Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a phase defined less by linear fronts and more by shifting domains of combat. Where once artillery barrages dominated the battlefield as the leading killer, new data from Russia itself suggests that first-person view (FPV) drones are steadily overtaking them. This shift is more than a technological upgrade; it represents a doctrinal evolution. FPVs broaden the battlespace, reach into rear areas once considered safe, and introduce a constant unpredictability that traditional fires cannot match.
At the same time, Russia’s pattern of attacks reveals a larger truth about modern war: it is non-linear. The tactical flavor of one month rarely matches that of the next, as methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers cycle in and out depending on the conditions. This modular approach requires Ukraine to prepare for multiple, overlapping threats simultaneously, while also highlighting the multidimensional nature of contemporary conflict.
The charts below, provided by Vitaly on X and Telegram, effectively illustrate the shift in which drones are becoming the “new artillery” and how they expand the battlespace.
Russia used 4,136 drones, accounting for 60% of July’s total, likely by accumulating them after the mid-summer performance. 691 drones reached their targets, and even more fell as debris.
Chart 1Chart 1 Continued Chart 2Chart 2 Continued
Chart 1: Reported Drones (Lost, Intercepted, Not Reported)
Blue (Intercepted): The substantial interception of drones shows that both sides continue to invest heavily in counter-drone defenses.
Red (Lost): A significant share still makes it through, indicating drones achieve their objectives despite defenses.
Yellow (Not Reported): A steady fraction goes unreported, possibly due to operational gaps or unclaimed hits.
What this means: The volume of drones being launched rivals the tempo of artillery fire in past wars. Even if many are intercepted, the persistent pressure expands the kill zone where troops are constantly hunted.
Red (FPVs): Steady growth, recently overtaking barrages (147,444 total).
Blue (Bombs): Growing use of glide bombs fitted with UMPK kits or (Universal Gliding and Correction Module), including FAB-500, FAB-1500, and FAB-3000, alongside conventional free-fall FABs, particularly in areas with weak Ukrainian air defenses. Total: 4,400.
Green (MLRS or Multiple Launch Rocket System): Decline in use (2,478 total), likely due to attrition and limited inventory.
What this means: FPV drones have overtaken traditional artillery barrages in usage. That is a massive shift for artillery, long regarded as the “god of war” since Napoleon and especially in WWI/WWII. Unlike MLRS and artillery, which are limited by range and stockpiles, drones can penetrate deeper, creating an unpredictable kill zone that extends across tactical, operational, and even strategic depths.
Analysis
From Artillery to Drones
Artillery barrages and MLRS peaked early in the war. Artillery is steadily trending downward, MLRS has declined more sharply, while drones are scaling up. This signals a gradual shift from fewer, high-impact rocket strikes to more numerous, low-cost strikes using drones and bombs that are cheaper, more precise, and harder to predict.
Saturation Warfare
Even with an 83% loss rate, the sheer volume ensures hundreds of drones get through. This mirrors the principle of massed artillery fire: most shells miss, but enough hit to break defenses.
Economic Exchange
Drones cost a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. Interceptors cost tens of thousands. Even “failed” drone attacks create economic attrition by draining NATO-supplied systems.
Russia, however, benefits from its economic endurance as it transitions its economy to a wartime footing. It trades pennies for the West’s dollars, stockpiles drones at a rate of 5,000 per month (and rising), and operationally integrates them much as artillery once stockpiled shells before offensives (which it still does).
Expanding the Kill Zone
Even with only ~17% penetration, drones are striking far beyond the front lines, rear depots, power plants, and bridges. This creates a non-linear threat: instead of predictable barrages, drones “skip” depth and spread lethal pressure across the entire battlespace.
Exploiting Attrition
Overall, by using cheap weapons (FPV drones, decoys, artillery shells, and glide kits), Russia forces Ukraine to expend resources and expand its defensive systems. This necessitates the purchase of very expensive interceptors, radars, and other NATO-provided systems, allowing Russia to preserve its higher-value strategic assets while steadily depleting NATO’s stockpiles.
At the same time, this dynamic pulls Ukrainian manpower away from the front. Personnel who could be fighting are instead tied down operating defensive systems. Case in point: during World War II, Germany had more than one million Luftwaffe personnel who could have been redeployed to the front but were not. Ukraine faces a similar dilemma today, but with far fewer resources.
Finally, Russia benefits from exploiting captured territory and its infrastructure, even when much of it lies in ruins. The land itself becomes a weapon against Ukraine and NATO: any attempt to retake it is costly not only in reconstruction but also in human lives, as advancing forces would face both physical devastation and entrenched resistance. In this way, attrition favors Russia, as Ukraine is forced to expend manpower, resources, and time attempting to reclaim territory. This flips attrition into a net resource gain for Russia.
Conclusion
Russia’s own numbers confirm that FPV drones are slowly replacing artillery barrages as the leading killer. In doing so, they’ve made the battlefield broader and more unpredictable. Yet the tactical flavor of one month rarely carries into the next due to the fog of war. Russia’s methods do change, but often flip back to earlier approaches, cycling rather than progressing linearly. However, that should not fool anyone into thinking the threat is predictable.
Shift in lethality: FPVs outpace artillery as the primary killer.
Expansion of the battlespace: Drones strike from unexpected angles, turning rear areas into targets.
Fluid tactical flavor: Drones and bombs cycle in and out depending on supply chains, weather, and countermeasures.
In short, Russia’s warfighting style is characterized by modularity and non-linearity. They cycle tools, including methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers, at both macro and micro levels. These shift as conditions change, forcing Ukraine to counter multiple threats simultaneously.
Remember: war is non-linear—a complex contest of power unfolding across time, space, and every domain simultaneously.
The term DRG (Sabotage and Reconnaissance Group) is gaining wider attention in discussions of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, and for good reason. These teams represent a form of micro-maneuver warfare that has proven highly effective for Russian forces.
The concept dates back to the Soviet era, when DRGs were developed as small, highly mobile units capable of operating deep behind enemy lines to gather intelligence, conduct sabotage, and create disruption functionally similar to Western special operations forces (e.g., Green Berets, Navy SEALs, SAS).
Military historian David M. Glantz examined this doctrine in detail in his 1989 study The Fundamentals of Soviet Razvedka (Intelligence/Reconnaissance), which remains an excellent reference for understanding how DRGs evolved into their modern form.
This isn’t Deep Battle. It’s Patton’s “haul ass and bypass” approach, utilizing drones, artillery, armor, and assaults all with tactical patience. Russia’s 2025 summer offensive in Ukraine is not a sweeping, armored thrust meant to collapse the entire front in a matter of days. It is something quieter but no less dangerous. Frankly, it is a methodical campaign built around probing, bypassing, and isolating. In this model, the Russians aren’t trying to destroy Ukrainian forces in a grand clash. They’re trying to surround them, sometimes physically and often virtually, and then destroy them with firepower. This is a war of maneuver, but it is also a war of attrition by design. As I was told, it’s a paint-by-number war.
Before proceeding, it’s best to briefly explain what a paint-by-number war is. Some call this a “Triple Chokehold” tactic, which comes down in three phases. I first encountered this topic in May. The title is “Russia’s new three-step assault tactic yields gradual gains.“
Initial Ground Assault: Russian infantry initiates an attack to force Ukrainian units into fixed defensive positions, limiting their mobility.
Drone Surveillance: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) monitor Ukrainian troop movements, identifying weak points in their defenses. This continuous surveillance compels Ukrainian forces to remain static, often leading them to dig multiple trenches to mislead the enemy.
Airstrike Phase: Russian aircraft deploy glide bombs to target the identified positions, aiming to destroy fortifications and inflict heavy casualties.
Find – Tactical Reconnaissance and Probing
The first step in this approach is identifying soft points. Russian forces use a mix of ISR assets, drones, electronic warfare, SIGINT, and good old-fashioned reconnaissance-in-force to locate where Ukraine’s lines are overstretched or thinly held. These aren’t always places with trenches or fortifications. In fact, they often aren’t. The Russians aren’t looking for a fight. They’re looking for the void. The countryside becomes the enemy’s true weakness, not because of what’s there, but because of what isn’t.
This form of “finding” mirrors the first phase of traditional kill chains, but with a twist: it’s area-based, not just target-based. Russia does not look for targets to kill, but rather terrain to bypass and manipulate.
Fix – Pressure to Pin and Distract
Once potential axes of advance are identified, Russian forces apply pressure. This pressure is not designed to break through; it is meant to fix Ukrainian forces in place. Constant shelling, probing attacks, and drone harassment force Ukrainian commanders to commit reserves and dig in. In doing so, Russia accomplishes two things: it prevents Ukrainian units from maneuvering elsewhere, and it convinces them that this is where the fight will be. Meanwhile, the actual point of decision is forming somewhere else. In other words, watch this hand, not this hand, or watch both hands, or neither hand.
This is not frontal assault warfare; it is misdirection with kinetic tools.
Maneuver – The Operational Bypass
Now the real move begins. Instead of trying to take the fixed position head-on, Russian units bypass them, literally driving around resistance and securing the terrain behind it. These flanking maneuvers don’t need to be deep. In fact, they are often shallow by historical standards, extending only a few kilometers or miles into the rear. But they are enough to isolate and force the defenders into a dilemma. That dilemma is to stay and risk being cut off, or retreat under fire.
This method of warfare resembles Bewegungskrieg (war of maneuver) with a modern twist. There is no need to mass forces for a deep penetration when firepower and surveillance can do the work of encirclement. This is Patton’s doctrine in spirit, which is to “haul ass and bypass.” However, where Patton relied on airpower and speed to blitz through enemy lines, modern Russia has all that and more. Drones give them persistent surveillance. Artillery offers immediate punishment. Electronic warfare denies Ukrainian coordination. But their greatest asset may be less visible: patience. Patience is their speed.
Russia is not rushing breakthroughs. They advance deliberately, probing, pressing, and repositioning until the moment is right. This patience allows them to bypass strongpoints without the urgency of a race, because every bypassed position becomes a future problem for Ukraine, not a current one for Russia. Speed, in this war, is not measured in kilometers or miles per hour, but in how long it takes the trap to close, with or without bait.
