Category: Miscellaneous Military

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The Day After: The Peace No One Is Prepared For

What happens after the war ends in Ukraine—and it will—is the one subject most policymakers skirt, and perhaps with good reason. Because the day after is not a celebration, it is a reckoning.

Ukraine will not return to what it was in 2021. It will awaken to something far more unsettling: a society exhausted by war, disillusioned with its leaders, and divided by conflicting visions of what the country was supposed to become, regardless of political identity. The sentiment of betrayal by politicians who overpromised, by allies who underdelivered, by a strategy sold as inevitable victory, will fester. When that happens, the external enemy evaporates, and the internal enemies become visible.

Paraphrasing James C. Davies: nations don’t break from weakness, but from the collapse of the expectations they were led to believe—often for someone else’s agenda. Ukraine risks entering a postwar environment defined not by Russian aggression, but by Ukrainian fragmentation—regional mistrust, ethnic resentments, ideological vendettas, and political scapegoating—basically a hellscape that will affect all facets of life. That is how Balkanization begins: not through secession, but through the mentality of it. The idea that one’s real enemies live closer than Moscow has already taken root. And the more I think about it, the more I realize that “close” doesn’t just mean political factions or regional divisions within Ukraine. It also means the people who fled. When millions sought refuge in places like Poland, France, Germany, and elsewhere, they escaped the war physically—but they will return to a country transformed, hardened, and angry.

Those who stayed and fought may look at those who left not as fellow citizens coming home, but as outsiders who abandoned them when everything was on the line. Resentment is a powerful force, especially in a society held together by shared suffering. And when the war ends, those refugees will walk back across the border not to open arms, but to suspicion. They will be seen as people who missed the crucible, who didn’t carry the burden, who didn’t bleed with everyone else — yet now expect to reclaim the full privileges of citizenship.

This is how social fractures deepen: not only between east and west, soldier and politician, nationalist and pragmatist — but between those who endured and those who escaped. The enemy “close by” becomes not just the internal divisions born from war, but the distrust of those returning from safety to a nation that no longer sees them as the same.

But the internal fractures are only half the story. The other half is what leaves the country entirely.

This war has produced a generation of men who know nothing but combat. Many will return home to an economy that cannot absorb them—no jobs, no prospects, and no reason to embrace a peace that feels like defeat. That is when the training they received, the weapons they carried, and the networks they formed become a different kind of currency.

When the war ends, Ukraine—and Russia—will not simply demobilize soldiers. They will release them into a global marketplace where violence is both a commodity and a career. What emerges next is a conflict market for mercenaries: a worldwide, often illicit, and highly lucrative trade in private military services, where hardened fighters are hired for combat, security, training, or political enforcement.

Peace creates unemployment. The world provides opportunities. This market thrives on instability, and it will eagerly absorb thousands of men who have spent years learning the trade of war. For these veterans—Ukrainian, Russian, Chechen, and foreign volunteers (Colombian)—their experience becomes a portable skill set. Whether for money, purpose, or simply because peace offers them nothing, many will migrate into this shadow economy of conflict zones stretching from the Sahel to the Caucasus to the Middle East. Here, violence is no longer tied to national defense. It becomes transactional.

Ukraine will face a double blow: a country struggling with its identity at home while fueling instability abroad. The front lines may stop moving in Ukraine, but the war will continue—in the identities people cling to, and in the fighters who take their craft elsewhere. The tragedy is not merely that the war could have been avoided. It’s that its consequences will outlive the signatures on any peace agreement.

The day after is not peace.

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Russia’s Modular and Non-Linear Warfighting Style

Introduction

Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered a phase defined less by linear fronts and more by shifting domains of combat. Where once artillery barrages dominated the battlefield as the leading killer, new data from Russia itself suggests that first-person view (FPV) drones are steadily overtaking them. This shift is more than a technological upgrade; it represents a doctrinal evolution. FPVs broaden the battlespace, reach into rear areas once considered safe, and introduce a constant unpredictability that traditional fires cannot match.

At the same time, Russia’s pattern of attacks reveals a larger truth about modern war: it is non-linear. The tactical flavor of one month rarely matches that of the next, as methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers cycle in and out depending on the conditions. This modular approach requires Ukraine to prepare for multiple, overlapping threats simultaneously, while also highlighting the multidimensional nature of contemporary conflict.

The charts below, provided by Vitaly on X and Telegram, effectively illustrate the shift in which drones are becoming the “new artillery” and how they expand the battlespace.

