
by Cam Rea
Since the Russo-Ukrainian war began in 2022, we’ve witnessed one negotiating proposal after another. Russia presents its demands, Ukraine presents its own, and outside actors, including the United States, Great Britain, and European governments, have their say in what should or should not be accepted.
At times, it has appeared that both sides were moving closer to some form of settlement, only for negotiations to stall or collapse. The negotiations in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2022 are perhaps one of the more interesting examples, especially given the involvement of outside powers and their influence on the negotiating process.
Over the past year, I’ve paid particular attention to the grievances, demands, and political objectives expressed by the various parties. Eventually, you begin to notice a pattern. And frankly, nothing about it is particularly surprising. Much of what we’re witnessing is exactly what one would expect when competing national interests collide.
Negotiations at this level are complicated not only by disagreements between the belligerents, but also by the political, military, economic, and strategic interests of those operating outside the immediate conflict.
This is why I think it’s important to begin with the negotiating process itself before examining what each party wants, what it might be willing to concede, and what it would ultimately consider a successful outcome.
When explaining what a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine might look like, we first have to ask ourselves: What does each state actually want? Not necessarily what it publicly demands, but what are its underlying strategic objectives?
Once we identify those objectives, we can begin establishing negotiating positions. What are each state’s opening demands? These can often be maximalist positions intended to create bargaining room.
In turn, this lets us determine each side’s leverage. What does each side have that the other wants or fears losing? Territory, economic pressure, military strength, sanctions, diplomatic recognition, etc.
Once we’ve determined each side’s leverage, we can begin identifying the limits. What are each side’s red lines? What concessions are politically, militarily, or economically acceptable? What’s unacceptable?
When these have been somewhat established, and I say somewhat because nothing is ever truly set in stone, we can begin exploring possible exchanges. What can one side offer in exchange for something it wants? This is where the bargaining begins.
Once these exchanges begin and certain concessions are agreed upon, we can start constructing a possible agreement. What specific commitments will each state make? Who withdraws? Who guarantees security? Who lifts sanctions? And in what sequence?
This is the tricky part. This is the delicate part.
Once an agreement is reached, we can begin monitoring compliance and enforcing its terms. Basically, once the signatures are on the dotted line, how will compliance be verified? And most importantly, what happens if someone violates it?
Ultimately, all of this comes down to power dynamics at every level: political, military, economic, and social. These dynamics shape negotiations, but they don’t necessarily determine every outcome.
The Strategic Objectives of Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union
When analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian war, I think the most important distinction is that all four actors can claim some measure of success while pursuing fundamentally incompatible objectives.
Looking at Russia, we see that it can gain territory without achieving its larger geopolitical objectives. Ukraine has shown that it can lose territory without losing its sovereignty. The United States can facilitate a settlement without resolving Europe’s security problems, and the European Union can preserve Ukraine as an independent state while failing to establish a durable security agreement.
This is why, when describing what is happening on the ground, we cannot simply describe Russia as winning or losing. That would be analytically insufficient. The same applies to Ukraine and its Western supporters.
The issue is that we have to separate four things: political objectives, military objectives, strategic minimums, and measures of success.
What are the political objectives? What outcomes does each actor ultimately want? We’ve already touched on this in the introduction.
The military objective concerns what each actor must achieve through military action to support its desired political outcome.
Strategic minimum? Well, that comes down to what each actor could accept without suffering what it considers an unacceptable strategic defeat.
Which brings us to the measure of success. What developments would demonstrate that each actor’s objectives are being achieved?
Overall, it comes down to what Carl von Clausewitz argued: “War is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means.” In other words, the ends must justify the means, at least in the eyes of those pursuing them. Politics is fickle precisely because the relationship between ends and means remains in a constant state of uncertainty.
Through realpolitik, one must wade through the dynamic chaos of grievances to find a semi-equilibrium.
The Strategic Picture at a Glance
We’ll now examine each actor, its principal strategic objective, and the possible minimum it might be willing to accept.
Russia
First, Russia. What is its principal strategic objective? At the moment, it is to secure its borders, establish a buffer zone with a grey zone extending beyond it between Russia and the West, constrain Ukraine, consolidate territorial gains, limit Ukraine’s military alignment with the West, and preserve Russia’s regional influence.
I say “at the moment” because, while these objectives reflect Russia’s current strategic position, the changing nature of the war means that the political and strategic calculations behind them may also change.
