Valery Zaluzhny and Viktor Muzhenko, two former leaders of Ukraine’s armed forces who remain active in various roles, have recently offered starkly similar assessments of the war from different perspectives. Muzhenko diagnoses the military’s systemic failures, while Zaluzhny charts a path forward through innovation and adaptation. Together, their perspectives reveal an inescapable truth: war is the continuation of politics—at the cost of the state’s health.
The Problem with Ukraine’s Military Failures
Viktor Muzhenko
Texty.org.ua, a Ukrainian independent media outlet, published an interesting article in December 2024, in which they interviewed General Viktor Muzhenko, a former Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 2014 to 2019, who is now a leading researcher at the Armed Forces Research Institute. The title of the article is “We had a chance to win on the battlefield and still have it. General Muzhenko on how to stop the Russian.”
You can read the article for yourself, but here is a breakdown of his overall argument and concern. Below are the major points Muzhenko raises, with selected illustrative quotes and implications:
| Theme | Key Observations / Critiques | Implications / Recommendations |
|---|---|---|
| Russian initiative & existential framing | He acknowledges that Russia has the upper hand (i.e., dictates terms) and has achieved tactical successes, but cautions that tactical gains do not necessarily equate to a strategic victory. | He recommends (obviously) that Ukraine should not accept the narrative of “we are losing” and must maintain strategic resilience and correct internal defects. |
| Mistakes in negotiation and posture early in war | He argues that in the earliest days, Ukraine engaged in negotiations with Russia over territorial outcomes, without sufficient guarantees. This signaled a weak position. | He implies that Ukraine must avoid negotiating from a position of weakness and maintain firmness in negotiations. |
| Decentralized command vs discipline | Early mobilization and resistance benefited from decentralization and initiative at lower levels, which is natural. However, over time, this grew chaotic and undermined coherence due to a loss of leadership and a lack of capable, well-trained replacements (e.g., unexplained retreats in Luhansk, poor coordination). | Decentralization must be tempered, starting with disciplined command and accountability. |
| Mobilization and personnel policy failures | The recruitment process was and still is indiscriminate, as men were being forcibly taken off the street and out of public places. This approach often results in specialists being mismatched—for example, individuals with valuable civilian expertise are placed in general infantry roles rather than employed where their skills could be decisive. Such practices erode loyalty and compromise fighting spirit. As a result, commanders assumed they had unlimited human resources. It also does not help when you have frequent leadership changes (generals and colonels), which have undermined continuity and institutional memory. | To solve this problem, more selective and strategic mobilization is required. Stability in leadership and career progression must be respected. |
| Engineering, fortifications, and terrain neglect | Muzhenko criticizes the neglect of basic engineering measures—such as trenches and fortifications—and the insufficient preparation of terrain before operations. He highlights specific cases, including the Kharkiv and Kursk offensives, where the timing, objectives, or overall design were poorly conceived. In his view, persisting too long in an offensive posture left Ukrainian forces exposed when they should have shifted to defense. | Any large-scale operations must integrate engineering, terrain analysis, and realistic objectives; be ready to shift posture. |
| Flawed counteroffensive planning and unrealistic expectations | He notes that the counteroffensive was often overhyped—shaped more by public expectations than by operational realities—and underprepared in key areas such as reconnaissance, engineering support, manpower, and overall plan design. In some cases, offensives were even launched against sectors where Russian defenses were strongest. Big mistake. | Ukraine should avoid “euphoric” expectations, plan realistically, and ensure all supporting groundwork (reconnaissance, engineering, staging) is methodically done. |
| Leadership comparisons and delegation issues | Muzhenko argued that General Oleksandr Syrskyi was more professionally prepared and experienced than former Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny, who now serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. He also criticized the tendency to use delegated authority not as a tool of effective command, but as a means of evading responsibility. | Effective leadership must combine delegated authority with oversight, accountability, and strategic continuity to ensure effective management. |
| Societal mobilization and training of the population | He urges a national conversation: beyond soldiers, civilians must contribute much more to the war effort. Ukraine should restart general military training for individuals under 25, provide psychological preparation, and refine the training structure for mobilized personnel. | Victory demands a total-war mobilization, engaging the entire society, both materially and psychologically. |
| Defining victory correctly | Muzhenko’s conception of victory is the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign state and a functioning nation with a military, not necessarily recapturing every inch of territory immediately. | Having realistic and strategic definitions of objectives helps prevent overreach and the misallocation of resources. |
Overall Argument
Muzhenko is correct that Ukraine squandered early opportunities through a lack of leadership and foresight and continues to suffer from deep systemic flaws in mobilization, planning, and preparation. Unless these problems are corrected, neither tactical gains nor Western support will translate into victory. True success requires disciplined command, smarter use of manpower, realistic planning, and above all, a shift toward total societal mobilization—because survival as a sovereign state depends not only on soldiers at the front but on the whole nation adapting to a long, grinding war. Yet this adaptation can only succeed if the Ukrainian people believe their government’s actions are just and worthy of sacrifice.
