sufficient to exercises involving the temporary burial of military casualties in the event of conventional warfare. Now, add UFOs, classified military technologies, and the predictions people keep making about an impending global crisis or conflict, religious or not, and you start to see a familiar pattern emerge.

Understandably, some people look at these developments and believe the government is preparing for something catastrophic. Others dismiss the concerns as conspiracy theories. And depending on how you look at it, I can understand both sides. However, much of what’s being reported isn’t necessarily unusual or mysterious. Much of it falls into that gray area: the everyday minutiae of governmental preparedness that most people don’t really think about.

When it comes to national defense, none of this is particularly new. The military has developed contingency plans, improved infrastructure resilience, prepared for casualties, and worked on classified technologies for decades. The same goes, to a lesser extent, for civilian infrastructure. These things happen all the time. People, for the most part, don’t notice them. The military, along with the government, prepares for all kinds of possibilities, including scenarios within scenarios, many of which may never happen. That’s the whole point of preparedness.

Nevertheless, people will interpret these activities through speculation, fear, and incomplete information. And it certainly doesn’t help when commentators and news outlets take ordinary military preparations and present them as evidence that some major crisis is right around the corner. But then again, controversy creates cash.

Now, here’s where I think things get interesting. What happens when all this public speculation becomes strategically useful? Whether through deliberate manipulation, selective disclosure, or simply letting misinformation circulate, governments can benefit from where people direct their attention. Sometimes that attention is drawn toward a perceived threat while the real activity happens elsewhere. Other times, the lack of public attention is just as useful.

The strategic value of controlling public attention lies in the government’s ability to manufacture or exploit distractions while pursuing objectives it would rather keep hidden. By creating or amplifying perceived threats, or “boogeymen,” governments can redirect public attention away from sensitive activities, including classified military projects and technological developments.

This creates an interesting social dynamic between the majority and the minority. The majority becomes absorbed in the prevailing narrative, while a smaller minority questions it, recognizing that something else may be occurring beneath the surface. However, without concrete evidence, that minority struggles to substantiate its suspicions. Consequently, the majority may dismiss these individuals as conspiracy theorists, eccentrics, or simply “kooks.” In effect, social conformity becomes a mechanism of control. The government doesn’t necessarily have to discredit its critics because the public can do that work for it.

During peacetime, this mechanism can operate differently. When there is no immediate threat of war or national emergency, public interest in military affairs and classified technological developments tends to diminish. People become occupied with everyday life, allowing government programs to proceed with relatively little public scrutiny. However, when suspicious activity does attract attention, speculation and disagreement can obscure the underlying reality. The public becomes preoccupied with debating competing explanations rather than investigating what is actually happening.

The UFO (Sorry, UAP) phenomenon offers an interesting historical example. While the public debated extraterrestrial visitors, the United States was secretly developing advanced reconnaissance aircraft, including the U-2 and A-12 OXCART. Some sightings involved classified aircraft, and officials sometimes provided misleading explanations to protect those programs. Whether deliberately manufactured or exploited, public speculation can serve secrecy’s interests.

The broader implication is that social control does not always require direct government intervention. It can emerge through manipulating attention, exploiting uncertainty, and the natural pressures of social conformity. Most people may unknowingly reinforce an official narrative, while those who question it are marginalized through ridicule rather than formal censorship.

Ultimately, the strategic advantage lies not merely in controlling what people know, but in influencing what they choose to investigate, what they dismiss, and whom they consider credible. In such circumstances, the government may conceal activities in plain sight not because no one is looking, but because public attention is directed elsewhere.

On the flip side, controlling public attention isn’t necessarily limited to keeping something hidden. Something can be out in the open and still go largely unnoticed. That’s the interesting thing about an open secret. Public attention can also undermine confidence in something already out in the open. It’s a weapon with many faces. And it doesn’t necessarily have to be our own government doing it. An outside adversary could exploit these same social and psychological dynamics, especially when the objective isn’t to conceal an activity but to make people question an institution’s legitimacy.

Consider the role organizations, including NGOs (non-governmental organizations) operating domestically, can play in shaping public opinion. Take the Overton window, for example. An idea that might initially be considered unacceptable can, through discussion, repetition, and exposure, gradually become acceptable. Kind of like when a radio station keeps playing a song you can’t stand, hoping that eventually you’ll come around, decide it isn’t so bad after all, and maybe even go out and buy a copy.

Now, once that idea becomes acceptable, you take it a step further. You do what Edward Bernays called crystallizing public opinion. You take those loose, shifting opinions and begin shaping them into something more solid and cohesive. In other words, first you make the idea acceptable. Then you crystallize that acceptance into something that becomes part of the prevailing public narrative. And eventually, questioning that narrative may carry its own social consequences.

That doesn’t mean these organizations are necessarily acting on behalf of an adversary. But it shows how public opinion can shift over time. Different actors, even without coordinating or knowing one another, can end up advancing similar objectives.

Now, take that idea beyond simply shaping public opinion. What happens when these same mechanisms are used to create distrust in the political process itself? Organizations, activists, and other political actors can influence public perceptions of institutions through their activities, statements, and legal challenges. When intimidation, misconduct, or deliberate obstruction enters the picture, the consequences can become far more serious.

Here’s the interesting part: you don’t necessarily have to change an election’s outcome to damage public confidence in it. Sometimes, convincing people the process is compromised is enough.

And that brings us to something particularly sensitive: our elections, and how an adversary might exploit public uncertainty to undermine confidence in them.

In a situation like that, the psychological objective could be more important than the technical attack itself.

For example, this doesn’t mean such an event will happen, or even that it’s particularly likely. It’s simply a hypothetical scenario worth considering.

Let’s say an attack aims to disrupt a nationwide election. The lights stay on. The internet works. Television stations continue broadcasting. Social media remains operational. However, conflicting election results, unexplained reporting delays, fabricated announcements, and rumors of compromised voting systems begin to circulate.

We’ve seen similar disruptions and controversies on a more localized scale. Now imagine the uncertainty spreading nationwide.

The objective wouldn’t necessarily be to prevent people from casting their votes. It could be to make people question whether their votes mattered in the first place. To some extent, we already see this kind of distrust today, but this hypothetical situation would take it considerably further. And that introduces a much more complicated strategic problem.

American elections are decentralized, with paper records, local election administration, audits, and established certification procedures. These safeguards let people verify election results without relying on electronic reporting systems.

But here’s the problem. You don’t necessarily have to compromise the electoral system itself to undermine public confidence in it.

Disrupt electronic reporting, and people will immediately question what happened and why. Even if the paper ballots remain legitimate and the counting procedures function exactly as intended, the mere disappearance of one familiar component can create suspicion. You’ve taken something off the table; you removed a food item off the tray, and that alone may be enough to spook people.

It reminds me of the Twilight Zone episode The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street. If anyone remembers that episode, the residents end up doing much of the destructive work themselves, driven by suspicion and fear, with little understanding of what’s actually happening.

And that’s where the psychological objective becomes more significant than the technical attack. Even with safeguards in place, disrupting one familiar component could be enough to cast doubt on the entire process in the public mind.

An adversary doesn’t necessarily have to destroy a functioning institution. It may be enough to convince people that the institution can no longer be trusted.

An institution can remain operational while becoming illegitimate in the eyes of the people it serves. But for how long? It might survive another 50 years, continuing to function through established laws, bureaucratic procedures, and institutional authority. However, over time, people may simply stop caring. They lose confidence, become indifferent, and eventually abandon their belief in the institution’s purpose. The institution remains intact, but its foundation slowly rots away.