Kill Zones Without Troops
What makes this strategy lethal isn’t the movement alone. It’s the environment that follows. Once Ukrainian units are isolated either tactically or geographically, the Russians don’t have to storm their positions. They just watch. Drones track every movement. Artillery waits for vehicles or clusters of troops. Even when Russian ground forces are not present in strength, they maintain fire control over the area.
Trying to move is death. Standing still is surrender, starvation, or death. This is not an encirclement in the classic sense; it is an algorithmic siege. It is a battlefield that punishes initiative and rewards stasis only long enough for the trap to close. This is a 360-degree kill zone maintained by sensors and standoff firepower.
Conclusion
Russia is not currently executing a form of modern Deep Operations. There is a reason for that, and that is politically based, I think. They do not need to. Instead, they are conducting a highly pragmatic, lethally modern form of maneuver warfare: find the void, fix the defenders, and maneuver around them until they are isolated and vulnerable. It is not fast, but it is effective. It is not elegant, but it is repeatable. This is a paint-by-number blitzkrieg blueprint, siege by satellite. And it is working.
Ukraine now faces a battlefield where movement means death, fixed defenses become liabilities, and initiative is punished by a hovering all-seeing eye. The Russians have found a way to wage war without needing to engage in a direct confrontation. They don’t crush. They surround. They don’t break through. They bypass. And in doing so, they turn the very terrain into a weapon of war.
Putin’s approach to the Russo-Ukrainian War reflects both World War II and the Korean War—one shaped by industrial might, the other by political endurance. These strategies have proven effective in the past and remain just as formidable today.
The Military Aspect of the Russo-Ukrainian War in a Nutshell
The Russo-Ukrainian War is a 21st-century high-tech hybrid of second through fifth-generation warfare (2-5GW). Third-generation warfare (3GW) was the center of both forces in 2022-23, emphasizing rapid maneuvering in hopes of penetrating deep behind enemy lines and collapsing the enemy’s center of gravity. Russia’s initial invasion (2022) sought an AirLand Battle Blitzkrieg-style advance that failed to obtain air superiority, which led to its demise and pushback of its ground forces. The same could be said of Ukrainian forces in the following years.
The failure to establish maneuver ultimately led toan attritional, technology-driven conflict (2GW and elements of 4-5GW). For example, Russia’s shift toward entrenched defensive strategies, mass artillery fire, and drone warfare (2GW + 4GW), while Ukraine’s adaptation with precision strikes, asymmetric attacks using drones, and heavy reliance on Western intelligence (4GW + 5GW). However, the pendulum would swing the other way.
For 2024-2025, the war has shifted even further away from third-generation warfare (3GW) and is now dominated by second-generation (2GW) attrition and fourth-/fifth-generation (4GW/5GW) technological integration. Russia is winning due to several key factors.
The first of these many factors starts with the decline of 3GW and the rise of attrition (2GW). Russia’s fortified defensive lines made maneuver warfare almost impossible for Ukraine. Russia’s sheer firepower through massed artillery gave it an advantage due to outproducing the West in shell production and giving it an upper hand in grinding battles—along with the dwindling Ukrainian manpower, ammunition shortages, recruitment, and Western support.
However, shortly before the Ukrainian forces began to suffer the lack thereof, the Russian military began to integrate and amalgamate (4GW/5GW), giving their forces an edge. Drone warfare dominance has allowed the Russians to master loitering munitions, first-person view (FPV) drones, and swarm tactics, overwhelming Ukrainian positions. Not to forget electronic warfare (EW), which the Russian EW systems can now effectively jam Ukrainian communications, drones, and guided munitions and vice versa at times. AI and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) have improved the Russian forces’ real-time battlefield awareness through satellites, drones, and AI-assisted targeting. At this stage of the conflict, Russia is not winning through maneuver (3GW) but by a relentless combination of industrial capacity and attritional strategy (2GW), advanced technology (4GW/5GW), and Ukraine’s weakening strategic position. While a basic overview of the military aspect has been outlined, how does it connect with the political dimension, and in what ways do they correlate?
The Political and Industrial Aspect of the Russo-Ukrainian War in a Nutshell
Like Stalin in Korea, Putin seems content with a prolonged war, seeing it as a way to:
Observe, Study, Train, and Improve his forces for the current war and potential future conflicts.
Strain Western support for Ukraine by dragging the war out, banking on political fatigue.
Erode the military and economic strength of NATO-backed Ukraine, just as Stalin hoped to weaken the US-led coalition in Korea using China and North Korea.
At the same time, Putin has applied the WWII-era industrial attrition model, mirroring how the Soviets countered German Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) by leveraging sheer production capacity and the advantage of time and space. The vast Ukrainian front allowed Russia to absorb enemy attacks, stretch Ukrainian supply lines, and gradually wear down its forces—just as the Soviets did against the Germans. As Ukraine’s army and NATO supplies diminish, the vastness of its territory becomes an increasing liability. With fewer troops to defend an expansive front, strategic overstretch sets in, making it harder to hold ground, reinforce weak points, and sustain prolonged resistance—playing directly into Russia’s war of attrition:
Russia’s mass industrial mobilization ensures its army is never starved of munitions.
Defensive depth + counteroffensive waves: Like in WWII, Russian forces absorbed early Ukrainian counterattacks (2023), only to grind them down through attritional battles and layered defenses (2024-present), similar to how the Soviets wore down the Germans.
Manpower attrition: Ukraine, with a smaller population and struggling recruitment, shows signs of exhaustion, much like Germany’s overstretched forces in WWII.
Ukraine’s dilemma is a lack of industrial capacity, much like NATO, which gives aid to Ukraine but also lacks a coherent military industry to fund, fuel, equip, train, and support the Ukrainian army, let alone its coalition, if decided to join directly. It also does not help to have low morale among the troops and the populace, even those nations’ administrations who support the effort; the nation’s population finds it fleeting. Because of this, the ability to conduct organized, combined arms maneuver warfare ceases to exist, leaving the Ukrainian forces to the brutality of attritional warfare.
Conclusion
This comparison suggests Putin’s long-term strategy is not about breakthrough victories but about wearing Ukraine and NATO down through political and industrial attrition. The defensive pressure placed on the Ukrainian forces and NATO backers will eventually collapse into itself as the center never holds. In this case, Ukraine and NATO are the center of gravity as both creatures exist in a politically symbiotic union; if the Ukrainian forces collapse, NATO folds. If NATO is unable to fund and equip the Ukrainian forces, Ukraine folds. In the end, both fold.
Get ready for another possible reboot. In 2019, a friend informed me that Gremlins 3 might be coming soon to a local theater/drive-in near you. While I am not a big fan of remakes, the idea of reigniting the Gremlins franchise sparked my interest. The person interested in reviving them is filmmaker Chris Columbus. Columbus, by the way, was the original writer of Gremlins. Columbus made it clear that not only was he “proud of the script,” but that the movie would “not be a sequel, it will be a reboot.” Therefore, Gremlins 3 will not be the third installment but a do-over.
The original Gremlins was released on June 8, 1984, and made $153.1 million on an $11 million budget. While I did not see the film in the theater, my parents rented the VHS tape a year later. After watching the live-action puppeteer version (designed by Chris Walas) of what a gremlin looks like, according to Hollywood, I still had the Looney Tune version ingrained in my head. The Looney Tune episode featuring a gremlin is titled “Falling Hare,” which was released on October 30, 1943. Another Merrie Melody featuring the gremlin came out less than a year later, titled “Russian Rhapsody,” released on May 20, 1944. The original title of this episode was “Gremlins from the Kremlin.” So what is a gremlin, and just as important, what in the hell is a mogwai from which the gremlins spring!?
What is a Gremlin?
The Royal Air Force aviators stationed in Malta, the Middle East, and India first coined the word gremlin in 1923. However, the term was slang to explain that some creature had caused mechanical failures. It was not until April 10, 1929, that the term gremlin first appeared in print as a poem in the journal “Aeroplane.” Nevertheless, the term became popularized during World War II and was picked up by Americans.
The New York Times Magazine, April 11, 1943, states that the term is of unknown origin and “probably formed by analogy with GOBLIN.” Moreover, there is a “possible dialectal survival of Old English gremman “to anger, vex” + the -lin of goblin; or Irish gruaimin “bad-tempered little fellow.” Surfer slang for “young surfer, beach trouble-maker” is from 1961 (short form gremmie by 1962).” While this explains a little about a gremlin, it does not give an exact origin. However, the 1984 film Gremlins does provide a possible origin and suggests that they come from a little furry creature called mogwai. But what is a mogwai?
What is a Mogwai?
In the film Gremlins, an inventor named Randall Peltzer visits a Chinatown antique store looking for a Christmas present for his son Billy. While in the store, he encounters a small, furry creature called a mogwai. Seeing that this might make the perfect gift, the storeowner, Mr. Wing, refuses to sell the creature. As the store goes, the grandson of the storeowner sells the mogwai to Mr. Peltzer and explains the three rules to him.
Keep him out of the light.
Keep him away from water.
Never feed him after midnight.
Sounds easy enough, right? Well, for those who have seen the film, you already know that it goes from good to bad to worse quickly. But the one thing missing is what a mogwai is.
The word mogwai is Cantonese and means “monster,” “evil spirit,” “devil,” or “demon.” While little Gizmo is a cute furry creature, in Chinese tradition, mogwai are certain demons that often inflict harm on humans. Gizmo is the exception since any other mogwai in the Gremlin series has a mean streak. As for reproduction, unlike the movie, where if water gets on one of them, they sprout many, according to tradition, “they reproduce sexually during mating seasons triggered by the coming of rain. Supposedly, they breed at these times because rain signifies rich and full times ahead.” As for the name mogwai, the “mo” is said to derive from the Sanskrit “Mara,” meaning ‘evil beings’ (literally “death”), whereas the “GUI” does not necessarily mean ‘evil’ or demonic spirits. Instead, it means deceased spirits or souls of the dead. But is there a connection between these two creatures? The answer is no. It sounded like a good idea and creative thought to make the two creatures one and the same.
The Gremlins True Origin and Meaning.
Okay. I saved the best for last. The origins of the gremlin do not come from some mythological creature but rather from a beer. Yes, a beer. The gremlin is based on Fremlin beer, brewed in Maidstone, Kent, England, and was a favorite among the R.A.F. pilots. Therefore, the term gremlin comes from Fremlin. Well, hold on. Yes, the term comes from Fremlin, but with a rather funny twist. According to the Observer, on November 8, 1942, John Moore was told that gremlins “were goblins which came out of Fremlin beer bottles.” But it gets funnier, folks.