The Solution to Ukraine’s Military Problem
Valery Zaluzhny
Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, the man whom former General Viktor Muzhenko criticized, argues in his article “The role of innovation as the basis of a sustainable resistance strategy in depriving Russia of the opportunity to impose its terms through war” that in today’s conflict, Ukraine must build a strategy of sustainable resistance grounded in technological and innovation superiority, so as to deprive Russia of the ability to impose its terms via force. He claims that conventional approaches and mass assaults are no longer sufficient given the modern battlefield dynamics. Instead, Ukraine must regain and maintain the technological initiative, adapt its military and institutional structures accordingly, and harness innovation to break out of the “positional deadlock” on the front and force Russia to respond to Ukraine’s terms. All of which is correct. The key highlights of Zaluzhny’s argument start at the major Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition in London (2025), billed as the world’s largest military exhibition.
Observation at DSEI-2025 & the role of innovation
Zaluzhnyi notes that while many of the exhibited weapon systems are relics of past wars, Ukraine’s companies are showcasing cutting-edge innovations that attract both military and commercial interest. He highlights foreign systems explicitly incorporating lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, especially in UAVs (drones), electronic warfare (EW), and artificial intelligence (AI).
The positional stalemate (deadlock) analogy
Zaluzhnyi compares the situation on the front to World War I’s positional warfare, characterized by entrenched lines, layered defenses, and limited maneuver room. He argues that both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian war have entered a “positional deadlock,” where achieving an operational breakthrough is extremely difficult. In such a scenario, massed force or classical maneuvers lose efficacy; the side that can leverage new technologies and sustain itself will have the advantage.
Drones, reconnaissance, and disruption of surprise
Drones (especially small tactical drones) have become central to reconnaissance, targeting, and battlefield awareness. Their presence makes any concentration of forces, particularly on the offensive, highly vulnerable. Due to the integration of drones, long-range precision weapons, and real-time reconnaissance, surprise has become almost impossible. The battlefield has grown more “transparent” due to sensor networks, signals, and observations, all of which feed into decision systems.
Threats to personnel/survivability
However, while the battlefield has grown more transparent, large concentrations of troops, even in defensive positions, are vulnerable to drone and artillery strikes. Thus, defense must shift toward dispersed, semi-autonomous small units that can survive under constant threat. The article mentions that in current conditions, 80% of losses (personnel and equipment) stem from drone-based or drone-assisted attacks. The “kill zone” is expanding due to the “deep battle fires” doctrine, where the goal is not just to hit the frontlines, but to make the entire depth of the enemy’s territory unsafe. Traditional rear areas are no longer safe because drones extend the reach of fire and observation.
Emerging technological challenges & AI/autonomy
He also warns that as AI and autonomous systems mature, the battlefield will be further transformed, potentially removing humans from direct exposure in some roles. However, he admits that current autonomous systems are not capable of replacing humans on a large scale in combat.
Institutional and state-level innovation
The author argues that for Ukraine to maintain technological momentum, it must adopt a national-level strategy for defense innovation, including clear responsibilities, R&D programs, and institutional backing. It should mobilize software engineers and technologists (many of whom are already in the armed forces) to support innovation efforts. He highlights the challenge of accessing microprocessors (“chips”) due to geopolitical bottlenecks (China, Taiwan, and the USA) and the need to form strategic alliances for supply and technological cooperation. He calls for scientific and technological isolation of Russia, and leveraging Western research institutions (for example, CERN or the European Organization for Nuclear Research) as partners.
Strategic implication: turning war into a losing proposition for Russia
The overall goal of Ukraine’s innovation-based sustainable resistance is to force Russia into adapting and absorbing costs, rather than letting Russia dictate the pace or terms. If Ukraine can “get out” of the positional deadlock first — via technology, adaptation, and institutional capacity — then Russia will be compelled to respond. Accordingly, Ukraine must act fast in adopting, scaling, and innovating new systems before Russia does.
Overall Argument
His overall argument is that war with Russia has reached a positional stalemate similar to World War I, where mass assaults and conventional tactics no longer bring decisive results. In this new environment, the key to survival and victory lies in innovation and technology — especially drones, AI, electronic warfare, and precision systems. Ukraine cannot rely on manpower or traditional methods; instead, it must adopt a strategy of sustainable resistance built on technological superiority, adaptation, and institutional support for defense innovation.
Conclusion
After reading Valery Zaluzhny and Viktor Muzhenko’s articles, one is reminded of Clausewitz’s famous observation that “war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Both generals underscore this truth, showing that success depends on more than the clash of arms. The political conditions that shape war must be established well before fighting begins. When diplomacy fails and war does come, the “other means” will only be as effective as the political foundation beneath them—one that determines the equipment, the doctrine, and ultimately the health of the military.
Yet in the end, both would agree that everything comes down to the power of politics, plain and simple. Ukraine, NATO, and the front will ultimately decide the war’s outcome—and what future Ukraine will have left, if any.
Bibliography
Muzhenko, Viktor. “We Had a Chance to Win on the Battlefield and Still Have It: General Muzhenko on How to Stop the Russians.” Texty.org.ua, December 9, 2024. https://texty.org.ua/fragments/114022/we-had-a-chance-to-win-on-the-battlefield-and-still-have-it-general-muzhenko-on-how-to-stop-the-russians/
The Role of Innovation as the Basis of a Strategy of Sustainable Resistance in Depriving Russia of the Ability to Impose Its Conditions through War.” ZN.UA, September 24, 2025. https://zn.ua/ukr/war/rol-innovatsij-jak-osnovi-stratehiji-stijkoho-oporu-u-pozbavlenni-rosiji-mozhlivosti-navjazuvati-svoji-umovi-cherez-vijnu.html