Anger usually means people are still willing to fight for something they believe in, while apathy suggests they’ve stopped believing it’s worth saving. But people can move back and forth between the two, sometimes becoming angry enough to act, other times indifferent enough to do nothing. And that back-and-forth can create its own kind of chaos before things eventually settle. It reminds me of that familiar saying, “Out of chaos comes order,” often associated with Nietzsche. But here’s my question: what kind of order comes out of that chaos, and who ultimately benefits? Because order still looks like chaos in wait.

Without trust, there is no faith. Without faith, legitimacy erodes. And without legitimacy, an institution may continue to exist, but its authority becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

An institution doesn’t have to collapse to become irrelevant. It only has to outlive the people’s belief in its purpose.

REFERENCES:

1. Haines, Gerald K. (1997). “A Die-Hard Issue: CIA’s Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947–90.” Studies in Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/cia-role-study-UFOs.pdf

2. Mackinac Center for Public Policy. (n.d.). “The Overton Window.” Mackinac Center for Public Policy.
https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow

3. Bernays, Edward L. (1923). Crystallizing Public Opinion. New York: Boni and Liveright.
https://dn760102.eu.archive.org/0/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.1607/2015.1607.Crystallizing-Public-Opinion.pdf

4. Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). “The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street.” Wikipedia. Originally aired 4 March 1960; written by Rod Serling for The Twilight Zone.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Monsters_Are_Due_on_Maple_Street

Russia’s War of a Thousand Cuts

Introduction

Recently, I watched an interview with military analyst Michael Kofman, conducted by Perun, concerning Russia’s military evolution since 2022. The interview raised several interesting questions. These are my takes, not challenges to his assessment.

When observing Russian military operations in Ukraine, particularly through battlefield footage and maps such as DeepState, it is easy to conclude that Russia is suffering from resource constraints. Perhaps it is. But another possibility is worth considering. Russia may have considerably more resources than it is willing to commit, and what we are witnessing may not be a limitation in Russian military capability, but a deliberate economy-of-force approach.

There are several ways to examine this.

First, Russia may lack the resources to equip and sustain larger formations capable of fully conducting coordinated offensive maneuver. Second, Russia may possess those resources but lack the secure logistical system necessary to sustain such operations across the battlefield. Third, Russia may possess both capabilities but prefer to continue its present method of warfare because it serves a larger strategic purpose.

That purpose, I would suggest, is attrition, not merely military attrition, but political attrition as well.

What makes Russia’s present method of warfare interesting is the scale at which it conducts offensive operations. Rather than consistently employing battalion- or company-sized formations, Russian forces increasingly rely on small assault groups, sometimes consisting of only two or three soldiers.

At first glance, this may suggest an inability to concentrate forces. But does it?

When the economy of force is properly employed, it allows a commander to allocate the minimum necessary resources to secondary tasks while preserving greater combat power for the main effort. It works alongside the principle of mass, balancing risk, resources, and effectiveness across the battlefield.

If done without significantly compromising its own operations, it holds the cards in that respect. It can determine where to apply pressure, where to delay, where to deceive, and where to concentrate its supporting capabilities.

This is where operational fluidity becomes important.

Imagine multiple two-man assault teams operating across a broad front. Individually, they possess little combat power. Collectively, however, they may create numerous simultaneous problems for Ukrainian defenders.

Where are these teams operating? How far apart are they? What zones of responsibility are assigned to them? Are they independent infiltration teams, or are another ten or twenty teams following behind them?

A two-man team might seem insignificant until it becomes clear that reconnaissance drones, artillery, electronic warfare, and other strike capabilities support it.

The maneuver element may be small, but the supporting military apparatus is not.

In that sense, we could argue that Russia is dispersing its maneuver elements while concentrating its firepower and operational effects.

This creates something of a reciprocal relationship between economy of force and mass. Resources saved on secondary tasks can be concentrated elsewhere, while numerous localized actions may collectively produce operational effects far greater than their individual size suggests.

In other words, the micro becomes macro.

One often-overlooked factor is the length of training soldiers receive before entering combat, especially as both Russia and Ukraine struggle to replace experienced personnel.

Training periods are often too short, and the loss of experienced officers and NCOs creates another problem. Soldiers must learn on the fly, and on a battlefield like Ukraine, that can be deadly, assuming they survive long enough to learn anything.

Now consider a two-man assault team.

What happens when one man is killed?

The surviving soldier is now in charge. He must decide whether to advance, withdraw, hold his position, or wait for further instructions. He may have little training or experience, but the circumstances still demand a decision.

In that sense, battlefield initiative isn’t always developed through extensive training or a well-established command structure. Sometimes necessity imposes it.

This arrangement offers flexibility, but it comes at a cost. What one soldier sees as an opportunity, another might see as an unnecessary risk. Without experienced leadership, the outcome can depend heavily on an individual’s judgment.

This raises another interesting question about micromaneuvering. Are we witnessing a deliberate effort to decentralize tactical decision-making, or has the nature of small-unit warfare forced that responsibility onto soldiers who might otherwise never have been expected to exercise it?

Perhaps it is a little of both. There are no wrong orders.

The military may enter the war with a professional fighting force. But once the war ends, it’s left with volunteers and conscripts, who now become the new professional class. Period.

This brings me to what I consider the larger significance of micromaneuvering.

It reminds me of death by a thousand cuts.

If Russian forces can threaten multiple positions at once, Ukrainian commanders must decide which threats demand immediate attention and which they can contain.

This uncertainty shapes decisions.

Does a Ukrainian commander reinforce a threatened position? Does he commit reserves? Does he redirect artillery? Does he allocate additional drone operators to locate and destroy an infiltration team?

What happens if that infiltration team is only a diversion?

What happens if Ukrainian forces commit more resources than necessary and thereby weaken another sector?

Of course, Ukrainian commanders have considerable experience dealing with these small groups by now. They won’t necessarily overreact to every two-man team that appears.

But that is precisely where the larger supporting system matters.

A two-man team by itself may pose little danger. Twenty such teams, operating across several locations and supported by artillery, drones, and reconnaissance, present a different problem. Think of the game “Whac-A-Mole.”

The defender must continually assess what is happening, determine where the main effort exists, and respond accordingly.

This can strain command and control, logistics, reserves, and response times.

It also raises an important question about resource consumption. How much does Russia expend conducting these operations, and how much must Ukraine expend to counter them?

If Russia can consistently impose greater defensive costs than it incurs offensively, then its economy-of-force approach becomes especially significant.

The question is not simply how much territory Russia captures in a given day or week. It is what those operations are doing to Ukraine’s ability to sustain its defensive system over time.

This also brings us back to Russia’s industrial capacity.

When I previously argued that Russian industrial mobilization could prevent its army from being starved of munitions, I was considering the small scale of the assault formations being employed.

A two-man or four-man assault team does not have the same immediate logistical requirements as an entire mechanized battalion.

Granted, those teams may depend on considerable artillery and drone support, and those supporting systems consume resources of their own.

But the relationship between industrial production and the scale of force employment remains important.

Russia does not necessarily need to equip every formation for simultaneous large-scale offensive maneuver. It needs to sustain the formations actually conducting operations while maintaining the larger force supporting them.

This may help explain why Russia can continue applying pressure along an extensive front without committing its entire military establishment to large offensive operations.

However, this does not automatically mean Russia has unlimited resources or that every supporting formation is adequately supplied. Those are separate questions.

What interests me is whether Russia has deliberately organized its offensive operations around the resources it can sustain most effectively.

If so, does this arrangement also serve its larger political strategy?

Military attrition is only part of this argument.

The other part is political attrition.

Russia does not necessarily need to destroy the Ukrainian military outright if it can progressively exhaust the political and financial system sustaining Ukraine’s war effort.