Russia used 4,136 drones, accounting for 60% of July’s total, likely by accumulating them after the mid-summer performance. 691 drones reached their targets, and even more fell as debris.

Chart 1
Chart 1 Continued
Chart 2
Chart 2 Continued

Chart 1: Reported Drones (Lost, Intercepted, Not Reported)

Blue (Intercepted): The substantial interception of drones shows that both sides continue to invest heavily in counter-drone defenses.

Red (Lost): A significant share still makes it through, indicating drones achieve their objectives despite defenses.

Yellow (Not Reported): A steady fraction goes unreported, possibly due to operational gaps or unclaimed hits.

What this means: The volume of drones being launched rivals the tempo of artillery fire in past wars. Even if many are intercepted, the persistent pressure expands the kill zone where troops are constantly hunted.

Chart 2: Drone vs. Fire Support Systems

Yellow (Barrages): Overall decline (166,471 total).

Red (FPVs): Steady growth, recently overtaking barrages (147,444 total).

Blue (Bombs): Growing use of glide bombs fitted with UMPK kits or (Universal Gliding and Correction Module), including FAB-500, FAB-1500, and FAB-3000, alongside conventional free-fall FABs, particularly in areas with weak Ukrainian air defenses. Total: 4,400.

Green (MLRS or Multiple Launch Rocket System): Decline in use (2,478 total), likely due to attrition and limited inventory.

What this means: FPV drones have overtaken traditional artillery barrages in usage. That is a massive shift for artillery, long regarded as the “god of war” since Napoleon and especially in WWI/WWII. Unlike MLRS and artillery, which are limited by range and stockpiles, drones can penetrate deeper, creating an unpredictable kill zone that extends across tactical, operational, and even strategic depths.

Analysis

From Artillery to Drones

Artillery barrages and MLRS peaked early in the war. Artillery is steadily trending downward, MLRS has declined more sharply, while drones are scaling up. This signals a gradual shift from fewer, high-impact rocket strikes to more numerous, low-cost strikes using drones and bombs that are cheaper, more precise, and harder to predict.

Saturation Warfare

Even with an 83% loss rate, the sheer volume ensures hundreds of drones get through. This mirrors the principle of massed artillery fire: most shells miss, but enough hit to break defenses.

Economic Exchange

Drones cost a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. Interceptors cost tens of thousands. Even “failed” drone attacks create economic attrition by draining NATO-supplied systems.

Russia, however, benefits from its economic endurance as it transitions its economy to a wartime footing. It trades pennies for the West’s dollars, stockpiles drones at a rate of 5,000 per month (and rising), and operationally integrates them much as artillery once stockpiled shells before offensives (which it still does).

Expanding the Kill Zone

Even with only ~17% penetration, drones are striking far beyond the front lines, rear depots, power plants, and bridges. This creates a non-linear threat: instead of predictable barrages, drones “skip” depth and spread lethal pressure across the entire battlespace.

Exploiting Attrition

Overall, by using cheap weapons (FPV drones, decoys, artillery shells, and glide kits), Russia forces Ukraine to expend resources and expand its defensive systems. This necessitates the purchase of very expensive interceptors, radars, and other NATO-provided systems, allowing Russia to preserve its higher-value strategic assets while steadily depleting NATO’s stockpiles.

At the same time, this dynamic pulls Ukrainian manpower away from the front. Personnel who could be fighting are instead tied down operating defensive systems. Case in point: during World War II, Germany had more than one million Luftwaffe personnel who could have been redeployed to the front but were not. Ukraine faces a similar dilemma today, but with far fewer resources.

Finally, Russia benefits from exploiting captured territory and its infrastructure, even when much of it lies in ruins. The land itself becomes a weapon against Ukraine and NATO: any attempt to retake it is costly not only in reconstruction but also in human lives, as advancing forces would face both physical devastation and entrenched resistance. In this way, attrition favors Russia, as Ukraine is forced to expend manpower, resources, and time attempting to reclaim territory. This flips attrition into a net resource gain for Russia.

Conclusion

Russia’s own numbers confirm that FPV drones are slowly replacing artillery barrages as the leading killer. In doing so, they’ve made the battlefield broader and more unpredictable. Yet the tactical flavor of one month rarely carries into the next due to the fog of war. Russia’s methods do change, but often flip back to earlier approaches, cycling rather than progressing linearly. However, that should not fool anyone into thinking the threat is predictable.

Shift in lethality: FPVs outpace artillery as the primary killer.

