The Hunnic War Machine: Horsemen of the Steppe – Part II

The fifth century politician and bishop Sidonius Apollinaris, wrote an interesting description on the horsemanship of the Huns, stating, “You would think the limbs of man and beast were born together, so firmly does the rider always stick to the horse.” Such were the abilities of the horsemen of the steppe – an integral part of the success of the Hunnic Invasion and the creation of an empire.

[Read Part 1: The Hunnic War Machine]

Hunnic Horsemen

Being that the majority of the Hunnic cavalry consisted of light horse archers led by petty nobles and their followers, their attire would have been light. The sixth century scholar Procopius states that the Hunnic warrior/herdsman wore “loosely woven” garments. Ammianus, much earlier, describes the dress of the Huns stating:

“They dress in linen cloth or in the skins of field-mice sewn together, and they wear the same clothing indoors and out. But when they have once put their necks into a faded tunic, it is not taken off or changed until by long wear and tear it has been reduced to rags and fallen from them bit by bit. They cover their heads with round caps and protect their hairy legs with goatskins; their shoes are formed upon no lasts, and so prevent their walking with free step.”

Being that the vast majority of Huns wore meager garments, their armor was not much better. In other words, do not expect the poorer Huns to be decked out in armor like the nobles or the wealthy. The type of armor worn would have been scale (sewn on) or lamellar (linked plates) armor reaching to the waist or knee. Hunnic armor also appears to have been sleeveless in some accounts. According to Procopius, he states:

“He came to be surrounded by twelve of the enemy, who carried spears. And they all struck him at once with their spears. But his thorax with-stood the other blows, which therefore did not hurt him much; but one of the Goths succeeded in hitting him from behind, at a place where his body was uncovered, above the armpit, right close to the shoulder, and smote the youth, though not with a mortal blow.”

While the Hunnic warrior could withstand a series of hits to the chest, his armpits were exposed, which indicates that his armor was sleeveless. Another interesting aspect is that the word thorax is used. This may suggest that the armor was not a breastplate but a metal shirt or scale-mail jacket, which protects all sides of the body and is sleeveless. The fourth century panegyric, Pacatus, Sidonius, and Procopius, all mention that the Hunnic horse archers wore iron cuirasses. While most Hunnic horsemen wore meager armor, those lucky enough to serve alongside Rome were decked out. Fifth century Latin poet, Flavius Merobaudes, mentions that Huns serving the Roman general Aetius wore “belts, quivers, horse, bits, helmets, and the armor, studded with precious stones, were gilded.

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse's head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse's owner.’

‘This fine and rare set of horse trappings is decorated with stones in beaded settings- a style Hunnish metalworkers favored. Fourth century. The large piece is a chamfron, which was worn on the horse’s head above the eyes. This one is ornamental rather than defensive and indicated the wealth and power of the horse’s owner.’  (Public Domain)

However, some of the Hunnic armor worn may have been Roman. Other Huns, not associated with Aetius, may have donned gilt Persian armor. Understand that the vast majority of Huns were not emblazoned in armor from head to toe, most wore meager amounts while the few nobles and wealthy Huns could afford the luxury of armor.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass.

An example of lamellar armor, a Japanese cuirass. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

One such luxury was the helmet. Huns serving under the Romans were provided helmets. The majority of Huns not serving Rome donned felt or soft leather caps. Reason for this is that many of the so-called Hunnic graves are absent of such an item. Hunnic noblemen and the wealthy could afford a helmet, which could be passed down from generation to generation. The type of helmet the Huns would have worn under the Romans is called a spangenhelm. The spangenhelm is a conical helmet consisting of four to six sections, reinforced by bands over the joins. Most had large cheek pieces, neck guard and a nose piece. The origin of the helmets is said to be of Sassanid origin, which was later adopted by the Romans during the late third early fourth century.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna.

A surviving Spangenhelm, sixth century, Vienna. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns also used a shield. Unfortunately, like most items pertaining to the Huns, it remains elusive. The Hunnic shield would have been small, as a large shield would have been cumbersome to utilize on horseback. The type of small shield used would have been as the ones used by other steppe nomads, and since no shield has been discovered, it is suggested that the shield was made of wicker covered in leather.

As for swords, it is disputed whether the vast majority of Huns carried them. The Hunnic swords likely varied, as some were like that of the Sarmatians and Goths, which was long, straight, and designed for slashing. However, in the 10th century, Latin Germanic epic poem founded on German popular tradition called Waltharius, the hero Walther “arms himself in the Hunnish fashion… with a double-edge long sword belted to his left hip … and a single-edged half-sword at his right.” While the poem is fictional, it provides and indicates that some Huns wore a long sword, spatha, and a single-edged half-sword, semispatha, like that of the Sassanid noblemen who are regularly depicted wearing the same type of swords in this fashion.

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha

Roman cavalry reenactor wearing a replica spatha (CC BY 2.0)

Another side arm the Huns used was the lasso. The lasso was widely used by many steppe nomads like the Scythians and Sarmatians to name a few. Ammianus speaks of the Hun lasso and states “while the enemy are guarding against wounds from the sabre-thrusts, they throw strips of cloth plaited into nooses over their opponents and so entangle them that they fetter their limbs and take from them the power of riding or walking.”

As for heavy horsemen, the Huns had few and mostly relied on those they conquered and incorporated into their own military apparatus. The tribes that aided heavy cavalry to the Huns were the Sarmatians, Alans, and Goths. With heavy cavalry, accompanying the Hunnic horse archers, the Huns had a well-defined military capable of delivering mobility and shock to the enemy on the field of battle.

Bow and Arrow

The primary weapon of the Hunnic horse archer was the composite bow. The Hunnic reflex bow was made of wood, horn, and sinew. The ears of the bow had seven bone plaques, while the handle had three, two on the side one on its top.

The foundation of the bow was made of wood. The type of wood used could have been maple, yew, poplar or ash. When the tree of choice had been selected, the bowyer would choose to use the heartwood of the tree instead of the growing outer layer or sapwood.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE.

Scythians shooting with composite bows, fourth century BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

After the selecting and fashioning the wood into shape, a layer of sinew is applied. Sinew gives the bow its penetrating power. Once the sinew is applied, the bow would be bellied with horn, which provides compressive strength and on release of the arrow, the bone brings the bow back to original position like a coil. To keep this complex weapon together, glue made from boiled animal hide was used. These multiple layers of bone made the bow quite stiff and powerful upon release.

The Hunnic bow was between 130-160 centimeters long or between four and five feet in length. Unlike other steppe bows, the length of the Hunnic bow was not ideal for use by a horse archer. The ancient Scythian bow was 80 centimeters or (2.6 feet) in length, making it ideal for horse archery, even though some were found to be 127 centimeters or (4.2 feet) in length. The Huns got around this by making the bow asymmetrical. Its upper half was slightly longer than the lower. The reason for the lower half being shorter was so as not to poke the horse in the neck. Another reason why the Huns extended the length of the bow was to produce more power. Upon release, the Hunnic horse archers could effectively hit an unarmored opponent at 150 to 200 meters or (492-656 feet), and an armored opponent at 75 to 100 meters or (246-328 feet).

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow.

A modern reconstruction of an historical composite bow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The type of bowstring used also varied. The string for the bow must not be too heavy or light nor stretch easily. The materials used could have been from twisted gut, sinew, horsehair, vines, and even silk. The Hunnic horse archer probably had a variety of bowstrings on hand for various climate conditions. Horsehair strings were best suited for colder climates, whereas sinew absorbed moisture, making them less desirable due to stretching.