This includes Ukraine, but also the European Union, NATO member states, and the United States.

Under this interpretation, the objective is to keep increasing the costs of continued resistance and external support.

Drain their coffers. Force governments to find additional funding. Create recurring financial obligations. Make supporting states repeatedly reconsider what they can provide, when they can provide it, and how long they can continue.

Europe has repeatedly shown it can finance Ukraine, whether through borrowing, budgetary mechanisms, or other arrangements. That demonstrates financial capacity and political commitment.

But neither guarantees assistance will arrive at the scale or pace needed to achieve Ukrainian military objectives.

Four variables matter most: speed, predictability, completeness, and political sustainability.

These are not merely financial considerations. They directly affect military planning.

A government might approve billions in assistance, but that does not necessarily mean Ukraine receives the equipment it needs when it needs it.

A promised weapon system does little good if it arrives after the operational circumstances that prompted the request have changed.

Likewise, uncertainty about future support complicates Ukraine’s ability to plan sustained military operations.

And behind all of this are the domestic political commitments of the supporting states.

Governments must balance foreign assistance against their own defense requirements, public services, economic problems, and the expectations of their populations.

The longer the conflict continues, the more often those competing priorities must be reconciled.

This is where financial strain can become political strain, and political strain can develop into internal political attrition.

Political attrition does not necessarily require elections or a change of government.

It can emerge through exhaustion.

A government may continue publicly supporting Ukraine while becoming increasingly reluctant to assume additional financial commitments or political risks.

Political leaders may begin questioning whether continued assistance can produce the desired outcome.

Institutions may remain intact while confidence in their decisions, commitments, and effectiveness gradually diminishes.

This is where the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back comes into play.

If enough political and financial strain accumulates, governments may become more willing to pursue a negotiated settlement simply because the costs of continuing the war have become increasingly difficult to sustain.

That does not guarantee a rapid peace. Political exhaustion may encourage negotiations without resolving the underlying disagreements between Russia and Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the strategic possibility remains.

Russia might seek to achieve through political attrition what it has been unable to achieve through decisive large-scale military maneuver.

And that brings us back to the battlefield.

If Russia’s objective is to exhaust Ukraine and its supporting states politically, then micromaneuvering may be more than an adaptation to battlefield conditions.

It may be an operational method suited to a strategy of prolonged attrition.

Small assault teams maintain pressure. Reconnaissance and firepower disrupt Ukrainian defenses. Localized advances force continued military responses. Ukraine expends personnel, equipment, and ammunition. Its external supporters must repeatedly provide additional assistance.

That process creates recurring military, economic, and political demands.

Whether Russia can sustain those demands more effectively than Ukraine and its supporters remains a separate question. Attrition cuts both ways, and Russia also pays a high price.

Nevertheless, the strategic logic is worth considering.

Perhaps Russia’s present method of warfare is not simply the consequence of an inability to conduct larger offensive operations. It may reflect a deliberate decision to preserve flexibility, avoid overcommitment, and maintain pressure until political circumstances become more favorable.

Or perhaps it reflects both military limitations and strategic preference.

That distinction matters because it changes how we interpret Russian operations.

The absence of large-scale maneuver does not necessarily mean the absence of operational purpose.

Nor does the slow accumulation of territorial gains necessarily mean those gains are the primary objective.

The ultimate objective may be to exhaust the political will and institutional capacity sustaining the enemy’s resistance.

And if that is the case, then micromaneuvering, economy of force, industrial production, and political attrition are not separate features of Russia’s war. Rather, they are interconnected, compartmentalized elements of a broader strategy designed to exhaust Ukraine militarily, economically, and politically, while simultaneously placing increasing financial and political pressure on the nations supporting it.

The Evolution of the Russian Military – Its Strengths and Shortfalls in 2026 (With Michael Kofman)

The Stalin-Putin Parallel: The War of Attrition as Strategy both Militarily and Politically

Find, Fix, and Maneuver

DRG

Military Failure, the Need for Innovation, and the Day After

Neo-Deep Battle Fires: How Artillery and Drones Are Rewriting Depth Warfare

The Day After: The Peace No One Is Prepared For

The Eagle May Have Fleas: Military Leaders Warn Hegseth Against Extending Iran War Operations

The Washington Post recently published an article titled “Military leaders warn Hegseth against extending Iran war operations,” based on what appears to be leaked internal military reporting. The article is interesting, but the bigger issue is what it reveals: the longer the Iran conflict continues, the more the United States must draw from the same limited pool of ships, aircraft, air defenses, munitions, and personnel needed elsewhere. Links to the reporting are provided at the bottom of the page.

The leak sends a clear message to U.S. adversaries. Sustained pressure is producing measurable strain. The message they may take is simple: keep doing what you are doing, because the longer this continues, the more it drains the U.S. military.

The central problem with this article isn’t the article itself, but what’s going on. The first issue is that one can argue CENTCOM is eating the global reserve. As indicated, the United States has kept more than 50,000 personnel in the Middle East available for the Iran conflict, with some deployments being extended through September and others apparently into 2027. At the same time, it has pulled ships, surveillance assets, air defenses, and munitions from other theaters.

This comes down to the requirements of the Iran operation versus the available global military capacity. Now, when you combine the two and consider that after six months the problem becomes cumulative, it isn’t simply the number of ships or aircraft physically present in CENTCOM on a given day. It is deferred maintenance, crews held beyond normal deployment cycles, as we’ve seen with the USS Lincoln, disrupted training cycles, declining ammunition inventories, replacement units committed earlier than planned, and other combatant commanders losing their contingency forces. In other words, to strengthen one force, you have to weaken other forces. Too much for too long does matter.

The most significant part of the article is probably the strain now being placed on the Navy. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle reportedly told Hegseth that the Navy warned that maintaining the current operational commitment without a defined endpoint was unsustainable, especially because there’s no known termination point for the Iran operation. The admiral’s job is to define the military risk, not necessarily the political end state. If the mission is A, B, C, and D, then his responsibility is to explain what A, B, C, and D will cost the Navy and whether his force can sustain them. His concern is the force under his responsibility. He may not be privy to every larger political calculation, strategic purpose, or evolving objective being formulated, revised, or reconsidered in Washington. On top of that, The Washington Post says only one quarter of the destroyer fleet is currently ready to deploy. That doesn’t mean three-quarters of American destroyers are broken. Ships rotate through deployment, post-deployment, maintenance workup, certification, deployment, rinse and repeat. However, if you repeatedly extend ships or accelerate replacements, yes, you begin cannibalizing the future force to sustain the present force. Once again, it comes back down to: to strengthen one force, you’ve got to weaken another somewhere else. So overall, you get something very similar to operational overstretch through time rather than simply through geography. That’s the major distinction. The United States can certainly mass naval power against Iran. However, the question becomes, how long can it maintain that concentration without seriously reducing its ability to mass elsewhere?

Of all this, INDOPACOM is probably the most strategically important concern. Adm. Samuel Paparo reportedly objected to continuing to provide an aircraft carrier strike group and destroyers from the Pacific. The Washington Post does note that the Navy’s dedicated Pacific carrier was moved toward the Middle East to relieve another carrier that had already been deployed for more than 300 days. This is where Iran becomes much larger than Iran. From a Chinese perspective, the question isn’t whether the United States can defeat Iran. Of course it possesses a vastly greater military power. The relevant question, or the question that should be asked, is how much American combat power is tied down in the Gulf if a crisis begins in the Western Pacific? That is the opportunity cost problem. Iran doesn’t necessarily have to destroy American military power. It can absorb American military availability. The larger strategic effect becomes cross-theater reallocation: the United States grows stronger in one theater while accepting greater exposure in another.