Less than a year later, Newsweek published an article on September 7, 1943, discussing the term gremlin and its origins. According to Newsweek, they quote the following from a dispatch they received from Merrill Mueller, chief of the magazine’s London bureau:
The great-grandaddy of all “bloody Gremlins” was born in 1923 in a beer bottle belonging to a Fleet Air Arm pilot whose catapult reconnaissance plane was cursed with perpetual engine trouble. This pilot was overloaded with beer the night before a practice maneuver, when the engine failed and he crashed into the waves. Rescued he said the engine failed because little people from a beer bottle had haunted him all night and had got into the plane’s engine and controls during the flight…. “the bloody Gremlins did it.”
Therefore, the 1984 film Gremlins was unknowing (perhaps Chris Columbus did know?).. built off Fremlin booze, which an R.A.F. pilot ingested in mass quantities in 1923 until he could no longer fly. Upon his rescue, he clarified that “the bloody Gremlins (Booze) did it.” So there you have it: Fremlin beer and a bit of drunken creativity started a franchise we enjoy today. Cheers!
This work is not intended to be an exhaustive overview of Soviet Deep Operations but rather a culmination of three years of interest and study in the subject—an area I intend to continue investigating with the hope of writing a full-length book. I am grateful to Dr. Curtis S. King, Associate Professor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Although we have never met, his insightful series “Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare” on YouTube was the catalyst that sparked my deep dive into this field. His lecture provided a foundation from which I began exploring the writings of various Soviet military theorists and the invaluable contributions of Colonel David M. Glantz, particularly his book “Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle.” I highly recommend Dr. King’s lectures to anyone interested in the intricate world of Soviet military thought. This journey has been guided by the knowledge shared by these scholars, whose works have been instrumental in shaping my understanding of this complex and fascinating doctrine.
Introduction: A brief overview of the Deep Operations doctrine
The genesis of the Deep Operations doctrine can be traced to the Soviet Union’s interwar period during the 1920s and 1930s. This unique doctrine’s objective is to achieve a decisive victory by neutralizing the enemy’s logistical capabilities, causing the defensive front to collapse under its weight.
Importance of Understanding its Origins and Principles
Understanding Deep Operations, its origins, and principles is crucial because it represents a foundational shift in military thinking developed by Soviet theorists in response to the stalemate of World War I. The doctrine emphasizes deep, coordinated attacks across multiple levels to disrupt and dismantle enemy forces, and it played a crucial role in Soviet successes during World War II. Its principles continued to influence modern military strategies, particularly in America, with the AirLand Battle doctrine developed in 1982 and continued to be in play until the late 90s, which itself was replaced with full-spectrum dominance only to evolve into multi-domain operation gradually by 2018. Even today, the Russian military still incorporates many aspects of the Soviet-era doctrine due to its fluidity and adaptability to the chaotic character of war. The study of Deep Operations provides valuable lessons on the interplay between military doctrine, geography, and broader geopolitical objectives.
Historical Context: The Need for a New Military Doctrine
The development of deep operations, also known as the Soviet deep battle doctrine, was profoundly influenced by the contrasting nature of warfare on the Western and Eastern Fronts during World War I. The Western Front’s static, trench-based warfare with little movement and the Eastern Front’s more fluid and dynamic nature, which proved to be a significant challenge, left a lasting impact. Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852–1925) famously remarked, “In the west, the armies were too big for the land; in the east, the land was too big for the armies,” highlighting the fundamental differences in the strategic environments of the two fronts.
A Brief Observation on the Western Front
Soviet military theorists were highly critical of the static nature of trench warfare on the Western Front, seeing the prolonged stalemate and high casualty rates as evidence of strategic and tactical failures. They recognized the limitations of the Western Front’s geography, where the dense network of trenches, fortifications, and obstacles severely restricted large-scale maneuver operations. This concentration of forces in a narrow zone led to logistical challenges and limited opportunities for decisive movements.
Technological innovations, such as artillery bombardments, dominated the Western Front, yet these often failed to achieve strategic breakthroughs. While advancements like tanks and aircraft emerged, their initial deployment was limited and did not immediately transform the nature of warfare. Commanders, many of whom were veterans of previous wars like the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, struggled to adapt to the new realities of modern warfare. Their experience in leadership, logistics, and traditional tactics proved inadequate for the complex demands of World War I, where the effective execution of combined arms theory was still evolving.
Key Observations on Russian Failures on the Eastern Front
Brusilov offensive 1916
Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s identified the vast size of the Eastern Front as both a strategic asset and a significant challenge. The expansive geography of Russia and Eastern Europe created operational and logistical difficulties that deeply influenced Soviet military thought. The immense distances made maintaining supply lines daunting, with armies operating far from their bases and facing delays in receiving essential supplies, equipment, and reinforcements. The underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in remote areas, exacerbated these challenges, with poor roads, limited rail networks, and harsh weather conditions frequently disrupting the flow of resources.
Command and control also posed significant challenges on the Eastern Front. The sheer size of the theater necessitated decentralized command structures, leading to coordination difficulties and slower decision-making. Communication across vast distances was often unreliable, resulting in delays in transmitting orders and intelligence. While necessary due to the front’s scale, this decentralized command structure often led to a lack of cohesion and operational fragmentation. Commanders frequently focused on their immediate areas of responsibility, sometimes prioritizing local objectives over the broader strategic picture. This fragmentation hindered the effectiveness of operations and contributed to the Russian Army’s overall strategic failures in the war.
The decentralized command further complicated the maintenance of supply lines. Competing priorities among semi-independent units led to logistical bottlenecks and shortages. The movement and allocation of reinforcements were often poorly coordinated, leaving critical areas unsupported due to the lack of centralized control and planning.
This fractured command structure was a key reason for the Russian Army’s defeat. The Imperial Russian Army’s inability to execute large-scale, coordinated operations effectively stemmed from its fragmented leadership, nepotism, and overall corruption. Even well-conceived strategic decisions often failed due to poor communication and inadequate coordination across the military’s various components.
Soviet military thinkers later lambasted the Russian Imperial Army for its failure to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. They pointed out that the Army’s leadership had not developed a contemporary military doctrine to meet the evolving battlefield challenges. Instead, outdated tactics, such as mass infantry assaults, persisted, leading to severe casualties and operational failures. The inability to modernize and innovate within its military doctrine was a critical flaw that ultimately contributed to the Army’s decline.
Conclusion
In summary, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s attributed the defeat of the Imperial Russian Army in World War I to a combination of ineffective command structures, logistical failures, and an inability to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. These factors combined created a situation of strategic exhaustion, a state of depletion that led to the Army’s eventual collapse and the revolutionary discontent that followed. This analysis laid the groundwork for developing the Deep Operations doctrine, which sought to address the shortcomings of earlier military strategies and adapt to the realities of 20th-century warfare.
After World War I, Soviet military thinkers in the 1920s—like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Svechin, and Vladimir Triandafillov—took a hard look at the differences between the Eastern Front of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. These two conflicts were worlds apart regarding scale, movement, and strategic challenges. For these military minds, understanding these differences was key to shaping the future of warfare.
Although the Red Army did not officially use what we now know as Deep Operations or Deep Battle during the Polish-Soviet War, the conflict was a crucial testing ground for these ideas. The strategies employed by the Red Army during the war hinted at the early stages of deep operations, showing promising glimpses of their potential—even if they were not fully formed or executed by later standards. In many ways, this war was a proving ground, helping to lay the groundwork for the doctrines that would eventually define Soviet military strategy.
The Eastern Front in World War I was massive and complex, with millions of troops battling across vast territories. Unlike the static trench warfare of the Western Front, the Eastern Front was highly fluid, marked by rapid advances and retreats that demanded enormous logistical and operational coordination over great distances. In contrast, the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 was much smaller. It was a fast-paced series of campaigns involving fewer troops and resources, more about swift maneuvers than a prolonged struggle. Although intense, it lacked the grand scale and industrial might of World War I.
Soviet military thinkers recognized that the lessons from the Polish-Soviet War could not be directly applied to a conflict on the scale of World War I. The smaller size of the war allowed for more flexibility but also exposed glaring weaknesses in Soviet operational planning and execution—flaws that could have been catastrophic in a larger conflict.
In the early stages of the war, the Red Army attempted a bold maneuver, aiming to penetrate Polish territory with a rapid advance toward Warsaw. The plan was to bypass fortified positions and strike directly at Poland’s heart, hoping to force a quick surrender. This approach reflected early ideas that would evolve into the deep battle concept—skipping strong points to disrupt the enemy’s rear and command. However, poor coordination, lack of reserves, and stretched supply lines meant the Red Army could not maintain its momentum, revealing significant flaws in executing complex operations.
The war underscored the critical importance of logistics, driving home that logistical planning couldn’t be an afterthought but had to be integrated into every operational planning level, especially in long-distance, sustained offensives. It also highlighted the need for better coordination and communication among combat units, which later became crucial aspects of the deep operations doctrine.
Ultimately, the Polish-Soviet War was a condensed version of the operational and strategic challenges faced on the Eastern Front during World War I. It served as a wake-up call for Soviet military thinkers, pushing them to refine their understanding of warfare. They saw the need for a new approach to integrate various military actions into a coherent whole, combining strategy and tactics through effective command, control, and logistics. This would eventually lead to developing the deep operations doctrine, focusing on synchronized, multi-layered attacks designed to keep constant pressure on the enemy.
In short, the Polish-Soviet War was a stark reminder of past challenges and a critical learning experience. It drove home the need for a more sophisticated approach to warfare, setting the stage for the deep operations doctrine that would redefine Soviet military strategy in the decades to come.
Soviet Military Theorist: Key Thinkers
Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931)
Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931) coined the term “deep operation” and played a pivotal role in formulating the concepts that defined this military strategy in his book The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (1929). As a key theorist and planner in the Red Army, Triandafillov expanded on the ideas of deep operations. He introduced the concept of glubokiy boy (deep battle or fight), emphasizing the need for multi-echeloned attacks to sustain offensive momentum and penetrate great depths with massed armies to overwhelm and outmaneuver the enemy to obtain victory. However, Triandafillov was a realist. While he was offensive-minded, the Soviet Union’s economy was not ready for the high casualties that future wars would produce due to not being advanced enough for mechanization.