The Huns used a variety of arrowheads. One type was a large leaf-shaped and the other a large three-bladed iron arrowhead. The Huns are also said to have used “sharp bone” according to Ammianus. They are said to have fixed bone balls behind the tips called “whistlers”, which produce a terrifying sound for psychological effect. When placing the arrowhead on the shaft, the Huns and other eastern steppe peoples did not socket it into place like the Scythians and Sarmatians did. Instead, the Hunnic arrowheads had a tang, which was sunk into the arrow shaft. The possible reason for this is that it was easier to produce arrowheads with tangs than socketed. Later on western steppe tribes adopted the eastern tang style.

The type of arrow shafts possibly used was cane, reed, birch, cornel, rose-willow, hornbeam, and ash. Reed may have been the preferred material to use for it would travel further and easier to produce. The feathers used in fletching would generally have been from either ducks or geese. The number of feathers attached to the shaft was between two and four. The feathers provided aerodynamic stabilization for the flight of the arrow.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads.

Ancient Greek bronze leaf-shaped, trefoil and triangular arrowheads. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com / CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Huns carried a broad shaped bow case, which hung on the left side, and an hour glassed shape quiver or tube-like on the right side, which had a flap. The materials used to construct these cases were made of leather, bark or wood. Upon firing the arrow, the Hun would place the arrow on the right side of the bow. The archer would draw the bowstring with three fingers with the thumb locked under the first three fingers and protected by a ring of bone, horn, ivory or even stone.

An Empire of Conquest

In conclusion, the Hunnic war machine was like that of any other nomadic steppe tribe but with a twist. The twist is the Huns could do it better. Whereas the Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans and many others could only do little in terms of conquest and confiscation, their goals to expand beyond the steppe frontier was never considered, even when they were united. This is not to say that they did not take the plunge into the civilized sedentary world. They did, but in small strikes and fast retreats from those who posed a challenge. The Huns, like the others mentioned, became powerful enough to challenge the various steppe tribes and absorbed them through conquest. While the Huns initially were still not united, their appetite for conquest and confiscation could not be quenched and was a shared goal among them. Even when the Huns pushed out the Goths, they still found plunder by joining with the Romans. Once Attila came on the scene with his brother Bleda, the brothers were able to negotiate and coerce the tribes to coalesce as one. Therefore, the Huns were the first true nomadic empire to establish itself before the civilized world.

But their world was not long term, as the Hunnic economy was based on war and extortion with no lasting goal. In the end, the Hunnic war machine that set foot in Europe, before mighty Roman and the fractured Barbarians, would soon disappear, but the carcass of the machine remained to be absorbed by those affected, to be restudied and implemented to make their (Romans and Barbarians) armies much more effective on the battlefield.

Sculpture of Attila the Hun

Sculpture of Attila the Hun (Public Domain)

Top Image: Attila and his Hordes (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

Subutai: Dog of War — Silent, Insatiable and Remorseless, Part II

Invasion of Central Europe: Battle of Liegnitz (1241)

Subutai planned the invasion of Central Europe with precision. This military expedition into Europe placed Subutai into the annals of great military leaders.

After beating down many of the Russian principalities, Subutai sent spies into Poland, Hungary, and even as far as to Austria. He was able to put together a dossier after gathering vital intelligence on the various kingdoms throughout Eastern Europe. Even though Subutai made the plans, his was under the command of Batu Khan.

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century).

Medieval Chinese drawing of young Batu Khan (14th century). (Public Domain)

While Batu Khan was the leader of this expedition, Subutai, Kadan Kahn, Orda Kahn, Baidar, and a slew of others were the muscle behind the plans. Subutai’s mission was to attack Central Europe by spearheading into Hungary. Kadan’s forces would punch north into Poland.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Baidar led two Mongol tumans of soldiers westward into Silesia. The object was to destroy their European opponents before they could unite. Duke Henry II of Silesia on 5 April 1241 at Liegnitz was waiting for a force of 50,000 Bohemians under King Wenceslas. The Mongols were in the right place at the right time before the remaining forces could unite with Duke Henry. The Duke’s army was 25,000 strong consisting of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights, Hospitallers, and Knights Templars. However, much of Henry’s army consisted of poorly trained, inexperienced levies. Can you image Bavarian gold miners fighting a battle for you?

Mongol Heavy Cavalry

Mongol Heavy Cavalry (Public Domain)

Duke Henry’s army assembled themselves in a formation that was typical at the time for European armies. Heavy cavalry was the strike force looking to make the decisive blow to the enemy when the enemy showed weakness, while the infantry played only a supporting role protecting the rear. Henry’s formation is understandable and expected, but what Henry did not understand was the Mongol art of war. The Mongols used a tactic known as mangudai or feigned retreat. They would pretend to flee only to ambush those chasing after them.

The Mongols laid in wait for the Poles to make their move, as they did not want to give away their ruse. The Polish begin by charging the Mongols, hoping to engage them; however, the Mongol cavalry surrounded them and showered them with arrows.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

Arrows in the snow, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Polish quickly pulled back. They then made a second attempt at the Mongols with two cavalry units charging ahead. The Mongols quickly fled, acting as if they were scared. This fake retreat by the Mongols encouraged the knights to continue, moving deeper and becoming more frustrated while trying to engage the enemy—but the Mongols would not cooperate. Instead, the charging knights realized they were in a trap. It was too late.

The Mongols surrounded the Europeans on three sides and began to shower their enemy with arrows and smoke bombs, separating the cavalry force sent in by Duke Henry from his main army. Once the dividing of Henry’s troops had been accomplished, the Mongol heavy cavalry rode down and cut to pieces the European infantry, ultimately winning the battle. Duke Henry was also killed. His head became an ornament on the tip of the spear.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241.

Battle of Legnica (Legnitz) 1241. (Public Domain)

Battle of Sajo River (or Mohi) (1241)

The Battle of Liegnitz took place a mere few days before the battle of Sajo River.

On the day of the battle, many European men died in the fighting including Duke Henry of Silesia. Once word got out that the Mongols had defeated Duke Henry, King Bela of Hungary was left to confront the Mongols with roughly around 80,000 men.

King Bela’s army was very much similar to Duke Henry’s, which consisted of heavy cavalry, infantry, and a number of mercenaries consisting of nomadic light cavalry. Bela’s army was huge, and one that could, if applied tactically, go toe to toe with just about any fighting force thrown at it. However, this fighting force was Mongols: smart thinkers who looked ahead and planned methodically.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century.

A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

The Mongols choose a site called Mohi, which was on a plain. The reason for this location choice was to better maneuver their cavalry force while having a forest protecting their flanks. The Mongols quickly crossed over the Sajo River and rode a few miles ahead to make camp at that location. King Bela arrived nearby and set up camp, sending a small unit ahead to guard the far side of the bridge.

The Mongols decided that it would be best to divide their forces, sending 30,000 up north under the command of Subutai. Subutai gave the order for a bridge to be built that crossed over the River Sajo to the Hungarian side.

Batu began his attack early at dawn on 11 April with 40,000 troops at his aid. They attacked the bridge, but this proved dangerous, unless the bridge could be flushed of the European forces stationed there.

Batu gave the order for the catapults to be brought up, which hurled bombs of various sorts and made raucous sounds, which were used against the European forces to cause a panic. Once the European forces fled from the bridge, Batu was able to cross and control the bridge and establish a foothold on Bela’s side.