This brings us to EUCOM, which has the same problem, particularly regarding missile defense. European Command reportedly warned that transferring naval and surveillance assets to CENTCOM is degrading its ability to carry out its own responsibilities. That becomes especially consequential because Iran has forced the United States to expend expensive defensive munitions. The article specifically identifies pressure on Patriot interceptors, THAAD interceptors, and Tomahawks, and states that roughly 25 percent of the Pentagon’s Reaper drone fleet has been lost during the conflict. The Patriot/THAAD issue may actually be more strategically important than losing aircraft or ships. The reason is that Iranian ballistic missiles force the United States into an unfavorable exchange where relatively cheap offensive missiles may require very expensive and relatively scarce interceptors. Those same interceptor inventories matter for Europe against Russia, Israel in the Middle East against Iran, and U.S. territories, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the Pacific in the event of a war with China, as well as for U.S. bases supporting homeland and regional defense. Every theater begins competing for ammunition.

One could make the argument now that Iran appears to have created an attritional problem without defeating the United States conventionally. This deserves emphasis. Iran does not need to beat the United States Navy or shoot down the U.S. Air Force. It doesn’t even necessarily need to close the Strait of Hormuz permanently. If Tehran can repeatedly generate threats requiring the United States to maintain carrier groups, destroyers, air defense batteries, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), aircraft, troops, interceptors, etc., then Iran is imposing continuous readiness costs by slowly draining the United States. The conflict’s character has changed. What began as a high-intensity strike campaign is evolving into something more like: strike, Iranian retaliation, defensive reinforcement, maritime enforcement, prolonged deployment, replenishment/maintenance costs, reduced global readiness, etc. Kinetic intensity can decline while strategic costs keep mounting. In other words, endurance and resilience matter more than raw power or initial aggression.

One interesting part of the article is the 82nd Airborne detail. It says about 2,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne mobilized for the war, and according to the article, elements of the division could now remain deployed for a year. Patriot units may receive extensions as well. The Post calls those airborne troops potentially central to any invasion. I don’t know if I’d interpret their presence as evidence that an invasion is imminent. I’d interpret it more as a contingency force held because Washington cannot eliminate the possibility of ground escalation. Whether the ground invasion is real or not, the option must be available. Washington must keep the option available, and it must also make a potential invasion believable to Iran. That creates another burden. Forces reserved for one option become unavailable for other operations, home or abroad, even if that option is never exercised. That’s important strategically. A reserve tied down by contingency planning is still tied down. On the flip side, though, it creates the illusion of the possible.

Now, this doesn’t mean the United States military is running out of weapons. That’s an interpretation to take with a grain of salt. Yes, the Pentagon disputes reports that it faces ammunition shortages, and there is an enormous difference between “we have no missiles left” and “continued expenditure is pushing inventories below levels commanders consider prudent for other war plans.” The article is describing the second problem. Military planning doesn’t wait until magazines are empty before declaring risk. INDOPACOM might say it technically still has enough interceptors to fight, while also saying it no longer has enough to execute its Taiwan contingency plan with the confidence level it considers acceptable. Both things can be true, by the way.

The real danger is strategic concurrency. This is where the story becomes larger than Iran itself. The United States is balancing several potential theaters simultaneously: Iran/the Middle East, Russia/Europe, China/the Western Pacific, and homeland defense. The Iran operation draws on assets that aren’t easy to duplicate. Destroyers are especially important because the same ships can provide air defense, missile defense, Tomahawk strike, escort, ASW (anti-submarine warfare), surveillance, and maritime security. But you can’t manufacture another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer next Thursday, because CENTCOM wants one. Likewise, you cannot rapidly regenerate experienced crews, Patriot batteries, THAAD interceptors, or carrier availability. All this takes time to replenish, train, retrain, etc. So the limiting factor isn’t total American military power. It is simultaneously available military power. That’s a much more meaningful measure. And then something happened yesterday that makes the report even more important. The warning contained in the 14 August document predates the latest renewed exchange. On 30 August, U.S. forces struck Iranian missile launchers on Larak Island after CENTCOM said Iranian forces were preparing a threat involving sea mines. Iran then retaliated with ballistic missiles against U.S. forces in Jordan. So the military was reportedly warned: don’t let this become an indefinite force commitment. Two weeks later, the conflict sparked another exchange. That showed exactly why commanders worry about an open-ended commitment. Even during periods of reduced fighting, the force posture cannot easily disappear because Iran retains the ability to regenerate a crisis. Across the many articles I’ve already written on this conflict, it fits into my earlier analysis and strengthens something I’ve been circling for months. The war has moved from destruction of Iranian capabilities toward a struggle over whose system absorbs prolonged pressure better. Iran has suffered greater physical destruction, but Tehran doesn’t have to achieve military parity. Iran’s strategic opportunity is to make Washington continuously expend resources to maintain the situation it created.

The current phase could be summed up as follows: The United States and Israel achieved the initial military advantage and degraded much of Iran’s conventional capability. Iran then adapted by dispersing, absorbing punishment, and relying more heavily on asymmetric retaliation. This forced the United States to maintain a large regional presence around the Strait of Hormuz. As deployments extend, maintenance demands rise, munitions inventories tighten, and readiness pressures accumulate. The battlefield may remain centered on Iran, but the strategic risk increasingly migrates outward into Europe and the Pacific.

Overall, overextension describes the symptom. Strategic concurrency describes the system producing it. In other words, it means you are fighting a multi-front war with a single pool of forces.

Links

The Washington Post — “Military leaders warn Hegseth against extending Iran war operations”

The Guardian — “Pentagon plays down report of Hegseth regularly overruling military advice”

Just the News — Pentagon response to the report

The Jerusalem Post — U.S. military chiefs warn Iran war is eroding readiness

Times of Israel — U.S. military warns prolonged Iran campaign could affect other theaters

IranWire — “U.S. Military Commanders Warn of Attrition in Iran War”

The Decapitation Carousel of Iran

Strategic decapitation doesn’t automatically produce political moderation or collapse. You’d be a fool to believe this. In some cases it does, but in others it doesn’t. Sometimes it makes it harder for a regime to survive; other times, the surviving regime becomes less suspicious and more willing to compromise. It’s a balancing act, usually on their end, since they’re the receiving end of all the violence. Now, Washington can say what it wants. They make the argument: we tried negotiation, and they attacked us anyway. Well, it works both ways, and there’s political logic to it.

The strategic importance is that the United States and Israel may have altered the Iranian regime without replacing it. However, that’s different from regime change. One could argue that it was an involuntary internal political selection process, destroying parts of one elite configuration and thereby increasing the relative power of another. Basically, put the entire country under new management until you get the right management to run it. I think the important part is that Iran is not the Islamic Republic we knew, but something else. The decapitation carousel appears to be transforming Iran into something far more radical: a harder authoritarian system in which the internal balance has shifted further toward the security establishment.

So when you break it down, if you look at the strategic logic in all this, yes, you can destroy the command structures, the missile infrastructure, the nuclear infrastructure, political leadership, and its economic capacity, and still fail to eliminate the enemy’s ability to impose costs. It’s a tit-for-tat game. What it really is, though, is a war of the fleas.

This intersects with something I’ve discussed in previous articles: physical destruction becomes functional destruction only when the destroyed physical system can no longer perform its function. Killing commanders is physical destruction. Destroying missile launchers is physical destruction. But if replacement commanders assume control, those dispersed systems will continue operating. Proxies will remain in place, waiting for further notice, and Iran can switch to other means of coercion. Then you’ve destroyed components without necessarily destroying the broader strategic function.