Expansion of the battlespace: Drones strike from unexpected angles, turning rear areas into targets.

Fluid tactical flavor: Drones and bombs cycle in and out depending on supply chains, weather, and countermeasures.

In short, Russia’s warfighting style is characterized by modularity and non-linearity. They cycle tools, including methods of attack, applications of economy of force, and force multipliers, at both macro and micro levels. These shift as conditions change, forcing Ukraine to counter multiple threats simultaneously.

Remember: war is non-linear—a complex contest of power unfolding across time, space, and every domain simultaneously.

Sources

Russia on track to build artillery shell stockpile triple the size of the US’s and Europe’s combined: top US general

Is Russia producing a year’s worth of NATO ammunition in three months?

WW2 Germany Population, Statistics, and Numbers

Russia Will Soon Fire 2,000 Drones a Day: ISW – Newsweek

With China’s Help, Moscow Says It Has Tripled Its Drone …

Russia ramps up drone war with more than … – RBC-Ukraine

Shahed drones – Intelligence reveals Russia’s monthly UAV …

Russia wants to produce over 6000 “Shaheds” per month – CNN

Russia significantly increases production of long-range drones


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DRG

The term DRG (Sabotage and Reconnaissance Group) is gaining wider attention in discussions of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, and for good reason. These teams represent a form of micro-maneuver warfare that has proven highly effective for Russian forces.

The concept dates back to the Soviet era, when DRGs were developed as small, highly mobile units capable of operating deep behind enemy lines to gather intelligence, conduct sabotage, and create disruption functionally similar to Western special operations forces (e.g., Green Berets, Navy SEALs, SAS).

Military historian David M. Glantz examined this doctrine in detail in his 1989 study The Fundamentals of Soviet Razvedka (Intelligence/Reconnaissance), which remains an excellent reference for understanding how DRGs evolved into their modern form.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET RAZVEDKA (INTELLIGENCE/RECONNAISSANCE) 1989

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Find, Fix, and Maneuver

Russia’s Paint-by-Numbers Blitzkrieg in Ukraine’s Summer War

Introduction

After reading the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, dated July 5, 2025, from the Institute for the Study of War, I was prompted to think. Russia has been advancing much faster and seizing land more quickly. This is nothing new, given that the Russians have already been doing this since last year, but the momentum is picking up.

This isn’t Deep Battle. It’s Patton’s “haul ass and bypass” approach, utilizing drones, artillery, armor, and assaults all with tactical patience. Russia’s 2025 summer offensive in Ukraine is not a sweeping, armored thrust meant to collapse the entire front in a matter of days. It is something quieter but no less dangerous. Frankly, it is a methodical campaign built around probing, bypassing, and isolating. In this model, the Russians aren’t trying to destroy Ukrainian forces in a grand clash. They’re trying to surround them, sometimes physically and often virtually, and then destroy them with firepower. This is a war of maneuver, but it is also a war of attrition by design. As I was told, it’s a paint-by-number war.

Before proceeding, it’s best to briefly explain what a paint-by-number war is. Some call this a “Triple Chokehold” tactic, which comes down in three phases. I first encountered this topic in May. The title is “Russia’s new three-step assault tactic yields gradual gains.“

  1. Initial Ground Assault: Russian infantry initiates an attack to force Ukrainian units into fixed defensive positions, limiting their mobility.
  2. Drone Surveillance: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) monitor Ukrainian troop movements, identifying weak points in their defenses. This continuous surveillance compels Ukrainian forces to remain static, often leading them to dig multiple trenches to mislead the enemy.
  3. Airstrike Phase: Russian aircraft deploy glide bombs to target the identified positions, aiming to destroy fortifications and inflict heavy casualties.

Find – Tactical Reconnaissance and Probing

The first step in this approach is identifying soft points. Russian forces use a mix of ISR assets, drones, electronic warfare, SIGINT, and good old-fashioned reconnaissance-in-force to locate where Ukraine’s lines are overstretched or thinly held. These aren’t always places with trenches or fortifications. In fact, they often aren’t. The Russians aren’t looking for a fight. They’re looking for the void. The countryside becomes the enemy’s true weakness, not because of what’s there, but because of what isn’t.

This form of “finding” mirrors the first phase of traditional kill chains, but with a twist: it’s area-based, not just target-based. Russia does not look for targets to kill, but rather terrain to bypass and manipulate.