Nevertheless, Bela gave the order for his cavalry to charge the Mongol cavalry, for the Mongol cavalry had the river to their back, thus walling themselves in somewhat, until Subutai arrived from the north to flank Bela’s army. In doing so, it freed up Batu forces to engage Bela’s forces. The Mongols in turn devastated Bela’s camp.

After several hours of fighting the Mongols allowed a gap in their lines big enough to allow European forces to escape by any means necessary.  It was a bad idea to attempt escape, for the men had become a flood of panic and confusion. Nevertheless, the fate of the men fleeing was a deadly one. The Mongols cut down 60,000 men in a 30-mile (48 km) stretch back to Pest. King Bela escaped the butchery, most likely a changed man.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols.

Battle of Mohi 1241 between Hungarians and Mongols. (Public Domain)

Once Hungary was clear of any foe left to challenge them, the Mongols knew that it was time to complete the mission and conquer the rest of Hungary. However, although it seemed the fate was sealed for the Hungarians, chance saved the Hungarians: a significant death. The Mongol Khan Ogotai died in December 1241, and Batu was forced to leave in order to elect a new Khan, as was their custom.

The Nine Principles of War

The Mongols demonstrated the Nine Principles of War at both Liegnitz and Sajo by massing their forces on a concentrated position at the right time and place.

The Mongol objective was clear and decisive as to whom they would hit, like clockwork, in order to gain the advantage.

The Mongol offensive was a strike force that could now exploit the enemy and retain enemies to do their will—all by the use of psychological maneuver.

Surprise in the Mongol offensive was crucial in order to disrupt the enemy to thrown him off balance. This allowed the Mongol economy of force to concentrate all secondary units on primary targets, to achieve a much greater position than his enemy did. This allowed the Mongols to maneuver their enemy into a fixed position for the beating.

Mongol flexibility and cunningness was crucial to this endeavor. Unity of command under the Mongols was by one Batu Khan. However, Batu was flexible in his unity of command in order to gain the best out of his officers, such as with Subutai.

Because of the Mongol effectiveness in chaos and confusion, it allowed for a great sense of security on their behalf. The Mongol army could create an atmosphere of safety to ensure that their troops always had the advantage over the enemy. With security safely applied, the objective of simplicity was greatly understood in order to execute any order without asking twice.

The reason why both Duke Henry and King Bela lost the battles was due to a lack of combined arms or a lack of understanding how to utilize them in a time of war. However, this may be unfair to those who died. Nevertheless, from what we have read, we can see why they lost: a lack of good troops with experience, the feeling of over confidence and superiority, and most important, a lack of understanding of their enemy’s way of warfare.

Béla IV flees from Mohi

Béla IV flees from Mohi (Public Domain)

The End of the European Theater

The Mongol onslaught into Europe would halt when on 11 December 1241 when the great Mongol leader Ogedei Khan died.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong.

Portrait of Ögedei Khan (the 14th century). The Chinese annotation reads: Third son of Genghis Khan, also known as Emperor Qaγan. He eliminated the Jin, his west expedition read central European. He reigned for 13 years, temple name Taizong. (Public Domain)

With his death, it was mandatory that all Mongol military expeditions stop and the Mongol princes were required to return to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was during this event that Subutai had been drawing up plans for the invasion of the Holy Roman Empire, but the man in charge of the European theater, Batu Khan, had to rush back since he was a prince.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan.

Batu Khan on the throne. Batu Khan was a Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde. Batu was a son of Jochi and grandson of Genghis Khan. (Public Domain)

It took three years before a new khan was elected and the man elected was Guyuk, and Guyuk had no interest in Batu. With a feud now in the works, any further military operations into Europe had ceased for the time being. With Subutai’s ambitions to advance further into Europe dashed, he received new military operations to conduct, particularly at the Song Dynasty during 1246-47.

The Legacy of Subutai

In 1247, a Franciscan monk by the name of Plano Carpini visited the Mongol court. In his letters, he mentioned that Subutai was still alive and in his early seventies. Carpini also went on to state that Subutai was held in high regards among the court, and referred to him as “Subutai the Unfailing.”

Carpini wrote, “He was a soldier without weakness.” Carpini is just one of the few sources available that speak of the man’s personality. The Muslims, for instance, saw him as “silent, insatiable, and remorseless.” The Russians said he was “extremely disciplined.” The Chinese had a much more revealing description. They looked upon Subutai in high esteem, and he was a great warrior. When Subutai passed, the Chinese bestowed an honorary title on him, proclaiming Subutai King of Honan (Hunan Province). The reason for this title was that Subutai captured the province from the Chin. He was also awarded the title of “faithful and steady.”

In 1248, Subutai returned to Karkorum after a successful campaign and retired. After Subutai left court, he is said to have removed the badges of rank from his yurt and spent the remainder of his days tending to his herds and watching over his grandchildren, particularly his grandson, Achu, and he sharpened his warrior skills.

Some say he went home near the Tuul River, others say he died alone in a tent, while others say he moved further west near the Danube River to be near his son, Uriangkatai, who was in the service of Batu army, serving as an officer. If so, Subutai would spend the remainder of his days living within the territory of the Golden Horde.

It is said he had grown tired of the court, and rightfully so. Subutai grew nauseous of the political squabbling of the Mongol princes, particularly that of Batu and Kuyuk that went on long after Ogedai’s death. By 1248, the once-great Mongol Empire established by Genghis Khan was still great, but fractures created after the death of Ogedei in 1241 continued to grow and further separate the empire from its foundation.

In the end, the historical records provide little information when it comes to the generalship of Subutai. Furthermore, this piece cannot relate the grand scope of all of the battles and wars he part took in, but instead provide a rare glimpse into the man called Subutai.

If one wants to know how accomplished this man was as a general on his Eurasian tour, then consider the words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, as he states that Subutai from China to the Danube “had conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.” As military historian Richard Gabriel further comments, and rightfully speaks of Subutai’s achievements, they’re described as “a record of accomplishment literally unsurpassed by any of the great generals who had gone before him.”

Unfortunately, Subutai has long been overlooked, especially in military circles, but now his successes on the battlefield have become known for all to see and decipher.

After he retired, Subutai died two years later at the age of 72. Even though Subutai was dead, his sons and their descendants continued to serve one Khan after another for the next three decades.

Subutai is thus remembered in The Secret History of the Mongols:

“They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai, Jelme, and Subotai.”

Featured image: Deriv; A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0) , A Mongol melee in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

(Read Part I: Subutai: Dog of War — Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire)

References

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Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography.New York: Castle Books, 1995.

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Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

The Forgotten Roman General

General Publius Ventidius is probably one of the most overlooked, if not completely forgotten, generals in military history. Maybe it is because Ventidius grew up poor like most Romans… Or perhaps it was due to the reports that he sold mules and wagons before joining the Roman army.

Despite this, Ventidius would go on to have a distinguished military career, accompanying Julius Caesar during his campaign against Gaul and partaking in the Roman Civil War. Then in 45 BCE, Ventidius took up Caesar’s offer and accepted the post of plebeian tribune when the senate was reorganized and expanded.

Finally, on top of everything else, it may have been this forgotten general, with whom we concern ourselves today, that was responsible for reversing the Parthian tide, for changing the course of Roman History.

We will look at the series of battles now, in an effort to amend the marginal position in the history books that has been designated to poor Ventidus.

Mark Antony

It was in 39 BCE that Mark Antony assigned Ventidius Bassus the mission to retake Asia-Minor. Reports had reached Antony while he was in Greece that the Parthians were finished with their campaign in Asia-Minor for the year. These intelligence reports most likely came from the province of Asia, which was, at the time, loyal to Rome. From this news, Antony was able to draw up his plans.