That’s the biggest issue. The campaign has been extremely successful in terms of physical destruction, including much of Iran’s military and civilian infrastructure. But it’s incomplete strategically in terms of political conversion. Washington may have destroyed much of Iran’s previous military-political architecture without creating the political conditions necessary to produce the behavior Washington wants.

One of the biggest things people forget in the minutiae of war and politics is this: never confuse removing people with removing the system, and never confuse destroying capability with achieving the political outcome that destruction was meant to produce. Overall, wrecking Iran is easier than determining what political and strategic system occupies the wreckage afterward. It’s always about the day after.

The Phantom Invasion of Iran?

Countryside Looking toward Iranian Border – Outside Halabja – Kurdistan

Iran’s greatest weakness may have been the static posture it maintained while its external defense in depth was progressively dismantled. However, that comes with a caveat.

(See my article What Would War with Iran Look Like?

Its regional network through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon had once resembled a modern strategic ribat, extending Iran’s defensive frontier outward and pushing the battlefield away from Iranian territory. When that network weakened, Tehran remained dependent upon fixed facilities, such as established command structures, hardened positions, and long-range retaliation. This allowed its enemies to determine the tempo and sequence of the war.

That does not mean Iran would remain static if foreign troops entered the country. This is where my caveat comes in. Because a ground invasion would likely activate a different form of defense in depth, Iran could fall back through mountains, cities, and tunnels. This, in turn, could help preserve and fortify its internal-security networks, militias, and other irregular or conventional units. The Iranian state appears suppressed under aerial attack for the time being and likely will be for the foreseeable future. The question, and the concern, is whether, if boots were to hit the ground, Iran would shift from a static defense to a mobile defense in depth.

However, the greatest danger to Tehran may not come from American troops advancing directly toward the capital. Rather, it may come from the interaction between external pressure and internal fragmentation. Kurdish forces and other opposition groups could create disturbances along the periphery, forcing the government to divide its forces and attention. However, Iranian command would know better than to venture out en masse to confront a much smaller enemy. The reason for this is that it would expose Iranian forces to U.S. fighters, drones, bombers, and missiles. More consequentially, factions within the Iranian military, bureaucracy, and political establishment could decide that the survival of the present regime no longer coincides with their own survival. In other words, the regime may lose the faith of the very institutions expected to defend it.

Such internal fragmentation could arise by Iran’s own hand or be encouraged through outside assistance. Understand that foreign black-operations personnel may already be operating inside Iran, supported by a much larger clandestine intelligence system working through the country’s institutions, commercial networks, political factions, and administrative structures. Yet the bureaucracy does not end with the institution. Every person encountered represents a bureaucracy of his own. What do I mean by that? Each person has a network of loyalties, ambitions, grievances, fears, obligations, and personal relationships waiting to be understood and, where possible, exploited.

As for the American presence, it is almost phantom-like. It surrounds Iran without presenting a single conventional army for Iran to confront. It appears through air, sea, and cyber, causing sudden destruction against selected targets. Its physical body remains largely outside Iran, while its effects are felt inside the country. It is not merely a phantom, but a deadly phantom: difficult to locate, difficult to engage, and capable of reaching deep into a state that cannot strike it with equal precision.

The strategic purpose of such a presence is not necessarily to conquer Iran from the outside, but to create the conditions under which Iran begins to conquer itself from within. External attacks weaken the connections holding the state together, peripheral factions generate movement, and political uncertainty forces every component of the system to reconsider where its loyalty and survival truly lie. The decisive moment would arrive not when American troops entered Tehran, but when Tehran could no longer be certain which Iranian forces would defend it.

The broader objective is to cripple Iran. The operational apparatus presently employed is largely air, sea, and cyber. A land campaign may eventually follow, but even the possibility of one can serve as a weapon in itself. The threat of American forces entering the country, combined with Kurdish activity and other pressures along the borders, could force Tehran to look in several directions at once while confronting no single conventional invasion force. In other words, Tehran could be forced to defend against deliberately exaggerated or ambiguous armies that might appear.

While Tehran searches for the physical body of the invasion, the United States can continue striking the systems that serve as the regime’s eyes and ears and enable it to defend itself.

Therefore, a land invasion does not have to occur to produce operational effects. Its possibility alone can compel and expose movement, divide attention, and deepen uncertainty. Iran is forced to defend against something that remains largely absent while absorbing punishment from capabilities that are already present. The phantom is not simply the American force itself, but the invasion that Iran must continually anticipate without knowing whether, where, or when it will materialize.

China’s Closing Window and the Thucydides Trap in Reverse

Ever since the start of the U.S.-Iran war, or conflict, however one wants to describe it, the situation has placed a tremendous amount of pressure on China. That pressure comes from several directions: tariffs, technological restrictions, energy insecurity involving oil and other resources, and declining access to certain markets.

Because of that, I have started reconsidering the usual way we discuss the Thucydides Trap, or at least the way it is commonly presented.

Now, in no way, shape, or form am I saying that the Thucydides Trap is wrong. The trap is still the trap. I am simply looking at it from a slightly different direction, which I will explain in a moment.

The danger may not come only from an established power fearing the rise of a challenger. That fear may also come from the challenger itself. China’s fear may not simply be that it cannot keep up with the United States. It may be that its own rise is slowing, which in turn creates the impression that its strategic window is closing. If that happens, then its opportunity to achieve its objectives, whatever those objectives may be, could begin to disappear.

Professor Graham Allison uses the term Thucydides Trap to describe the increased likelihood of war when a rising power, such as China, threatens to displace an established power, such as the United States.

However, I personally see it somewhat in reverse—or, rather, as a reversed Thucydides Trap. Frankly, it is still a Thucydides Trap regardless, but the reversal identifies which side of the power transition feels the greatest urgency.

The classic formula is that a rising power threatens an established power, and the resulting fear makes war more likely. However, both sides can experience different versions of the same trap. The established power fears displacement and may act before the challenger becomes unbeatable. At the same time, the rising power may fear that its rise is stalling or reversing and act before its best opportunity disappears.

Those pressures can operate simultaneously. The United States may fear that China will become too powerful if left unchecked. China, however, may fear that containment, tariffs, energy vulnerability, demographic problems, technological restrictions, and other pressures will prevent it from ever reaching its strategic objectives.

Each side interprets delay differently, but dangerously. Washington may believe that waiting strengthens China. Beijing may believe that waiting weakens China.

This is not really a separate trap moving backward. It is the same competitive mechanism closing from different directions.

Another way of putting it is that the Thucydides Trap in reverse occurs when a rising power, such as China, fears that its rise is stalling, its strategic window is closing, and delay will leave it permanently weaker. Instead of war emerging only because an established power fears being overtaken, conflict may also arise when the challenger fears it may never achieve its objectives or realize its true potential. It therefore believes it must act to defend its position before that position deteriorates any further.

In that sense, the trap is reciprocal: the established power fears the challenger’s continued rise, while the challenger fears that its own rise may be arrested before it can achieve its objectives.

In a nutshell: The United States fears the China of tomorrow. China fears it may never reach tomorrow.

Further Reading

China’s oil imports plunge 40 percent, keeping a lid on energy prices

China refineries seek less fuel oil as they opt for cheaper crude, sources say

China’s Crude Imports Plunge to Lowest in Nearly a Decade

Interpositive Warfare

In war, an action can accomplish its immediate purpose while simultaneously altering the surrounding environment in ways that strengthen, weaken, reverse, or transform the original success.

Take counterinsurgency, or COIN, as an example. The United States employed COIN extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its immediate purpose was often to secure territory and protect the population from insurgent activity. In the process, forces gathered intelligence, identified and removed insurgents, and attempted to build relationships with local communities. One operation could accomplish all of these objectives and therefore appear successful.

