Today I signed my author’s contract with Helion & Company (https://www.helion.co.uk/), based in the UK, for The Beast from the East: The Mongol Invasion of Europe, 1236–1242. Years of research are becoming a reality.
Publication is planned for 2027, arriving around the 800-year anniversary of the Mongol invasion of the Rus principalities under Batu Khan—when the lands of Rus (modern-day Russia and neighboring regions) were a fragmented collection of principalities.
To celebrate, I’m also sharing an alternative book cover concept I put together.
So what would a war with Iran look like? I have no idea, but I have a rough idea, like most. I think the first thing we have to establish is that the real objective isn’t destruction — it’s controlled escalation.
Before the first bomb, the core operational question is what political outcome is being forced. Nuclear rollback? Missile rollback? Regime destabilization? Deterrence by punishment? And how do you stop once the first rung of the escalation ladder is climbed?
The Pentagon’s reported worry — stocks, defenses, time — basically comes down to this: you don’t get to control the length of the war once Iran is firing back. This is according to the Wall Street Journal, which had an article titled “Pentagon Flags Risks of a Major Operation Against Iran,” February 23rd this year. And rightfully so.
So what would the war look like in phases? That is probably the best way to approach it.
Phase Zero or One
If we looked at Phase Zero or Phase One, we would have to call it shaping and positioning — quietly building the kill web. I don’t think there’s any other way around it.
The reality is that this part is what most people miss because it is non-climactic — anti-climactic. So what would this look like?
Picture forward basings. Dispersal of aircraft, often outside Iranian missile range, obviously—tankers and AWACS positioning.
We would probably see a rise in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
Satellites
RC-135–type aircraft
MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft
Overall, this allows for building the coalition in layers, in other words:
Overflight
Base access
Maritime corridors
This takes us to cyber and electronic preparation, which would include:
Mapping networks
Identifying choke nodes
Rehearsing deception
Even if not publicly acknowledged, this is standard practice in modern planning, regardless.
Recent reporting describing large aircraft movements and posture outside Iranian missile range fits this shaping logic, according to the Washington Post on February 24th.
The purpose of all this is to set conditions so the opening blows land as a system shock and not just a few good strikes.
Phase Two
The first night would probably be about integrated air defense systems and command coherence — not the nuclear sites.
In U.S. doctrine terms, the first operational imperative is counter-air: gain enough control of the air to operate and reduce inbound threats.
What gets prioritized early?
Iran’s integrated air defense system:
Sensors
C2 links
Key SAM nodes (surface-to-air missiles)
Also:
Battle management and communications systems that allow Iran to coordinate a coherent air-defense picture
Possibly runway and airbase denial if needed. That doesn’t necessarily mean cratering everything, just enough to complicate sortie generation.
The reason why is simple.
If you cannot operate in or near Iranian airspace with tolerable losses, everything else becomes slower, more expensive, and more escalatory.
Which brings us to Phase Three.
Phase Three
Phase three would be to roughly stop the arrows or offensive counter-air against missile launch capacity. This would involve operations designed to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy missile launch platforms, supporting infrastructure, and command-and-control networks before or after launch.
U.S. joint doctrine explicitly treats offensive counter-air as the preferred way to reduce the threat burden on defenses, because shooting every inbound is a losing math problem. Basically, nearly downright futile.
So very quickly, the campaign becomes a race to disrupt Iran’s ability to launch:
Mobile launchers
Storage
Fueling and handling
Targeting chains
Which brings us to breaking the sensor-to-shooter loop that enables Iranian missiles and drones to find and hit U.S. bases or regional partners.
This is where cybernetic–kinetic decapitation comes into reality.
Kinetic strikes alone won’t erase dispersed missile forces. Period. It’s not going to do it.
The condition to win is paralyzing the system that makes launches effective:
Communications
Cueing
Targeting
Logistics
Coordination
You get the picture.
Phase Four
Phase four is the maritime and base-defense grind — because Iran gets a vote.
Even if Iran’s air defenses are degraded, the hard part is sustaining operations under retaliation. There’s no way around it.
This was pointed out by the Pentagon’s concerns about a major operation against Iran.
Phase Five
What would that look like?
Strategic pressure strikes:
Energy
Industry
Regime levers
This is the controversial part. For if the goal shifts from limited coercion to regime compliance, escalation moves toward:
Critical infrastructure
Industrial nodes
National-level command structures
Regime security organs: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
This is where wars either end — because the opponent yields — or metastasize because the opponent escalates asymmetrically, regionally, and politically.
In other words: The beast takes on a life of its own.
It is also where coalition support often fractures because humanitarian and political costs spike, and the question “Why are we doing this?” becomes much louder.
Not only in legislatures — but in the streets.
Eventually, everybody catches on.
Phase Six
This phase is where we may see the termination and off-ramps, because this is where most plans are weakest.
A serious plan has to be pre-baked. It doesn’t matter what it is — it just has to be pre-baked.
What success looks like in measurable terms — not vibes
What concessions end the campaign
How to prevent uncontrolled regional widening
How to handle Iran’s proxies
How to handle maritime retaliation if the main air war pauses
So what makes this opening air campaign any different from the 2003 Iraq campaign, operationally speaking?
Even without getting lost in platform details, the key differences are structural.
Geography and depth make it harder to see the entire battlespace.
Dispersed missiles and drones make it harder to eliminate and easier to regenerate.
Undergrounding and redundancy or slowing decisive effects.
Regional vulnerability of U.S. bases and partners — Iran can impose costs without prevailing.
That is why the campaign’s center of gravity tends to become:
Missile suppression
Base defense
Endurance
Not quick decapitation.
So what would cybernetic–kinetic decapitation look like in real terms?
It wouldn’t mean “hack everything.”
It would look more like:
Blind and confuse the sensing layer: This involves jamming or spoofing sensors, radars, or surveillance systems through cyberattacks, electronic warfare, or disinformation, essentially creating a “fog of war.”
Disrupt the coordination layer: Targeting communication networks, nodes, or decision hubs to isolate units and prevent unified responses. In other words, divide-and-conquer communication.
Throttle launch and targeting cycles: Slowing the adversary’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop by delaying, false data, or overloads, making their reactions sluggish.
Exploit paralysis with selective kinetic strikes: Using the induced vulnerability for exact physical attacks, like missiles or special operations, on critical targets.
Sustain while managing retaliation and off-ramps: Maintaining pressure through ongoing operations while controlling escalation, while offering diplomatic exits to avoid a wider conflict.
Modern air campaigns aim to achieve political objectives without occupying territory. It’s a cheaper cut.
The Larger Meaning: War in the Age of Persistent Visibility
In conclusion, a war with Iran would ultimately illustrate not just the mechanics of an air campaign but also a broader shift in how war is conducted in the twenty-first century. It is a far cry from the twentieth.
The campaign described here would not be centered on territorial conquest, nor would it depend primarily on traditional battlefield maneuver. Instead, it would revolve around managing visibility and strikeability within a persistently observed battlespace.
It is like fighting inside a snow globe, you might say. Everything can be seen, and nothing fully escapes observation, targeting, and death.
Modern war increasingly unfolds in a condition of persistent visibility. Satellites, drones, signals intelligence, and networked sensors have made the operational environment structurally transparent in ways that did not exist even a generation ago. Even as recently as 2003, the battlespace was obviously not as technologically dense as it is today.
Forces now emit — thermally, electronically, or physically — and in doing so become detectable. And once detected, they become targetable.
The result is a battlespace in which the logic of operations shifts. Movement alone no longer guarantees survival, but neither does concealment alone guarantee security. Both static and mobile forces operate under conditions of uninterrupted observation.
Under these conditions, the maneuver does not disappear, but it changes character.
Operational maneuver becomes inseparable from signature management. Understand that the force that survives is not necessarily the force that moves fastest; rather, it is the force that can control its visibility while sustaining combat power.
A war with Iran would likely demonstrate this clearly. The central operational problem would not be destroying Iranian forces outright, which would be an unrealistic objective against a large and redundant state. Instead, rendering them operationally ineffective via disrupting the systems that allow them to detect, coordinate, and strike.
This is why the campaign’s center of gravity would shift toward:
Sensor disruption
Command dislocation
Missile suppression
Defensive endurance
Victory in such a war would not come via decisive battlefield collapse, but through operational suffocation — the gradual reduction of the enemy’s ability to function as a coherent military system.
In that sense, the emerging model of warfare is neither purely maneuver nor purely attrition.
Better understood as maneuver-attrition conducted inside a transparent battlespace.
The objective is not simply to destroy the enemy’s forces, but to place them in a condition where meaningful operations become impossible.
That is the deeper logic behind what might be called cybernetic–kinetic decapitation — not the physical elimination of every launcher or facility, but the disruption of the networks that make those systems effective.
Modern war, in this sense, is less about the destruction of armies than the paralysis of systems.
And if a war with Iran comes, it will likely be remembered less for its opening strikes than for what it reveals about warfare in the age of persistent visibility.
Various military theorists have contributed to and shaped the evolving concepts of time and space in warfare for centuries. These crucial ideas play a fundamental role in military strategy, operations, and tactics, significantly influencing maneuver, positioning, and timing. Their profound impact on the outcome of military operations cannot be emphasized enough.
Space in warfare pertains to the physical environment in which military operations occur. This encompasses the geographical area, terrain, and spatial positioning of forces and assets. Time in warfare refers to the chronological aspect of military operations, including the planning, execution, and duration of actions and strategies. It entails considerations of military activities such as speed, timing, and temporal coordination. Therefore, in the art of war, space becomes a tangible representation of time, and time can be seen as the intangible kinetic dimension of space.
Time in Warfare
Timing of Engagements: Choosing the optimal moment to initiate or avoid combat.
Speed and Efficiency: Rapid movement and quick decision-making to exploit opportunities.
Duration: Managing the length of operations to maintain momentum and resources.
Synchronization: Coordinating multiple units and operations to maximize effectiveness.
Space in Warfare
Geographical Terrain: Utilizing natural features (e.g., mountains, rivers) for strategic advantage.
Positioning: Placing forces in advantageous locations relative to the enemy.
Movement and Maneuver: Moving forces through space to gain positional advantage.
Control of Key Locations: Holding vital areas such as chokepoints, supply routes, and strongholds.
As one can read, mastering time and space elements is essential for success in military operations. However, what are the origins of this theory?
Origins and Theory
Time and space have always been central to military theory, shaping strategies and tactics from ancient to modern times. Even in prehistoric times, the principles of time and space played a critical role in warfare.When it came to time, early human groups would choose the optimal moment to attack or retreat, often based on environmental conditions or the status of their resources. Rapid movement and quick decision-making were vital for surprise attacks or quick escapes. Managing the length of conflicts was essential to ensure resources were not depleted and to avoid prolonged vulnerability. Even with basic communication, coordination among group members was necessary to execute effective hunting strategies or defensive actions.
Regarding space, natural features like hills, caves, and water sources were used for shelter, ambushes, and strategic advantages. Placing groups in advantageous locations, such as high ground or hidden areas, gave early humans an edge over their enemies or prey. Skilled maneuvering through familiar terrain allowed for effective hunting and evasion tactics. Securing vital areas like water sources, fertile land, or resource-rich zones was crucial for survival and dominance.
These aspects of time and space allowed prehistoric humans to enhance their chances of survival and success in their conflicts and daily struggles. From these experiences, humans would continue to develop and refine their strategies, laying the foundation for more sophisticated tactics in future warfare. As societies evolved, these early timing, positioning, and resource management lessons informed the complex military doctrines that would shape human history.
Leveraging time and space became integral to warfare and the broader context of human organization and development, which caused some to theorize on the subject. Therefore, a short introduction to some of these thinkers is imperative, starting with the ancient world and working to the present. We begin with Sun Tzu.
From the ancient period, Sun Tzu’s (c. 544–496 BC)The Art of War emphasizes the importance of timing and spatial advantage. He writes about the need to adapt to changing circumstances and to use the terrain to one’s advantage. He argues that the effective use of time and space can determine the outcome of battles.
Thucydides’ (c. 460–395 BC) History of the Peloponnesian War discussed the strategic use of naval and land forces, highlighting the importance of logistics, troop movement, and attack timing.
Alexander the Great’s (356–323 BC) campaigns showcased the effective use of time and space. He used rapid movements over vast distances and diverse terrains to outmaneuver enemies. His battles, such as Gaugamela, demonstrated the importance of timely and precise deployments.
Julius Caesar’s (100–44 BC) Commentaries on the Gallic Wardocumented the strategic use of time and space in military campaigns, including the rapid construction of fortifications and the use of geographical features to gain tactical advantages.
Vegetius’ (c. 4th century AD) Epitoma Rei Militaris emphasized the importance of logistics, training, and the strategic use of fortifications. Vegetius discussed the significance of preparation and the timing of maneuvers.