He probably was aware that the majority of the Parthian army would retire for the winter and return home to their respected nobles. This would mean that those who remained were local militias, with questionable loyalty to garrison the cities throughout Asia-Minor. In addition, Antony understood the need to attack now to inhibit any further Parthian progress coming next spring.

Antony saw this as a perfect opportunity to surprise the enemy.

And so, once the coast was clear, Antony took a chance and placed a few legions under the command of our dear Ventidius, who subsequently set sail for the province of Asia. Vantidius’ mission was simple; establish a beachhead at the province of Asia and push inland.

Battle of the Cilician Gates

Ventidius’ landing was unexpected. This only goes to show the lack of intelligence gathering on the part of Labienus, head of the Roman-Parthian army. Once the Roman forces were accounted for, Ventidius quickly began to push eastward in a ‘search and destroy’ mission.

Word spread rapidly that the Romans had arrived. When the message reached Labienus, he was startled and terrified for he “was without his Parthians.” The only troops available to him were the neighborhood militia.

Labienus quickly fled the province of Asia and headed east, seeking military support from his co-ruler, Pacorus, a Parthian prince and son of king Orodes II.

Meanwhile, Mark Antony’s man, Ventidius, took a chance of his own and abandoned his heavy troops. He pursued Labienus with his lightest forces.

Warrior

Eventually, Ventidius caught up with Labienus and cornered him near the Taurus range. He chose the high ground, so he could look down upon Labienus’ encampment. But there was another, more important, reason why Ventidius took the high ground; he feared the Parthian archers.

It was a standoff as both generals encamped for several days, waiting for the arrival of their main forces. As the bulk of the armies finally arrived, the Romans and the Parthians hunkered down for the night.

Cataphract

At daybreak, the Parthians, over-confident with their numbers and past victories, decided to start the battle before joining forces with Labienus. Unfortunately these were not the famous and deadly Parthian horse archers… but the heavy cavalry, or cataphract. Once they were at the length of the slope, the Romans charged down on top of them and repelled the enemy with ease, for the Romans had the momentum.

While the Romans were able to kill and maim many of the cataphract, the cataphract were, in fact, doing a better job at killing and maiming themselves.

See, the cataphract were at the top of slope, where all the fighting took place, but when they retreated, they ran into their own men coming up the hill. Instead of descending in order to rally around Labienus, they bypassed their general and headed straight for Cilicia. It was absolute chaos.

Ventidius, seeing that the Parthians were scattering all about and fleeing, decided to bring his men down from the hill and march on Labienus’ camp.

Both armies were now face to face… But Ventidius decided to stay put.

Why would Ventidius do this? Well, he was informed from deserters that Labienus was going to flee the camp, come nightfall. Therefore, Ventidius decided that it was better to set up ambushes rather than have an all-out pitch battle, which would result in losing many men and resources during the process.

Once nightfall came, the ambushes set in place worked as planned, killing and capturing many… that is, except for Labienus. Labienus was able to escape by changing clothes… His destination was Cilicia.

However, Labienus was not able to hide for long. Demetrius, a former slave, then “freedman” turned bounty hunter, arrested him. After Demetrius turned Labienus over to the Roman authorities, he was quickly executed.

Battle of Amanus Pass

With Labienus dead, Ventidius was able to secure the province of Cilicia. This did not mean they won; in fact, the mission was far from finished. To complete it, Ventidius devised a plan to trick the Parthians.

Ventidius sent a cavalry, headed by the officer Pompaedius Silo, to scout out the Amanus Pass, a strategic mountain path connecting the province of Cilicia and Syria. Not far behind Silo would be Ventidius, along with a small contingent of troops to aid in the fight.

Horseman

Meanwhile on the Parthian side, Pacorus understood that if the same Amanus pass were not secured, the Romans would march through and invade Syria. Therefore, he felt, the best method was to station a garrison there to bottle up the small mountain road.

So Pacorus stationed Pharnapates, a Parthian lieutenant considered the most capable general of Orodes, to wait for the Romans to come. Once Silo reached the pass, the two sides engaged in battle immediately.

But don’t forget – this was, in fact, an elaborate trick. Silo’s real mission was to lure the Parthians away from their strongest defensive position. In doing so, Ventidius would either attack at the flank or from the rear.

Arrows

In a sense, the Romans were giving the Parthians a taste of their own medicine by using the same tactic that worked so well against them at the Battle of Carrhae. With many of Pharnapates’ cataphract lured away, Ventidius fell upon the Parthians unexpectedly. Pharnapates, along with many of his men, perished during the engagement.

With the Amanus Pass now clear, the invasion of Syria was imminent.

With the Amanus Pass secured, Ventidius, head of the Roman forces, pushed south into Syria. Pacorus, the Parthian prince and co-leader of the Roman-Parthian army, was done fighting… at least for now.

He abandoned the province to the Romans in late 39 BCE. With the Parthians out of the way, Ventidius led his forces to the province of Judea.

Ventidius’ mission in Judea was simple and lucrative; it was to rid the province of any remaining Parthians. He was also there to remove the anti-Roman King, Antigonus, and to restore Herod to the throne.

But Ventidius did neither.

King Herod

Instead, he bypassed Herod’s royal family, who were besieged by the troops of Antigonus on the top of Masada, and went straight for Jerusalem. Ventidius was playing psychological warfare with Antigonus, by making him think that he was going to take Jerusalem.

This, however, was just another ruse.

Ventidius promised not to attack Jerusalem… that is, unless he received vast amounts of wealth from the king. Antigonus had, in his mind, no choice but to capitulate to Ventidius’ demands.

Make no mistake, Ventidius was still going to support Herod and place him on the throne. But while Herod was still far away, and his brother besieged, Ventidius thought he might as well make some money while they wait.

After Ventidius’ coffers were filled, he took the bulk of his forces and headed back for Syria, leaving his second, officer Pompaedius Silo, in charge to deal with the ‘Jewish problem’.

The Ruse

However, King Antigonus would come up with a ploy of his own; he bribed Silo multiple times. Antigonus hoped to buy time so that the Parthians could come to his assistance, while he kept the Romans at bay.

Unfortunately for King Antigonus, this would not happen.

Pacorus

When Ventidius returned to Syria, he sent the bulk of his forces beyond the Taurus Mountains to Cappadocia for winter quarters. It was during this time that the Parthian Prince, Pacorus, planned another invasion of Syria and began to mobilize a substantial number of cavalry from the nearby provinces.

Word of Pacorus’ intentions soon spread, reaching the ears of loyal Roman informants, who then relayed the information to Ventidius. Not only was this information crucial for preparation, it also informed Ventidius that a Syrian noble by the name of Channaeus (also called Pharnaeus), who pretended to be a Roman ally, was, in fact, a spy and Parthian loyalist.

Ventidius likely invited Channaeus over for dinner and during their meeting, Ventidius made it clear that he feared the Parthian would abandon their normal route, “where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near the city of Zeugma.”

Ventidius acted concerned over the issue, making it clear that if Pacorus were to invade Syria much further to the south, he would have the advantage over the Romans for it, “was a plain and convenient for the enemy.”

Like the good spy he was, Channaeus returned to his home after the meeting and quickly sent messengers to inform Pacorus of Ventidius’ fears.

Come early spring 38 BCE, Pacorus, unwilling to let go of Syria, led his forces south along the Euphrates River based on Ventidius’ supposed fears of engaging the enemy on a plain.

