Neo-Deep Battle Fires: How Artillery and Drones Are Rewriting Depth Warfare

Earlier this week, a map shared on X by Big Serge visualized Russia’s ongoing drone and missile campaign across Ukraine in October 2025. Such maps have become predictable, yet the growing tempo and scope of these strikes highlight a doctrinal evolution — the application of deep battle logic through modern precision fires. Call it Neo–Deep Battle Fires.

Each colored line or arrow usually represents a specific category of munition:
Red / Orange lines: cruise missiles (e.g., Kalibr, Kh-101, Iskander-K)
Yellow / Green lines: Shahed/Geran-2 loitering drones
Blue or Purple lines: air-launched missiles (e.g., Kh-22, Kh-59)
These converge on Ukrainian cities and regions, including Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Lviv.

If you’re unfamiliar with the term, see my longer piece Soviet Deep Operations Doctrine: Origins and Key Theorists. Briefly: Soviet Deep Battle was developed in the 1920s–1930s to break the stalemate of positional warfare. It used combined-arms echelons to concentrate mobility and shock at decisive points, allocating minimum forces to secure flanks while the main mobile force punched deeply into the enemy’s operational depth. The goal was to destroy the enemy’s command, logistics, and reserves — collapsing the entire defensive system rather than grinding down a frontline by attrition.

A central component of classical Deep Battle was massive artillery and airpower: preparatory barrages to blind and suppress defenders, followed by waves of mechanized exploitation.

Artillery — the “god of war” — enabled Deep Battle by suppressing defenses, destroying command nodes, and disrupting logistics far behind the frontline. In the interwar years and during World War II, synchronized indirect fires, air strikes, and maneuver created windows of opportunity for breakthroughs and deep exploitation.

Note: “Deep Battle Fires” is not an official Soviet or Russian doctrinal label. It’s an analytical term used to describe the practice of applying fires deep into an opponent’s system.

Russia’s contemporary fires emphasize precision and efficiency. Drones provide spotting, terminal guidance, and battle-damage assessment, while modern artillery employs precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for greater accuracy and efficiency. Smart shells have made targeting far more precise.

Increased Vulnerability: Dense troop concentrations are now highly vulnerable to detection and strike, forcing units to disperse and dig in. What artillery cannot destroy, first-person-view (radio-controlled) drones can—serving as smart shells, while others act as miniature cruise missiles.

Centralized vs. Decentralized: While long-range strikes remain centrally coordinated, drone integration has enabled greater decentralization at the tactical level, creating a hybrid fire-control model. Where WWII-era doctrine relied on massed, saturating barrages, modern practice prefers fewer, more accurate strikes supported by sensor networks.

  • Shift to accuracy: Fewer rounds, higher probability of effect per shot.
  • Drone integration: Unmanned systems enable targeting, correction, and assessment in near real-time.
  • Precision munitions: Guided artillery and smart projectiles increase lethality per round.
  • Rapid counterbattery: Radar + drones enable quick interdiction of enemy guns.
  • Dispersal & vulnerability: Dense concentrations are easier to detect and strike, driving forces to disperse.
  • Mix of centralization/decentralization: Tactical decentralization for survivability, operational centralization for coordinated long-range fires.
  • Mass & quantity: massed artillery barrages.
  • Preparatory barrage: large pre-attack fires to suppress and blind.
  • High rate of fire: intense short windows of saturation.
  • Decisive blunt effect: artillery as a sledgehammer enabling mechanized exploitation.
  • Shift to accuracy: “less is more” — maximize effect per round.
  • Integrated with drones: sensor-to-shooter links improve efficiency.
  • Precision-guided munitions: smart shells and guided munitions.
  • Improved counterbattery: rapid detection and interdiction of enemy guns.
  • Increased vulnerability: dense formations are high-value, high-risk targets.

Operational effect and implications

Russia’s massed drone and missile strikes project effects across Ukraine’s depth, mirroring Deep Battle’s objective: degrade logistics, morale, and sustainment beyond the front. Drones act as low-cost precision bombers and guided weapons, saturating air defenses and forcing Ukraine to disperse forces across a far wider area.

  • Attrition by depth: continuous pressure on logistics, power, and transport erodes operational tempo.
  • Spread of defenses: units and air defenses are stretched thin, reducing local combat superiority.
  • Psychological & economic strain: recurring strikes increase civilian stress and divert resources.
  • Strategic paralysis: a reactive defender loses initiative and offensive options.
  • Systems vulnerability: concentrated logistics and energy nodes are high-payoff targets; predictable transport corridors enable persistent interdiction.
  • Repair & resilience gaps: slow repair cycles and centralized infrastructure amplify damage effects.