During the medieval period, Byzantine Emperor Maurice’s (6th century AD) manual Strategikonoutlined the importance of mobility, terrain use, and attack timing. It also highlighted the need for adaptability and the strategic use of cavalry.
Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1469–1527)The Art of Waradvocated for a military organization based on Roman principles during the Renaissance and early modern period. It emphasized the importance of terrain and the timing of engagements and highlighted the need for flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.
Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) On Warintroduced the “culminating point” concept in warfare, where the balance of time and space would favor one side. Clausewitz emphasized the fog of war, the importance of timing in attacks, and the use of geography to achieve strategic goals.
Antoine-Henri Jomini’s (1779–1869) Summary of the Art of War focused on the principles of interior lines and the importance of time and space in achieving decisive victories. Jomini emphasized the rapid concentration of forces at critical points.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840–1914) The Influence of Sea Power upon Historyhighlighted the strategic importance of naval power and the control of maritime space. Mahan discussed how naval supremacy could influence the timing and outcome of wars.
World War I and II showcased the significant role of logistics, the strategic use of terrain, and the timing of large-scale operations. The introduction of mechanized warfare and air power revolutionized the concepts of time and space in military theory.
During the modern era, nuclear strategy took precedence. The Cold War introduced the concept of deterrence, where the control of space (through missile deployment) and the timing of potential retaliatory strikes played crucial roles in maintaining the balance of power.
During the information age, military theory incorporates cyber warfare, space warfare, and real-time intelligence, exponentially expanding the concepts of time and space to include the virtual domain, where the speed of information and control of digital spaces are critical.
In summary, the strategic use of time and space remains a cornerstone of military theory, continually evolving with technological advancements and shifting geopolitical landscapes. While the concepts of time and space in warfare are universal, their application of military doctrine varies depending on the territorial size of the nation.
How Geography Shapes Time and Space in Military Doctrine and Theory
The geographic context significantly influences a nation’s military doctrine about spatial and temporal considerations. Essentially, military doctrine is designed to anticipate the preferred mode of warfare, although it may not align with the actual circumstances encountered.
This impacts military tactics, operations, strategy, and the nation’s infrastructure and economy. Larger geographical areas require more resources than smaller ones, including transportation, communication, and supply lines. However, this relationship can be nuanced, and several factors can influence the resource demands, effectively altering the offensive and defensive capabilities in said space.
Terrain and topography can be challenging if the area is mountainous, heavily forested, or a desert. These types of terrain can be more complex and resource-intensive to navigate and control than flat or open terrain for both the host nation and the invader. Because of this, the infrastructure, whether the presence or absence thereof, will significantly impact resource requirements for transportation and logistics. Densely populated areas may require more resources for maintaining order, providing services, and ensuring effective communication. At the same time, a sparsely populated area might need extensive communication networks and longer supply lines to reach dispersed inhabitants.
Weather is essential for those defending and invading, as harsh weather conditions (e.g., cold, heat, or heavy rainfall) can increase the need for specialized equipment, shelter, and additional logistics support. At the same time, seasonal variants and changes can affect an area’s accessibility and resource requirements. Because of this, the economic development of regions with established industries might have better infrastructure and resources in place, reducing the need for additional inputs. Meanwhile, underdeveloped regions may need more critical infrastructure, necessitating more transportation, communication, and supply network investments, which are strategically important.
The importance of infrastructure is another area of strategic value (e.g., ports, airports, crossroads, resource-rich regions), requiring a concentration of resources to secure and maintain control, especially in core areas. Core areas are high-value targets due to their significant infrastructure. Military doctrine often includes detailed plans for defending these areas because their loss could cripple military operations and destabilize the economy. However, the strategic value of core areas to invading armies is significant. Once controlled, these areas offer economic benefits, meet logistical needs, and enable the establishment of forward bases and defensive positions to better position forces strategically.
While core areas are desirable due to their resources and infrastructure, peripheral areas often lack these assets and are found less desirable. Military doctrine typically designates peripheral areas as low-priority. Because of this, peripheral areas tend to take to asymmetric warfare due to the lack of military presence.
Asymmetric warfare significantly alters the dimensions of space and time in war, introducing complexities that traditional warfare often does not encounter. When it comes to space in asymmetric warfare, the fluidity of the battlefield becomes non-linear since asymmetric engagements do not adhere to traditional frontlines. Guerrilla fighters move fluidly across vast territories, making the battlefield unpredictable and widespread. This use of terrain allows the guerrilla fighters to exploit challenging topography—mountains, forests, urban areas—leveraging local knowledge to their advantage, making it difficult for conventional forces to track and engage them.
Guerrillas often operate and blend within civilian populations, complicating conventional force’s task of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Thus, the operational space expands into urban and populated areas and becomes nuanced. This pressures conventional forces to spread out and cover more ground, diluting their combat effectiveness due to the creation of multiple fronts.
When it comes to time, in asymmetric warfare, protracted conflicts extend the duration of the war, which tends to drag out over more extended periods. Guerrillas avoid confrontation and focus on defeating the enemy over time through persistent, small-scale attacks. This type of war places tremendous psychological pressure on the conventional forces, and the sustained nature of guerrilla tactics aims to exhaust the opponent’s will to fight, eroding morale and political support over time. The operational tempo and the unpredictable nature of guerrilla attacks involve strategic decision-making regarding the timing and location of these actions. The intended goal is to maximize impact while circumventing fortified enemy positions. This irregular tempo disrupts conventional military operations. This operational flexibility allows guerrilla fighters to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, exploiting brief windows of opportunity that conventional forces might not be able to respond to as swiftly.
Overall, the strategic impact of asymmetric warfare on space and time strains resource allocation. Conventional forces must allocate significant resources to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to track guerrilla movements, often stretching their capabilities thin. Guerrilla warfare imposes disproportionate costs on conventional armies, requiring more resources to effectively counter small, mobile units. Conventional forces must adapt their strategies to combat this, incorporating counterinsurgency tactics that emphasize winning hearts and minds, improving intelligence gathering, and building local alliances. This comprehensive approach to guerrilla warfare often requires a multi-faceted approach, integrating military, political, economic, and social efforts to undermine guerrilla support and address the root causes of the conflict.
An Example of How the Size of a Nation Can Influence Military Doctrine
As mentioned, a nation’s geography determines and significantly influences the concepts of time and space in military doctrine. Here is an example of how the size of a nation influences its military doctrine, particularly in terms of time and space, by briefly looking at the Ukraine-Russia conflict:
Strategic Depth and Geographic Considerations:
Large Nations:
Strategic Depth: Larger nations, such as Russia, enjoy a significant advantage in terms of strategic depth. This advantage allows them to withstand and absorb initial attacks and engage in prolonged conflicts without facing an immediate threat to their essential territories. This depth allows Russia to execute strategic maneuvers, regroup, and launch counterattacks from well-protected positions deep within its territory.
Geographic Diversity: A sprawling nation like Russia boasts a rich tapestry of terrain, ranging from dense forests to towering mountains and bustling urban centers. This varied landscape offers abundant opportunities for leveraging strategic defenses and launching tactical offensives.
Extended Frontlines: The vast territory also means extended frontlines, which require significant resources to defend and maintain supply lines.
Smaller Nations:
Limited Depth: Countries with smaller land areas, like Ukraine, have limited strategic depth. This means that they have less distance to fall back on if attacked, making them more susceptible to swift advances by an enemy. As a result, these countries must be more proactive and effective in defending their territory.
Concentration of Forces: Smaller countries might strategically position their military resources in vital regions to protect important locations and infrastructure.
Territorial Constraints: The limited size of the territory constricts the capacity to employ flexible defense strategies, thereby demanding resourceful utilization of the available space.
Time Considerations
Operational Tempo and Duration:
Large Nations:
Protracted Engagements: Larger nations can be involved in extended conflicts due to their ability to sustain longer supply lines, rotate troops to maintain troop morale and effectiveness, and maintain high levels of industrial production to support their war efforts. These factors allow larger nations to maintain a sustained military presence and effectively carry out their strategic objectives over a prolonged period.
Operational Flexibility: They possess the strategic flexibility to execute extended deep operations, apply delaying tactics to slow down the enemy’s advance, and make strategic withdrawals, all while being able to regroup and launch powerful counterattacks when necessary.
War of Attrition: A larger nation may opt for a strategy of attrition, gradually employing tactics to weaken the enemy’s capabilities over an extended period. This approach involves applying sustained pressure and gradually depleting the enemy’s resources to outlast and defeat them through a war of endurance.
Smaller Nations:
Need for Swift Actions: Smaller nations frequently need rapid and conclusive victories to uphold morale and garner international backing. Prolonged conflicts can deplete their resources and diminish public support over time.
Asymmetric Warfare: This type of warfare utilizes guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks to disrupt and impede the advance of the larger opposing force.
Defensive Focus: The primary focus is establishing a sturdy and swift defense. This involves using fortified positions, navigating urban warfare scenarios, and leveraging local terrain knowledge to overcome potential shortcomings in depth.
Application to Ukraine-Russia Conflict
Russia’s Approach:
Multidomain Deep Battle: Utilizing its expansive geography, Russia implements multidomain deep battle strategies, merging land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains to disrupt and overpower Ukrainian defenses.
Strategic Bombardment: Long-range artillery, missile strikes, and air campaigns target Ukrainian infrastructure, military positions, and supply lines far from the front lines.
Sustained Pressure: Russia’s capacity to uphold extended military campaigns is readily apparent through its ongoing application of pressure across several strategic fronts. This is made possible by leveraging its extensive strategic depth and abundant resources, enabling sustained operations in various theaters of conflict.
Ukraine’s Approach:
Adaptive Defense: Ukraine has had to adapt its strategies to compensate for its smaller size, focusing on agile, mobile defense tactics and leveraging international support.
Rapid Response: The Ukrainian military prioritizes rapid response and flexible tactics, using local knowledge and smaller, more mobile units to counter Russian advances early in the war.
International Support: Continuous support from NATO and EU countries is crucial for Ukraine, providing advanced weaponry, intelligence, and training to enhance its defense capabilities.
It is evident that a nation’s physical size significantly impacts its military doctrine and approach to warfare. In the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia leverages its considerable size and diverse military capabilities to execute multidomain deep battle tactics. In contrast, Ukraine relies on adaptability, international support, and asymmetric tactics to defend against its larger adversary. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for a deeper analysis of the conflict and anticipating future developments.
Conclusion
The integration of time and space forms a fundamental element of military doctrine, influencing the strategic planning and execution of operations, logistics, and tactics by nations. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a prominent example of the profound influence of these principles. Russia’s vast geographical expanse and multifaceted capabilities exemplify a sophisticated utilization of time and space to establish strategic depth and operational adaptability. However, the fluid nature of contemporary warfare is conspicuous as smaller forces, such as Ukraine, have demonstrated their ability to employ time and space to offset a more substantial adversary through rapid adaptation and asymmetric tactics with international backing.
Time and space in war extend into cyberspace, where battles are fought on digital terrain, and timing is critical. Cyber operations can disrupt enemy communications, delay responses, and create strategic advantages, demonstrating that control over cyberspace and timing can be as decisive as traditional physical maneuvers.
Understanding the origins and fundamental principles of time and space in warfare is crucial for analyzing current conflicts and predicting future military developments. By appreciating how time and space influence war and politics, we gain deeper insights into the strategies and outcomes that define tomorrow’s battles.
What happens when two great conquerors of the ancient world and their mighty forces go head to head? A successful but unpredictable Ottoman Sultan was matched against a charismatic Mongol leader of an empire – leading to the Battle of Ankara, fought on 20 July 1402. The Ottomans were led by Bayezid I, who brought his troops against the Turkic Mongols (Timurids), led by Timur, also known as Tamerlane. Two great empires, two powerful leaders, with only one outcome…
After Timur had rampaged throughout Russia and the Caucasus, he struck deeply into Anatolia by sacking and destroying the city of Sivas before pushing further south. One would think that Bayezid would have countered this loss for Sivas but he did nothing. Bayezid could have attempted to placate Timur, but given his nature, would he accept it? Bayezid could have taken his large army and counter-attacked Timur’s forces as they headed south. However, none of the above happened. Instead, Bayezid waited for Timur to enter his domain before reacting.
In the summer of 1402, Timur moved his armies west to Sivas. This caused Bayezid to stir. Bayezid called off the siege against Constantinople and headed southeast to the fortress of Angora, in central Anatolia.
Timur is said to have prayed all night. When morning arrived, he ordered the drums to sound. The sound of the drums in the early morning would have had a psychological effect on the Ottomans nearby. No matter how battle hardened a soldier becomes, new unknowns bring about unease.
The army Timur had with him is said to have numbered between 140,000 and 200,000 troops. His army consisted primarily of cavalry but he had 32 war elephants at his disposal.