This brings us to Russia’s possible minimum. If Russia cannot achieve its maximalist demands, a possible minimum would be to retain control of key occupied territories, prevent Ukraine’s NATO membership, and obtain restrictions or assurances concerning Ukraine’s future military posture. This would give Russia some political leverage in securing a long-term settlement while allowing Moscow to portray the outcome as protecting Russia’s interests in relation to Ukraine and the West.
Ukraine
For Ukraine, the principal strategic objective is, frankly, to preserve its sovereignty, restore its territory, and secure protection against future invasion, along with the ability to defend itself.
As for the practical minimum it may ultimately have to accept, that would be to preserve its independence first and foremost, remain a militarily viable state (if allowed), and obtain at least credible security guarantees, even if some territorial questions remain unresolved.
United States
The United States’ principal strategic objectives are, basically, to end the war on sustainable terms, limit American costs and escalation risks, preserve strategic influence, prevent a wider European war, and maintain NATO credibility.
As for the practical minimum, frankly, that would be achieving a sustainable cessation of hostilities that preserves Ukraine’s independence without requiring direct American military involvement. Any proposal involving American boots on the ground would likely face Russian opposition. At the same time, such a settlement would ideally avoid open-ended American military commitments. The American people themselves would probably be reluctant to support American troops being stationed in Ukraine to provide security.
The European Union
As for the European Union, its principal strategic objectives are preserving European security, Ukrainian independence, and the principle of territorial sovereignty.
As for the possible minimum it would accept, that would be to prevent Ukraine’s collapse, maintain European security, and avoid a settlement that leaves Europe exposed to future aggression. Preventing Ukraine’s collapse is one thing. Preventing its potential balkanization is another matter entirely.
Russia: Territorial Consolidation and Revision of the European Security Order
Russia’s political objectives extend beyond acquiring Ukrainian territory. Moscow seeks to establish a security environment that prevents Ukraine from serving as a Western military springboard against Russia, whether directly or indirectly. We’ve already discussed Moscow’s stated objectives. However, Putin has increasingly framed negotiations as a question of security for Russia, Ukraine, and Europe together.
The November negotiating proposals reportedly revived demands to restrict NATO’s eastern military posture. With this in mind, Russia’s larger strategic objectives can be divided into three categories.
Territorial consolidation
Russia wants recognition and control of its claimed regions, including Crimea, and seeks to secure territory that Ukraine continues to hold. Beyond the land itself, controlling these territories expands Russia’s defense in depth, secures transportation corridors and access to infrastructure, and enables Russia to shape Ukraine’s future military geography. The key point is that territory is both an objective and a tool of leverage. Russia may first seek to turn Ukraine into an anchor, buffer, or dependent state before using it as a catalyst for broader Russian influence.
Strategic neutralization of Ukraine
Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from developing into a militarily powerful, Western-aligned state capable of threatening its interests. This is where military restrictions, NATO exclusion, and opposition to Western troops become interconnected. The goal is not simply to defeat Ukrainian forces, but to constrain the military capabilities it could develop afterward. In other words, they want to hamstring Ukraine.
Revision of the European security order
It is without question that Russia wants a larger role in determining Europe’s security arrangements. Its demand for a return to NATO’s 1997 military posture indicates an ambition to restrict Western military developments near Russia and renegotiate the security conditions established after the Cold War. That demand serves two possible purposes: a genuine strategic objective and leverage to obtain concessions on Ukraine. The two are not mutually exclusive.
Military objectives
While Russia’s military objectives have already been summarized for the most part, they remain subject to change. Its military role is to translate continued military pressure into favorable political circumstances. The war is fluid, both kinetically and politically, and a change in one can fundamentally alter the calculations in the other.
Operationally, this involves holding occupied territory, attacking Ukrainian defenses, degrading infrastructure and military capabilities, all the while maintaining enough pressure to influence negotiations.
But territorial advances alone aren’t sufficient to establish a strategic victory. They certainly contribute, and under certain circumstances could establish one, but that seems unlikely here. Therefore, Russia must also consider whether its military gains justify their costs.
How Russia may measure success
This is the tricky part. But the measures Russia might use to determine success aren’t exactly a secret.
If the measure is territory held or acquired, it tells Moscow whether military operations are delivering tangible geopolitical gains. If we look at Ukrainian military degradation, well, this tells Moscow whether Ukraine’s ability to resist is being reduced.