Once they came to the point of crossing, Pacorus realized that they needed to construct a bridge, due to the banks being widely separated. It took many men and materials, and the bridge was completed only after forty days.

This is exactly what Ventidius wanted. Ventidius’ disinformation bought him much needed time, allowing his legions to assemble.

Once the Parthian forces were in Syrian territory, Pacorus likely expected an immediate attack during the bridge construction or during the crossing, but neither materialized. With no sign of the enemy, Pacorus became overconfident and began to believe that the Romans were weak and cowardly. Eventually however, Pacorus found Ventidius at the acropolis of the city of Gindarus, in the province of Cyrrhestica.

Ventidius had been at Gindarus for three days preparing his defenses when Pacorus showed up.

Repeated Mistakes

One would have thought that perhaps Pacorus carefully prepared a plan of action in such a situation…. but no. Instead, Pacorus and his officers tossed out the combined arms strategy of utilizing both heavy cavalry and horse archers in unison. This had worked many times, so they thought they could take the high ground with little trouble.

Battle

Moreover, the arrogant and overconfident Pacorus, and his nobles, did not want the commoners and horse archers to steal the show, as they did at Carrhae. So they decided to sally up the slope, as they did at the battle of the Cilician Gates.

Once the cataphracts were within five hundred paces of the Romans, Ventidius took advantage of their elitism and rushed his soldiers to the brim and over, until both armies met at close quarters on the slope.

Ventidius’ strategy here was simple, by engaging the elite Parthian cavalry, he had cover from the infamous Parthian horse archers.

You would think the Parthians would have learned from previous experiences what not to do. The result of their knee-jerk reaction was devastating. As the Parthian cataphract advanced up the slope, they were quickly repelled back… straight into those still coming up, inflicting great suffering to rider and mount.

This is not to mention those who did make it to the brim were met and repulsed by heavy infantry. And if the heavy infantry did not get them, the slingers would.

These slingers were likely on the left and right side of the Roman infantry, giving them a deadly arc of crossfire. This very well could be the reason as to why we do not hear of the Parthian horse archers partaking in the engagement, since any attempt to rush towards the front would put them in grave danger.

Battle

Even though the Parthian cataphracts put up a stiff fight at the foot of the hill, it was not enough.

The Roman infantry likely swarmed the cataphracts forcing them into hand-to-hand combat. With the famous Parthian horse archers neutralized from the fight due to the slingers, there was nothing that could be done to rescue the situation.

In the ensuing chaos, Pacorus likely tried to make one last push. He, along with some of his men, attempted to take Ventidius’ defenseless camp, only to be met by Roman reserves, in which he inevitably lost his life during the melee.

As news spread that Prince Pacorus lay dead, a scramble to recover his body was attempted. While those trying to retrieve his corpse met his same fate, the vast majority of Pacorus’ army quickly retreated. Some attempted to re-cross the bridge that was constructed over the Euphrates but were caught by the Romans and put to death. Meanwhile, others fled to King Antiochus of Commagene for safety.

Victorious Aftermath

This victory shocked Syria. To make sure the Syrians would never rebel against Rome, Ventidius took Pacorus’ corpse, severed the head and ordered that it be sent throughout all the different cities of Syria.

It was a gruesome sight to behold, but the effect it had on the natives was anything other than negative. Instead, “they felt unusual affection for Pacorus on account of his justice and mildness, an affection as great as they had felt for the best kings that had ever ruled them.”

As for the Parthians who sought refuge in Commagene, Ventidius came after them.

Truth be told, Ventidius could care less about the Parthian refugees. Instead, he was much more concerned with how much money he could confiscate from King Antiochus by besieging Samosata, the capital of Commagene, in the summer of 38 BCE.

Mark Antony

Antiochus offered Ventidius a thousand talents if he would just get up and go, but Ventidius refused the offer and proposed that Antiochus send his offer to Antony.

Once Antony got word of the situation, he quickly made his way to the scene of the action.

Ventidius was just about to make peace and take the lucrative offer when Antony barred him from making such a deal. Instead, Antony removed him from his command and took over the operations from there.

Why? Well, Antony was jealous of Ventidius and wanted in on the glory.

But instead of the desired fame, Antony inherited a protracted siege that went nowhere, and indeed hurt him in the end. When Antiochus offered peace again, Antony had little choice but to accept the now lowered offer of three hundred talents.

After the extortion of Commagene, Antony ventured into Syria to take care of some domestic issues before returning to Athens.

As for Ventidius, he went back to Rome where he received honors and a triumph, for “he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.”

The Next Generation

As Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome, Antony seethed in Athens.

Meanwhile, across the Euphrates in Parthia, King Orodes was in grief over the loss of his son and army. Orodes lost the will to speak and eat, and after several days, began to talk to Pacorus as if he was alive.

It was also during this time that the many wives of Orodes began to make bids as to why Orodes should choose their son for next in line to the throne. Each mother understood that there was this nasty habit in Parthia… once a new king was elected he would go out of his way to murder his brothers to secure the safety of his reign.

King Orodes

Orodes eventually made his choice and settled on his son Phraates to succeed him. Soon after Phraates was chosen heir to the throne, he began plotting against his father Orodes.

Phraates’ first attempt in murdering his father was with a poison called aconite. This failed due to Orodes suffering from a disease called dropsy (edema), which absorbed the poison and had little effect. Therefore, Phraates took a much easier route and strangled his father to death. To make sure his throne was safe, he murdered his thirty brothers and any of the nobility that detested him or questioned his motives for his acts of cruelty. Phraates was here to stay.

But while Phraates went on a vicious campaign to secure his throne, Mark Antony, jealous of the success that Ventidius had against Parthia, was prepping and planning an invasion of his own.

It was now Antony’s turn to avenge Crassus to fulfill Caesar’s dream.

By Cam Rea

Reference

Leviathan vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC-217 AD

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part 2

By Cam Rea

[Read Part 1]

The Fall of Bagdad

Hulegu sent messages to his commanders informing them to muster their forces and move on Baghdad.

Baiju moved his forces from Rum via Mosul to cover the western side. Ked-Buka advanced from Luristan, a province of western Iran in the Zagros Mountains. Contingents from the Golden Horde under the command of Batu’s three nephews approached from Kurdistan from the north.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde.

Tode Mongke Khan of the Golden Horde. (Public Domain)

Hulegu led the main force from Hulwan, located in Kermanshah Province in western Iran. In other words, the Mongol army was approaching the city in an arc from the north, which allowed them to converge from the east and west. The Mongols, due to the use of pontoon boats, overcame the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which once served as natural barriers against invading armies. As the Mongols advanced down both banks of the Tigris, the Caliph sent out 20,000 cavalries in an attempt to disperse and slow down the Mongol advance. Mongol scouts ahead of the main force found the Caliph’s cavalry and reported. Not long after, the Mongol engineers took advantage of the situation by breaking the dikes of the dams along the Tigris, which flooded the terrain behind the cavalry, downing many of them as they attempted to flee back to the city. With the only threat between Baghdad and the Mongol advance eliminated, Baiju’s forces marched down the west bank of the Tigris and took control of the commercial quarter, while Hulegu entered the Shiite suburbs to a rejoicing crowd beyond the eastern walls. Within twenty-four hours, the Mongols surrounded the city of Baghdad.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258.