The troop size of Bayezid’s army consisted of 85,000 men. Bayezid’s forces were mostly infantry, including the elite Janissaries, with archers and cavalry (including Serbian knights). However, a quarter of his men were Tatars who were recently conquered, and thus their loyalty was in question.
Tatar soldiers at the vanguard of a battle (1620) (Public Domain)
Matters only got worse for Bayezid as discontent spread throughout the Ottoman ranks. For starters, they were tired after the long march and their pay was overdue. Compounding that, Bayezid’s scouts reported back to Bayezid that Timur had circled in behind the Ottomans and was now approaching from the rear. Yet more problems arose when Bayezid’s men needed access to water. Timur had built a reservoir and, on the day of the battle, diverted the principal water source for the area, Cubuk Creek, denying its use to the Ottoman army, which was now advancing from the east.
The Day of Battle
The terrain of the battlefield consisted of a large plain cornered by mountains on two sides. This is perfect for cavalry attacks. Moreover, it allows both armies to maneuver with fluidity.
The Prince Shah Rukh and Khalil Sultan led Timur’s left wing. Miran Shah led the right wing, with Amir Sheikh Nur ad-Din as his lieutenant general. The main body consisted of the greatest lords of Asia and Timur’s son, Prince Muhammad Sultan led them. Timur led the reserves that consisted of forty companies. In front of Timur’s army was the war elephants armed with towers on their backs with archers and throwers of flame.
Manuscript showing war elephants with archers and soldiers on their backs. The Battle of Avarayr, Sharaknots, 1482 (Public Domain)
Sultan Bayezid arranged his troops in battle order with Pesir, a European Serbian, leading the right wing. The left wing was under the command of Suleiman Chelebi, son of Bayezid. Bayezid led the main body. Muhammad Chelebi commanded the Ottoman reserves.
After Timur had met with his military counsel, he mounted his horse and gave the order to attack. Around 10 a.m. on the morning of 28 July 1402, Miran, commander of the right wing, began the battle by discharging a volley of arrows on the Ottoman left wing.
The Surprising Turns of Battle
It was during the initial stages of the battle that Bayezid made his first error. He placed his newly conquered Tatar cavalry on the front line to take the brunt of the initial attack. Once the battle commenced, they deserted to Timur, and cavalry from the recently subjugated emirates followed suit. This changing of sides reduced the Ottoman army by a quarter and, for all practical purposes, decided the battle.
Bayezid ordered his left wing to attack, covering it by an attack of his Anatolian cavalry. However, it was all for nothing; even though the cavalry fought bravely, they encountered hailstorms of arrows as well as Greek fire (a form of naphtha) and were driven back in confusion, losing some 15,000 men.
Timur then pressed on the attack by pushing at the Ottoman left wing and defeating the cavalry. While the Ottoman cavalry were in disarray, the Serbian kings on the right wing fought heroically.
Timur’s attack was well executed— just as Bayezid’s defenses were well planned. The only difference is that Bayezid lost a substantial amount of his forces due to placing newly conquered men on the front line to take the brunt of the attack. This was a big mistake. The Tartar’s fleeing from the Ottomans to join Timur did not help the psyche of the Ottoman troops. Because of this, the morale of Timur’s troops greatly increased, and so did their numbers. According to what the primary sources suggest, Timur commenced the attack by sending in one wing before sending in the next wing, and in doing so he was able to perform a “pincer movement or double envelopment.”
While Timur’s left and right wings placed tremendous pressure on the Ottoman wings, this opened up the center. The Ottoman center would be at times required to provide aid to the wings in trouble. In doing so, the center deteriorated substantially. Seeing this, Timur committed the remainder of his forces to attacking the center. By placing pressure on the center, it took pressure off his left and right cavalry wings. Moreover, it allowed his central forces to split once they had pushed aside the Ottoman forces, allowing them to converge on the rear of the left and right wings. In doing so, not only did they perform a well-executed pincer movement in the initial stages, they were able to perform with perfection two more to neutralize the Ottoman wings to achieve total victory.
Map by SAİT71 (CC BY-SA 4.0) giving a glimpse into the positions and commanders at the Battle of Ankara (Battle of Angora). Timur performed a pincer movement, flanking the enemy and finally overwhelming them.
Seeing his Serbian cavalry fighting with great fervor yet beginning to succumb to the overwhelming numbers, he sent the remaining Janissaries to support them. The Ottoman forces eventually fled to a small hilltop and continued the fight. The battle raged well into the evening as they beat back several Mongol attacks until nightfall, with Bayezid in the thick of the fight. Late into the night, Bayezid looked to the remainder of his forces and together they attempted to break free, but he was overtaken, unhorsed, and captured.
Once the dust cleared and most of the moans from men and beasts subsided, the Ottomans were seen to have lost between 40,000 and 50,000 troops while the Turko-Mongols had lost 40,000. Besides the great cost of life and supplies lost on the field of battle, came more issues. The Ottoman defeat at Ankara pushed the Ottoman state into a crisis from which the Empire fractured and nearly collapsed when Bayezid’s sons fought for the throne. This Ottoman civil war lasted for 11 years (1402 – 1413). Furthermore, the capture of Bayezid was a first in Ottoman history.
So, what happened to Bayezid?
Some say he was captured and placed in a birdcage. This is false. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II, r. 1458-64), Asiae Europaeque elegantissima descriptio, written between 1450-1460 and published in Paris in 1509. According to Marcus Milwright and Evanthia Baboula, they state:
“This piece (Asiae Europaeque elegantissima description) brought together the key elements that were to remain fundamental to the European narrative for some two centuries: first, the sultan (often known in European writings as Bajazet) was placed in an iron cage; second, he was forced, like a dog, to eat scraps from under the table of Temur; and, third, Bayezid was employed as the ‘Scythian’ ruler’s mounting block when the latter got onto his horse.”
“Timur the Great’s imprisonment of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid”: The Sultan tied by his waist with a golden rope to Timur’s table, top, and the Sultan bound and on all fours, being used as a mounting-block by Timur, and similarly bound in his gilded cage, bottom. (Public Domain)
The truth of the matter is that Timur treated Bayezid with great respect according to Timur’s court historians. Timur is even said to have mourned the death of Bayezid that occurred on 8 March 1403; He was either 48 or 49.
As for Timur, news of his victory spread far throughout Europe. When the Genoese heard of the victory, they raised flags of Timur at Pera over the city. Interestingly enough, there were plans for a European fleet to help in the fight against the Ottomans. Furthermore, the battle and victory brought relief to the city of Constantinople. However, 51 years later the city would fall to the same besiegers.
Strange Bedfellows
Three days after Bayezid had been captured; Timur’s son Miran Shah sent many letters to the monarchs of Europe, offering trade and friendship.
Surprisingly (and yet not so surprisingly), Charles VI of France and Henry IV of England responded with great joy to Timur. Another interesting aspect is that British playwright Christopher Marlowe wrote Tamburlaine in 1587, which portrays Timur humiliating Bayezid and burning the Quran. Timur was made into what a model king should be throughout Europe However, all this would end by the eighteenth century when the anti-Timur literature and works began to change his image.
Timur (Tamerlane, Tamburlaine). (Wellcome Image/CC BY 4.0)
As for the man himself, Timur would not live much longer. As he was leading his massive army to conquer Ming China, he grew ill and died on 19 February 1405 (aged 68) at Otrar, Farab, near Shymkent, Syr Darya (now in Kazakhstan). With Timur’s death, his empire did not last much longer as it fractured and finally collapsed by 1507. However, his future seed would carry on his legacy with the establishment of the Mughal Empire founded by Babur. The Timurid Empire did not last, and the Ottoman Empire nearly fell apart. However, once the Ottoman civil war was over, Bayezid’s conquests in Anatolia that had been lost to Timur were brought back under the Ottoman fold.
As for the campaign leading up to battle itself, it displayed how strong and unrelenting Timur’s forces were as he marched from one end of his empire to another to defend and go on the offensive to reclaim rebellious lands, or push far north into the lands of the Golden Horde. His ability to defend and expand his lands was tremendous. The battle itself pitted two great leaders but Timur was the smarter of the two. He was able to take advantage of the Ottoman forces by diverting a river and making good use of the defecting Tartar army that came to his side at the initial stages of the battle.
Overall, the Battle of Ankara in 1402 brought an empire to its knees, temporarily freed an ancient empire now reduced to the size of a city after many centuries of defeat, and Europe praised a man who in many ways was no different from the Ottoman Turks they faced. However, the Ottomans would recover and pick up right where they left off in conquering portions of southeast Europe, and the Timurid Empire would fade away only to reestablish themselves further to the east in India.
Top Image: Sultan Bayezid is defeated by Timur at Ankara (Public Domain)
ByCam Rea
References
Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 1
Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire
Dennis M. Rose, The Campaigns of Tamerlane
Hamad Subani, The Secret History of Iran
J.B. Bury; edited by H.M. Gwatkin, The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol IV
What happens when two great conquerors of the ancient world and their mighty forces go head to head? A successful but unpredictable Ottoman Sultan was matched against a charismatic Mongol leader of an empire – leading to the Battle of Ankara, fought on 20 July 1402. The Ottomans were led by Bayezid I, who brought his troops against the Turkic Mongols (Timurids), led by Timur, also known as Tamerlane. Two great empires, two powerful leaders, with only one outcome…
Thunder and Lightning
On 15 June 1389, the Ottoman Sultan Murad I was assassinated on the battlefield at Kosovo. His son, Bayezid, also known by his nickname Yıldırım “The Thunderbolt,” was crowned the new Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. It is true that he could impulsively and unpredictable as a statesman. What often gets overlooked is that he was a capable military commander. Bayezid was a natural born leader. However, his leadership was best on the field of battle. This is how he got the nickname “Thunderbolt”; due to his swift maneuvering and attacking in battle.
Bayezid’s lightning-strike military campaigns began with the conquests of the beyliks (beylik was territory under the jurisdiction of a Bey; Bey is Turkish for chieftain) Aydin, Saruhan, Menteşe, and Sivas. The new Sultan continued his rampage throughout Anatolia (modern Turkey) during the fall and winter of 1390, as he confiscated Hamid, Teke, and Germiyan—as well as taking the cities of Akşehir and Niğde, and their capital Konya from the Karaman.
In 1391, the Karaman sued for peace and Bayezid accepted. Soon after, Bayezid moved north against Kastamonu and conquered both that city as well as Sinop.
Riding and Conquering, the Unstoppable Force
With much of Anatolia under Ottoman control, Bayezid turned his attention towards Southeast Europe. First on the list was Bulgaria. Having conquered them, he turned his forces on northern Greece and gobbled up their territory as well. It seemed as though nothing could stop him.
In 1394, Bayezid crossed the Danube River to attack Wallachia. However, the Wallachians proved troublesome against the much larger Ottoman army and were able to defeat them superior in number, but on 17 May 1395, they were defeated at the battle of Rovine, which prevented Bayezid’s army from advancing beyond the Danube.
While Bayezid was confiscating the lands in Southeast Europe, he laid siege to Constantinople in 1394, capitalizing on the city’s political instability. As Bayezid laid siege, the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaeologus sent messengers, as well did King Sigismund of Hungary, to Venice and Paris to lobby for a new crusade that would dislodge the Ottoman Turks from Southeast Europe. The new Crusade was agreed to and many western European nations responded by sending troops. The king of Hungary (future Holy Roman Emperor) led this large crusading army. Both armies met and fought in what is known as the Battle of Nicopolis, 25 September 1396. The result was a decisive Ottoman victory.
The Battle of Nicopolis, as depicted by Turkish miniaturist in 1588. (Public Domain)
While Constantinople remained under siege, Bayezid decided to push east and conquer new lands. From 1397-1398, Bayezid confiscated new territory throughout Anatolia, including the Djanik emirate and Kadi Burhan al-Din. This would prove to be a big mistake, for taking these lands violated a treaty he had with Timur (Tamerlane). The reason why Bayezid would violate such a treaty was due to his belief that the Ottomans were the heirs of the former Seljuk state in Anatolia. Understand that the violation was more than just territorial interest—Kadi Burhan al-Din represented the Ilkhanid inheritors of the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan.
Timur, Powerful Conqueror and Ruler of an Empire
Timur facial reconstruction from skull by M.Gerasimov. 1941 (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Timur, historically known as Tamerlane (1336 – 1405), was a Turco-Mongol conqueror and the founder of the Timurid Empire in Persia and Central Asia. Timur was born in Transoxania and was a member of Barlas tribe. He rose to power among the Ulus Chaghatay—a nomadic tribal confederation that formed the central region of Mongolian Chaghadaid khanate.
Timur’s story is similar to Genghis Khan’s. How true those stories are is up for debate. Timur rose through the ranks by gaining the respect of local chieftains due to his personal valor in combat and his brigandage. His actions, whether raiding or in combat, caused many to flock to him. It was also during a battle that arrows struck his right arm and leg that left him partially paralyzed. Because of this, Europeans referred to him as “Tamerlane.”