However, that same operation could also generate resentment, dependency, political distortion, and further resistance. Resentment could arise simply because foreign forces were present, regardless of whether they intended to protect the population. Local groups that allied with those forces could also become dependent on their protection, money, intelligence, or logistical support. Once that happened, they might struggle to operate or maintain their political position without outside assistance.

This dependency could then produce political distortion. Alliances were fragile. A tribe might cooperate with American forces against one enemy while remaining hostile toward another tribe that was also cooperating with them. A local ally could therefore become connected to a network of rivalries and obligations that extended well beyond the immediate operation. The question was no longer simply who supported the counterinsurgency effort, but why they supported it, whom they opposed, and what they expected to gain.

Over time, these relationships could generate further resistance. While American forces might not initially feel the brunt of that resistance, it could eventually turn against them. It might begin as an intertribal conflict, in which support for one group could indirectly alienate another, turning a local rivalry into resistance against the outside force itself. An operation might secure an area, remove insurgents, and protect part of the population while simultaneously remodeling the surrounding environment in ways that create new enemies, strengthen old rivalries, or transform the original success. Successful distortion is risky.

An interpositive is a positive image printed directly from the original camera negative. In simple terms, the original image is reproduced as a copy. That copy resembles the original, but it is no longer the original itself.

Defining Interpositive Warfare

Warfare comes from human decisions. Humans interpret, implement, manipulate, and respond to everything involved. Technology does not choose its objective; humans determine its purpose and how it will be used. Terrain does not formulate strategy, but it can redirect human action. Institutions are also made up of people making decisions, and those decisions shape what happens next.

Interpositive warfare shares a basic premise with praxeology: war begins with purposeful human action. The difference is that interpositive warfare is concerned not only with the intention behind an action, but with what happens after that action passes through human relationships, political institutions, and the wider environment of war. Along the way, the original intention is filtered and transformed.

Effects Are Recursive

A response not only changes the conditions under which the next action is planned and understood, but may also manipulate them. The process is not merely a linear exchange of action and reaction. Instead, it frequently returns to the past, reinterprets it through the present, and carries that altered understanding into the future.

In a linear model, action produces reaction, and the past provides a fixed baseline. In a recursive model, action and reaction form a continuing loop. The event remains fixed in the past, but its meaning changes as actors reinterpret it. Control therefore produces not only an intended result but also an emergent transformation that shapes what follows.

Success Can Produce Its Own Negation

An action may succeed according to its immediate measurement while producing consequences that weaken the larger objective. A tactical success can create operational difficulties. An operational success can produce strategic failure. Political success can also create future military liabilities.

Effects Can Be Delayed or Indirect

As for effects, they may return through memory, resentment, institutional behavior, doctrine, ideological change, economic dependency or lack thereof, and technological adaptation. While some of these may not appear in the current generation, they may appear in the next. In either case, the original action need not produce an immediate or direct response. It may simply nudge events in a particular direction, leaving later actors to carry the effect forward without recognizing where it began.

Actors Transform and Reposition Relationships

Whether it is soldiers, commanders, civilians, government workers, media organizations, allies, enemies, or institutions, they do not merely react; they interpret, transform, and retransmit effects. Think of it this way: improvise, adapt, and overcome.

Lastly, there are relationships. An action changes not only the actors involved but also the relationships among them. Once again, think of praxeology, the study of human action. Every interaction produces a response, which then produces another. The result is a chain reaction. Watch people moving through a crowded mall, constantly adjusting their paths to avoid colliding with one another. Each person’s movement causes others to reposition themselves.

Warfare operates in much the same manner. Allies may become less dependable. Populations may become hostile. Who needs conspiracies when you have bureaucracies growing defensive? Meanwhile, enemies may adapt in unexpected directions. Every action repositions the relationships surrounding it, changing how the actors respond to one another and what they may do next.

Multi-Domain and Systems Models

Land, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, physical, informational, and human categories remain useful for organization, planning, and analysis. The problem begins when these analytical categories are treated as independent parts of reality.

Multi-domain models generally show effects moving across or between domains. Interpositive warfare asks how those exchanges transform the actors, relationships, institutions, and boundaries through which later action must pass. The boxes do not merely exchange effects. The boxes themselves, and the people who operate through them, are altered by the exchange.

Think of the Columbian Exchange. It did not simply transfer people, goods, diseases, and ideas between otherwise unchanged worlds; it transformed the worlds involved.

Linear and Geometric Assumptions

A diagram captures the structure of a particular moment, but it cannot represent the transformation that follows. Interpositive warfare focuses on the organized chaos beyond the diagram: one action creates a vacancy, the opening passes through intermediaries, and the entire field rearranges itself—rather like a line of hermit crabs exchanging shells.

Distinctions from Existing Concepts

Interpositive warfare overlaps with many concepts, but it is not identical to any of them. Its purpose is not to replace established military theories, but to identify a particular feature of war. That feature is the study of human action and the institutions through which it operates, both on and off the battlefield.

Second- and Third-Order Effects

Second- and third-order effects describe consequences that extend beyond the immediate result of an action. A tactical decision may produce a cascade of operational, strategic, political, or social consequences that were neither intended nor immediately visible. In other words, blowback.

Interpositive warfare is built for these consequences but places greater emphasis on the process through which they emerge. The issue is not merely that one action causes another effect later. Instead, the action passes through intermediaries that interpret, redirect, delay, strengthen, weaken, or transform it, sometimes making it stronger while causing it to appear weaker. Intermediaries also change in the process. The result is not merely a chain of consequences, but a continuing alteration of the environment through which future history must pass.

Feedback, Complexity, and Friction

Feedback and complexity explain how actions produce responses that alter the conditions of later action. Clausewitzian friction explains how the human element disrupts intention.

Interpositive warfare shares these concerns but focuses on the reproduction of action in altered form. Friction may obstruct an action, and feedback may return information or consequences to the original actor. Interpositive warfare asks what the action becomes after it has passed through the wider field of war. In doing so, it may return in a misinterpreted form or even work against the purpose for which it was originally produced.

Praxeology

Praxeology begins with purposeful human action. Human beings choose objectives, employ means, and interpret circumstances, all in pursuit of a preferred outcome. Warfare likewise begins with human decisions, even when those decisions operate through various institutions.

Interpositive warfare begins with the same premise but extends the action beyond its original intent. Once purposeful action enters war, it passes through other human beings and the institutions they represent. Along the way, it is filtered, bottled, and transformed. Praxeology explains why the action begins; interpositive warfare examines what that action becomes after it enters a conflict, reshapes the surrounding conditions, and influences what happens next.

Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan

Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offers a clear example of self-negating success. In theory, COIN seeks to protect the population, secure territory, and win the confidence of local communities rather than simply destroy the enemy. It also attempts to address the political, economic, and social grievances that sustain insurgent movements, including poverty, corruption, weak infrastructure, and the absence of legitimate government.

COIN also depends heavily on intelligence. The more trust military forces establish with the population, the more information they hope to gather. That information helps identify insurgents, map relationships, and build case-by-case dossiers on individuals and networks. In the long term, the goal is to leave behind a legitimate and self-sustaining host-nation government capable of maintaining security without foreign assistance.

On paper, these are obvious strengths. In practice, however, they also reveal the doctrine’s self-negating character. COIN is extremely resource-intensive. It requires large numbers of personnel, money, and time, as well as repeated deployments. The longer forces remain, the more vulnerable they become to ambushes, IEDs (improvised explosive devices), and other forms of asymmetric attack. What begins as counterinsurgency can gradually expand into nation-building, creating an open-ended mission funded by outside taxpayers and carried out in a political environment that may never have possessed a strong sense of national unity to begin with.