If we focus on force regeneration, this indicates whether Russia can replace personnel, equipment, and ammunition at a sustainable rate.
The measure of Western political cohesion tells Moscow whether allied support for Ukraine is becoming more divided or conditional.
As for sanctions resilience, this indicates whether Russia can sustain its economy and defense production despite Western pressure.
If the measure is negotiating concessions, this tells Moscow whether military pressure is producing favorable political results.
And lastly, domestic stability. If that is the measure, then the question is whether the Kremlin can sustain the war politically, perhaps indefinitely, or at least until it considers its objectives sufficiently achieved.
However, here’s the critical point. Russia could win more ground and still fail strategically if Ukraine emerges with stronger Western security guarantees and NATO becomes more militarily consolidated along Russia’s borders. Period.
Conversely, Russia could accept less than all its territorial demands and still claim strategic success if Ukraine’s long-term military alignment is sufficiently constrained.
Which brings us to Russia’s possible strategic minimum.
My assessment is that Moscow would seek some combination of territorial consolidation, restrictions on Ukraine’s military alignment, and a settlement that preserves Russia’s regional influence.
The precise trade-offs Moscow would accept are unknown. Its current public negotiating position remains more demanding than this hypothetical minimum.
This is where the price anchoring interpretation becomes relevant. A government may announce maximalist objectives that exceed its reservation point: the least favorable settlement it would be prepared to accept.
Ukraine: Survival, Sovereignty, and the Prevention of Another Invasion
Ukraine’s declared political objectives remain preserving its independence and sovereignty, recovering territory, and acquiring credible security guarantees.
However, according to Reuters, Zelensky rejected a proposal that Ukraine withdraw from Donbas in exchange for NATO membership, while indicating that a comprehensive agreement could potentially be presented to a national referendum. Of course, by the time this article is published, who knows how much may have changed behind the scenes?
Nevertheless, three objectives are especially important.
Preservation of the Ukrainian State
Ukraine’s foremost strategic interest is remaining politically sovereign. That means retaining the ability to determine its own foreign policy, maintain armed forces, conclude international agreements, and govern without Russian control.
This is distinct from recovering every inch of territory. A state can lose territory while retaining its independence, although that loss can seriously damage its long-term security and raise political questions, whether arising from internal or external pressures.
Preservation of Military Viability
Ukraine needs a military capable of deterring future Russian invasions. It also needs access to ammunition, air defense, intelligence, military technology, and, frankly, any outside assistance it can obtain.
A peace settlement that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty on paper but leaves the country militarily defenseless is nothing more than a country trying to fight its way out of a wet paper bag.
Long-Term Security Guarantees
As for long-term security guarantees, Ukraine obviously wants arrangements that discourage Russia from ever invading again. This includes NATO membership, with its binding collective-defense commitments, European military assistance, or other security agreements.
The specific arrangements, or I should say the specific agreements, matter enormously because guarantees are only as credible as the parties’ willingness and capability to enforce them.
Military Objectives
Ukraine’s immediate military problem is to expel Russian forces from its territory while preventing further advances and future invasions.
Its military objectives include maintaining defensible front lines, preserving personnel and equipment, protecting infrastructure, and inflicting sufficient losses to limit further Russian advances.
Ukraine must also preserve the capacity to continue fighting if negotiations collapse. This creates a dual requirement: sustain resistance while keeping a political settlement possible.
In other words, Ukraine must negotiate a possible armistice while the war continues.
How Ukraine measures success
As for how Ukraine measures success, the priority is preserving sovereignty, because it tells Kyiv whether Ukraine can retain its political independence.
If it can retain its political independence, the next question is whether it has defensible territory. This indicates whether the remaining state can be militarily protected. Do you have enough territory? Do you have enough space? Do you have enough time? And, most importantly, can Ukraine stabilize the front and prevent further Russian advances?
This brings us to Ukrainian force regeneration, which determines whether Kyiv can sustain long-term military resistance. Can Ukraine continue replacing its personnel and equipment losses at a sustainable rate?
That question was raised back in 2022 and remains relevant to the present. Ukraine immediately looked to additional help in the form of foreign military assistance. The question now is whether Ukraine can maintain access to those essential military capabilities.
To sustain all of this and prepare for whatever may come in the future, Ukraine also needs to assess its security guarantees. This tells Kyiv whether a peace settlement could deter another invasion. What those guarantees might look like remains anybody’s guess and subject to interpretation.