Timur, not being related to Genghis Khan, could not bear the title Khan. Since he could not use the title, he decided to use politics to his advantage. While in the city of Balkh, (now northern Afghanistan), Timur quickly gained allies from among the merchants, peoples, and clergy due to sharing his loot with the locals, while the ruler, Husayn, who also happened to be Timur’s brother-in-law, was not viewed in with such praise. It may be that Husayn was a fine ruler; it is just that Timur had the capital to profit from his ambition.
Timur challenged and defeated Husayn in 1370 and took his other wife, Saray Mulk Khanum, who was a direct descendent of Genghis Khan. This allowed him to become the indirect imperial ruler of the Chaghatay tribe. However, Timur used the title of amir meaning general, instead. In order to legitimize his claim, Timur married the Genghisid princesses Saray Mulk Khanum and took the title Kuregen (Mongolian; “son-in-law”). Afterwards, he appointed a puppet of Genghisid line by the name of Suyurghatmish, as the ruler of Balkh while he pretended to act as a “protector of the member of a Chinggisid line, that of Genghis Khan’s eldest son, Jochi.”
To strengthen his position further, he collected a number of princes from the various branches of the Genghisid branches.
Timur also used Islam to legitimize his position by praising and patronizing the Sufi sheikhs and ulama. He built religious monuments to both please the religious faith and at the same time show that he was favored by the supernatural due to his connection to Genghis Khan. Timur understood the power of charisma as well as using the fear of the divine to solidify his position.
Timur feasts in the gardens of Samarkand. (Public Domain)
Timur on the Move
By 1381, Timur ruled over much of eastern Persia. However, he wanted more and campaigned against Kartid dynasty and when the capital of Herat refused to surrender he massacred the citizens and leveled the city. It was during this campaign that Timur sent his general to capture the rebellious Kandahar. 1385–1386 from Russia led by Khan Toktamish who was once his friend and ally. By 1389, much of Persia was under his control. He decided to head westward and conquered Persian Kurdistan. While this was going on, Timur invaded Russia in 1390 and crushed Toktamish but a revolt broke out in Persia that he crushed in 1392.
Timur besieges the historic city of Urganj. (Public Domain)
Land Grabs and Retaliations
Timur then went on to reconquer Armenia, (where it is said he took thousands of Christians from Sivas and buried them alive in moats), Azerbaijan, Fars, and he took Georgia in 1395. Toktamish in 1395 decided to invade once again but was defeated. In retaliation, Timur invaded and ravaged most of southern Russia and Ukraine, reaching Moscow in 1396.
Tode Mongke Khan and the Golden Horde (Public Domain)
As the war with the Golden Horde was ending, Timur prepared for another military campaign to the east. The aim of this campaign was to bring northern India under the Timurid fold, which he did with the sack and massacre of Delhi in 1398. With northern India now under his control, Timur turned westward to deal with his new enemy, the Ottomans. Before Timur entered Ottoman lands, he made stops at Aleppo and Damascus and sacked them both. After sacking and massacring 20,000 citizens of Baghdad, Timur let his troops rest for the winter before marching into Anatolia in 1401.
After the Usual Compliments…PERISH IN THE SEA OF PUNISHMENT
A missive from Timur “To the Emperor of Rum, Bayezid the Thunder”:
“After the usual compliments, we let you know, that by the infinite grace of God, the greatest part of Asia is in subjection to our officers, which we conquered by our strength, and the terror of our arms.
Know likewise that the most powerful sultans of the earth are obedient to our commands; that we govern our dominions by ourselves, and have even constrained fortune to take care of our empire; that our armies are extended from one sea to the other, and our guard consists of sovereign kings, who form a hedge before our gate.
Where is the monarch who dares resist us? Where is the potentate who does not glory in being of the number of our courtiers? But for thee, whose true origin terminates in a Turkoman sailor, as everyone knows, it would be well, since the ship of thy unfathomable ambition has suffered shipwreck in the abyss of self-love, if thou wouldst lower the sails of thy rashness, and cast the anchor of repentance in the port of sincerity, which is the port of safety; lest by the tempest of our vengeance you should perish in the sea of the punishment which you merit.
But as we have learned, that in obedience to the precept of the Koran, which orders us to wage war with the enemies of the Mussulman laws, you have undertaken a vigorous war with the Europeans; this consideration hath hindered us from making any insults in the lands which are subject to you: and the reflection that your country is the bulwark of the Mussulmans, hath obliged us to leave it in a flourishing condition; for fear the passage of our armies into it should raise a division among the inhabitants, and cause the Mussulmans to be disquieted, and the infidels rejoice.
Then take care of yourself, and endeavor by your good conduct to preserve the dominions of your ancestors, not suffering for the future your ambitions foot to wander out of the limits of your power, which is but small…. You may remember the precept of Muhammad, to let the Turks remain in peace, while they are quiet: don’t seek to wage war with us; which no one ever dared to do, and prospered….
Though you have been in some considerable battles in the woods of Anatolia, and have gained advantages upon the Europeans; it was only through the prayers of the prophet and the blessings of the Muhammadan religion of which you make professions: don’t be proud at these advantages, nor attribute them to your own valor. Believe me, you are but a pismire: don’t seek to fight against the elephants; for they’ll crush you under their feet…. If you don’t follow our counsels, you will repent it.
These are the advices we have to give you: do behave yourself as you think fit.”
Bayezid’s Reply to Timur:
“It is a long time,… since we have been desirous of carrying on a war with you. God be thanked, our desire has had its effects, and we have taken up a resolution to march against you at the head of a formidable army. If you don’t advance against us, we will come to seek you; and pursue you as far as Tauris and Sultaniah.”
Top Image: Battle of Ankara (Mughal painting) public domain
ByCam Rea
References
Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 1
Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire
Dennis M. Rose, The Campaigns of Tamerlane
Hamad Subani, The Secret History of Iran
J.B. Bury; edited by H.M. Gwatkin, The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol IV
Pharaoh Thutmose III pushed his 12,000-strong army towards the banks of the Orontes River. His scribe, Tjaneni, kept a daily journal in order to have the Pharaoh’s military exploits inscribed by his artisans on the walls of Amun-Re’s temple at Karnak. The men lay siege to the coalition of Canaanites led by the King of Kadesh. What lay in store for the citizens of Megiddo?
Thutmose decided to take the direct route that the King of Kadesh would not expect—the main road. While Canaanite scouts waited to report back after seeing the Egyptian army, Thutmose knew that if he did not take these routes, the advisors of the King of Kadesh would think that he had gone on another road “because he is afraid of us?’ So they will say.”
Upholding Oaths and Leading Men into Danger
Some of the Egyptian officials became concerned with this. The direct route to Megiddo was not the best plan of action and his officers and men grew so wary of the endeavor that Thutmose stated: “Your valiant lord will guide your steps on this road which becomes narrow.” For his majesty had taken an oath, saying: “I shall not let my valiant army go before me from this place!” Afterwards, Thutmose, before his army, showed strength by leading the forces himself for every “man was informed of his order of march, horse following horse, with his majesty at the head of his army.”
On day 19, the Egyptian army came out of the pass. Thutmose was still leading the way at the head of his army, which was “grouped in many battalions, without meeting a single enemy”. Their southern wing was at Taanach, and their northern wing on the north side of the Qlna valley. Then his majesty called to them: “——— they are fallen! The wretched enemy —— Amun——–. Give praise to him, extol the might of his majesty, for his strength is greater than ——-.” There was much concern, and rightfully so, concerning the rear (since that is where much of the supplies are located) as it was slowly making its way forward with the army. After confirming that the rear was secured, the elite vanguard came into the Qina valley and stated: “Lo, his majesty has come out with his valiant troops and they fill the valley. May our valiant lord listen to us this time. May our lord watch for us the rearguard of his army with its people. When the rearguard has come out to us in the open, then we shall fight against those foreigners; then we shall not be concerned about the rearguard of our army!” Thutmose III halted in the open.
Afterwards, the Pharaoh watched his troops march into camp until all had arrived. Thutmose and his forces sat south of Megiddo, on the shore of the Qina brook. After the camp had been prepared, Thutmose sent word to his officers to inform the troops that they should prepare. “Make your weapons ready! For one will engage in combat with that wretched foe in the morning; for one ———.” He rested in the royal camp, giving provisions to the officers, rations to the attendants. He said to the watch of the army: “Steadfast, steadfast! Vigilant, vigilant!” Finally, one came to tell his majesty: “The region is safe, and so are the troops of the south and the north.”
The Fierce Battle: ‘The fear of his majesty had entered their bodies’
On day 21, the Egyptians were celebrating by feasting during the new moon. However, the feasting would soon end as Thutmose appeared and gave instruction. “An order was given to the whole army to pass —. His majesty set out on a chariot of fine gold, decked in his shining armor like strong-armed Horus, lord of action, like Mont of Thebes, his father Amun strengthening his arm.”
Thutmose had the southern wing of his forces on a hill south of the Qina brook, and the northern wing to the northwest of Megiddo, while Thutmose himself was in the center.
What can be made of this battle from recorded details is that at dawn the Egyptian forces pushed out with the infantry on the right to stand their ground behind the steep banks of the Kina Brook, while the rest of the army struck the center and left. By doing this, Thutmose pinned the Canaanite forces against their own camp. One could say that he cut them in half in order to effectively deal with them.
Egyptian driving chariot, Crossroads of Civilization exhibit (CC BY 2.0)
Understand that when Thutmose attacked the center, he drove a wedge down the middle; this allowed his left wing to push that portion of the enemy’s left wing right into jaws of Thutmose’s center. This, in turn, allowed both the center and left wing to go ahead and push on into the right wing of the enemy, causing total mayhem throughout the ranks.
The Egyptians in their attack used a steady barrage of arrows as the left wing of the Egyptian infantry made their way in, being protected by archers and the devastating charge of Thutmose’s chariots. The Egyptian chariots during this battle acted as ancient tanks due to their weight, speed, and that they carried an archer who could fire arrows from a platform that gave him 360 degrees.
The enemy had stood at the most likely paths of attack, leaving their middle exposed. This led to a quick routing.
In the end, the Egyptian army did not pursue the fleeing Canaanite soldiers. Those who survived fled behind the safe walls of Megiddo. Thutmose and his forces decide that enough was enough and that it was time to celebrate on the enemy’s dime.
Diorama of Egyptian in Chariot, Crossroads of Civilization exhibit (CC BY 2.0)
“Then his majesty overwhelmed them at the head of his army. When they saw his majesty overwhelming them, they fled headlong to Megiddo with faces of fear, abandoning their horses, their chariots of gold and silver, so as to be hoisted up into the town by pulling at their garments. For the people had shut the town behind them, and they now lowered garments to hoist them up into the town. Now if his majesty’s troops had not set their hearts to plundering the possessions of the enemies, they would have captured Megiddo at this moment, when the wretched foe of Kadesh and the wretched foe of this town were being pulled up hurriedly so as to admit them into their town. For the fear of his majesty had entered their bodies, and their arms sank as his diadem overwhelmed them.”
Egyptian chariot, accompanied by a cheetah and archer (Public Domain)
“Then their horses were captured, and their chariots of gold and silver became an easy prey. Their ranks were lying stretched out on their backs like fish in the bight of a net, while his majesty’s valiant army counted their possessions. Captured was the tent of that wretched foe, which was worked with silver ——–. Then the entire army jubilated and gave praise to Amun for the victory he had given to his son on that day. They lauded his majesty and extolled his victory. Then they presented the plunder they had taken: hands, living prisoners, horses, chariots of gold and silver and of painted work.”
The Plunder of Megiddo
Aerial view of Megiddo (Tel Megiddo, Levant) (CC BY-SA 3.0)
While Thutmose and his forces celebrated, he knew that his opportunity to crush the Canaanite coalition was not going to happen unless he besieged and took Megiddo. After the drinking and eating were over, Thutmose surrounded Megiddo. Thutmose made it clear to his officers that “the capture of Megiddo is the capture of a thousand towns! Grasp firmly, firmly!” Thutmose understood the economic and military benefits that Megiddo would award the Egyptians. Once the siege began, Thutmose made it clear to his officers that they “provide for their soldiers and to let every man know his place. They measured the town, surrounded (it) with a ditch, and walled (it) up with fresh timber from all their fruit trees.” Not a sole could escape the wall built by the Egyptians. The siege lasted for seven months before the people of Megiddo surrendered.
While the city and citizens were spared, for the most part, it was open season on possessions— the spoils of war. The defeated enemy leaders were forced to send a son to Egypt, where they were raised and educated as Egyptians. Once they were returned, they governed with Egyptian background and sympathies. The victory at Megiddo was the beginning of several battles which crushed the rebellion.