Mongols besieging Baghdad in 1258. (Public Domain)

On 30 January 1258, the Hulegu gave the order to commence the bombardment of the city walls. However, there was a problem. The Mongol siege crews had no rocks. The siege train carrying the needed stones was three days’ journey away. While the Mongols looked for suitable projectiles to throw at the city walls, Hulegu ordered his Mongol archers to fire arrows over the walls with messages attached, which informed the citizens that they would be treated with kindness if they surrendered. While Hulegu sought to end this siege peacefully, Mongol engineers, likely accompanied by a detachment of troops, came up empty handed when it came to finding quality rocks. However, not all was lost. Mongol engineers stripped foundation stones from the buildings in the suburbs and uprooted palm trees to batter the walls of Baghdad.

The Caliph quickly sent ambassadors to negotiate peace but Hulegu would not hear the pleas and detained them. Hulegu’s message was clear, surrender was not enough; it must be unconditional surrender. While the Caliph continued to send envoys to Hulegu, the Mongols bombarded the walls, particularly focusing on the Ajami tower, which was reduced to rubble by 1 February.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine.

Persian painting (14th century) of Hulegu’s army besieging a city. Note use of the siege engine. (Public Domain)

The Mongols finally broke into the city the next day and seized a portion of the eastern wall. However, the battle was far from over and the negotiations continued for another four days. On the 6 February, the bombardment ended but the Mongols remained on the wall until the Caliph surrendered.

Hulegu sent another message, this one to the armies of Baghdad. The message told them to lay down their arms and leave their posts. Seeing the situation was unwinnable by use of arms, Izz al-Din and Mujahid al-Din advised the Caliph to flee the city. But one man by the name of Ibn Alqami proposed that the best way to end this was for the Caliph to go before Hulegu. Hulegu’s terms to the Caliph were simple. Hulegu desired that the Caliph turn over his daughter so that he could marry her and that the Caliph recognized Hulegu as the supreme authority. If these terms were accepted, Hulegu would end the siege. The Caliph agreed and his forces marched out thinking they were going to retire to Syria.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta'sim.

Medieval depiction of Hulegu (left) and Caliph Al-Musta’sim. (Public Domain)

According to the 13th century Aramean historian Kirakos of Gandzak, the “countless multitudes came through the city gates, climbing over each other to see who would reach him first (Hulegu) divided up among the soldiers those who came out and ordered (the soldiers) to take them far from the city and to kill them secretly so that the others would not known. They killed all of them.”

The Many Versions of the Caliph’s Death

Four days later, Al-Musta’sim, soon to be the last Caliph of Baghdad, surrendered. There are various accounts of his surrender.

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Al-Musta’sim emerged with his two sons, with all the grandees and much gold, silver, and precious stones as fitting gifts to Hulegu and his nobles. At first (Hulegu) honored him, reproaching him for dallying and not coming to him quickly. But then he asked the caliph: “What are you, God or man?” And the caliph responded: “I am a man, and the servant of God.” Hulegu asked: “Well, did God tell you to insult me and to call me a dog and not to give me food and drink to God’s dog? Now in hunger the dog of God shall devour you.” And he killed him with his own hands. “That, “he said, “is an honor for you, because I killed you.”

The account of 13th century polymath and prolific writer Nasir al-Din al-Tusi:

“When they took the walls, the King commanded the people of the town to join in demolishing them. Envoys passed to and fro…. After this, the Caliph, seeing that all was over, sought leave to come out. He came out…and saw the king, being accompanied by his son and courtiers…. Then (Hulegu) ordered the town to be pillaged.”

He went to examine the Caliph’s residence and walked in every direction. The Caliph was fetched and ordered presents to be offered. Whatever he brought, the king at once distributed amongst his suite and emirs, military leaders and (all) those present. He set a golden try before the Caliph and said: ‘Eat.” “It is not edible,” said the Caliph. “The why didst thou not make these iron doors into arrowheads and come to the bank of the river so that I might not have been able to cross it?” “Such,” replied the Caliph, “was God’s will.” “What will befall thee,” said the King, “is also God’s will.”…

Then he ordered the Caliph to bring out the women who were attached to himself and his sons. They went to the Caliph’s palace: there were 700 women and 1500 eunuchs, and they shared out the rest…. On the 14th Safar (20 February), the king set out from the gates of the town and sent for the Caliph….On that day he met his end in that village (Waqaf) together with his middle son. The next day his eldest son and those accompanied him met their end at the Kalwadh Gate.

The account by 13th century historian Rashid al-Din:

Hulegu Khan… the next morning … ordered Su’unchaq to go into the city, confiscate the caliph’s possessions, and sent them out. The items that had been accumulated over six hundred years were all stacked in mountainous piles…. The caliph was summoned… At the end of the day on Wednesday the 14th of Safar 656 (20 February 1258, the caliph, his eldest son, and five of his attendants were executed in the village of Waqaf … and the reign of the House of Abbas came to an end.

The account of Mustawfi Qazvini based much of his work on the histories of Rashid al-Din:

At Hulegu’s order, the executioner prepared for the killing, and maliciously brought a sack. He bound the Caliph, head, hand and foot and put him in a sack, which became his habitation. He said, “See this descendent from stock that is unequal led, and how the world has placed him in this sack.”

“Then they broke his head as though it were a stone and he died quickly. Fate dealt him a grievous blow, and brought destruction on that beautiful king. When the renowned Musta’sim was killed, a great name tumbled to the dust.”

Besides the Caliph and his sons being put to death, the three thousand courtiers who accompanied the Caliph were also said to be put to the sword.

The Destruction of Baghdad

Kirakos of Gandzak account:

Hulegu then ordered the troops guarding the walls to descend and kill the inhabitants of the city, great and small. (The Mongols) organized as though harvesting a field and cut down countless, numberless multitudes of men, women, and children. For forty days they did not stop. Then they grew weary and stopped killing. Their hands grew tired; they took others for sale. They destroyed mercilessly.

However, Hulegu’s wife, the senior Khantun (lady), named Doquz Khatun was a Christian. She spared the Christians of Baghdad, Nestorians and other denominations and beseeched her husband not to kill them. And he spared them with their goods and property.

Hulegu ordered all his soldiers to take the goods and property of the city. They all loaded up with gold, silver, precious stones, pearls, and costly garments, for it was an extremely rich city, unequalled on earth.

Hulegu himself took his share the caliph’s treasures—three thousand camel loads; and there was no counting the horses, mules and asses.

Grigor of Akanc’s account:

After this they convened a great assembly of old and young horsemen, including the Georgian and Armenian cavalry, and with countless multitudes they moved on the city of Baghdad. When they arrived on the spot they took at once the great and famous city of Baghdad, filled with many people and rare treasures, and countless gold and silver. When they took it they slaughtered mercilessly and made many prisoners.

While various Christian communities were spared the sword, the Muslim population suffered greatly. After the massacre ended, the Mongols and their allies torched the palaces and mosques. The wagon loads of treasure plundered from the city were sent to Mangku Khan in Karakorum or to Hulegu’s fort on the island of Shalia in Lake Urmiya.

Mongol siege.

Mongol siege. (Public Domain)

The number of dead is unknown. Martin Sicker in his book The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna estimates that 90,000 died. Ian Frazier in his article ‘Annals of history: Invaders: Destroying Baghdad’ published by The New Yorker, estimates (depending on the source) that “two hundred thousand, or eight hundred thousand, or more than a million” may have died. According to Andre Wink in his book Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, Vol.2, that perhaps 50,000 troops along with 200,000 to 800,000 civilians. A. Y. Al-Hassan in his book, The different aspects of Islamic culture: Science and technology in Islam, Vol.4, Ed. suggest that perhaps 2,000,000 may have perished.