And lastly, we come to economic and demographic recovery. This is the tough one because Kyiv has to ask the hard question: Can Ukraine remain a viable state after the war, or will it be divided piecemeal and eventually balkanized? Or could it simply balkanize from within?
The day after will tell us a lot.
Ukraine’s possible strategic minimum
As for Ukraine’s strategic minimum, what would it be willing to accept? This is where I distinguish a preferable outcome from a survival threshold.
Ukraine’s declared preferred outcome is restoring its territory and securing credible security arrangements. Its practical survival threshold could be remaining an independent, functioning, and defensible country, even if the territorial dispute remains unresolved.
That doesn’t mean Kyiv is prepared to surrender territory. In fact, its current position rejects such concessions, at least for now. It means that the survival of the state and the restoration of all its territory are distinct strategic measures.
If Ukraine preserves its sovereignty but loses territory, the result is mixed. If it recovers territory but lacks the means to defend itself afterward, the victory may prove temporary. In other words, Ukraine could emerge politically weak and militarily unstable. A recipe for disaster, both internally and externally.
United States: Ending the War While Maintaining Strategic Flexibility
It is no surprise that American strategic interests do not align perfectly with Ukrainian interests. They may overlap in important respects, but they aren’t interchangeable. Washington must consider European security and NATO credibility while avoiding escalation with Russia. It must also consider its own military expenditures and the long-term strategic competition with China.
The Trump administration has made it clear that it seeks to end the war through a negotiated settlement. But that objective operates within a larger strategic framework.
Political objectives
If we look at the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), it places American homeland defense, deterring China, greater allied burden-sharing, as in making NATO members pay more of their fair share, and defense-industrial capacity among its principal priorities.
The NDS also describes Russia as a persistent but manageable threat, while emphasizing that European allies should assume greater responsibility for their own conventional defense.
This alone suggests four interconnected American objectives.
Terminate the war without direct American military involvement
First, it comes down to ending the war without direct U.S. military involvement. The U.S. wants to negotiate an outcome that ends major combat operations and reduces the danger of confrontation between nuclear powers.
While an agreement that merely postpones renewed fighting may be beneficial, it is less valuable strategically than a durable settlement. Therefore, the administration must balance the attractiveness of a near-term agreement against the risk of producing an unstable peace. However, a near-term agreement could also establish the foundation for a lasting peace, provided both parties remain sufficiently satisfied with its terms to uphold them.
Reduce American strategic commitments in Europe
Washington has an interest in European governments taking greater responsibility for their own defense, and they should. However, this does not necessarily mean NATO will dissolve or that the United States will withdraw from Europe. Both remain possibilities, but whether either will happen in the foreseeable future is still in question.
Rather, the United States can seek to redistribute responsibilities, leaving European governments to provide more of the conventional military capabilities required for continental security.
Preserve freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific
Shifting defense responsibility to European governments and NATO allies allows the United States to focus more attention and resources on its strategic competition with China.
The United States has finite military resources, industrial capacity, diplomatic attention, and financial commitments. The United States is a nation of warehouses, laboratories, research facilities, factories, and tool shops. Resources concentrated in Europe cannot simultaneously be assigned elsewhere without trade-offs.
Ending the war on acceptable terms could improve Washington’s strategic flexibility in the Indo-Pacific.
However, the counterargument is that a settlement seen as rewarding territorial conquest could weaken America’s credibility with its allies in Asia, making strategic competition with China harder.
Perhaps. But I think this also depends on the administration in charge.
Preserve American influence over Europe’s security arrangements
However, even if Washington reduces its strategic commitments in Europe, it still wants to preserve its influence over European security arrangements diplomatically, militarily, economically, and institutionally.
The current administration has been examining the possibility of negotiating a broader European security arrangement alongside a settlement with Ukraine. According to 11 November reporting, American negotiators wanted to pursue both tracks simultaneously, while recognizing that Ukraine and European governments must agree to arrangements that affect their security.
In other words, there’s a lot of give-and-take that must happen before anything can truly move forward.
American military objectives
The United States is obviously not a direct belligerent in this war. Its military objectives are principally indirect. Its goals include preserving NATO’s defense, avoiding direct conflict between American and Russian forces, maintaining deterrence against attacks on NATO territory, preserving sufficient American military capability for other strategic theaters, and finally, supporting a postwar security agreement that does not depend on indefinite American military intervention.