A prolonged focus on COIN can also erode conventional military readiness. A force that spends years preparing for patrols, population security, intelligence collection, and small-unit engagements may become highly experienced in one form of warfare while allowing other capabilities to weaken.

The greatest difficulty, however, lies in human loyalty. Loyalties shift. Local actors may cooperate because the money is right, because one rival poses a greater threat, or because foreign support temporarily strengthens their position. That relationship may change as soon as another tribe, militia, political faction, foreign government, or outside economic interest enters the picture. An ally in one situation may become an obstacle in another. Trust remains conditional, and intelligence gathered through those relationships may be incomplete, manipulated, or directed against local rivals.

Counterinsurgency could therefore succeed tactically while undermining itself strategically. American forces won engagement after engagement, secured territory, removed insurgents, and often built enough trust to gain intelligence and local cooperation. In that immediate sense, COIN worked.

The strategic problem was that the groups involved were not unified in any meaningful way. In many areas, the real political units were tribes, militias, religious factions, local power brokers, and patronage networks. American forces were trying to win their support, but these groups were also competing among themselves for money, influence, protection, and position. The United States became another actor within the same field of rivalries rather than a power standing above it.

Winning the hearts and minds of one tribe did not necessarily strengthen the larger political order. It could weaken another tribe, deepen an existing rivalry, or make one group dependent on American protection. There was no true unifying apparatus capable of turning these separate tactical relationships into a lasting national settlement. COIN could therefore create local success without producing strategic unity.

This leads to COIN’s central weakness: the absence of a clearly defined end state. What does victory look like? How much stability is enough? When does a host-nation government become self-sustaining? At what point does the foreign force leave without undoing the gains it helped create? Without clear answers, tactical and operational success can continue indefinitely while strategic success remains undefined and elusive.

COIN could therefore protect populations, remove insurgents, gather intelligence, and secure territory while simultaneously creating dependency, weakening conventional readiness, distorting local politics, and extending the mission without a measurable end. Its successes were real, but they often altered the environment in ways that made those successes difficult to preserve. In that sense, counterinsurgency became a self-negating success.

Inside the Box of Mirrors

A tactic is never static. It exists inside a box of mirrors, multiplied, distorted, and reinterpreted by every observer. The box represents the operational environment. Its six faces represent six primary sides that refract the tactic: enemy forces, allied partners, command structures, institutional logistics, populations within the domain, and the physical and cultural terrain itself. These six faces are illustrative rather than fixed. Depending on the conflict, there may be many more.

Each reflection differs because perspective warps it. A flanking maneuver may appear to the enemy as a vulnerability, to an ally as resolve, to commanders as data, and to populations as a narrative. When the tactic is executed, adapted, or redirected, every reflection changes with it. There is no isolated action.

The Negative–Interpositive Cycle

The photographic analogy of the negative and interpositive beautifully captures how one effect becomes the source of the next. The original negative is the intent: the plan as conceived. The interpositive is the first-order effect, or how reality develops the image through human action, interpretation, and Clausewitzian friction.

The interpositive then becomes the new negative. The altered reality—enemy adaptations, unintended consequences, alliances, and fractures—becomes the baseline for the next cycle. Each iteration inverts and evolves the tactic. What begins as deception may harden into a predictable pattern if it is not refreshed. What once looked like strength may reveal fragility under a different light.

This is why rigid doctrines fail and why truly effective operators treat every success as a potential trap. The environment has already begun adapting to yesterday’s move.

Adaptation, Deception, and Predictability

In warfare and beyond, this dynamic helps explain several enduring principles. Take the OODA loop developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd (observe, orient, decide, act): observe the reflections, orient to their distortions, decide when and how to turn, act, and immediately begin the next loop before the enemy’s reflections stabilize.

Reflexive control deliberately shapes what the mirrors show the adversary so that the adversary’s reflected decisions serve one’s intent. Emergent strategy operates through a similar process. Real plans are not simply executed from the top down; they coevolve with the reflections that conflict produces.

The best commanders do not merely impose a plan. They design systems that learn from inside the box of mirrors faster than their opponents do. Entropy and surprise are useful only for a short time because repeated tactics lose their contrast. The box becomes familiar. New light, such as novelty, deception, and tempo, must be introduced before the reflections flatten into predictability.

Tactical Reproduction

At the tactical level, a single action—an ambush, feint, or drone strike—does not merely succeed or fail. It alters local conditions: enemy morale, alertness, ammunition stocks, small-unit trust, terrain usability, electromagnetic signatures, and civilian perceptions.

The result becomes a new negative. Tomorrow’s patrol operates in the world that today’s action helped create. Even inaction reproduces the same dynamic. Hesitation becomes data that the enemy develops into the next interpositive.

A battle does more than produce a result. It reproduces the actors who must fight the next battle. Enemy soldiers learn. Allied forces form new expectations. Commanders revise their judgments. Populations assign new meanings to what they have witnessed. The tactic survives not as an unchanged event, but as a series of altered interpretations carried forward by everyone involved.

Operational Reproduction

At the operational level, the mirrors multiply. An operation—a campaign phase, major offensive, or sustained air interdiction effort—reshapes force ratios, logistical nodes, command relationships, intelligence advantages, and political will. It changes what future operations can accomplish and what courses of action remain possible.

A successful breakthrough may advance too far without secure flanks, creating a vulnerable salient while also establishing a new base for further action. A deliberate withdrawal may cede ground but preserve forces, restore operational tempo, or strengthen political cohesion.

In either case, the altered battlefield, alliance dynamics, and resource picture become the fresh negative. Future operational art must develop from this plate rather than from the original plan. The operation that follows does not begin where the previous one began. It begins inside the environment that the previous operation helped manufacture.

Strategic Reproduction

Strategy is the highest-order darkroom. It does not merely win battles or campaigns; it redefines the war itself. Every strategic choice—forming alliances, imposing economic sanctions, conducting information campaigns, or changing war aims—reconfigures the enemy’s options, the home front’s endurance, third-party involvement, and even the conflict’s moral and legal framing.

The interpositive of one strategic decision becomes the negative for the next. Expanding war aims after early victories, for example, may make later restraint or de-escalation more difficult. A strategy of attrition, as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian war, may exhaust the enemy while also exhausting one’s own military and society, altering the political terrain upon which any negotiated settlement must eventually rest.

The introduction of new domains, including cyberspace and economic warfare, changes the purpose and character of the conflict. At this level, recursion can become self-referential. Strategy begins to reproduce the nature of the war, which in turn reshapes strategy. Wars begun for limited objectives may metastasize into existential struggles, or existential struggles may eventually contract into limited settlements. The means shape the ends, and the ends reshape the means.

The Recursive Loop

Tactics alter conditions and create the basis for new operations. Operations alter the conditions from which new strategies emerge. Strategies alter the conditions for a different war or for a different peace. Each level is both produced by and productive of the levels above and below it.

This is why linear planning eventually collapses. Effective practitioners treat every outcome as provisional source material rather than final validation and design for adaptability across tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Victory belongs less to the side with the best initial negative than to the side that masters the repeated development process: the side that sees the reflections clearly, turns at the right moment, and develops cleaner, more useful interpositives faster than its opponent.

War is often planned and analyzed in terms of action and reaction. Objectives are identified, forces are assigned, and operations are conducted. As for success and failure, well, those are measured through the outcome. Yet war does not remain still, nor do its conditions remain stable long enough for this process to unfold exactly as intended. Every reaction changes the actors, their relationships, the institutions they represent, and the conditions through which later action must pass.

Interpositive warfare does not promise control over this process, nor does it offer a formula for predicting every consequence. Human action cannot be predicted with certainty. Its value lies in recognizing that action and environment cannot be separated; that is its strongest suit. The battlefield is not simply the place where war occurs. It is continually reproduced by the people acting within it.