Alexander Svechin (1878–1938)
Alexander Svechin (1878–1938) was a prominent military theorist and historian who played a crucial role in shaping Soviet strategic thought by emphasizing that military strategy should be considered an art rather than a science, as argued in his book Strategy, whichremains a crucial text in understanding the evolution of Soviet military doctrine. He argued that no universal strategy fits all situations; instead, the strategy must be adaptive and based on a deep understanding of the specific political, economic, and social contexts. Svechin also introduced the idea of operational art as the bridge between tactics and strategy. He emphasized the need for flexible and coherent operational planning that could adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield. Svechin, like Triandafillov, argued that for deep operations to work, they had to prepare for a protracted conflict and stressed that the Soviet Union must be ready for total war, which would require the mobilization of all national resources.
Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925)
Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925) was a Bolshevik revolutionary who became one of the foremost military leaders in the early Soviet Union and significantly shaped its military doctrine. Regarding theory, Frunze advocated for creating a unique unified military doctrine, separate from the Czarist one, that would align with the political goals of the Soviet state. However, he would concede that his idea of a unique proletarian military was flawed since one would have to return to yesteryear’s military traditions and methods to be effective. He believed that military strategy should not be purely technical but should also serve the ideological aims of the Communist Party. Frunze advocated for the professionalizing and modernizing of the Red Army. He argued for the importance of a standing army, a professional officer corps, and the use of modern technology in warfare. He viewed warfare as an extension of class struggle. He believed that the Soviet military must be prepared to wage revolutionary wars against capitalist states and that this ideological perspective should inform all aspects of military strategy and organization.
Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937)
Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) was a prominent Soviet military leader and theorist and is often regarded as the father of the deep operations theory. Tukhachevsky advocated for mobile warfare with large-scale, coordinated operations that would penetrate deep into enemy lines. He believed that massed artillery, mechanized forces, and aviation should work together to achieve deep penetrations that would bypass enemy strongpoints and collapse their defenses from within. His ideas laid the foundation for developing Soviet operational art, emphasizing enemy force’s destruction through depth rather than mere attrition, unlike Svechin, who advocated for a protracted war.
Georgii Isserson (1898–1976)
Georgii Isserson (1898–1976) was another leading Soviet military theorist who contributed to developing deep operations doctrine. While Tukhachevsky is regarded as the father of deep operations, Isserson expanded the idea of deep operations (glubokaya operation), which involved simultaneous strikes at multiple depths within the enemy’s operational depth. He argued that modern warfare required a shift from linear tactics to operations that could achieve strategic effects by dislocating the enemy’s command and control structures and logistical networks. Isserson’s works, particularly “The Evolution of Operational Art” and “Fundamentals of the Deep Operation,” became foundational texts in Soviet military education. His ideas were critical in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.
Birth of the Operational Art
The development of operational art in the Soviet military doctrine was, in part, intended to alleviate the pressure on Soviet forces by improving how military operations were planned and executed at a scale larger than tactics but smaller than grand strategy. Operational art aimed to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics, allowing for more effective management of large-scale, complex operations across vast distances, which was crucial given the Soviet Union’s unique geographical and logistical challenges.
The solution began by embracing and working with the vast Soviet landscape, a valuable strategic asset, and a double-edged sword. Leon Trotsky did not have a hand in developing deep operations but served as the Commissar of War and effective leader of the Red Army. However, in his 1919 article “Proletariat, to Horse!” Trotsky emphasizes the need to bring mobility back to the battlefield, reflecting lessons learned from the aftermath of World War I and the ongoing Russian Civil War at the time, where static, positional warfare often led to stalemates. Trotsky argues that increased mobility, particularly the use of cavalry, could exploit the vast and open Russian terrain to outmaneuver and surprise the enemy, restoring a dynamic element to warfare. Trotsky viewed Russia’s vast steppes and open spaces as a strategic asset that could be leveraged through mobile warfare. By emphasizing mounted troops, the Red Army could capitalize on the terrain in a way that other military forces might struggle with, especially those more reliant on mechanized units or static defenses. His ideas contributed to a broader Soviet military tradition that valued maneuvering and understood the need to take advantage of the terrain by developing deep operations, which was still to come.
It Begins with the Unified Military Doctrine
Mikhail Frunze played a crucial role in shaping Soviet military thought during the early 1920s, particularly through his advocacy for a “Unified Military Doctrine,” which was briefly discussed in his biography. Frunze wanted to create a cohesive and standardized military doctrine that would reflect the unique ideological and strategic needs of the Soviet state.
Frunze believed that the Red Army should not only be a fighting force but also an ideological tool aligned with the goals of the Soviet state. His vision of a Unified Military Doctrine emphasized that military strategy and operations should not be politically neutral or purely technical but deeply intertwined with Marxist-Leninist principles, making the army an extension of the Communist Party’s will and a departure from traditional military doctrines.
Frunze advocated this Unified Military Doctrine, arguing that future wars would be total wars requiring the complete mobilization of society’s resources, both military and civilian. He emphasized the importance of a politically indoctrinated and disciplined army prepared for battle, a huge contrast to the many Western armies at the time.
Drawing from insights gained during the Russian Civil War, Frunze proposed integrating regular military forces with irregular partisan units. He regarded partisan warfare as a pivotal component of Soviet military strategy, particularly for safeguarding against potential invasions and executing offensive operations in hostile terrain.
Frunze pushed for a centralized and unified command structure within the Red Army, seeking to eliminate the fragmentation and inconsistencies that plagued military operations during the Civil War. This included establishing standardized training, command procedures, and organizational reforms to professionalize the Red Army while maintaining its revolutionary character.
Although Frunze did not fully develop the concept of Deep Operations, his ideas laid the groundwork for later Soviet theorists. He stressed the need for flexible and dynamic operational art beyond trench warfare and static defense, envisioning fluid and coordinated maneuvers to achieve strategic breakthroughs.
Overall, Mikhail Frunze conceded that there was no distinct “proletarian military art” at the time, a significant point in his discussions on Soviet military doctrine. Frunze acknowledged the challenges in creating an entirely new military art that was uniquely proletarian, given the Red Army’s reliance on inherited military practices and the limited time it had to develop its doctrines independently. This admission reflected the complexities of merging revolutionary ideology with practical military needs.
While Frunze’s Unified Military Doctrine did not achieve all its lofty goals, it was a necessary and influential step in the evolution of the Soviet military. Its primary value lay in its role as a transitional doctrine that helped stabilize and professionalize the Red Army. It was a vital part of the ongoing development of Soviet military thought.
Strategic Defense Positional Warfare
While Frunze’s ideas called for the professionalization of the Red Army, Alexander Svechin gave it a practical doctrine in his book Strategy. Alexander Svechin was vital in developing Soviet military thought in the interwar period. His theories were highly influential in shaping the Red Army’s strategic approach, particularly in contrast to the more operationally focused ideas of contemporaries like Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s theories emphasized the importance of strategic depth, adaptability, and the need for a scientific approach to military planning.
Svechin argued that strategy should be viewed as an art and a science. He emphasized the need for a thorough, scientific analysis of military problems, integrating a broad understanding of political, economic, and social factors into military planning. For Svechin, war was not merely about operational or tactical success but required a comprehensive approach that connected military actions with political objectives.
If and when war broke out, Svechin, like Frunze, recognized the significance of “total war,” where the entire nation, not just the military, was involved in the conflict. He emphasized that modern wars required mobilizing all economic, industrial, and social resources to achieve victory. This holistic approach influenced Soviet planning for potential large-scale wars, integrating civilian and military efforts.
However, Svechin, contrary to the more aggressive strategies advocated by other Soviet theorists, recognized the value of strategic defense. He argued that defensive strategies could be a viable and necessary component of warfare, especially when dealing with a superior adversary or preparing for a counteroffensive. His emphasis on defense reflected a pragmatic approach to military planning, considering the realities of Soviet military capabilities at the time. The reason for this is the Soviet Union’s economic limitations. Svechin emphasized the need to prepare the nation for war by aligning military plans with economic capabilities and ensuring that military actions were sustainable over the long term. He believed that war could not be left to chance and that strategic foresight was essential.
Svechin advocated for adaptability in military strategy, arguing that no single formula existed for success. He recognized two broad types of war: the war of attrition (positional warfare) and the war of maneuver. Svechin argued that commanders must be prepared to switch between these types depending on the situation, resources, and enemy capabilities. He was critical of an over-reliance on maneuver warfare, highlighting the dangers of being unprepared for prolonged conflicts.
Svechin was one of the first Soviet theorists to distinguish between strategy, operational art, and tactics. He defined strategy as the highest level of military art, concerned with the overall conduct of war and the connection between military means and political ends. Operational art was the link between strategy and tactics, involving the planning and execution of campaigns. Svechin’s ideas helped establish the framework that later Soviet military theorists would refine into the concept of Deep Operations.
Overall, Svechin’s theories concerning Deep Operations were conservative compared to the more revolutionary ideas of his other proponents, who focused on rapid, offensive warfare. However, Svechin’s emphasis on adaptability, strategic planning, and the scientific approach to war provided a foundational theoretical framework that continued to influence Soviet military thought.
Strategic Offensive Maneuver Warfare
While Svechin argued from a defensive position, his counterpart Mikhail Tukhachevsky sought an offensive approach. Mikhail Tukhachevsky was one of the most influential Soviet military theorists and commanders of the interwar period. Often referred to as the “Red Napoleon,” Tukhachevsky was a key architect of Soviet military modernization and played a pivotal role in developing the theory of Deep Operations, which profoundly shaped Soviet military doctrine leading into World War II. His theories emphasized offensive warfare, maneuverability, and the integration of new technologies, such as mechanization and aviation, into military strategy.
Tukhachevsky is best known for developing the concept of Deep Operations, a revolutionary approach to warfare that aimed to break the enemy’s front line and disrupt its rear simultaneously. Unlike traditional warfare, which focused on achieving victory through attrition and positional battles, Deep Operations sought to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s defenses, exploit those breaches with rapid mechanized forces, and cause systemic collapse by attacking command structures, supply lines, and reserves far behind the front.