Now the princes of this foreign land came on their bellies to kiss the ground to the might of his majesty, and to beg breath for their nostrils, because of the greatness of his strength and the extent of the power of Amun over all foreign lands. ——–, all the princes captured by his majesty’s might bearing their tribute of silver, gold, lapis lazuli, and turquoise, and carrying grain, wine, and large and small cattle for his majesty’s army; one group among them bore tribute on the journey south. Then his majesty appointed the rulers anew for every town ——.
Replica of Canaanite Temple at Megiddo (CC BY-SA 2.0)
The amount of booty brought forth to Thutmose was staggering. The Annals list:
Living prisoners: 340
Hands: 83
Horses: 2,041
Foals: 191
Stallions: 6. Colts: —
One chariot of that foe worked in gold, with a pole of gold
One fine chariot of the prince of Megiddo, worked in gold
Chariots of the allied princes: 30
Chariots of his wretched army: 892, Total: 924
One fine bronze coat of mail belonging to that enemy
One fine bronze coat of mail belonging to the prince of Megiddo
Leather-coats of mail belonging to his wretched army: 200
Bows: 502
Poles of mry-wood worked with silver from the tent of that enemy: 7
And the army of his majesty had captured cattle belonging to this town —— : 387
Cows: 1,929
Goats: 2,000
Sheep: 20,500
Victory stela of pharaoh Thutmose III, from Jebel Barkal, temple of Amen. Made of granite, from the 18th dynasty, circa 1490-1436 B.C. Erected during his 47th regnal year (roughly 1443 BC) marking his kingdom’s southern boundary. 50 lines of hieroglyphs mark his campaigns in Naharin, the Battle of Megiddo, an elephant hunt, a royal speech, and more. (CC BY 3.0)
But wait there’s more. Here’s a list of what was carried off afterward by Thutmose:
The household goods of the enemy of Yanoam, Inuges, and Herenkeru, together with the property of’the towns that had been loyal to him which were captured by the might of his majesty ——-
Maryan-warriors belonging to them: 38
Children of that enemy and of the princes with him: 84
Maryan-warriors belonging to them: 5
Male and female slaves and their children: 1,796
Pardoned persons who had come out from that enemy because of hunger: 103, Total: 2,503
As for the expensive bowls of costly stone and gold, and various vessels:
One large Jay of Syrian workmanship. Jars, bowls, plates, various drinking vessels, large kettles, knives: [x+] 17, making 1,784 deben
Gold in disks skillfully crafted, and many silver disks, making 966 deben and 1 kite
A silver statue ——. ——- with a head of gold
Walking sticks with human heads: 3
Carrying chairs of that enemy of ivory, ebony, and ssndm-wood worked with gold: 6
Footstools belonging to them: 6
Large tables of ivory and ssndm-wood: 6
One bed of ssndm-wood worked with gold and all costly stones in the manner of a krkr, belonging to that enemy, worked with gold throughout
A statue of ebony of that enemy worked with gold with a head of lapis lazuli. ——–, bronze vessels and much clothing of that enemy
Moreover, if that was not enough, many of the fields were “made into plots and assigned to royal inspectors in order to reap their harvest.”
Thutmose III’s exploits are recorded in the Annals, inscribed into stone at Karnak. Thutmose III smiting his enemies. (Public Domain)
Overall, the Battle of Megiddo secured Egypt the right to control and dictate southern Canaan and extended its frontier to the Orontes River in Syria. Furthermore, they now had a safe passage from which their troops could run up and down the land bridge that connected Asia with Africa and control the flow of trade that was both being imported and exported.
Thutmose III was indeed Egypt’s Napoleon.
Top Image: Thutmosis III statue (Public Domain) and Ancient Egyptian military in battle (Public Domain); Deriv.
ByCam Rea
References
Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. 2013.
Gabriel, Richard A. Thutmose III: A Military Biography of Egypt’s Greatest Warrior King. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009.
Pritchard, James B., and William Foxwell Albright. The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures. [Princeton]: Princeton University Press, 1958.
With the death of the famous female Pharaoh – Hatshepsut – Thutmose III rose to power and knew there would be trouble. On the banks of the Orontes River, a revolt was brewing. Amassing a huge army and heading out on a forced march, the Egyptian king prepared for battle.
The Battle of Megiddo pitted the Egyptians, led by Pharaoh Thutmose III on one side, against a coalition of Canaanites led by the King of Kadesh. Megiddo is a battle of firsts, such as a recorded body count and the first use of the composite bow. Moreover, Megiddo is considered the first recorded battle due to the reliable detail provided by the Egyptians. Details of the battle come from the 42 year of Thutmose’s reign, as he instructed his scribe, Tjaneni, to keep a daily journal, in order to have his military exploits, particularly the 14 campaigns that took place in the Levant (Canaan), inscribed by his artisans on the walls of Amun-Re’s temple at Karnak.
The Battle of Megiddo is regarded to have taken place 16 April 1457 BCE.
A Battle for Position and Goods
Power-shifts taking place in the strategic location— on the Great Bend of the Euphrates River north of Egypt— was the beginning of the conflict. The Asiatic kingdom that Thutmose was concerned about was the city-state of Kadesh on the Orontes River, which was under the protection of the Kingdom of Mitanni.
Main cities of Syria in the second millennium BCE. Kadesh, or Qadesh, is to the west. (Public Domain)
This protection allowed Kadesh to expand southward into Canaan and to confiscate many of the mini-states and expand its influence as far south as the city of Megiddo. Kadesh understood the geographical strategic importance of Megiddo, for whoever controls the city effectively controlled the Esdraelon Plain in Galilee. More important was that Megiddo controlled the main trade routes that flowed east into the Trans-Jordan as well as to the north leading to the city-state of Kadesh. If Kadesh, along with their protectorate, Mitanni, controlled the trade routes leading east and north, it also would affect the trade flowing from Egypt to the south. Therefore, Egypt could not fully partake in the lucrative trade flowing from the rich lands of Mesopotamia. As 19th-century French Liberal economist Frederic Bastiat was to have said, “When goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will.” It seems evident that goods did not cross or if they did, they were next to none.
Egyptian relief depicting Kadesh garrisoned by Hittites and surrounded by the Orontes River, Reign of Ramesses II, 19th dynasty. (Public Domain)
Pharaoh Thutmose Strikes
Understand that before Pharaoh Thutmose III was sole ruler, he shared that power with his stepmother and aunt, Hatshepsut, for twenty-two years. However, Pharaoh Hatshepsut held much of that power. During this co-rule, Hatshepsut did little to stem the powers from the north from taking the Levant both politically and physically. When Hatshepsut died, Thutmose took action. Seeing the encroachment of northern foreign powers into lands considered under the sphere of Egyptian influence, Thutmose began to build his political and military powerbase to thwart any further regression in the nearby lands of the Levant.
Seated statue of Thutmose/Thutmosis III (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Time was of the essence, for the Asian coalition to the north controlled Megiddo, and who controls Megiddo could cross the Carmel Ridge into the southern Canaanite plain. This was problematic, for Thutmose had few troops stationed in the garrisons that dotted the plain. If this northern Asiatic coalition broke through Egypt’s garrisons, there would be no natural obstacles or physical (garrisons/fortresses) to hinder the enemy forces in Egypt if they passed Gaza and Sharuhen.
In order to prevent further Asiatic expansion south, Thutmose held a meeting with his military advisors during the winter to plan his campaign to come. While Thutmose was in talks with his military advisors, he would have sent messengers to the four corners of his kingdom to muster the forces and acquire the supplies needed at Sile, which served as an important stop en route from Egypt to Canaan. Furthermore, Sile was located on the coastal road near the Nile River and ten kilometers (6.2 miles) north-northeast of modern Qantara. From this location, Thutmose could assemble his military forces behind a series of forts that controlled the roads leading to Canaan and south into the Sinai.
Thutmose’s Impressive Forces
The armies of Thutmose III were much better off under his rule than under previous pharaohs’. Thutmose’s forces were truly professional. Military families were given land grants as long as they sent a son into the officer corps. Moreover, the army was transformed into a national force based on conscription, while the militia was allowed to exist. Not only did Thutmose transform the structure of the military into a national force, he also passed a decree that the levy of men required would be ‘one man in ten’ instead on one in a hundred. Non-commissioned and professional officers trained the men for war.
Thutmose also changed the look and tactics of his army by adopting the arms and armaments of the Hyksos, such as the chariot, composite bow, axe, and sickle sword. Furthermore, he took the design of the Hyksos chariot and improved upon it by positioning the axle to the rear of the carrying platform, expanding the spokes in the wheel from four to six, and connecting the U-shaped joint to the yoke pole under the chariot was designed to slide left and right allowing the driver smooth rotation when on the move.
The Hyksos of Ancient Egypt drove chariots. (Public Domain)
The size of Thutmose’s army at Megiddo is unknown, as the Annals are silent. Estimates suggest that his army was between 5,000-20,000 troops. The Annals do indicate that when Thutmose’s army arrived at the battlefield that its rearguard was still in camp. The distance between the campsite and the rearguard was 14.4 km (nine miles). If one considers an American infantry brigade during World War I, one might have an idea as to the size of the Egyptian army; According to Richard Gabriel, “An American infantry brigade comprised 6,310 men and 1,021 animals and occupied a road space of 8,385 yards or approximately 4.8 miles.” Therefore, the Egyptian forces would have numbered roughly 12,000 men if the army was occupying a road space of nine miles. If so, one could speculate that 10,000 of the 12,000-strong army would have comprised mostly of Infantry, while the remaining 2,000 were primarily chariot units comprised of 1,000 chariots divided in two to support each infantry corps.
The Egyptian army under Thutmose III would have been something along these lines: Pharaoh (Thutmose III) was the Commander-in-Chief, his vizier was Minister of War, his council would comprise of senior officers who would advise the pharaoh before, and once in the field. When it came to the military organization, divisions organized the Egyptian forces. Egypt would have had a corps in Upper and Lower Egypt. Each division consisted of 5,000 men of combined arms consisting of infantry and chariots. Thutmose would muster his forces from Lower Egypt forces. Of the 12,000 soldiers, most were your standard infantry while elite troops and chariot warriors reinforced other units.
To supply his forces and pack animals, Thutmose had much to draw from due to the numerous places located between Sile and Raphina. These places and the castles/fortress in between provided rest stops to the army to recuperate and to draw fresh supplies of water, food, and feed for their animals. Each soldier carried roughly 10 days’ worth of rations.
The next issue was the amount of food needed. However, the problem is there is no information one can draw from concerning Thutmose’s army but we’re not at a total loss. The typical Egyptian meal would have been emmer cereal grain, which was flat bread. The soldier would have been given eight small loaves that would last him ten days. He would place these in his backpack and bake them on the march. Once he was able to rest, he would build a three-foot cone-shaped mud dome. Once complete, he would take his moist dough and slap it on the side of the oven. He would have few to no twigs at all to use as fuel. Instead, to heat the oven he would have burned horse dung to cook his meals. Besides flatbread, the Egyptian warrior would have enjoyed such meats as smoked goose flesh, beef jerky, and smoked or salted fish. As for vegetables, he had beans, lentils, cabbage, and onions. For fruit, he had chickpeas, cucumbers, and other. To wash this fine meal down, he was provided milk sometimes, but his main drink was beer. The beer was so important to the soldiers on the move that traveling breweries sometimes accompanied them.
When comes down to the Egyptian warriors’ caloric intake, a man would be required roughly 3,400 calories due to the rigorous activity. However, this depends on the height and weight of the soldier. An ancient Egypt soldier would have stood roughly 5-foot-2-inches (157) and weighed between 100-120 lbs (45-54 kg). Because of this, his caloric intake would have been between 2544-2716 calories along with nine quarts of water in skins. Moreover, given the amount of food choices he had, there is no doubt that he was able to sustain his health. When it comes to water, as briefly mentioned, the Thutmose and his advisors would have known about the water storage sites since many of the wells along the coast were stale, foul, or salty. As for the animals, each one would roughly need eight gallons of water per day.
Once the army and their animals had reached Gaza, food and water supply became less of a problem due to the number of cisterns in the area, and since many of the towns would have granaries from which they could draw from, particularly during the months of April and May. Given the amount of water needed by the men, which was eight or nine quarts a day or roughly two gallons, an army of 12,000 men would require 24,000 gallons of water. With 2,000 horses on hand, it comes to 16,000 gallons of water each day to support these animals! This does not take into account the amount of feed brought along that would be needed due to an absence of ample pastures for the horses to graze at times. This also does not take into account the number of mules and donkeys used to pull the wagons loaded with additional supplies.
The Push towards Megiddo
Once winter ended, Thutmose moved out with his forces and into the lands of Canaan. In the first summer of the 23 year of his reign on day four, Thutmose celebrated his coronation as he arrived at the town of “Conquest-of-the-Ruler”—the Syrian name for Gaza. On day five, he departed from the location with the aim to extend the borders of Egypt.