Fix – Pressure to Pin and Distract

Once potential axes of advance are identified, Russian forces apply pressure. This pressure is not designed to break through; it is meant to fix Ukrainian forces in place. Constant shelling, probing attacks, and drone harassment force Ukrainian commanders to commit reserves and dig in. In doing so, Russia accomplishes two things: it prevents Ukrainian units from maneuvering elsewhere, and it convinces them that this is where the fight will be. Meanwhile, the actual point of decision is forming somewhere else. In other words, watch this hand, not this hand, or watch both hands, or neither hand.

This is not frontal assault warfare; it is misdirection with kinetic tools.

Maneuver – The Operational Bypass

Now the real move begins. Instead of trying to take the fixed position head-on, Russian units bypass them, literally driving around resistance and securing the terrain behind it. These flanking maneuvers don’t need to be deep. In fact, they are often shallow by historical standards, extending only a few kilometers or miles into the rear. But they are enough to isolate and force the defenders into a dilemma. That dilemma is to stay and risk being cut off, or retreat under fire.

This method of warfare resembles Bewegungskrieg (war of maneuver) with a modern twist. There is no need to mass forces for a deep penetration when firepower and surveillance can do the work of encirclement. This is Patton’s doctrine in spirit, which is to “haul ass and bypass.” However, where Patton relied on airpower and speed to blitz through enemy lines, modern Russia has all that and more. Drones give them persistent surveillance. Artillery offers immediate punishment. Electronic warfare denies Ukrainian coordination. But their greatest asset may be less visible: patience. Patience is their speed.

Russia is not rushing breakthroughs. They advance deliberately, probing, pressing, and repositioning until the moment is right. This patience allows them to bypass strongpoints without the urgency of a race, because every bypassed position becomes a future problem for Ukraine, not a current one for Russia. Speed, in this war, is not measured in kilometers or miles per hour, but in how long it takes the trap to close, with or without bait.

Kill Zones Without Troops

What makes this strategy lethal isn’t the movement alone. It’s the environment that follows. Once Ukrainian units are isolated either tactically or geographically, the Russians don’t have to storm their positions. They just watch. Drones track every movement. Artillery waits for vehicles or clusters of troops. Even when Russian ground forces are not present in strength, they maintain fire control over the area.

Trying to move is death. Standing still is surrender, starvation, or death. This is not an encirclement in the classic sense; it is an algorithmic siege. It is a battlefield that punishes initiative and rewards stasis only long enough for the trap to close. This is a 360-degree kill zone maintained by sensors and standoff firepower.

Conclusion

Russia is not currently executing a form of modern Deep Operations. There is a reason for that, and that is politically based, I think. They do not need to. Instead, they are conducting a highly pragmatic, lethally modern form of maneuver warfare: find the void, fix the defenders, and maneuver around them until they are isolated and vulnerable. It is not fast, but it is effective. It is not elegant, but it is repeatable. This is a paint-by-number blitzkrieg blueprint, siege by satellite. And it is working.

Ukraine now faces a battlefield where movement means death, fixed defenses become liabilities, and initiative is punished by a hovering all-seeing eye. The Russians have found a way to wage war without needing to engage in a direct confrontation. They don’t crush. They surround. They don’t break through. They bypass. And in doing so, they turn the very terrain into a weapon of war.

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The Origin of Gremlins

Get ready for another possible reboot. In 2019, a friend informed me that Gremlins 3 might be coming soon to a local theater/drive-in near you. While I am not a big fan of remakes, the idea of reigniting the Gremlins franchise sparked my interest. The person interested in reviving them is filmmaker Chris Columbus. Columbus, by the way, was the original writer of Gremlins. Columbus made it clear that not only was he “proud of the script,” but that the movie would “not be a sequel, it will be a reboot.” Therefore, Gremlins 3 will not be the third installment but a do-over.

The original Gremlins was released on June 8, 1984, and made $153.1 million on an $11 million budget. While I did not see the film in the theater, my parents rented the VHS tape a year later. After watching the live-action puppeteer version (designed by Chris Walas) of what a gremlin looks like, according to Hollywood, I still had the Looney Tune version ingrained in my head. The Looney Tune episode featuring a gremlin is titled “Falling Hare,” which was released on October 30, 1943. Another Merrie Melody featuring the gremlin came out less than a year later, titled “Russian Rhapsody,” released on May 20, 1944. The original title of this episode was “Gremlins from the Kremlin.” So what is a gremlin, and just as important, what in the hell is a mogwai from which the gremlins spring!?

What is a Gremlin?