Unlike in World War II — when Deep Battle focused on the front line and the operational depth immediately behind it — modern Russian operations have expanded the concept to encompass an entire national battlespace. Russia is gradually extending vertical envelopment across the full breadth of Ukraine, employing drones, loitering munitions, and missile strikes to make every layer of Ukrainian territory, from trench to power grid, unsafe.

Neo–Deep Battle Fires preserves the classical Deep Battle objective — collapsing an opponent’s defensive system across depth — but replaces massed, saturating barrages with networked presision using automation and AI: drones, precision‑guided munitions, and sensor‑to‑shooter links, together with strike assessment in near‑real time, create a semi‑autonomous cycle of reconnaissance, targeting, and destruction that achieves the same operational effect through surgical, distributed fires rather than brute volume.

The result is an evolved form of Deep Battle: not confined to linear fronts or shallow depths, but multidimensional—horizontal, vertical, and informational. The tools have changed—from barrages to algorithms, from mass to precision—but the logic endures: to paralyze the enemy’s defensive system across the total battlespace.

Sources

Citino, Robert M. “Going Deep: The Red Army in World War II.” Robert M. Citino – Accessed 9/27/2025. https://www.historynet.com/going-deep-the-red-army-in-world-war-ii/

Cranny-Evans, Sam. “Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations.” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), August 9, 2023.

Kem, Jack D., ed. Deep Operations: Theoretical Approaches to Fighting Deep. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, November 2021.

Klug, Jon. “Soviet Theory Forgotten: Russian Military Strategy in the War in Ukraine.” Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 9, Issue 3 (Spring 2024): 30-37.

Laughbaum, R. Kent. Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle. CADRE Paper. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL, January 1999. Accessed October 2025.

Mittal, Vikram. “Artillery Is Still the King of Battle in the Russia-Ukraine War.” Forbes, July 16, 2024.

Mittal, Vikram. “Russia Capitalizes on Development of Artificial Intelligence in Its Military Strategy.” RealClearDefense, March 4, 2025.

Peck, Michael. “The War in Ukraine Is Pushing Russia Away from Its WWII-Style Artillery Strategy, and Experts Say It’s ‘a Concerning Trend.'” Business Insider, September 7, 2023.

Peck, Michael. “Russia Is Getting Better at Rapidly Destroying Enemy Artillery.” Business Insider, April 12, 2025.

Rea, Cam. “Soviet Deep Operations Doctrine: Origins and Key Theorists.” War and Civilization, September 5, 2024.

Russia’s Modular and Non-Linear Warfighting Style

Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a phase defined less by linear fronts and more by shifting domains of combat. Where once artillery barrages dominated the battlefield as the leading killer, new data from Russia itself suggests that first-person view (FPV) drones are steadily overtaking them. This shift is more than a technological upgrade; it represents a doctrinal evolution. FPVs broaden the battlespace, reach into rear areas once considered safe, and introduce a constant unpredictability that traditional fires cannot match.

At the same time, Russia’s pattern of attacks reveals a larger truth about modern war: it is non-linear. The tactical flavor of one month rarely matches that of the next, as methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers cycle in and out depending on the conditions. This modular approach requires Ukraine to prepare for multiple, overlapping threats simultaneously, while also highlighting the multidimensional nature of contemporary conflict.

The charts below, provided by Vitaly on X and Telegram, effectively illustrate the shift in which drones are becoming the “new artillery” and how they expand the battlespace.

Russia used 4,136 drones, accounting for 60% of July’s total, likely by accumulating them after the mid-summer performance. 691 drones reached their targets, and even more fell as debris.

Chart 1
Chart 1 Continued
Chart 2
Chart 2 Continued

Blue (Intercepted): The substantial interception of drones shows that both sides continue to invest heavily in counter-drone defenses.

Red (Lost): A significant share still makes it through, indicating drones achieve their objectives despite defenses.

Yellow (Not Reported): A steady fraction goes unreported, possibly due to operational gaps or unclaimed hits.

What this means: The volume of drones being launched rivals the tempo of artillery fire in past wars. Even if many are intercepted, the persistent pressure expands the kill zone where troops are constantly hunted.

Chart 2: Drone vs. Fire Support Systems

Yellow (Barrages): Overall decline (166,471 total).

Red (FPVs): Steady growth, recently overtaking barrages (147,444 total).