Depiction of Tuthmoses III at Karnak holding a Hedj Club and a Sekhem Scepter standing before two obelisks he had erected there. (Public Domain)
Eleven days later, Thutmose arrived at the town of Yehem. Afterwards, he commanded that his forces meet him so he could discuss what was about to take place, stating:
“That wretched foe of Kadesh has come and entered into Megiddo and is there at this moment. He has gathered to him the princes of all the foreign lands that had been loyal to Egypt, as well as those from as far as Nahrin, consisting of —, Khor and Kedy, their horses, their armies, their people. And he says–it is reported–‘I shall wait and fight his majesty here in Megiddo. (Now) tell me what you think.”
The soldiers responded to their pharaoh:
“How will it be to go on this road which becomes narrow, when it is reported that the enemies are waiting there beyond and they are numerous? Will not horse go behind horse and soldiers and people too? Shall our vanguard be fighting while the rearguard waits here in Aruna, unable to fight? There are two (other) roads here. One of the roads is to our east and comes out at Taanach. The other is on the north side of Djefti, so that we come out to the north of Megiddo. May our valiant lord proceed on whichever of these seems best to him. Do not make us go on that difficult road!”
Thutmose, along with his advisors, knew that the King of Kadesh was expecting them to take the easiest routes to Megiddo. Therefore, Thutmose decided to take the direct route that the King of Kadesh would not expect since it was the main road. While Canaanite scouts waited to report back after seeing the Egyptian army, Thutmose knew that if he did not take these routes, the advisors of the King of Kadesh would think that Thutmose had gone on another road “because he is afraid of us?’ So they will say.”
Top Image: Thutmosis III statue (Public Domain) and Wooden figures found in the tomb of Mesehti: Egyptian army of the 11th Dynasty (CC BY-SA 3.0); Deriv.
Ardashir proclaimed himself king of Persis by 208 CE. His brothers protested this and Ardashir disposed of them. If his brother challenges were not enough, many local petty kings of Persis refused to acknowledge Ardashir rule. Ardashir responded by going to war in which he crushed them. He thus solidified his position as the rightful king of Persis. However, Parthian leadership in Ctesiphon thought otherwise, and sounded the alarm.
The House of Sasan ruled the Sasanian Empire from 224 to 651. Ardashir I named the dynasty in honor of his grandfather, Sasan. The Sassanian Royal Symbol and the Mythology of Persia. (Public Domain)
Ardashir Challenges the Parthians
Ardashir made his challenge known in 224 CE. While risky, he knew that the Parthian power base at Ctesiphon was impotent and the confederation that supported the Arsacid throne weak and tired of Arsacid rule. Ardashir understood that so long as the Arsacid’s stayed in power, the next Roman invasion of Iranian lands would go roughly unchecked. To avoid this from happening, there was a crucial need for a much stronger central government capable of fielding a tough, well-disciplined army with the ability to meet, engage, discharge, and have the ability to give chase and conquer former territory once under Achaemenid rule.
Ardashir I is receiving the Kingship’s ring. (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Ardashir, uncertain, but ready for the challenge, soon gained support beyond the borders of Persis. Many supporters from the provinces of Media, Media Atropatene, Adiabene, and Kurdistan, came to join in the rebellion. But that would not be enough if he was to defeat King Artabanus V. To seal the deal, Ardashir needed the support of the Iranian highlanders in the northwest.
This is mentioned in the Arbela Chronicles which state: “And this was recognized by the Persians and the Medes and they closed a union with Šahrat, the king of Hedajjab, and Domjtana, the king from Karek Selok and made a hefty assault on the Parthians in spring.” With many nations now backing Ardashir, particularly the western Iranians, which was extremely important (for the Parthian seat of power was right in the middle), Ardashir made his move to battle.
Artabanus V, like any king during a time of crises, assembled his forces and marched on the province of Persis to crush Ardashir.
The fate of the Iranian peoples was decided by three battles. The first battle was won by Ardashir but at a considerable cost for both sides. According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir son of Babag, Ardashir “came to battle with Ardavan (Artabanus) but Artabanus was not in command of the Parthian forces. Instead, Bahman, the son of Artabanus, led the forces and was killed along with his entire army. Afterwards, Ardashir “seized their wealth, property, horses; and portable lodges, and settled himself in Stakhar.” Some may view this battle as a draw.
The second battle also was a victory for Ardashir and proved pivotal, for the Parthians suffered a great loss of men. With Parthia wounded, Ardashir took advantage of the situation and pressed on. The final battle between the two powers took place at Hormizdeghan, near the modern city of Bandar Abbas, 28 April 224 CE.
Ardashir chose this area, which gave him access to the water supplies, crucial to quench the thirst of men and horses. As for Artabanus, his force took up a position near an inadequate water supply. In such a hot area and with a lack of water, both man and beast grew weary the longer they waited. This may have been Ardashir’s strategy. Taking advantage of the water supply physically weakened the Parthians, which in turn caused psychological distress.
When both armies formed battle lines, the forces of Ardashir were better equipped, as some of his horsemen were wearing the Roman-style, flexible chain armor. Artabanus fielded a much larger force. However, his forces were hastily assembled, ill equipped, and less prepared for battle, for even the king of the Parthians was wearing the old style lamellar armor considered cumbersome at the time. While details of the final battle are scant, Ardashir was victorious as “He killed Ardavan, whose entire wealth and property fell into the hands of Ardashir, who married Ardavan’s daughter, and went back to Pars.”
Details of this battle can be seen at Firuzabad, Iran. The rock carving shows Ardashir unhorsing and killing Artabanus V from his horse in a joust. This ended the House of Arsaces and established the House of Sasan.
Drawing of French orientalist painter and traveler Eugene Flandin (1840): Sasanian king Ardachir Babakan’s rock relief (Firuzabad 1), Scene showing an equestrian victory over Parthian king Artabanus V, province of Fars, Iran. (Public Domain)
Ghal’eh Dokhtar (or “The Maiden’s Castle”) in present-day Fars, Firuzabad, Iran, built by Ardashir in 209, before he was finally able to defeat the Parthian empire. (Public Domain)
Ardashir’s Military Reform and Forces
After defeating the Parthians, Ardashir turned his attention towards driving Rome back into the sea and restoring the former glory of Persia when it was under Cyrus the Great. However, Ardashir needed a professional army, an army that was organized, and not only in structure, but also in capability.
Rome was not an easy army to fight, just look at the many battles fought between Rome and Parthia over time. They were equals to one another. However, one was better at going on the offensive while the other excelled at remaining defensive. Ardashir needed an army that could do both, for he could not afford just a defensive army.
Ardashir consolidated and centralized his forces directly under his command. He was absolute, and an absolute monarchy needed a subjective army that would forcefully submit to the nobility without contestation. In order to do this, the command must start at the very top, which was the king himself, Ardashir.
Bust of a Sasanian king, most likely Shapur II (309 to 379 CE) Representative image. (Public Domain)
The Chain of Command
Ardashir was not only King of Persia, but he was the Shahenshah, “King of kings.” Ardashir’s military chain of command started with the Vuzurg-Framander. The Vuzurg-Framander was in charge of state affairs when the Shahenshah was off on a military campaign. The person in charge of the military forces was the Eran-Spahbad. Under the Eran-Spahbad was the Spahbad who was a general and could be a military governor of a province. The Spahbad received help from his assistants, known as the “Padgospan.” The Padgospan, otherwise known as “Padan” were lower officers assisting the Spahbad. Under the Padan was the Framandar, which were the battlefield commanders. This list provides a somewhat clear detail as to the day-to-day duties of the military chain of command whether in peace or in war. However, other titles are mentioned, but many remain unclear as to their job description or role in war.
Artistic rendering of a Sasanian spahbed. (Public Domain)
Now that we have a glimpse into the command structure of the Sassanid military, one can see that it was highly organized due to its centralized role. Nevertheless, good command structure needs a good army to function, in order to go on the offensive or stay on the defensive when needed.
The Sassanid military was heavy and built for shock for its sole purpose was to dominate the battlefield and beyond. The Sassanid military force was a mirror image of the Parthian military. In other words, cavalry ruled the day throughout the empire. Cavalry was tradition in these parts and the Sassanids continued in that tradition, but with better organization.
The Sassanids primarily relied on two types of cavalry in combat; the heavy cavalry consisted of cataphracts, the clibanarii, and the lighter horse archer cavalry. In addition to the cavalry, the Sassanids also relied upon infantry and elephants as well as having an effective siege train. However, cavalry was the cornerstone of the Sassanid army.
Historical re-enactment of a Sassanid-era cataphract, complete with a full set of scale armor for the horse. (GFDL)
As mentioned before, the cataphracts and the clibanarii were the cornerstone of the Sassanid army, the reason is that they were heavy. What made them heavy was the use of scale or plate armor. Both horse and rider were covered in an elaborate array of armor. This gave the horse and its rider full protection and provided the Sassanid forces with a shock element that could ride down, fleeing enemy forces or piercing through enemy formations thus breaking enemy cohesion into pieces and exposing them.
Horse archers also were pivotal in regards to mounted combat; they provided the heavy cavalry windows of opportunity. Horse archer’s main role was to not only fix an enemy unit or army but to lead them out in open pasture for annihilation by the heavy cavalry once exposed. Nevertheless, horse archers could also be considered psychological warfare, for once the arrows began to rain down the end never seemed to come and when doubt set in, either the enemy fled or its officers made irrational decisions that ultimately exposed the men, which led to certain death.
Cataphracts fighting Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD. (Public Domain)
An example of both heavy and light cavalry elements combined comes from the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. This battle highlights the effective use of both heavy and light cavalries that the Sassanids were accustomed.
Elephants were also deployed upon the field of battle. The elephants the Sassanids used were from India. Every elephant was mounted with howdahs, which carried the armed men including the driver.
Elephant in Battle, Kota, Rajasthan, India circa 1750-70. (Public Domain)
A medieval Armenian miniature representing the Sasanian War elephants in the Battle of Vartanantz. (Public Domain)
Another aspect that sometimes is easily forgotten, or overlooked, is the fact that elephants scare horses due to their smell. Horses that were not accustom to the beasts’ smell, became upset and restless with fear, causing panic among the ranks. This also prompted fear among the Roman ranks who had never encountered such an intimidating and powerful beast. In many ways, the Sassanid use of the elephant was a psychological shock weapon for both men and animals on the opposing side.
Infantry was the weak link to the Sassanid military structure and organization throughout their long history. The reason was due to the Sassanids being grounded in a cavalry based culture that was very much pastoral as well as agricultural. However, it is the pastoral way of life that controlled the Sassanid Empire and the way it fought. Nevertheless, we are not at a complete loss concerning the role of infantry in the Sassanid military apparatus.
The infantry, for the most part, was not what one would think as a traditional infantryman; frankly, they resembled nothing of an infantryman. The historian Procopius, describes the Sassanid infantry as being, “nothing more than a crowd of pitiful peasants who come into battle for no other purpose than to dig through walls and despoil the slain and in general to serve the other soldiers.” As for weapons, it seems that many had none at all, for Procopius states that the only thing between them and the enemy was, “enormous shields.” However, the Sassanid military did have an infantry unit that was effective and heavy, but not great in numbers. They were known as the Dailamites.
A Sasanian army helmet. “There were several different types of army helmet worn by Sassanian soldiers. This rare helmet likely resembled the tall headdresses (kulah) depicted on Sassanian portrait seals and dates to the 6th century AD.” (Public Domain)
The Dailamites (or Daylamites) were a different breed of infantry warrior men. The Dailamites came from Northern Persia and were spoken highly about among the Romans. They were known for sword and dagger skills, but also carried a battle-axe, a two-pronged spear, and to top it all off, they also carried a rather large decorative shield. In addition, they were hardy and able to fight with the best of them—whomever or whatever was thrown their way. However, the only problem was they lacked numbers, as it seems that only four thousand were employed as the king’s elite guard.
Foot archers were another highly prized infantry force among the Sassanid military. An officer known as a “Tribad” led foot archers. Foot archers could add to the already heavy volume of arrows being delivered by the horse archers. It was raining death on a massive scale, as the quantity of arrows would increase and come closer as the foot archers moved forward, showering the enemy with arrows. This tactic did not always work, but it seems to have been effective overall, offsetting the enemy formation on both the offensive and defensive. Nevertheless, foot archers are used for siege operations, as they were placed in the tops of towers to shower arrows down on the enemy protecting the walls and to protect the towers from any would-be saboteur.
Ardashir I was known as the Adashir the Unifier. It was his intelligence, energy, and talent for organization and strategy that enabled him to overthrow an empire and create another, forming a dynasty that would last four hundred years.
The Sasanian Empire at its greatest extent c. 632 CE (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Top Image: Deriv; Sassanid-era Cataphract Renactor (GFDL), and The Battle of Hormozdgan, April 28, 224 CE. (Public Domain)
By Cam Rea
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Incredibly, the end of the Parthian Empire started with a fake wedding.