The Royal Air Force aviators stationed in Malta, the Middle East, and India first coined the word gremlin in 1923. However, the term was slang to explain that some creature had caused mechanical failures. It was not until April 10, 1929, that the term gremlin first appeared in print as a poem in the journal “Aeroplane.” Nevertheless, the term became popularized during World War II and was picked up by Americans.

The New York Times Magazine, April 11, 1943, states that the term is of unknown origin and “probably formed by analogy with GOBLIN.” Moreover, there is a “possible dialectal survival of Old English gremman “to anger, vex” + the -lin of goblin; or Irish gruaimin “bad-tempered little fellow.” Surfer slang for “young surfer, beach trouble-maker” is from 1961 (short form gremmie by 1962).” While this explains a little about a gremlin, it does not give an exact origin. However, the 1984 film Gremlins does provide a possible origin and suggests that they come from a little furry creature called mogwai. But what is a mogwai?

What is a Mogwai?

In the film Gremlins, an inventor named Randall Peltzer visits a Chinatown antique store looking for a Christmas present for his son Billy. While in the store, he encounters a small, furry creature called a mogwai. Seeing that this might make the perfect gift, the storeowner, Mr. Wing, refuses to sell the creature. As the store goes, the grandson of the storeowner sells the mogwai to Mr. Peltzer and explains the three rules to him.

  • Keep him out of the light.
  • Keep him away from water.
  • Never feed him after midnight.

Sounds easy enough, right? Well, for those who have seen the film, you already know that it goes from good to bad to worse quickly. But the one thing missing is what a mogwai is.

The word mogwai is Cantonese and means “monster,” “evil spirit,” “devil,” or “demon.” While little Gizmo is a cute furry creature, in Chinese tradition, mogwai are certain demons that often inflict harm on humans. Gizmo is the exception since any other mogwai in the Gremlin series has a mean streak. As for reproduction, unlike the movie, where if water gets on one of them, they sprout many, according to tradition, “they reproduce sexually during mating seasons triggered by the coming of rain. Supposedly, they breed at these times because rain signifies rich and full times ahead.” As for the name mogwai, the “mo” is said to derive from the Sanskrit “Mara,” meaning ‘evil beings’ (literally “death”), whereas the “GUI” does not necessarily mean ‘evil’ or demonic spirits. Instead, it means deceased spirits or souls of the dead. But is there a connection between these two creatures? The answer is no. It sounded like a good idea and creative thought to make the two creatures one and the same.

The Gremlins True Origin and Meaning.

Okay. I saved the best for last. The origins of the gremlin do not come from some mythological creature but rather from a beer. Yes, a beer. The gremlin is based on Fremlin beer, brewed in Maidstone, Kent, England, and was a favorite among the R.A.F. pilots. Therefore, the term gremlin comes from Fremlin. Well, hold on. Yes, the term comes from Fremlin, but with a rather funny twist. According to the Observer, on November 8, 1942, John Moore was told that gremlins “were goblins which came out of Fremlin beer bottles.” But it gets funnier, folks.

Less than a year later, Newsweek published an article on September 7, 1943, discussing the term gremlin and its origins. According to Newsweek, they quote the following from a dispatch they received from Merrill Mueller, chief of the magazine’s London bureau:


The great-grandaddy of all “bloody Gremlins” was born in 1923 in a beer bottle belonging to a Fleet Air Arm pilot whose catapult reconnaissance plane was cursed with perpetual engine trouble. This pilot was overloaded with beer the night before a practice maneuver, when the engine failed and he crashed into the waves. Rescued he said the engine failed because little people from a beer bottle had haunted him all night and had got into the plane’s engine and controls during the flight…. “the bloody Gremlins did it.”

Therefore, the 1984 film Gremlins was unknowing (perhaps Chris Columbus did know?).. built off Fremlin booze, which an R.A.F. pilot ingested in mass quantities in 1923 until he could no longer fly. Upon his rescue, he clarified that “the bloody Gremlins (Booze) did it.” So there you have it: Fremlin beer and a bit of drunken creativity started a franchise we enjoy today. Cheers!


Bibliography

https://gremlins.fandom.com/wiki/Gremlins_3

Falling Hare (1943):

Russian Rhapsody (1944)

Benjamin W. McCraw, Robert Arp, Philosophical Approaches to the Devil

American Heritage Dictionaries, Word Histories and Mysteries: From Abracadabra to Zeus

Paul Dickson, War Slang: American Fighting Words & Phrases Since the Civil War, Third Edition

Richard Cavendish, Man, Myth and Magic: The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Mythology, Religion and the Unknown (21 Volume Set)