There is an important difference between supporting Ukrainian resistance to constrain Russia and treating the degradation of Russia’s military capabilities as an overriding American objective. The former can serve American interests. The latter may create costs or commitments Washington is unwilling to sustain indefinitely. The U.S. cannot afford to overplay its hand.
How the United States measures success
Now, when it comes to measuring success, the first indication would be the end of major hostilities. This would tell Washington that diplomacy has ended the immediate conflict, which brings us to the settlement’s durability. Will the agreement prevent another costly war, or merely postpone one?
It also raises the question of direct American military exposure. Has Washington avoided direct military involvement while keeping the risk of escalation contained?
Furthermore, European defense contributions come into play. This tells Washington whether its allies are assuming greater responsibility for their own security and whether NATO’s collective defense arrangements remain effective.
This brings us to the availability of strategic resources. Has Washington gained greater flexibility to redirect military, economic, and political attention toward China and other strategic priorities?
As for American influence over the settlement terms, this shows whether Washington’s diplomacy shaped the outcome or merely facilitated an agreement without securing its broader strategic interests. After all, negotiating an end to the fighting is one thing. Ensuring that the resulting political and security arrangements serve American interests is another.
America’s possible strategic minimum
In my assessment, the Trump administration’s practical minimum would be an arrangement that terminates major hostilities. This could, in turn, reduce the risk of renewed war, preserve essential American security interests, and avoid an indefinite military commitment.
But there is a complication.
A diplomatic settlement can succeed for an American administration without being strategically successful for the United States over the long term. In other words, it does not matter if you lose the battle so long as you do not lose the war, for strategic endurance outweighs temporary tactical setbacks.
An agreement could end the fighting and deliver an immediate political achievement, yet create military vulnerabilities that require considerably greater American commitments later.
However, the reverse is also possible. An imperfect settlement could free resources and reduce the danger of escalation while preserving the broader European balance.
This is why an administration’s political success and a country’s strategic success must be evaluated and weighed separately.
European Union: Containment of the Conflict and Preservation of European Security
Of all the positions examined, the European position is perhaps the most complicated because the EU is not exactly a sovereign state with a unified military command. Its member states have different geographical vulnerabilities, military capabilities, economic interests, and political considerations. In other words, it’s a gaggle of competing interests, even if they are all aligned toward the same outcome: peace. The disagreement lies in how to achieve it.
Furthermore, the EU and NATO are different institutions. Not all European NATO members are in the EU, and not all EU members are in NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has established several common strategic objectives.
Political objectives
The European Council has committed itself to Ukrainian independence and internationally recognized borders. On 13 November, European Council President António Costa reaffirmed that Ukraine must decide questions concerning its own territory and sovereignty, while European governments must participate in decisions affecting the continent’s security. European leaders also agreed to establish a negotiating team involving EU institutions and five European countries from the Coalition of the Willing.
As a result, four principal European objectives emerge.
Prevent the war from expanding into European Union territory
This is probably by far the most immediate security concern, and understandably so. European governments will want to prevent a wider conflict involving Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, or other countries. For the eastern member states, Russia’s military pressure is not an abstract security issue; it directly affects their defense planning.
Preserve Ukraine as a buffer against further Russian expansion
This part requires careful wording. Ukraine is a sovereign country, not just a buffer state. However, a militarily viable Ukraine occupies strategically important territory between Russia and NATO’s eastern members.
From the European Union’s standpoint, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian military pressure helps defend Europe’s eastern approaches. That relationship exists regardless of whether European governments publicly describe Ukraine as a buffer.
Prevent territorial conquest from becoming an accepted method of changing European borders
The EU has argued that international borders should not be changed through force. This is simultaneously a legal principle and a strategic concern. If conquest becomes an effective way to obtain internationally recognized territorial concessions, European governments fear the precedent could encourage further attempts to redraw borders by force. This also raises questions about EU member states’ military capabilities and their ability to respond collectively.
Increase Europe’s strategic autonomy and military capacity
The ongoing conflict has caused the European Council to call for greater defense readiness by 2030. This includes stronger defense-industrial capacity, protection of critical infrastructure, and reduced strategic dependencies.
This tells us that these objectives extend beyond Ukraine, and they should. European governments are attempting to prepare for a security environment in which American commitments may become more limited or conditional.