Tukhachevsky was a staunch advocate of offensive warfare. He believed the defense was inherently passive and could only lead to a prolonged, costly war of attrition, which was unsustainable for the Soviet Union. He argued that decisive, aggressive action was necessary to maintain the initiative, disrupt enemy plans, and achieve rapid victory. This offensive mindset underpinned much of his strategic thinking and was reflected in the Red Army’s doctrinal evolution under his influence.
A forward-looking thinker, Tukhachevsky emphasized the need to modernize the Soviet military by integrating new technologies such as tanks, aircraft, and motorized infantry. He envisioned a highly mobile army that could conduct deep, rapid maneuvers. Tukhachevsky was one of the first Soviet theorists to fully grasp the potential of mechanized and armored forces in creating breakthroughs and exploiting them at an operational depth, which would overwhelm traditional defensive tactics.
To make deep operations work, Tukhachevsky advocated using combined arms, integrating infantry, artillery, tanks, and air power to achieve synergy on the battlefield. He believed that different arms of the military should operate in close coordination to support each other, creating a force multiplier effect. This approach aimed to maximize the strengths of each component and minimize their weaknesses, achieving overwhelming force at decisive points.
Tukhachevsky believed that future wars would be characterized by mass and scale, requiring vast mobilization of men and resources. In other words, total war. He stressed the importance of preparing the Soviet Union for large-scale conflicts involving millions of troops and requiring extensive logistical planning. His theories highlighted the need for the Soviet military to be prepared for protracted and widespread engagements rather than limited or localized conflicts.
To control this juggernaut of a fighting force, Tukhachevsky proposed a command structure that allowed for centralized strategic planning but encouraged decentralized execution at the operational and tactical levels. While high command would set the overall objectives and strategies, field commanders were given flexibility and autonomy to adapt to the evolving battlefield conditions. This approach was intended to make the Soviet military more responsive and adaptable in dynamic combat situations.
Tukhachevsky strongly emphasized the innovative use of artillery and air power to support offensive operations. He advocated massing artillery to create overwhelming firepower at critical points of attack and using air forces for direct support, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and disrupting enemy communications. His theories anticipated using air and ground forces to achieve tactical and operational breakthroughs. Tukhachevsky also recognized the importance of psychological factors in warfare. He emphasizes speed, surprise, and relentless pressure to demoralize the enemy and force them into disorganized retreats or surrenders.
Tukhachevsky’s theories were groundbreaking and pushed the Soviet military towards a modern, highly mechanized force that sought to dominate through speed, coordination, and deep penetration into enemy territory. However, his ideas were not without controversy; they clashed with more conservative views within the Soviet military, and Tukhachevsky’s career was cut short by Stalin’s Great Purge in 1937, during which he was arrested and executed. Despite his tragic end, Tukhachevsky’s military theories influenced Soviet military doctrine and played a critical role in shaping the Red Army’s approach during World War II.
“The three basic elements of an operation, strength, time and space, are always combined in a strategy of destruction so that gaining time and space is a means and defeating the mass of the enemy’s army is the end.” —Alexander Svechin p, 239.
Preparation and Planning
Before initiating an offensive action, extensive reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering operations are carried out to pinpoint enemy positions, assess their strengths and weaknesses, and understand their command structures. It is imperative to gain a comprehensive understanding of the depth of the enemy’s defenses. Soviet commanders meticulously develop a multifaceted military operation with well-defined phases, objectives, and coordinated efforts across different branches. Their strategic focus revolves around targeting the enemy’s logistical network, command structures, reserves, and depth rather than solely concentrating on frontline positions.
Initial Assault: Tactical Breakthrough
After thorough preparation and strategic planning, the Soviet forces position themselves for tactical maneuvers. The operation begins with intense artillery and aerial bombardments designed to destroy enemy fortifications, disrupt command and control, and suppress enemy firepower. Precision strikes target key points within the enemy’s tactical depth, such as communication hubs and artillery positions.
Afterward, a combined arms assault consisting of infantry, tanks, engineers, and supporting artillery launches a coordinated attack on the enemy’s frontline defenses. The aim is not just to penetrate but to create multiple breaches in the enemy’s line, allowing for deeper exploitation. These shock units, specially designated with superior firepower and armor, are employed to break through the first line of defense quickly. Engineers clear obstacles and mines, while flamethrowers and other specialized weapons neutralize fortified positions.
Exploitation
Once a breach is achieved, mechanized and tank units exploit the gaps, pushing into the enemy’s rear areas. This phase aims to destabilize the enemy by rapidly advancing and targeting their command centers, artillery positions, and logistics hubs. This causes a cascade of confusion that will disrupt the enemy reserves, which are intercepted and neutralized by the mechanized and airborne units before they can reinforce the front line. Simultaneously, airborne operations may seize critical locations, such as bridges or road junctions, to further complicate enemy movements. Tactical air forces provide continuous support by attacking enemy reinforcements, supply lines, and defensive positions in depth, maintaining pressure and preventing the enemy from regrouping.
Deep Battle: Continuous and Layered Engagements
The operation involves multiple echelons (waves) of forces moving forward. The first echelon focuses on breaching and exploiting the front, while the second echelon reinforces the attack and pushes deeper. The third echelon (often fresh reserves) prepares for new offensives or exploitation in response to the evolving battle. These simultaneous, multiple-layered, continuous attacks are launched on multiple enemy positions simultaneously, overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. This disrupts their defense and command structure, creating confusion and compounding losses. Mobile logistics units rapidly follow the advancing forces, establishing supply points to maintain the momentum of the attack. Supply lines are secured to ensure the continuous flow of ammunition, fuel, and reinforcements.
Destruction of Enemy’s Operational Depth
The primary objective is to completely encircle and cut off large enemy formations, trapping them without access to essential supplies and reinforcements. This move often results in the capture or annihilation of enemy units. Soviet forces strategically advanced into enemy territory to seize vital targets crucial to the enemy’s war efforts. These targets encompassed transportation hubs, industrial areas, and communication centers, which played a pivotal role in maintaining the enemy’s logistical and operational capabilities.
Exploitation and Consolidation
After achieving the operational goals, forces consolidate their gains and prepare for either a transition to defense against potential counterattacks or continued offensive operations. This phase focuses on securing captured territory, reorganizing forces, and setting conditions for future actions. The scale and speed of Deep Operations often have psychological effects on the enemy, potentially leading to loss of morale, panic, and political instability, which can hasten the collapse of enemy resistance.
Success and Conclusion in Deep Operation
Success on the battlefield hinges on the ability to strike effectively at enemy lines while coordinating the combined efforts of different military branches—air, artillery, and mechanized forces. Deep Operations emphasize relentless, continuous offensive actions that deny the enemy the chance to regroup or mount a coherent defense. Commanders must remain adaptable and capable of making swift, decisive moves to exploit emerging weaknesses in real-time. This approach shifts warfare from static, attritional confrontations to dynamic, fluid campaigns that aim to win battles and comprehensively dismantle the enemy’s strategic capacity to fight.
Strategic depth, however, is a double-edged sword. The vast expanses of the Soviet landscape, both then and now, present a complex paradox: they serve as a protective buffer against invasion and pose significant logistical challenges for any military force seeking to defend or advance. This immense scale can absorb and dissipate military strength, complicating even the most sophisticated doctrines, such as the German Bewegungskrieg or Blitzkrieg, which struggled against these geographic constraints during World War II.
This geographic reality fundamentally drove the Soviet Union’s development of Deep Operations. The vast, relatively flat terrain of Eastern Europe and Soviet territories provided the ideal setting for a doctrine prioritizing operational depth and rapid maneuver. Deep Operations were designed not just to repel invaders but to leverage the Soviet Union’s expansive borders as a battlefield advantage, turning space challenges into a powerful tool for defense and offense. This doctrine’s evolution reflects a profound understanding of how geography shapes strategy, offering a tailored solution to the unique demands of the Soviet strategic environment.
The Dole Institute of Politics. “Ft Leavenworth Series: Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare.” Edited by Dr. Curtis S. King. YouTube, July 29, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUQqwyDPZRw.
Trotsky, Leon. “Leon Trotsky: 1919 – How the Revolution Armed/Volume II (Proletarians, to Horse!).” Marxists.org, September 1, 1919. https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch97.htm.
Blitzkrieg, the lightning-fast strategy and tactic that once seemed unstoppable on the battlefields of Europe—was it truly invincible, or did its fatal flaws doom it from the start? Germany’s rugged terrain, vast plains, and strategic borders played a crucial role in shaping the military doctrine of Bewegungskrieg, better known in the West as Blitzkrieg. This article delves into the core principles and philosophies behind Bewegungskrieg. We will examine how geographical factors influenced the development and implementation of Bewegungskrieg and analyze its successes and inherent limitations. Additionally, we will uncover why the term Bewegungskrieg is more fitting than Blitzkrieg in a linked video below. This brief exploration will shed light on the intricate military theories and practices that defined Germany’s approach to warfare and ultimately led to its defeat.
Bewegungskrieg (“war of movement”) is a military doctrine emphasizing rapid, surprise attacks to disrupt enemy forces and command structures. Redeveloped by Germany during the interwar period, it played a critical role in the early successes of World War II. Geography and technology significantly influenced both the redevelopment and execution of Bewegungskrieg, shaping its strategic and tactical elements.
In a Bewegungskrieg operation, the initial step involves careful reconnaissance to identify weak points in the enemy’s defenses, typically less fortified sections of the front line. Schwerpunkt, meaning “focal point” or “center of gravity,” is crucial here, focusing forces at critical points to achieve a breakthrough. Once identified, a concentrated attack utilizing fast-moving tanks and motorized and mechanized infantry, supported by close air support, created a breach. Central to this doctrine are the principles of speed and surprise, achieved through rapid movement and force concentration at decisive points. This requires integrating tanks, infantry, artillery, and air support into combined arms operations for a synergistic effect.
Once the front line is breached, the attacking forces swiftly advance into the enemy’s rear areas. The goal is to avoid prolonged engagements with the main enemy forces and instead focus on capturing command centers, supply depots, communication lines, and other essential infrastructure. The attackers seek to cause maximum disruption and disarray by targeting these crucial points. This strategy severely hampers the enemy’s ability to mount a coordinated defense as their command and control structures are disrupted, and their supply lines are cut off.