The Destruction of Intellectual Wealth

The destruction of Baghdad was one of greatest disasters in human history. While one can elaborate on the great amount of wealth lost, one must not overlook the great amount of intellectual wealth lost, such as art, philosophy and science, all put to torch, along with the library, the learning centers, the hospitals and so forth. But even more precious was the amount of life lost that had no part in the conflict. Some may ask how a group of people could do such a thing. The answer is not simple.

But given what is known about the Mongols, they strongly despised farmers and cities. To them farming was a waste, which is understandable. Mongols had no use for growing crops. They needed lands for their horses and herds to graze. Cities were seen as centers of laziness. This also is understandable, for the Mongols were always on the move and had not time for leisure for their horses and herds needed constant attention. Life on the steppe had not the division of labor found in a city in order for it to function. Lastly, the Mongol record of sacking cities in China, Iran, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, always came with a tremendous loss of life and shows their disregard for human life. They treated people as if they were nothing more than animals, herding them before their great army and preparing them for the slaughter as the army slowly encircles them for the grand kill. While despicable, it is understandable in how the Mongols, such as Genghis Khan, Hulegu, or Tamerlane, treated civilians, like that of Baghdad, for such men saw outsiders as nothing more than vermin, unless that person or group of people had something to offer that could provide the Mongol administration or military machine an advantage.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362.

The Battle of Blue Waters between the armies of Lithuania and the Golden Horde in 1362. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

When looking at the Mongols from afar, a quote from the French historian René Grousset comes to mind when considering uncivilized and civilized:

“It has been noted that the Jenghiz-Khanite Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century was less cruel, for the Mongols were mere barbarians who killed simply because for centuries this had been the instinctive behavior of nomad herdsmen toward sedentary farmers. To this ferocity Tamerlane added a taste for religious murder. He killed from piety. He represents a synthesis, probably unprecedented in history, of Mongol barbarity and Muslim fanaticism, and symbolizes that advanced form of primitive slaughter which is murder committed for the sake of an abstract ideology, as a duty and a sacred mission.”

The outcome of Hulegu’s sacking of Bagdad was expected, especially coming from a man who grew up on the uncivilized steppe, while Turco-Mongol conqueror Tamerlane’s later sacking of Bagdad in 1401 was not expected, especially coming from a man who grew up surrounded by civilization.

Top Image: Mural of siege warfare, Genghis Khan Exhibit in San Jose, California, US (CC BY 2.0)

References

Bretschneider, E. Mediaeval Researchers from Eastern Asiatic Sources, Vol I. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. LTD, 1910.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979.

Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Gettleman Marvin E. and Stuart Schaar. The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Secret Order of Assassins: The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the Islamic World. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Jackson, Peter and Willem van Ruysbroeck. The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1955. London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990.

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance. London: Routledge, 2003.

Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Man, John. Kublai Khan: From Xanadu to Superpower. London: Bantam Press, 2006.

Marshall, Robert. Storm from the East: From Genghis Khan to Khubilai Khan London: Penguin, 1994.

May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War. Yardley, Penn: Westholme, 2007.

Mclynn, Frank. Genghis Khan: His Conquests, His Empire, His Legacy. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2015.

Nicolle, David and Richard Hook. The Mongol Warlords: Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan, Hülegü, Tamerlane. Poole, Dorset: Firebird Books, 1990.

Saunders, J.J. The History of the Mongol Conquests. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1971.

A History of Medieval Islam. London: Routledge, 2007.

Weatherford, J. McIver. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Crown, 2004.

Willey, Peter. The Eagle’s Nest: Ismaili Castles in Iran and Syria. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005.

Palms Over Baghdad: Hulagu’s Expedition to Oust the Abbasid Caliph – Part I

Palms-Over-Baghdad

By Cam Rea

In 1253 CE, a breeze began to blow into Baghdad from the east. Unbeknownst to Al-Musta’sim, the Abbasid Caliph, this breeze would soon turn into a violent shamal (wind). This shamal was gaining energy from Karakorum, the Mongol capital of the most powerful empire on earth. For in the same year, Mongke Khan, the Great Khan, held a khuriltai (a political and military council meeting) with siblings and close family. It was during this meeting that Mongke expressed his desire to launch a dual military campaign: one led by Khubilai against the Sung Dynasty in China, and another against the Arabs and Persians, this led by Hulegu, grandson of Genghis Khan.

Hulagu Khan, 14th century

Hulagu Khan, 14th century (Public Domain)

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum.

An artist’s depiction of ancient Karakorum. (CC BY 2.0)

Hulegu’s mission was to conquer the Arabs and Persians and to expand further westward by subjugating Muslim nations, particularly bringing the Abbasid Caliphate under the Mongol yoke, and from there to proceed southwards through the Kingdom of Jerusalem to conquer the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. But there was another reason for Mongke’s decision to bring the Muslim nations under Mongol control:  riches and fear.

Riches and Fear

Thirty-six years earlier in 1217, the Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan invaded the Khwarazmian Empire, which ruled Persia at the time, and toppled it by 1221. However, the invasion of Persia was not completed. After Genghis Khan died in 1227, his son, Ogodei, inherited the throne. To complete this, Ogodei promoted Chormaqan to act as military governor of Persia with the sole mission to subjugate and control. Chormaqan reigned as military governor of Persia from 1231-1237.  Ogodei replaced Choraqan with Baiju in 1237. Baiju was tasked with the same mission: control the territory and expand the borders—which he did by conquering the Seljuks of Asia-Minor from 1242-1256. However, a Muslim delegation arrived at the court of Mongke in 1252, led by the religious leader, Qadi of Qazvin, which requested Mongke to replace Baiju with a royal Mongol prince.

O illustrious and magnanimous Qa’an we do not speak of a bridge made of stone, or brick, nor a bridge of chains. I want a bridge of justice over the river, for where there is justice, the world is prosperous. He who comes over the river Amu Darya (Oxus) finds the Qa’an’s justice, and on this side of the river there is justice and a path. On that side of the river, the world is evil, and some people become prosperous through injustice.

Audience with Möngke.

Audience with Möngke. (Public Domain)

This message to the Great Khan made it clear that if the Persian people were citizens of the Mongol Empire, then they should act like it and be given a representative from Genghis’ own bloodline. As to how bad the situation in Persia was under the Mongol military governors, it is unclear, but leaves one to speculate that it was not good, and enough to cause a delegation to travel to the Mongol capital of Karakorum to request a change in leadership. Mongke could have turned them away but he was no fool. The Mongols were long familiar with the influential Muslim merchants traversing throughout Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia.

Influential merchants traded goods across Asia. (Public Domain)

Besides the great flow of wealth, the Mongols also noticed the influential reputation of the renowned Persian scientists, astronomers, astrologers, mathematicians, technologist, painting, carpet making, music and poetry.

Jabir ibn Hayyan, "the father of Chemistry".

Jabir ibn Hayyan, “the father of Chemistry”. (Public Domain)

This level of sophistication was too lucrative for the Mongols not to control, especially if they could conquer southern China and combine their commerce and intellectuals with that of the Muslim world. Therefore, it was imperative to make the citizens of Persia feel equal if the Mongols wished to enjoy the lucrative commercial and intellectual benefits. Thus, the formation of the Ilkhanate was established with Hulegu as its head.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu.

Ilkhanate, part of the Mongol Empire located primarily across modern Iran, as led by Hulegu. (Public Domain)

Besides riches, there was fear. Mongke feared a small group called Assassins, who were a Shiite sect more properly known as the Nizari Ismailis. Mongke’s paranoia, while reasonable, affected those who entered his court. William Rubruck, who traveled to the Mongol court in 1253-1255, describes the atmosphere prior his admission into the court.