Humans are interpositives: 360-degree transparent images of time and space, drawn inward toward a center that looks back from every direction. Conflict lives in a geometric box of mirrors that never sits still.

The Battlefield Was Alive: War of the Worlds and Technological Overreach

Intro

Most of us know War of the Worlds primarily through film, whether it is Byron Haskin’s 1953 version or Steven Spielberg’s 2005 adaptation, though both ultimately trace back to H. G. Wells’s 1898 novel of the same title. After recently watching the 1953 version and revisiting Spielberg’s 2005 adaptation, I started thinking about the invaders’ military way of war.

The first thing that stuck out to me was decapitating the human world by shock, paralysis, and absolute asymmetry. All of these are key to what will be discussed. The one thing that really stuck out to me in both movies and the book is that they do not maneuver like an army trying to defeat another army. No. Instead, they arrive as a force, so technologically superior that human command systems, weapons, morale, and assumptions collapse immediately, or almost immediately.

Method

When it comes to their method, their approach has several layers. In Wells’s book, the Martians arrive in cylinders from Mars. However, in the 1953 film, they come through meteor-like landings. In Spielberg’s version, the machines are already buried underground and are activated by lightning-like energy from above that somehow transports the driver into the machine. The last version is especially interesting because it makes the invasion feel less like an expeditionary landing and more like pre-positioned sleeper infrastructure or even a preplanned first strike. The enemy is not merely arriving; the enemy was already inside the world, waiting to be activated. In that sense, it gives the invasion a rhizomatic and cybernetic flavor. In other words, these hidden nodes are embedded in the environment and activated at the right moment.

Second is paralysis. Humans do not understand what’s happening because it’s moving too fast to respond coherently. From that point of view, that’s the liminal part of all this. The invasion begins in a zone between normality and war. Because of this, the people are still living their roles as civilians, spectators, reporters, police, and families, until suddenly the world crosses into annihilation. The aliens understand this, and they exploit that psychological gap.

The first weapon is not the heat ray. The first weapon is confusion, and with confusion comes terror and incomprehension.

Number three on this list would be tactical annihilation. The tripods do not fight battles in a balanced sense. No, instead, they erase opposition. Infantry, artillery, aircraft, tanks, police, crowds, all become targets of the same system. They become singular. Their method is simple: detect, advance, vaporize, harvest, occupy. Negotiations do not exist. The victims are given no terms, no demands, and no recognizable war aim — only annihilation. This is war stripped of diplomacy and presented as predation. In other words, if I were to sum it up, I’d say it’s insect politics at its finest.

In the book, like in the Spielberg movie, unlike the 1953 version, the tripods are essentially walking systems of dominance. They combine mobility, surveillance, firepower, and psychological terror. In modern terms, they are not merely vehicles. They are integrated, compartmentalized kill systems. They move through the human battlespace like an immune system attacking a body, or like a machine clearing terrain, or a chemical agent killing an infestation.

This brings us to environmental conversion. This is probably the strongest aspect of Wells’s novel and of Spielberg’s adaptation. The invaders are not just conquering territory. No, they’re trying to make Earth usable for themselves. Take Spielberg, for instance. The red weed makes this very visual. They’re not simply occupying the world; they are beginning to terraform the human environment into an alien ecology. That means their military method is tied to biology and infrastructure. They are not just defeating armies, they are replacing the conditions of life to favor theirs.

Now, this is where the invasion begins to cross into what is known as liminal warfare. Once the Martians begin converting the environment, the battlefield is no longer limited to armies, weapons, or territory. The world humans know becomes unrecognizable. Human space becomes alien space—a Martian Lebensraum—and the victims are forced to fight within a confused reality, where the rules of survival are no longer clear.

Forms of Warfare

This brings us to warfare. The first type of warfare we begin to notice is called liminal. The invasion begins before humans can even fathom what’s going on. They look around themselves, trying to make sense of the situation. Is it the weather? A meteor? A machine? Terrorism? An earthquake? An alien attack? All of the above matter because each is a delay. Understand that liminal warfare operates in the threshold space before the victim can clearly say, “We are at war.” Too late. In War of the Worlds, humanity loses the opening phase because it cannot interpret or even comprehend the event, as it is moving too fast for them. By the time the threat is legible, the aliens already dominate the battlespace.

Next is the connection to cybernetic warfare. In both the novel and the films, the Martian system is superior to the human system. The invaders do not need to understand human society, culture, or politics. They only need to disrupt its control loops: communication, command, mobilization, defense, and morale. Once those loops break, organized resistance collapses into local survival. This is especially clear in Spielberg’s version, where the invasion scatters individuals almost instantly. The state disappears from view. The military becomes background noise. The family becomes the only functioning unit. Cybernetically, the Martian attack reduces humanity from an organized civilization into scattered biological fragments—survivors, bodies, dust, and panic.

Next is rhizome warfare. Spielberg’s version is the most rhizomatic of the three. The tripods are buried underground across the planet as hidden nodes. They are activated simultaneously or near-simultaneously. The attack does not come from a particular direction, such as a beachhead or border. Rather, it erupts from beneath the world itself. There are no clear front lines. The enemy is not over there. The enemy is under the street. In this sense, the Martian method involves infiltration/pre-positioning, dormancy, node activation, and the collapse of the surface order from within. This is not about breaking through the wall, but about already being inside it.

Which now brings us to kinetic warfare. The kinetic layer is simple: overwhelming direct destruction. The heat ray is the ultimate asymmetrical tactical weapon. Human weapons are irrelevant. Once the machines are active, the aliens do not need operational subtlety. Their kinetic power is so dominant that maneuver becomes almost ceremonial, like marching.

They walk, and humanity dies. End point.

However, the most important point is that kinetic violence comes after the deeper shock. That deeper shock is the collapse of understanding.

To summarize it militarily before moving on, one could say the aliens wage a war of absolute asymmetry.

Their pre-positioned or sudden arrival produces psychological paralysis, which enables mobile annihilation, systemic collapse, and ultimately environmental replacement. The Martians do not invade a battlefield; they convert the world into one, then make humanity irrelevant inside it. Their method is not conquest first, but erasure first. Conquest, from their viewpoint, only begins after humanity no longer exists.

Overall, War of the Worlds is a useful case study because the alien method is not really war in the human sense. What the book and films show is something closer to extermination by technological overmatch, followed by attempted occupation and extraction.

That is what got me thinking. If humanity is being slowly exterminated by technological overmatch, then something similar happens to the aliens. Except, in their case, it is not technological overmatch that destroys them. It is technological overreach.

Their own power outruns their understanding. They can dominate human weapons, cities, armies, and machines, but they fail to account for Earth’s invisible ecology. They understand destruction, but apparently not the environment. They conquer the surface, but not the system underneath it.

That is the irony of War of the Worlds. The Martians defeat humanity militarily, but lose ontologically. They misread what Earth is. Their method assumes that superior machines create superior force, and that superior force guarantees conquest. But the reality is different: alien bodies enter a hostile biosphere, and the result is systemic collapse.

So the ending is not simply that germs kill them. It is deeper than that. When one steps back, it is the planet itself that defeats them. Earth is not passive terrain. Earth is an active battlespace.

In that sense, the Martians commit the classic error of overreach. They project power into a space they do not fully understand but take for granted. Their technology allows them to enter the world, but not belong to it. Therefore, humanity was technologically overmatched by the Martians, but the Martians were exterminated by their own technological overreach. Their machines conquered the battlefield, but their bodies could not survive the world.

In other words, they mastered war but misunderstood life.