However, this is easier said than done. The problem is that not all member states have equal capabilities. As a result, some will have to pick up the slack for others. Some may lack the economic strength, while others may have strong economies but insufficient industrial capacity. Still others may possess the industrial base but lack access to the necessary resources or face regulations that restrict their ability to develop the military apparatus required not only to defend themselves but also to conduct offensive operations.
European military objectives
Remember, the EU still has objectives. But the EU has not established a unified military force. NATO provides a collective defense framework for many EU member states, but the two institutions are not interchangeable.
Nevertheless, European governments seek to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses, expand European military production, reinforce vulnerable fronts, and increase their ability to deter Russian military action.
The strategic purpose is obvious: prevent Russia from translating its gains in Ukraine into a larger military advantage over Europe, whether kinetically or politically.
While buffer zones are desirable, the gray zone may be even more valuable. In this clandestine environment, European governments can conduct intelligence, cyber, and other covert operations to defend their interests or undermine an adversary, often without the public knowing what is happening. Russia is doing the same thing.
However, this competition is already taking place. Once the fighting ends and the smoke clears, the strategic landscape will change. Both sides will have a clearer understanding of the buffer zones that have emerged and where gray-zone competition can be conducted. Both Russia and Europe will seek to exploit these arrangements to their strategic advantage.
How Europe measures success
The first European measures of success are the survival of the Ukrainian state, the continued independence of a critical partner, and the containment of the conflict.
As for Russian military capacity, this tells the EU whether Moscow can still threaten other European countries.
European military readiness will be an indication of whether the EU can defend itself with reduced American support.
Defense-industrial production tells the EU whether its member states can sustain military operations and assistance.
Perhaps the biggest measure of all is EU political cohesion. The question is whether member states can remain united and on the same page while maintaining common strategic positions and pursuing common objectives, whether defensive or offensive.
Ukrainian reconstruction will indicate whether postwar Ukraine can become economically and politically stable again, and if so, how long that recovery might take. And if it does recover, what will the spheres of influence look like? How much influence will each side retain, gain, and lose?
Which brings us finally to European influence in negotiations. How much influence does the EU need to shape the outcome? How strong is Europe, really? And does it need outside assistance? Ultimately, only European governments can answer those questions.
Europe’s possible strategic minimum
So what is the minimum? Based on observation, the minimum would likely involve preventing Ukraine’s collapse, preserving European security, and ensuring that any settlement doesn’t create immediate military vulnerabilities along NATO’s eastern flank.
But Europe’s minimum acceptable outcome is not necessarily uniform. Poland and the Baltic states may attach greater weight to deterring Russia. Other governments may place more emphasis on ending hostilities, stabilizing energy markets, reducing financial commitments, or restoring European economic predictability. In other words, normality.
These differences give Russian diplomacy opportunities to exploit disagreements, and vice versa. However, they also complicate Washington’s efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to Europe as a whole.
Where the strategic objectives collide
This is where the conflict becomes especially interesting from a classical realist perspective. The parties aren’t simply fighting over territory. They’re naturally attempting to establish political and military arrangements that will determine their future positions relative to one another.

Notice the contradiction between Russia and Ukraine. Russia wants security by limiting Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukraine wants security by maintaining those capabilities. Both can describe their objectives as defensive. However, each side’s preferred security arrangement can make the other feel less secure. It’s a classic security dilemma.
Russia’s invasion and territorial claims also involve coercive revision of the existing order, not merely defensive reactions.
Washington’s problem is different. It wants to reduce its commitments without necessarily reducing its influence. Europe wants to maintain American protection while becoming less dependent upon it.
These objectives are not impossible to reconcile, but they create competing incentives that can shift as certain terms are negotiated and agreed upon. This could restart the entire negotiating process, even over the most minute details.
What Constitutes Victory or Defeat?
This is a tough question, and I think it’s best answered by distinguishing five dimensions of success rather than relying on a single battlefield measurement.
The first is tactical. The principal question is: Who’s winning individual engagements?
The second is operational. The principal question is: Who’s achieving campaign objectives and controlling the ground?
The third is strategic. The question here is: Are military operations producing the desired political conditions?
The fourth is economic. Can the state sustain the conflict and recover afterward?
And finally, the fifth is political. Can the government preserve its legitimacy and alliances while securing an acceptable settlement?
A military can succeed tactically and operationally while failing strategically. Likewise, an army can experience considerable battlefield setbacks without losing the political independence its government is fighting to preserve.