The enemy’s dispersion and disarray render them susceptible to further exploitation. Swift-moving units can encircle substantial enemy formations, resulting in their isolation and eventual capitulation. This approach diminishes the necessity for direct, large-scale confrontations.
The fundamental principle behind Bewegungskrieg is to triumph by inducing disarray rather than outright destruction. Through swift advancement and targeting of critical points, attackers aim to immobilize the enemy’s ability to respond, resulting in a strategic collapse. This compels the enemy to retreat or surrender without prolonged confrontations. The speed and surprise of Bewegungskrieg significantly impact the enemy psychologically, creating confusion and panic, further deteriorating organized resistance. By leveraging speed, surprise, and concentrated force, Bewegungskrieg disrupts and paralyzes the enemy, leading to a quick and decisive outcome. The strategy focuses on dislocating the enemy’s forces and infrastructure rather than their physical destruction, embodying the principle of “winning by not fighting.”
Geographic Considerations for Success and Limitations
The Bewegungskrieg doctrine, redeveloped by the Germans in the 1920s to avoid another war of attrition and fit modern military technological needs, was designed for the type of war they sought, whether defensively or offensively. This doctrine was used with great success from 1939 to 1941. However, this highlights a key issue: the problem of doctrine itself. The Bewegungskrieg doctrine represented the war the German command desired, but not necessarily the war they would face. Doctrines often evolve to fit specific scenarios or desires, and Bewegungskrieg was no different. It proved effective against smaller countries like Belgium and the Netherlands and countries nearly or roughly the same size as Germany, such as Poland and France. When the Germans first developed the concept in the late 19th century and later updated it with early 20th-century technology, they did so with the spatiotemporal context of their Western and Central European neighbors in mind.
Unlike the smaller and more accessible nations in Western and Central Europe, the limitations of the Bewegungskrieg doctrine became clear when roughly 3.8 million German soldiers, along with their allies, invaded the vast and logistically challenging expanse of the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front on 22 June 1941. The Soviet Union’s vast geographic scale and complex logistics revealed the inadequacies of a doctrine intended for swift, decisive victories in more confined and manageable areas.
Constant Need for Supplies
An army of 3.8 million neededfood, fuel, equipment replacements, ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts to function, all of which were in short supply as the war progressed. The doctrinal nature of Bewegungskrieg required a constant and substantial supply, and so did all military doctrines. The consistent supply of essentials was disrupted, hampering German operations due to stretched supply lines and partisan interference. Moreover, it did not help that the Soviet Union’s underdeveloped infrastructure, including roads and railways, compounded the difficulty of transporting supplies to the front lines. Furthermore, the retreating Soviet forces resorted to scorched-earth tactics that exacerbated this lack of infrastructure, and the environment also affected the invaders as the severe Russian winter and the muddy conditions during the rasputitsa (season of impassable roads) significantly hindered German mobility and logistical support.
Doctrine to Bypass Certain Targets
Bewegungskrieg doctrine bypassed specific strong points to maintain momentum and find and crush the enemy’s center of gravity. While this tactic initially succeeded in causing disarray, it left pockets of enemy resistance that could regroup and counterattack. This is what can be considered missed strategic objectives.Bypassing key strategic targets sometimes meant missing opportunities to destroy vital Soviet infrastructure or command centers, which allowed the Soviets to regroup and mount effective counteroffensives. Because of this, Soviet partisans conducted guerrilla operations behind German lines, disrupting supply routes, communications, and railways. This further strained German logistics and hindered their operational capabilities. These were crucial for the German army to push forward, which led us to supplies.
Overstretched Combined Arms Operation
With 3.8 million German forces pressing deep into the Soviet Union, the need to supply grew more crucial daily. The rapid advances of Bewegungskrieg tactics extended supply lines over vast distances, making them vulnerable to disruption and overextension. The longer the supply lines, the more difficult it was to maintain a steady flow of necessary resources. Because of this, coordination issues arose. The complexity of coordinating armor, motorized units, and air support over such extended distances created logistical and operational challenges. Communication and coordination often broke down, reducing the effectiveness of combined arms operations. The threat of attrition, the antithesis of Bewegungskrieg, loomed large as stretched and poorly supplied units risked becoming bogged down in protracted battles, sapping their strength and momentum.
So What Defeated Bewegungskrieg?
As the Germans battled overstretched lines, dwindling supplies, and the harsh Russian seasons of winter and spring, the Soviets quickly adapted to German tactics, implementing deep defensive strategies and conducting effective counteroffensives. None of this would have been possible had the Soviets not relocated over 1,500 military-important plants to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia and received aid through the Lend-Lease Act (1941) from the U.S. Their ability to swiftly mobilize and produce war materials strained German resources, shifting the tide of the battle by 1943.
Remember, the Bewegungskrieg doctrine is about the war of movement. It must stay in motion, seeking the best avenues of attack and avoiding targets that would bog them down. Doing so allowed the means to keep pressing forward to fulfill their objective of destroying the enemy through dislocation. However, no matter how sound Bewegungskrieg was, it was still subject to unforeseen limitations, such as attrition.
Bewegungskrieg’s doctrine was designed to avoid attrition warfare and seek a quick victory, as it did in Poland and France. However, when the German army invaded the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front, the vast Soviet landscape swallowed the German army and its doctrine. The rapid advances that the Germans made deep into the Soviet Union slowly exposed Bewegungskrieg, in which the landmass stretched the manpower and material of the German army to its limits and beyond, causing overstretched combined arms operations, dwindling manpower, and the constant need for supplies coupled with the gradual development of fierce resistance and the deep Soviet landmass exposing the German forces, eventually revealed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg.
So, back to the question, what defeated Bewegungskrieg? There are two answers: fatal conceit and attrition. The term ‘fatal conceit’ comes from Friedrich A. Hayek, who describes the belief that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” In the context of Bewegungskrieg, this overconfidence manifested as a belief that rapid and decisive maneuver warfare could overcome any challenge, including the vast and varied terrain of the Eastern Front.
The German military’s adherence to the doctrine reflected a conviction that their strategic innovations and technological superiority would ensure success regardless of the logistical and environmental hurdles. In other words, the German high command assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse as quickly as Poland and France had. This overconfidence led to critical underestimations of the Soviet Union’s capacity to adapt, resist, and endure prolonged conflict. However, attrition gradually took its toll, depleting German manpower and supplies. The prolonged engagements exposed the limitations of Bewegungskrieg, a doctrine not designed for extended conflict.
The tale of two attritions was the other killer of Bewegungskrieg. On one hand, the attrition of manpower and resources stretched the German army thin. On the other hand, industrial attrition, where the Allies outproduced the Germans in war materials, exposed Bewegungskrieg’s vulnerabilities and contributed to its ultimate failure.
In conclusion, Bewegungskrieg was a doctrine built on the principles of rapid movement to achieve decisive victories. However, the fatal conceit of believing it could universally overcome all challenges and the relentless grind of attrition revealed its limitations. The vast Soviet landscape and the Allies’ industrial might turned the tide against the German forces. The initial successes in Poland and France could not be replicated on the Eastern Front, where the realities of war demanded more than Bewegungskrieg could deliver. Ultimately, the interplay of fatal conceit and attrition led to the downfall of this once-dominant doctrine.
References
Imperial War Museum. “The German ‘Lightning War’ Strategy of the Second World War.” Imperial War Museums, 29, 5AD. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-lightning-war-strategy-of-the-second-world-war.
Military History Visualized. “Only Peasants Call It ‘BLITZKRIEG’ – Bewegungskrieg.” YouTube, March 26, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8y-of5WpVA.
Various military theorists have contributed to and shaped the evolving concepts of time and space in warfare for centuries. These crucial ideas play a fundamental role in military strategy, operations, and tactics, significantly influencing maneuver, positioning, and timing. Their profound impact on the outcome of military operations cannot be emphasized enough.
Space in warfare pertains to the physical environment in which military operations occur. This encompasses the geographical area, terrain, and spatial positioning of forces and assets. Time in warfare refers to the chronological aspect of military operations, including the planning, execution, and duration of actions and strategies. It entails considerations of military activities such as speed, timing, and temporal coordination. Therefore, in the art of war, space becomes a tangible representation of time, and time can be seen as the intangible kinetic dimension of space.
Time in Warfare
Timing of Engagements: Choosing the optimal moment to initiate or avoid combat.
Speed and Efficiency: Rapid movement and quick decision-making to exploit opportunities.
Duration: Managing the length of operations to maintain momentum and resources.
Synchronization: Coordinating multiple units and operations to maximize effectiveness.
Space in Warfare
Geographical Terrain: Utilizing natural features (e.g., mountains, rivers) for strategic advantage.
Positioning: Placing forces in advantageous locations relative to the enemy.
Movement and Maneuver: Moving forces through space to gain positional advantage.
Control of Key Locations: Holding vital areas such as chokepoints, supply routes, and strongholds.
As one can read, mastering time and space elements is essential for success in military operations. However, what are the origins of this theory?
Origins and Theory
Time and space have always been central to military theory, shaping strategies and tactics from ancient to modern times. Even in prehistoric times, the principles of time and space played a critical role in warfare.When it came to time, early human groups would choose the optimal moment to attack or retreat, often based on environmental conditions or the status of their resources. Rapid movement and quick decision-making were vital for surprise attacks or quick escapes. Managing the length of conflicts was essential to ensure resources were not depleted and to avoid prolonged vulnerability. Even with basic communication, coordination among group members was necessary to execute effective hunting strategies or defensive actions.
Regarding space, natural features like hills, caves, and water sources were used for shelter, ambushes, and strategic advantages. Placing groups in advantageous locations, such as high ground or hidden areas, gave early humans an edge over their enemies or prey. Skilled maneuvering through familiar terrain allowed for effective hunting and evasion tactics. Securing vital areas like water sources, fertile land, or resource-rich zones was crucial for survival and dominance.
These aspects of time and space allowed prehistoric humans to enhance their chances of survival and success in their conflicts and daily struggles. From these experiences, humans would continue to develop and refine their strategies, laying the foundation for more sophisticated tactics in future warfare. As societies evolved, these early timing, positioning, and resource management lessons informed the complex military doctrines that would shape human history.
Leveraging time and space became integral to warfare and the broader context of human organization and development, which caused some to theorize on the subject. Therefore, a short introduction to some of these thinkers is imperative, starting with the ancient world and working to the present. We begin with Sun Tzu.