Before the wedding took place, a civil war had been raging in Parthia between Vologases VI and his brother Artabanus V. After much warring between the two contesting parties, Artabanus came out as the winner and inherited the Empire. While Artabanus was enjoying his new throne, many miles to the west, the Roman Emperor Caracalla moved his headquarters to Antioch in the summer of 215 CE. The reason for Caracalla’s temporary move was that he was desirous of the title ‘Parthicus’, which would grant him great renown throughout the Roman Empire, and so he devised a plan in 216 CE.
He decided that the best way to win over the Parthians was to write Artabanus a letter. Once the last scribbles were written, he gave it to his embassy, along with expensive gifts of fine workmanship.
Artabanus enjoyed the gifts, and when he opened the letter, Caracalla made it very clear that he wished to marry one of his daughters. Caracalla’s objective was to unite two empires under one great power, which would benefit both men, since not only would a much stronger army emerge from this union, but the trade restrictions could be lifted. Artabanus at first did not approve of the request, saying, “that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman” and “it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.”
Therefore, Artabanus declined the offer. Artabanus was no fool; he knew of Caracalla’s deceitfulness when dealing with other nations. But this was not the end of the matter. Caracalla persisted, offering more gifts and showing enthusiasm for the marriage and for the union between the two powers. Artabanus finally believed that Caracalla was telling the truth. Artabanus felt that a permanent peace had finally arrived and publicly announced the wedding.
Caracalla crossed the rivers and was welcomed with sacrifices, decorated altars, incense scattered in his path, and all sorts of entertainment. Once he was near the palace at Ctesiphon, Artabanus came out to meet his future son-in-law in the plain before the city, with his daughter nearby. With an entire city jubilant over the event, crowned with flowers in their hair and wearing the finest robes, the populace danced to the music of flutes and drums. The men left their horses and their bows to partake in the drinking. Nothing out of the ordinary was suspected. When the Parthians were good and drunk, especially the men, the decisive moment was to be unveiled.
Caracalla gave the signal, and the happy party—celebrating what they thought was to be a peaceful end to many centuries of bloodshed—was slaughtered. Artabanus nearly died, but was helped onto a horse and escaped with a few men. The Roman troops took much booty and many prisoners. Caracalla then gave the order to pull out, and marched away unopposed. However, this was not to be the end, for Caracalla gave his men permission to loot and burn all the towns and villages they came across and to carry as much as they could, for it was all theirs for the taking. How far they went into Parthian territory remains unknown.
Caracalla’s great raid across the western portion of the Parthian Empire was short lived, for as soon as he enjoyed his spoils, one of his own men assassinated him. For roughly three days, the Romans were without an emperor until they chose a Praetorian Prefect, Macrinus, who was not a soldier by any means. There was no time for mourning Caracalla’s death or rejoicing in Macrinus’ ascension, for the Parthians were fast approaching.
Medallion with Roman Emperor Caracalla, circa 215 and circa 243 (Imperial Roman). (Walters Art Museum/Public Domain)
The Bloody Battle of Nisibis 217 CE
Artabanus was seeking retribution, and once he entered Roman territory, he burned several cities in Mesopotamia. Word eventually reached Macrinus of the coming Parthians, who were great in number, “including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.”
A Westerner on a camel. (386 – 534 CE) (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Macrinus assembled his forces and moved out. The new emperor understood the severity of the situation and took to diplomacy in the hope it could avert battle and restore peace in the region. Macrinus sent the captives and a friendly message to Artabanus, urging him to accept peace and arguing that he was not to be blamed for Caracalla’s actions. Artabanus looked over the letter and rejected it immediately. He responded to Macrinus that if peace were to exist between the two, Rome must “rebuild the forts and the demolished cities, abandon Mesopotamia entirely, and make reparation for the injury done to the royal tombs as well as for other damage.” Further deliberation ceased when the Parthian army arrived outside the Roman headquarters at Nisibis.
At sunrise, the vast Parthian army appeared. Artabanus, along with his men, saluted the sun, as was their custom, and with loud cheers, the cataphract charged while the horse archers fired over their heads. The cataphract horsemen and dromedary riders inflicted considerable damage to the Roman ranks along with the relentless shower of arrows from above.
A Chinese terracotta figurine of a cataphract horse and rider. (386–534 CE) (CC BY-SA 3.0)
But even the Parthians suffered considerable losses since the Romans were at their best in close combat. After a while, the Romans began to feel the pressure and had to make a quick decision while the Parthians were regrouping. The Romans pretended to retreat, and as they did, they threw down caltrops and other pointed devices, which the sand concealed, making them nearly invisible. The Parthians, thinking that the Romans were fleeing the battlefield, gave chase, and when the horses and the soft-footed camels stepped on the sharp devices, they suffered great injury and would throw the rider. The rider was now vulnerable to be captured or killed since his armor weighed him down. Or, if he were to get up, he could not run far, for his robe would trip him.
Antique Roman Caltrop made of iron. (CC BY-SA 3.0)
For two days, the armies fought in this manner, with disastrous results from morning until night, both celebrating in their camps as if they had won. On the third day, the Parthians tried to encircle the Romans, but the Romans had given their divisions and extended their front line to avoid this. The Romans were being worn down by the relentless attacks of the Parthians, who had numerical superiority. But, they could extend their lines to avoid being outflanked for only so long. The consistent Parthian onslaught eventually wore down and demoralized the Romans, causing their lines to collapse and Macrinus to flee, but the arrival of night saved them. With nothing left to gain, especially with the piled-up dead bodies creating barriers, the Romans acknowledged defeat and retired to their camp.
The slaughter of both men and animals was so great that the entire plain was covered. Bodies were piled in huge mounds; camels lay in heaps. The number of corpses that littered the battlefield hampered any further attacks, for not only could one not gain a foothold without stumbling but even finding the enemy was a problem since the piled remains of dead comrades blocked each other’s view.
Macrinus, who had lost the respect of his men, knew that he had lost something else, a victory. Macrinus forgot that the forces of Artabanus were merely a militia, as Parthia had no standing army, and he could only hold onto his men for so long because they were unaccustomed to sustained efforts. Having been in the field for some months now, the Parthians had grown weary and wished to return home. With a temporary armistice in place, Macrinus could rethink his plans.
The Parthians carried off their dead and the Romans carried theirs off the field as well. Once the battlefield had been cleared, it was just a matter of time before a renewal of combat was to ensue. Macrinus was not going to let that happen, but it would not have mattered anyway because his men had lost faith in their newly crowned emperor.
Macrinus offered friendship to Artabanus and explained that Caracalla was dead and that he, Macrinus, was the new emperor. To secure peace, Macrinus offered the Parthian king gifts and 200 million sesterces (approximately fifty million denarii). Artabanus thought it over carefully and agreed to peace, since the Romans had “suffered a suitable punishment.” Besides, Artabanus’ own army was terribly wounded. Afterward, Artabanus returned to Parthia while Macrinus hurried to Antioch.
Even though Macrinus had lost the battle, the entire affair was presented as if he’d won. The Roman Senate offered Macrinus the title of “Parthicus,” but he refused it, and rightfully so. But regardless of his feelings, coins were still minted bearing the legend Victoria Parthica. Even though Rome held him as the victor, the fact of the matter is, he shamefully lost, costing Rome much money, but more importantly, prestige.
The Rise of the House of Sasan and Mighty King Ardashir
Parthia never would recover from this Pyrrhic victory over Rome in 217 CE. Due to losses in 116, 164, and 198/99 CE, Parthia had lost much prestige. While it is true that Parthia kept Rome in check, and did not allow themselves to be destroyed by the Romans like the Celts and Carthaginians, the Romans were still able to dictate politically and penetrate Parthian territory militarily. Parthia’s inability to fend off the Romans allowed others, like its own family and those who held a considerable amount of power within their own regions, make a bid for the throne. When there is regime uncertainty, expect political upheaval. Even though Artabanus V had defeated Rome, the war with his brother Vologases VI resumed.
Iran would never find stability while the Arsacids were in charge. It would take a person of non-Arsacid birth to stabilize and unite Iran, and his name was Ardashir I of Persia. But who was Ardashir?
Ardashir was born in Tirdeh, Persia, in 180 CE. He was the son of Badag (Papak or Papag) a Zoroastrian priest and Princess Rodak. However, Ardashir’s father may have been Sassan, a Zoroastrian priest who served in the temple of Anahita. Many historians regard this alternative, and suspect that Badag adopted Ardashir after the death of Sassan. According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir, Sassan is claimed to be a descendent of the Achaemenids, who were a former ruling house of Persia. Ardashir, from a purely political position, legitimized this claim in order to unite Persia. Before Ardashir became king of Persia, his father took him to a man named Tire, in the city of Darabgerd (modern Iran), to be educated when he was seven. Tire agreed and took him for a son of his own.
According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir son of Babag, Ardashir was proficient and accomplished in learning and riding at the age of fifteen. When Artabanus V received word of this accomplished man, he wrote a letter to Babag requesting him to send his son to Artabanus to his court “so that he will associate with our sons and princes, and we might order for him position and reward according to the learning which he possesses.”
Relief of the Coronation of Ardashir I at Naghsh-e-Rostam. Ardashir is receiving the Kingship’s ring from Ahuramazda. (CC BY 2.5)
Babag could not refuse his Lord and immediately “sent Ardashir well-equipped with ten servants and a superb present of many marvelous, magnificent, and suitable things for the acceptance of Ardavan (Aratabanus V).” Every day Ardashir was immersed in the art of horsemanship and hunting alongside the sons and princes of Artabanus. After some time, Ardashir proved better than his competition. Not only did he surpass the Arsacid nobility in horsemanship and hunting, he was more “warlike than them all, on the polo and the riding (ground), at Chatrang (chess) and Vine-Ardashir, and in (several) other arts.” However, the nobility became jealous of Ardashir and decided to use their privilege to undermine him during a hunting trip.
One day Ardavan went a hunting with his chevaliers and Ardashir. An elk which happened to be running in the desert was (then) pursued by Ardashir and the eldest son of Ardavan. And Ardashir, on reaching close to the elk, struck him with an arrow in such a manner that the arrow pierced through the belly as far as its feathers, passed through the other side, and the animal died instantly.
When Ardavan and the chevaliers approached them, they expressed wonder at such a dart and asked: — “Who struck that arrow?” — Ardashir replied: “I did it.” The son of Ardavan said: — “No, because I did it.”
Ardashir became angry and spoke thus to the son of Ardavan: “It is not possible to appropriate the art and heroism (of another) through tyranny, unpleasantness, falsehood, and injustice.” This is an excellent forest, and the wild asses here are many. Let us try here a second time, and bring into display (our) goodness or evil nature and dexterity.”
When Artabanus heard this, he was offended and banned Ardashir from riding horses, and punished the young man by sending him to his stables, with the task to take care of those animals so “that you do not go in the day or night from before those horses and cattle a hunting, to the playground or the college of learning.” Ardashir, upset by this, wrote a letter to his father. Upon reading the letter, Babag responded to his son:
“You did not act wisely in disputing with great men on a matter from which no harm could have reached you, and in addressing them with coarse words in public. Now speak out excuses for your relief and feel humble repentance, for the sages have said: It is not possible for an enemy to do that for an enemy, which, is brought on himself by an ignorant man from his own actions. Do not be grieved narrow-mindedly from a person at the time when you cannot pass your life (happily) without him. And you yourself know that Ardavan is a king more powerful than I, you, or many people in this world with reference to (our) bodies, lives, riches, and estates. And now, too, such is my strictest advice to you that you should act in unison with and obediently (towards them), and not deliver up your own glory to annihilation.”
After Ardashir’s debacle with the Arsacid nobility, the man who raised him, Tire, died. When Tire passed, the king of Persis (the province of Persia or Fars), Guchehr, declared Ardashir king of Darabgerd. Soon after, Ardashir challenged Guchehr with the aid of his father, Babag, and overthrew the king by 200 CE. However, Ardashir was not granted the kingship of Persis, Babag gave this title and province to his eldest son, Shapur. Ardashir, unhappy playing second fiddle, declared war on his brother. Before the battle could take place, Shapur mysteriously perished. The cause of death was said to have been by a collapsing structure from an old Achaemenid fortress. Afterwards, Ardashir proclaimed himself king of Persis by 208 CE. His brothers protested this and Ardashir disposed of them. If his brother challenges were not enough, many local petty kings of Persis refused to acknowledge Ardashir rule. Ardashir responded by going to war in which he crushed them.
He thus solidified his position as the rightful king of Persis. However, Parthian leadership in Ctesiphon thought otherwise and sounded the alarm.