Hypothetical Outcomes
A: Russia retains substantial territory, but Ukraine survives and joins NATO
Russia achieves territorial success. Ukraine suffers a territorial loss but secures a major external security guarantee. The United States and NATO extend their security arrangements, while Russia faces a strengthened Western military presence along its borders.
From Moscow’s standpoint, the outcome could represent a substantial failure of its broader strategic objectives despite its territorial gains.
B: Russia retains territory, Ukraine remains outside NATO, and Ukraine accepts military restrictions
Russia achieves many of its preferred strategic objectives.
Ukraine retains its independence but accepts significant constraints on its future military capabilities.
Washington helps end major hostilities, although the settlement’s durability remains uncertain.
Europe may view the agreement as having reduced immediate danger while creating longer-term security risks.
C: The war ends in an armistice along approximately existing lines, with no final territorial settlement
Russia retains de facto control of occupied territory.
Ukraine retains its sovereignty, military capabilities, and territorial claims.
The United States helps end major hostilities.
Europe gains an opportunity to reinforce its defenses.
However, the underlying political conflict remains unresolved.
This third scenario illustrates something important. It shows that an armistice can end large-scale military operations without producing a strategic victory for either belligerent. Stalemate.
Conclusion
Overall, four conclusions are worth carrying into a future discussion, if any discussion at all.
First, Russia does not need to defeat NATO to achieve a strategically favorable settlement. It needs sufficient political, territorial, and military concessions to improve its position relative to the situation before or during the war.
Second, Ukraine does not need to defeat Russia militarily to preserve its existence as a sovereign state. However, survival alone would not fulfill Ukraine’s declared territorial and security objectives. To consider survival alone a complete victory would be an error.
Third, the United States can achieve its diplomatic objective of terminating the war while leaving the larger conflict between Russia and Europe unresolved. Whether this constitutes strategic success depends on the settlement’s durability and consequences. This could be seen as a mistake or a blessing.
Fourth, Europe can preserve Ukraine’s independence while remaining strategically vulnerable if it fails to develop the military capabilities necessary to sustain its preferred security order.
And that raises another question underlying the entire war. Are these actors measuring success against their original objectives, their present circumstances, or the consequences of an alternative outcome?
I recognize these are three different standards, but they’re also three legitimate ways to measure success.
A government that initially sought complete victory might eventually accept a settlement far short of that objective, especially if the alternatives have worsened. However, that does not automatically transform the settlement into a strategic victory, or a victory at all. It may simply represent the most favorable attainable outcome under changed circumstances.
This connects with an argument I made some time ago about Russia’s maximalist demands. The Kremlin’s opening position may define what it wants, but its willingness to concede particular demands would reveal considerably more about what it regards as essential. What is essential to the Kremlin may not be essential to Kyiv, Brussels, or Washington. And the same reasoning applies to the negotiating positions of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.
I think the measure of strategic success is, frankly, not simply what a state gains or loses, but whether the ends ultimately justify the means employed to achieve them.
Was it worth it in the end?
And that is another question for another time.
References
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated by J. J. Graham. 1873. https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html.
Costa, António. “Remarks by President António Costa at the Press Conference Following the Informal Meeting of Heads of State or Government of 13 November 2026.” European Council, November 13, 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/11/13/remarks-by-president-antonio-costa-at-the-press-conference-following-the-informal-meeting-of-heads-of-state-or-government-of-13-november-2026/.
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. March 19, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-defence-readiness-2030_en.
European Council. “European Council Conclusions on Ukraine and on European Defence and Security.” June 18, 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/18/european-council-conclusions-on-ukraine-and-on-european-defence-and-security/.
Harmash, Olena. “US Floated Idea of Ukraine Ceding Donbas for NATO Membership, Zelenskiy Says.” Reuters, November 14, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-floated-idea-ukraine-ceding-donbas-nato-membership-zelenskiy-says-2026-11-14/.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” April 4, 1949. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty.
Ravid, Barak. “Scoop: U.S. Asks Russia to Propose New Security Agreement with Europe.” Axios, November 11, 2026. https://www.axios.com/2026/11/11/russia-ukraine-europe-war-security-agreement.
Shabranska, Viktoriia. “Russia Demanded NATO Return to Its 1997 Positions during Abu Dhabi Talks – NYT.” Ukrainska Pravda, November 14, 2026. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/11/14/8062819/.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2026 National Defense Strategy. January 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.pdf.