From the ancient period, Sun Tzu’s (c. 544–496 BC)The Art of War emphasizes the importance of timing and spatial advantage. He writes about the need to adapt to changing circumstances and to use the terrain to one’s advantage. He argues that the effective use of time and space can determine the outcome of battles.
Thucydides’ (c. 460–395 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War discussed the strategic use of naval and land forces, highlighting the importance of logistics, troop movement, and attack timing.
Alexander the Great’s (356–323 BC) campaigns showcased the effective use of time and space. He used rapid movements over vast distances and diverse terrains to outmaneuver enemies. His battles, such as Gaugamela, demonstrated the importance of timely and precise deployments.
Julius Caesar’s (100–44 BC) Commentaries on the Gallic Wardocumented the strategic use of time and space in military campaigns, including the rapid construction of fortifications and the use of geographical features to gain tactical advantages.
Vegetius’ (c. 4th century AD) Epitoma Rei Militaris emphasized the importance of logistics, training, and the strategic use of fortifications. Vegetius discussed the significance of preparation and the timing of maneuvers.
During the medieval period, Byzantine Emperor Maurice’s (6th century AD) manual Strategikonoutlined the importance of mobility, terrain use, and attack timing. It also highlighted the need for adaptability and the strategic use of cavalry.
Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1469–1527)The Art of Waradvocated for a military organization based on Roman principles during the Renaissance and early modern period. It emphasized the importance of terrain and the timing of engagements and highlighted the need for flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.
Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) On Warintroduced the “culminating point” concept in warfare, where the balance of time and space would favor one side. Clausewitz emphasized the fog of war, the importance of timing in attacks, and the use of geography to achieve strategic goals.
Antoine-Henri Jomini’s (1779–1869) Summary of the Art of War focused on the principles of interior lines and the importance of time and space in achieving decisive victories. Jomini emphasized the rapid concentration of forces at critical points.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840–1914) The Influence of Sea Power upon Historyhighlighted the strategic importance of naval power and the control of maritime space. Mahan discussed how naval supremacy could influence the timing and outcome of wars.
World War I and II showcased the significant role of logistics, the strategic use of terrain, and the timing of large-scale operations. The introduction of mechanized warfare and air power revolutionized the concepts of time and space in military theory.
During the modern era, nuclear strategy took precedence. The Cold War introduced the concept of deterrence, where the control of space (through missile deployment) and the timing of potential retaliatory strikes played crucial roles in maintaining the balance of power.
During the information age, military theory incorporates cyber warfare, space warfare, and real-time intelligence, exponentially expanding the concepts of time and space to include the virtual domain, where the speed of information and control of digital spaces are critical.
In summary, the strategic use of time and space remains a cornerstone of military theory, continually evolving with technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. While the concepts of time and space in warfare are universal, their application of military doctrine varies depending on the territorial size of the nation.
How Geography Shapes Time and Space in Military Doctrine and Theory
The geographic context significantly influences a nation’s military doctrine about spatial and temporal considerations. Essentially, military doctrine is designed to anticipate the preferred mode of warfare, although it may not align with the actual circumstances encountered.
This impacts military tactics, operations, strategy, and the nation’s infrastructure and economy. Larger geographical areas require more resources than smaller ones, including transportation, communication, and supply lines. However, this relationship can be nuanced, and several factors can influence the resource demands, effectively altering the offensive and defensive capabilities in said space.
Terrain and topography can be challenging if the area is mountainous, heavily forested, or a desert. These types of terrain can be more complex and resource-intensive to navigate and control than flat or open terrain for both the host nation and the invader. Because of this, the infrastructure, whether the presence or absence thereof, will significantly impact resource requirements for transportation and logistics. Densely populated areas may require more resources for maintaining order, providing services, and ensuring effective communication. At the same time, a sparsely populated area might need extensive communication networks and longer supply lines to reach dispersed inhabitants.
Weather is essential for those defending and invading, as harsh weather conditions (e.g., cold, heat, or heavy rainfall) can increase the need for specialized equipment, shelter, and additional logistics support. At the same time, seasonal variants and changes can affect an area’s accessibility and resource requirements. Because of this, the economic development of regions with established industries might have better infrastructure and resources in place, reducing the need for additional inputs. Meanwhile, underdeveloped regions may need more critical infrastructure, necessitating more transportation, communication, and supply network investments, which are strategically important.
The importance of infrastructure is another area of strategic value (e.g., ports, airports, crossroads, resource-rich regions), requiring a concentration of resources to secure and maintain control, especially in core areas. Core areas are high-value targets due to their significant infrastructure. Military doctrine often includes detailed plans for defending these areas because their loss could cripple military operations and destabilize the economy. However, the strategic value of core areas to invading armies is significant. Once controlled, these areas offer economic benefits, meet logistical needs, and enable the establishment of forward bases and defensive positions to better position forces strategically.
While core areas are desirable due to their resources and infrastructure, peripheral areas often lack these assets and are found less desirable. Military doctrine typically designates peripheral areas as low-priority. Because of this, peripheral areas tend to take to asymmetric warfare due to the lack of military presence.
Asymmetric warfare significantly alters the dimensions of space and time in war, introducing complexities that traditional warfare often does not encounter. When it comes to space in asymmetric warfare, the fluidity of the battlefield becomes non-linear since asymmetric engagements do not adhere to traditional frontlines. Guerrilla fighters move fluidly across vast territories, making the battlefield unpredictable and widespread. This use of terrain allows the guerrilla fighters to exploit challenging topography—mountains, forests, urban areas—leveraging local knowledge to their advantage, making it difficult for conventional forces to track and engage them.
Guerrillas often operate and blend within civilian populations, complicating conventional force’s task of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Thus, the operational space expands into urban and populated areas and becomes nuanced. This pressures conventional forces to spread out and cover more ground, diluting their combat effectiveness due to the creation of multiple fronts.
When it comes to time, in asymmetric warfare, protracted conflicts extend the duration of the war, which tends to drag out over more extended periods. Guerrillas avoid confrontation and focus on defeating the enemy over time through persistent, small-scale attacks. This type of war places tremendous psychological pressure on the conventional forces, and the sustained nature of guerrilla tactics aims to exhaust the opponent’s will to fight, eroding morale and political support over time. The operational tempo and the unpredictable nature of guerrilla attacks involve strategic decision-making regarding the timing and location of these actions. The intended goal is to maximize impact while circumventing fortified enemy positions. This irregular tempo disrupts conventional military operations. This operational flexibility allows guerrilla fighters to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, exploiting brief windows of opportunity that conventional forces might not be able to respond to as swiftly.
Overall, the strategic impact of asymmetric warfare on space and time strains resource allocation. Conventional forces must allocate significant resources to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to track guerrilla movements, often stretching their capabilities thin. Guerrilla warfare imposes disproportionate costs on conventional armies, requiring more resources to effectively counter small, mobile units. Conventional forces must adapt their strategies to combat this, incorporating counterinsurgency tactics that emphasize winning hearts and minds, improving intelligence gathering, and building local alliances. This comprehensive approach to guerrilla warfare often requires a multi-faceted approach, integrating military, political, economic, and social efforts to undermine guerrilla support and address the root causes of the conflict.
An Example of How the Size of a Nation Can Influence Military Doctrine
As mentioned, a nation’s geography determines and significantly influences the concepts of time and space in military doctrine. Here is an example of how the size of a nation influences its military doctrine, particularly in terms of time and space, by briefly looking at the Ukraine-Russia conflict:
Strategic Depth and Geographic Considerations:
Large Nations:
Strategic Depth: Larger nations, such as Russia, enjoy a significant advantage in terms of strategic depth. This advantage allows them to withstand and absorb initial attacks and engage in prolonged conflicts without facing an immediate threat to their essential territories. This depth allows Russia to execute strategic maneuvers, regroup, and launch counterattacks from well-protected positions deep within its territory.
Geographic Diversity: A sprawling nation like Russia boasts a rich tapestry of terrain, ranging from dense forests to towering mountains and bustling urban centers. This varied landscape offers abundant opportunities for leveraging strategic defenses and launching tactical offensives.
Extended Frontlines: The vast territory also means extended frontlines, which require significant resources to defend and maintain supply lines.
Smaller Nations:
Limited Depth: Countries with smaller land areas, like Ukraine, have limited strategic depth. This means that they have less distance to fall back on if attacked, making them more susceptible to swift advances by an enemy. As a result, these countries must be more proactive and effective in defending their territory.
Concentration of Forces: Smaller countries might strategically position their military resources in vital regions to protect important locations and infrastructure.
Territorial Constraints: The limited size of the territory constricts the capacity to employ flexible defense strategies, thereby demanding resourceful utilization of the available space.
Time Considerations
Operational Tempo and Duration:
Large Nations:
Protracted Engagements: Larger nations can be involved in extended conflicts due to their ability to sustain longer supply lines, rotate troops to maintain troop morale and effectiveness, and maintain high levels of industrial production to support their war efforts. These factors allow larger nations to maintain a sustained military presence and effectively carry out their strategic objectives over a prolonged period.
Operational Flexibility: They possess the strategic flexibility to execute extended deep operations, apply delaying tactics to slow down the enemy’s advance, and make strategic withdrawals, all while being able to regroup and launch powerful counterattacks when necessary.
War of Attrition: A larger nation may opt for a strategy of attrition, gradually employing tactics to weaken the enemy’s capabilities over an extended period. This approach involves applying sustained pressure and gradually depleting the enemy’s resources to outlast and defeat them through a war of endurance.
Smaller Nations:
Need for Swift Actions: Smaller nations frequently need rapid and conclusive victories to uphold morale and garner international backing. Prolonged conflicts can deplete their resources and diminish public support over time.
Asymmetric Warfare: This type of warfare utilizes guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks to disrupt and impede the advance of the larger opposing force.
Defensive Focus: The primary focus is establishing a sturdy and swift defense. This involves using fortified positions, navigating urban warfare scenarios, and leveraging local terrain knowledge to overcome potential shortcomings in depth.
Application to Ukraine-Russia Conflict
Russia’s Approach:
Multidomain Deep Battle: Utilizing its expansive geography, Russia implements multidomain deep battle strategies, merging land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to disrupt and overpower Ukrainian defenses.