Blue (Bombs): Growing use of glide bombs fitted with UMPK kits or (Universal Gliding and Correction Module), including FAB-500, FAB-1500, and FAB-3000, alongside conventional free-fall FABs, particularly in areas with weak Ukrainian air defenses. Total: 4,400.

Green (MLRS or Multiple Launch Rocket System): Decline in use (2,478 total), likely due to attrition and limited inventory.

What this means: FPV drones have overtaken traditional artillery barrages in usage. That is a massive shift for artillery, long regarded as the “god of war” since Napoleon and especially in WWI/WWII. Unlike MLRS and artillery, which are limited by range and stockpiles, drones can penetrate deeper, creating an unpredictable kill zone that extends across tactical, operational, and even strategic depths.

Analysis

From Artillery to Drones

Artillery barrages and MLRS peaked early in the war. Artillery is steadily trending downward, MLRS has declined more sharply, while drones are scaling up. This signals a gradual shift from fewer, high-impact rocket strikes to more numerous, low-cost strikes using drones and bombs that are cheaper, more precise, and harder to predict.

Saturation Warfare

Even with an 83% loss rate, the sheer volume ensures hundreds of drones get through. This mirrors the principle of massed artillery fire: most shells miss, but enough hit to break defenses.

Economic Exchange

Drones cost a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. Interceptors cost tens of thousands. Even “failed” drone attacks create economic attrition by draining NATO-supplied systems.

Russia, however, benefits from its economic endurance as it transitions its economy to a wartime footing. It trades pennies for the West’s dollars, stockpiles drones at a rate of 5,000 per month (and rising), and operationally integrates them much as artillery once stockpiled shells before offensives (which it still does).

Expanding the Kill Zone

Even with only ~17% penetration, drones are striking far beyond the front lines, rear depots, power plants, and bridges. This creates a non-linear threat: instead of predictable barrages, drones “skip” depth and spread lethal pressure across the entire battlespace.

Exploiting Attrition

Overall, by using cheap weapons (FPV drones, decoys, artillery shells, and glide kits), Russia forces Ukraine to expend resources and expand its defensive systems. This necessitates the purchase of very expensive interceptors, radars, and other NATO-provided systems, allowing Russia to preserve its higher-value strategic assets while steadily depleting NATO’s stockpiles.

At the same time, this dynamic pulls Ukrainian manpower away from the front. Personnel who could be fighting are instead tied down operating defensive systems. Case in point: during World War II, Germany had more than one million Luftwaffe personnel who could have been redeployed to the front but were not. Ukraine faces a similar dilemma today, but with far fewer resources.

Finally, Russia benefits from exploiting captured territory and its infrastructure, even when much of it lies in ruins. The land itself becomes a weapon against Ukraine and NATO: any attempt to retake it is costly not only in reconstruction but also in human lives, as advancing forces would face both physical devastation and entrenched resistance. In this way, attrition favors Russia, as Ukraine is forced to expend manpower, resources, and time attempting to reclaim territory. This flips attrition into a net resource gain for Russia.

Conclusion

Russia’s own numbers confirm that FPV drones are slowly replacing artillery barrages as the leading killer. In doing so, they’ve made the battlefield broader and more unpredictable. Yet the tactical flavor of one month rarely carries into the next due to the fog of war. Russia’s methods do change, but often flip back to earlier approaches, cycling rather than progressing linearly. However, that should not fool anyone into thinking the threat is predictable.

Shift in lethality: FPVs outpace artillery as the primary killer.

Expansion of the battlespace: Drones strike from unexpected angles, turning rear areas into targets.

Fluid tactical flavor: Drones and bombs cycle in and out depending on supply chains, weather, and countermeasures.

In short, Russia’s warfighting style is characterized by modularity and non-linearity. They cycle tools, including methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers, at both macro and micro levels. These shift as conditions change, forcing Ukraine to counter multiple threats simultaneously.

Remember: war is non-linear—a complex contest of power unfolding across time, space, and every domain simultaneously.

Sources

Russia on track to build artillery shell stockpile triple the size of the US’s and Europe’s combined: top US general

Is Russia producing a year’s worth of NATO ammunition in three months?

WW2 Germany Population, Statistics, and Numbers

Russia Will Soon Fire 2,000 Drones a Day: ISW – Newsweek

With China’s Help, Moscow Says It Has Tripled Its Drone …

Russia ramps up drone war with more than … – RBC-Ukraine

Shahed drones – Intelligence reveals Russia’s monthly UAV …

Russia wants to produce over 6000 “Shaheds” per month – CNN

Russia significantly increases production of long-range drones