Top Image: Detail; Emperor Caracalla. (CC BY 2.5), and Cataphracts circa 101 AD. (Public Domain)
By Cam Rea
References
Al-Tabari. he Conquest of Iran: History of al-Tabari, Volume 14. Edited and translated by G. Rex Smith. Albany, New York: University of New York, 1994.
Bowman, Alan K, Peter Garnsey and Averial Cameron. The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 12: The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Debevoise, Neilson Carel. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938.
Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.
Dixon, Karen R., and Pat Southern. The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century AD. London: Batsford, 1992.
Erdkamp, Paul. A Companion to the Roman Army. Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2007.
Falk, Avner. A Psychoanalytic History of the Jews. Lewisburg, PA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996.
Farrokh, Kaveh and Angus McBride. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642 . Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.
Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.
Herodian. Herodian, History of the Roman Empire since the Death of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Edward C. Echols. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.
Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.
Plutarch. The Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives. London: Penguin Classics, 1984.
Sheldon, Rose Mary. Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand . London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010.
Sidnell, Phil. Warhorse: Cavalry in the Ancient World. London: Hambledon & London, 2007.
In 700 BCE, The Assyrian army commanded by King Sennacherib invaded Egypt.
Before the Assyrians pushed any further into Egypt, the Assyrian army made camp at Pelusium, which is located on the salt flats and flax fields of northeastern Egypt. It was to be an easy victory in Sennacherib’s eyes, for the enemy Pharaoh’s soldiers would not fight for him. The “warriors of the Egyptians refused to come to the rescue,” according to Greek historian Herodotus.
The reason for this is that Pharaoh Sethos of Egypt had distanced himself from the warrior class, holding them with great contempt, and felt that their service was needed no more.
Sennacherib, king of Assyria 705 BCE–681 BCE. (Public Domain)
Herodotus wrote: “After him there came to the throne the priest of Hephaistos, whose name was Sethos. This man, they said, neglected and held in no regard the warrior class of the Egyptians, considering that he would have no need of them.” The reason for this odd and dangerous move was due to dreams and visions of grandeur.
Pharaoh Sethos
As Herodotus mentioned, Sethos was a priest, thus divinely inspired, and felt that the gods were on his side thus he was not needing an army. But reality soon enveloped the Pharaoh. For a brief moment his divine omnipotence was shaken and he was left to humble and lament himself before the god: “the priest, being driven into a strait, entered into the sanctuary of the temple and bewailed to the image of the god the danger which was impending over him.” As the priest bellowed and begged the god Ptah for an answer, as Pharaoh Sethos slept, dreams and visions were bestowed upon him, the god Ptah is said to have spoken with Pharaoh Sethos saying: “that he should suffer no evil if he went forth to meet the army of the Arabians; for he himself would send him helpers.”
Statue of Ptah, Egyptian deity of craftsmen, architects and creation. (CC BY 2.0)
When the Pharaoh awoke from his translucent dream, he stood up with full confidence and walked out of the sanctuary to meet and greet his people letting them know that all would be well.
The People’s Army
The Pharaoh needed an army and his god would provide. However, the army he would have used refused to fight for him and all that was left was the common civilian, people who worked in goods and services.
Herodotus mentioned this event: “Trusting in these things seen in sleep, he took with him, they said, those of the Egyptians who were willing to follow him, and encamped in Pelusion, for by this way the invasion came: and not one of the warrior class followed him, but shop-keepers and artisans and men of the market.”
Pharaoh Sethos had no choice, regardless of what his god said, for the only army around him, was an army of merchants, and it looked as if the Assyrians are set to conquer Egypt.
However, a strange and anomalous incident might have changed history.
Of Mice and Men
Once Pharaoh’s men made camp near the Assyrians, and as the night drew over them, a creature began to stir. It was a single mouse—and then it was thousands of them!
“Then after they came, there swarmed by night upon their enemies mice of the fields, and ate up their quivers and their bows, and moreover the handles of their shields, so that on the next day they fled, and being without defense of arms great numbers fell” -Herodotus
The mice that invaded the Assyrian camp are said to have eaten all the leather they could find, and most likely an unbelievable amount to say the least! However, back in the ancient days, this was doubly damaging: if a mouse had eaten your leather military gear, it was believed to be an omen of bad things to come.
An Assyrian winged bull, or lamassu, from Sargon’s palace at Dur-Sharrukin. (Public Domain)
As for the Assyrians, Herodotus explained it well. The Assyrians fled out of Egypt and where they went remains unknown, but it seems possible that the Assyrians made a move to take Jerusalem next, and possibly with the same army, after being resupplied with men and arms.
An Assyrian siege ramp outside of Lachish, now Shephelah Southern District, Israel. Lachish archaeological site. (CC BY-SA 3.0)
Army on the Run
The Old Testament book of II Kings 19:35 tells an interesting story that might be somewhat related to the events that happened in Egypt.
“And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the LORD went out, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand: and when they arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses.” -II Kings 19:35.
Is it possible, that the remaining Assyrian army that fled from Egypt regrouped with other Assyrian forces already conducting war operations against Judah, and marched on Jerusalem together to besiege it? It is very possible, for the events that happened in Egypt are said to have occurred around 701 BCE and events which took place outside the walls of Jerusalem happened around 700 BCE. For when we look back to II Kings 19:35 we notice that the ‘angel of the Lord smote the Assyrians’ killing well over 100,000 of them. It becomes quite possible that when the Assyrian army set camp in Egypt—preparing for the conquest and subjugation of Egypt—that the very mice that ate the leather fixed to the weapons the Assyrians carried, also carried the plague.
Assyrian warriors hurling stones. The carving is from a wall decoration in the palace of Sennacherib at Nineveh (early seventh century BCE). (Public Domain)
Thus, any remaining Assyrian soldiers that escaped, most likely carried plague with them, and in turn ended up infecting those they encountered like other Assyrian soldiers.
An Army of Plague Bearers?
It becomes quite likely that the account Herodotus told and the account found in the Bible are thus related to one another in terms of biological agents being passed from one location to another through military maneuver. Whatever the case was, concerning Assyria’s march and retreat from Egypt and Assyria besieging Jerusalem, these events should be reexamined, to see if they coincide with one another on a short-term base.
Now, besides the two events matching one another there is another issue concerning these two fascinating events.
Rebellion
In 703 BCE Babylonia challenged Sennacherib’s rule by rebelling. A man by the name of Marduk-apla-iddina, who had taken the Babylonia throne for himself once before did so again. However, Marduk-apla-iddina met defeat and Babylonia was plundered and placed firmly back under Assyrian control.
This event caused another rebellion to ignite in Syria-Palestine when Egypt and Hezekiah of Judah decided to challenge Assyria’s authority by renouncing their own allegiances. Many more would join in this seminal event, such as the Phoenician city-states of Sidon and Ashkelon.
Sennacherib quickly mustered his forces and marched on the region. Sennacherib moved his forces down the coast of Phoenicia and Philistia and defeated, pillaged, took captives and moved on. As each rebellious city was subjugated, the writing was on the wall: rebellion was futile.
As his forces continued to push south they met an Egyptian army heading north to support the Judean rebellion, but met them head-on and defeated them at Ekron. In total, he had taken and sacked around forty-six cities. While the bulk of Sennacherib’s forces were conducting military operations throughout the southern Levant, particularly along the coastal region and inland, he probably sent an Assyrian detachment into Egypt.
This Assyrian detachment was conceivably small in size and their mission was likely to chase the fleeing Egyptians back into Egypt. After pursuing the Egyptians from Ekron, they set up camp at Pelusium. The distance between the two is roughly 549 miles (884 kilometers) and it would have taken the Assyrian army a little over a month to reach Pelusium. Given the distance and the events transpiring east of them, this small, perhaps medium sized force was for the most part cut off from the main force, except for communications.
Nevertheless, communications moved much faster by horse than on foot but made little difference, for the Assyrian force stationed at Pelusium (likely awaiting additional supplies and further orders from Sennacherib) was eventually confronted by a force more determined. Thus they were soundly defeated and chased out of Egypt.
What Really Happened?
Herodotus may have been right that the Egyptians soundly evicted the Assyrian force from their lands, but the idea that mice ate the bowstrings and other items for military use seems a bit farfetched but not impossible. What likely happened was that the Assyrian force which had been stationed in Egypt had been there for some time, and because of this, vermin infiltrated their camp, which is not at all uncommon, even today among armies bivouacked in the field for a considerable amount of days.
While vermin are quickly killed and shooed away, the bugs, which use them as a host, are not so easily disposed of. Because of this, fleas and lice could have bitten the Assyrian men. Also, consider that the mice, which began to eat the grain, would also defecate in it, and this too would add to their coming illness. Vermin, bugs, and excrement weakened the Assyrian forces, and as such they were easily disposed of.
Another proposition is that the Egyptians, sensing that they had not the professional, seasoned soldiers at their disposal, decided to round up all the flea-carrying rodents and herded them towards the Assyrian camp. From a tactical stance, Pharaoh Sethos employed an indirect attack by utilizing his men as a ‘fixing force’ (controlling or stopping an enemy’s advance), thus allowing nature and its biological agents to act as the real attack power. The Assyrian forces able to make it back to their main unit would infect their comrades as well.
As Sennacherib and his officers continued to conduct military operations, they gave the order to send a medium-sized detachment to besiege Jerusalem as a show of force. However, the medium force that encamped outside the walls of Jerusalem may have basically been dead men walking. The Assyrian commanders may or may not have taken notice that some men were sick. If so, little could have been done to alleviate their pain, and the sickness spread fast, passing even to the officers in charge.
Unfortunately, the health of the men before the day they died at the walls of Jerusalem is unwritten. However long the Assyrian army had been stationed outside the walls of Jerusalem is also unknown. Eventually, the defenders on the walls noticed one morning that the Assyrian soldiers on the ground were dead. It would have indeed appeared as if a miracle from heaven had happened.
“Sennacherib’s Army Is Destroyed” by Gustave Dore, 1891. (Public Domain)
Here and Gone Again
Another interesting aspect of this campaign is that the army that presumably suffered and died from plague or some other type of illness somehow did not spread that vile scourge to the rest of the Assyrian army. For after Sennacherib was done despoiling the Levant he headed home, proclaiming himself victorious, and claiming to have captured 200,150 people. If a major disease did break out in Assyria, it was not recorded in their annals.
Limestone stele of king Sennacherib from Nineveh. (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Furthermore, while the Bible indicates that 100,000 Assyrian forces were dead, the reality is, it was far less. The purpose for the Bible stating that 100,000 men died outside the walls of Jerusalem was likely nothing more than propaganda. While it is true in one dark sense that they did defeat 100,000 troops, this is only true in the sense that the great army of Sennacherib had already taken their fill of booty, had reclaimed their sphere of influence, had left for home with a great number of captives, and as such allowed Judea to continue as a state.
Judean captives being led away into slavery by the Assyrians after the siege of Lachish in 701 BC. (Public Domain)
However, Judea was now worse off than before.
As for Egypt, they too were able to avoid the full wrath of Assyria, but this would not last. For the next time Assyria invaded, no plague could stop them, and in 671 BCE, they conquered the Egyptians.
Map of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and its expansions – dark green shows the empire in 824 BCE, light green in 671 BCE. (Public Domain)
The Destruction of Sennacherib
In conclusion, I leave you with the famous poem by British poet Lord Byron titled “The Destruction of Sennacherib”, faithful to the Biblical account and a recounting of the history from a romantic perspective:
The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold,
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold;
And the sheen of their spears was like stars on the sea,
When the blue wave rolls nightly on deep Galilee.
Like the leaves of the forest when Summer is green,
That host with their banners at sunset were seen:
Like the leaves of the forest when Autumn hath blown,
That host on the morrow lay withered and strown.
For the Angel of Death spread his wings on the blast,
And breathed in the face of the foe as he passed;
And the eyes of the sleepers waxed deadly and chill,
And their hearts but once heaved, and for ever grew still!
And there lay the steed with his nostril all wide,
But through it there rolled not the breath of his pride;
And the foam of his gasping lay white on the turf,
And cold as the spray of the rock-beating surf.
And there lay the rider distorted and pale,
With the dew on his brow, and the rust on his mail:
And the tents were all silent, the banners alone,
The lances unlifted, the trumpet unblown.
And the widows of Ashur are loud in their wail,
And the idols are broke in the temple of Baal;
And the might of the Gentile, unsmote by the sword,
Hath melted like snow in the glance of the Lord!
Featured image: Assyrian relief of a horseman from Nimrud, now in the British Museum. “Battle scene, Assyrian, about 728 BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0)
By Cam Rea
References
Boardman, John, I. E. S. Edwards, and N. G. L. Hammond. The Cambridge Ancient History. The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires and Other States of the Near East, from the Eighth to the Sixth Centuries B.C. Volume III, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Bray, R. S. Armies of Pestilence: The Impact of Disease on History. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2004.
Herodotus. The Histories. North Clarendon, VT: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1992.
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