Strategic Bombardment: Long-range artillery, missile strikes, and air campaigns target Ukrainian infrastructure, military positions, and supply lines far from the front lines.
Sustained Pressure: Russia’s capacity to uphold extended military campaigns is readily apparent through its ongoing application of pressure across several strategic fronts. This is made possible by leveraging its extensive strategic depth and abundant resources, enabling sustained operations in various theaters of conflict.
Ukraine’s Approach:
Adaptive Defense: Ukraine has had to adapt its strategies to compensate for its smaller size, focusing on agile, mobile defense tactics and leveraging international support.
Rapid Response: The Ukrainian military prioritizes rapid response and flexible tactics, using local knowledge and smaller, more mobile units to counter Russian advances early in the war.
International Support: Continuous support from NATO and EU countries is crucial for Ukraine, providing advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training to enhance its defense capabilities.
It is evident that a nation’s physical size significantly impacts its military doctrine and approach to warfare. In the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia leverages its considerable size and diverse military capabilities to execute multidomain deep battle tactics. In contrast, Ukraine relies on adaptability, international support, and asymmetric tactics to defend against its larger adversary. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a deeper analysis of the conflict and anticipating future developments.
Conclusion
The integration of time and space forms a fundamental element of military doctrine, influencing the strategic planning and execution of operations, logistics, and tactics by nations. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a prominent example of the profound influence of these principles. Russia’s vast geographical expanse and multifaceted capabilities exemplify a sophisticated utilization of time and space to establish strategic depth and operational adaptability. However, the fluid nature of contemporary warfare is conspicuous as smaller forces, such as Ukraine, have demonstrated their ability to employ time and space to offset a more substantial adversary through rapid adaptation and asymmetric tactics with international backing.
Time and space in war extend into cyberspace, where battles are fought on digital terrain, and timing is critical. Cyber operations can disrupt enemy communications, delay responses, and create strategic advantages, demonstrating that control over cyberspace and timing can be as decisive as traditional physical maneuvers.
Understanding the origins and fundamental principles of time and space in warfare is crucial for analyzing current conflicts and predicting future military developments. By appreciating how time and space influence war and politics, we gain deeper insights into the strategies and outcomes that define tomorrow’s battles.
Map of the 2021 Taliban-led offensive in Afghanistan after the announcement of the United States’ withdrawal.
It comes as no surprise that the Taliban have taken over Afghanistan in just a little over a week. Many, not all, in the administration and pentagon are surprised at how fast they could rapidly move across the country. This should not be a surprise.
When news reached that the Taliban were on the move, the White House made it clear that the Afghans were fully capable of deterring the threat. Our politicians assured the American people that the Afghans had the best training and equipment instead of returning it home. It’s much cheaper to leave the military items behind than bring them back. According to the BBC, the “Americans left behind about 3.5 million items, Gen Kohistani said, including tens of thousands of bottles of water, energy drinks and military ready-made meals, known as MREs. They also left behind thousands of civilian vehicles, without keys, and hundreds of armoured vehicles, the Associated Press reported.” Much of this military equipment will be sent to Iran, China, Russia, Pakistan, and other places to be examined, reverse engineering, and duplicated. According to Politico, the “United States spent more than $88 billion to train and equip Afghanistan’s army and police, nearly two-thirds of all of its foreign aid to the country since 2002.” I’m sure this number is an underestimate. So, with all the aid and training provided to the Afghan people, why did they collapse so quickly? The answer is they didn’t.
The Afgan troops did fight, losing 69,000 troops and perhaps many more. Let us also not forget the civilians caught in the crossfire. Without fuel, intelligence, air support, and much more, the tools to fight a war diminished. While many Afghans did fight, just as many saw no point. Would you want to continue the fight if you witnessed American troops pulling out overnight? While many did fight, just as many are okay with the Taliban. Those Afghanistan troops who did not fight are fine with the Taliban in charge due to their religious beliefs, kinships, clans, and tribal connections. These four alone, and perhaps many more, create a place for many parties within the many districts throughout Afghanistan to put aside their political differences and focus on what connects them. The Afgan landscape is a political kaleidoscope. This is what many in the military have failed to understand. They failed to understand that there are many shades of grey in Afghanistan.
The biggest mistake was thinking that Afghanistan was a country where we could create a state to our liking. Many military and political leaders failed to understand that Afghanistan is not a country but a phantom state where empires go to die.
It was a decade of Elvis, Eisenhower, Cold War, atomic bombs, and sci-fi movies! I wasn’t born in the 50s, but I wish I could have been in the theaters and drive-ins during the 50s to view these sci-fi gems. Science fiction movies of the 50s have slowly faded away among younger people. Baby Boomers, Generation X, and the first wave of Millennials are the last to have remembered such movies flickering on the TV. Depending on where you live, channels such as TBS, USA, TNT, and perhaps your local station were known for such movies throughout the 80s and 90s. I miss those days and watching those movies on TV.
I love science fiction films of the 1950s! Of course, this is due to age and family culture. I was born 1977 to a southern family big into science fiction and horror films. According to Job Bob Briggs, it had to have the three B’s (Blood, Breasts, and Beasts) to be watchable.
Like most my age, we were exposed to films playing on the floor, model TV, or something compact. It was during a time when you either saw the movie or you didn’t. Unlike today, where you can buy or rent with a click. It was when you rented the movie or waited for it to air on TV. At some point during the year, they will show the flick on one of the few channels at your disposal. We still have a problem, and that is video rental stores. Most of your mom-and-pop rental stores didn’t carry every film because they were small businesses. Unlike Blockbuster or Family Video, they had a vast video library at their disposal and also had little depending on your taste. The one and perhaps the first video rental store we had in Kendallville during the early to mid-80s was called Genie’s. Genie’s had maybe fifty films at most, possibly more, but I do not recall having much to select. I remember how exciting it was to go there on the weekends. Most of the movies they featured were drama or action. But they had a nice shelf dedicated to horror! The problem is sci-fi films of the 50s were hard to come by. I could rent Friday the 13th (1980), an OK movie I have watched multiple times with the family, but I can’t rent The Thing (1951)! My only hope was to wait for Mom to buy the weekly TV guide so I could thumb through and circle the movies I wished to view. My Grandpa taught me this art at a young age and was a PRO!
The first time I was exposed to a science fiction horror film, I remember it was Creature from the Black Lagoon (1954). I first saw this film on TV at my aunt and uncle’s house in Michigan between 1980-81, so I was roughly 3-4. The film captivated and frightened me. It also didn’t help that it was night and I was watching a movie in the countryside. That night and film sparked my love affair with 1950s science fiction movies. The following year, I came across the American version of Godzilla (1956). I found this film at Genie’s rental. I saw this giant creature on the VHS cover that said, “Godzilla: King of the Monsters!” I had to see this!
As a child, I was in shock and awe and kept looking for it to appear on TV. I tried to rent the movie often, but to my surprise, others liked the film and rented it. It’s kind of like trying to rent the Tecmo Super Bowl at your local grocery store to find that it is missing every Friday and Saturday! But I digress. During this time, I encountered many strange moves, most of which were mentioned by my family. They would talk about movies like The Blob (1958), The Thing from Another World (1951), War of the Worlds (1953), Them (1954), 20 Million Miles to Earth (1957), Forbidden Planet (1956), and The Fly (1958) to name just a few. These movies were just myths that I needed to investigate.
These films and many more from the 50s not mentioned, I would religiously look for in the TV guide and seek out at the local video store, hoping they would carry it. Eventually, Genie’s would go out of business, and the next rental store was Video Connection, which later became Video Unlimited. It was here that I could rent many of the moves listed. Many films were nothing more than myths and legends for a long time until I found them at the rental store or on TV. Once the 1980s had vanished, these movies were still played on cable. Channels like the USA Network or TBS were known for showing such features, especially on Commander USA’s Groovie Movies and Super Scary Saturday. Every Saturday, both programs would play at the same time but five minutes apart. Commander USA started at noon and Super Scary Saturday at 12:05 pm and would switch back and forth between both programs. But with the 90s, these movies were slowly fading from cable TV. Channels like TBS and TNT still showed them from time to time. Especially on TNT with the birth of Monstervision starting in 1991 during its early stages instead of the mid-late 90s hosted by Joe Bob Briggs. This is understandable, as many people wanted to see more modern movies and still do. When the 2000s came, I rarely saw a 50’s sci-fi flick featured. By the 2010s decade, it had pretty much vanished from cable TV. Of course, TCM and AMC show some of these movies every year on Halloween but not much.
James Hendricks as “Commander USA” Al Lewis as “Grampa”
The good news is these movies are back, but mostly streaming, and this is a good thing. For nearly 15 years, it was rare to see anything of the sort on basic or premium cable. With the advent of streaming and Blu-rays, they are more affordable to buy and rent. Not to forget, where I live, two great horror hosts show these types of films. They are Svengoolie on MeTV Fort Wayne at 8 pm and Lord Blood-Rah on MyTV Fort Wayne at 10 pm every Saturday.
The bad news is that 1950s sci-fi films are an acquired taste. For the Baby Boomers, Generation X, and some Millennials, you either loved or hated these films. I, for one, with many of the same age, perhaps a bit younger or older, do have an appreciation for these films, which were at one time a mystery and a myth until we saw it with our own eyes—kind of like The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974). I grew up seeing the film, and it was no myth –it was real! But most of my friends never saw the film, and the rumor persisted until they viewed it in some safe, secret location away from their parents and likely with that one family member who was a bit off. My family was odd since this was a normal viewing for us. Anyways, today’s youth have no idea. Ok, to be fair, some do. Most movies are old and in black and white. If that is not bad enough, the effects are dumb, and the acting is even worse. However, many young people who watch a sci-fi horror film don’t realize an original exists. Take John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982). Many people who saw it did know there was an original made in 1951 by Howard Hawks. In some ways, this is good because it brings back that myth and legendary status to these 50s films that fall in the science fiction horror genre.
While it is terrible that I can’t flip through the channels to find a good sci-fi horror creature feature on the TV throughout the weekdays, I now can buy or stream them for a low price or for free. Thank God for streaming, physical media, Svengoolie, Lord Blood-Rah, The Haunted Hotel by Rob Graves, and The Last Drive-In with Joe Bob Briggs!