This interrogation was being conducted because Mangu Chan had been informed that four hundred Assassins, in various disguises, had made their way in with the aim of killing him.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target.

Assassins had a notorious reputation. Illustration of an agent of the Ismailis (Order of Assassins) (left, in white turban) fatally stabs his target. (Public Domain)

Preparation

The first Mongol contingents left Mongolia in the spring of 1253. Before the conquest of the Middle East was underway, Mongke and the Mongol princes threw a lavish party for Hulegu and showered him with gifts, such as jewelry, money, fine horses and robes for himself, his wives, and sons.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century.

A Mongol horse archer in the 13th century. (Public Domain)

Mongke’s biggest gift to his brother was issuing an order that two out of every ten Mongol armed forces would join the Hulegu army. After the feasting was ended and the hangovers cured, the beginning of what was to become a grand army left on 19 October 1253. Once on the move, the Mongol army lumbered through central Asia and swelled into an enormous force before coming to rest at the outskirts of Samarkand.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia.

Samarkand, (Uzbekistan) is one of the oldest inhabited cities in Central Asia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

While at Samarkand, Hulegu continued to increase the size of his forces. When Eastern Christian communities received news of Hulegu’s planned campaign, the vassal Kingdoms of Georgia and Armenia provided troops and were enthusiastic in recovering former Christian lands in Mesopotamia.

Further to the north, Batu Khan, Mongol ruler and founder of the Golden Horde, division of the Mongol Empire, provided newly conscripted tumens (an army unit of 10,000 soldiers), mostly Turks and Alans, led by Balaghai, Khuli, and Tutar, Batu’s nephews. Furthermore, Hulegu brought in a “thousand engineers from China [who] had to get themselves ready to serve the catapults, and to be able to cast inflammable substances.”

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart.

Ancient Chinese mobile catapult cart. (CC BY 1.0)

The total size of Hulegu’s army was roughly between 100,000-150,000 men, probably closer 120,000 total. However, Hulegu probably gained additional forces along the way as he marched through Persia.

To prepare the way for such a large military force, Hulegu dispatched advanced troops across central Asia with the mission to sweep the path of livestock in order to ensure a good supply of pasture for his horses and pack animals when they passed through the area. Prior to pushing towards their objective, it was important to fatten the horses during the summer before moving out in the winter. While the collection of troops and supplies keep coming in, Hulegu sent his vanguard ahead of the main force to negotiate and procure potential allies before his massive army passed through their territories. Once his army pushed out, a vast army of non-combatants, such as Chinese engineering corps and European craftsmen, were tasked to pave the way by clearing the roads of obstacles, repair or building bridges, have boats ready for the rivers, and construct catapults besides other devices of war. However, this was no ordinary traveling army. In fact, this Mongol force was a traveling city accompanied by their families.

Hulagu Khan leading his army.

Hulagu Khan leading his army. (Public Domain)

Whether Hulegu’s army consisted of 120,000 or 150,000 men, each horseman would have extra horses for the journey. This would indicate that between 240,000 to 300,000 horses, if not more, accompanied the army along with perhaps 1.8 million sheep. To ensure that overgrazing would not occur, the vast amount of horses and sheep were widely dispersed. Besides ensuring the accompanying animals got pastures to feed, the army and their families also needed food. While sheep is one source of food, Hulegu’s agents were sent ahead, tasked to collect stores of flour, wine, and mares for kumiz (fermented horse milk). The big difference between Hulegu’s army when compared to Genghis Khan’s army, is that Genghis Khan’s forces moved like a storm, it was not a traveling city, whereas Hulegu’s army moved a few kilometers a day due to its sheer size.

Assassins

On 1 January 1256, Hulegu’s army crossed the river Amu Darya (Oxus). When Hulegu crossed the Amu Darya, he was met with rejoicing, unlike what took place some thirty-nine years earlier. As Hulegu’s army passed through, he and his forces were greeted with great enthusiasm by chiefs and dignitaries.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan.

Amu Darya in Turkmenistan. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

“There came willingly to his service a large number of the princes and generals. People from every house and by roads to praise him. At every halting place where they stopped they received praise from those along the way.”

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850.

Map of the Abbasid Caliphate at its greatest extent, c. 850. (CC BY 3.0)

Before proceeding to the lands of the Abbasid Caliph, Hulegu had some business to conduct in the Elburz Mountains. When the leader of the Assassins, Rukn ad-Din received news that Hulegu was coming for him, he quickly sent letters and by a show of compliance, began to dismantle the castles by removing all battlements and towers. However, he took his time in doing so, which caused Hulegu to lose patience and on 8 November 1256, the Mongols encircled Maymundiz castle.

After four days of battle, the Mongols finally assembled their mangonels, a type of siege engine, and proceeded with bombarding the fortress causing Rukn ad-Din to surrender later that month.

Medieval Mangonel.

Medieval Mangonel. (Public Domain)

Once in Mongol custody, Hulegu ordered him to tell the remaining fortress to surrender and dismantle immediately. Not all surrendered of course. Many had to be taken by storm and in doing so, every man, woman, and child were put to the sword.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold.

Alamut fortification in Iran and Ismailites Assassins stronghold. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Muslim rejoicing over the destruction of the Assassins quickly turned cold. Many seemed unaware that Hulegu now turned his attention towards the grand city of Baghdad, which served as the seat and power of the Muslim faith.

Letters to the Caliph

With the Assassins a distant memory, Hulegu moved his forces to Tabriz in April 1257, and sent an emissary to the Caliph with a message. These messages are provided by Rashid al-Din.

“When the Heretics’ fortresses were conquered we sent emissaries to request assistance from you… In reply you said that you were in submission, but you did not send troops. Now, a token of submissiveness and allegiance is that you assist us with troops when we ride against foes. You have not done so, and you send excuses.

No matter how ancient and grand your family may be, and no matter how fortunate your dynasty has been … is the brightness of the moon such that it can eclipse the brilliance of the sun? Talk of what the Mongol army has done to the world and those in it from the time of Genghis Khan until today may have reached your hearing from common and elite, and you may have heard how, through God’s strength, they have brought low … dynasties … all of whom were families of might and majesty.

Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past year is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us…. If you command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad even if you hide in the sky or in the earth … I shall put your city and country to the torch. If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s head, heed my advice. If you do not let us see what God’s will is.”

After listening to Hulegu’s message, the Caliph replied:

“Young man, you have just come of age and have expectations of living forever. You have … passed prosperously and auspiciously in dominating the whole world. You think your command is absolute…. Since you are not going to get anything from me, why do you seek? You come with strategy, troops, and lasso, but how are you going to capture a star? Does the prince not know that from the east to the west, from king to beggar, from old to young, all who are God-fearing and God worshipping are servants of this court and soldiers in my army? When I motion for all those who are dispersed to come together, I will deal first with Iran and then turn my attention to Turan, and I will put everyone in his proper place. Of course, the face of the earth will be full of tumult, but I do not seek vengeance or to harm anyone. I do not desire that the tongues of my subjects should either congratulate or curse me because of the movement of armies, espcially since I am of one heart and one tongue with the Qa’an (Mongke) and Hulegu. If, like me, you were to sow seeds of friendship, do you think you would have to deal with my moats and ramparts and those of my servants? Adopt the path of friendship and go back to Khurasan (Central Asia).”

After hearing the Caliph’s response, Hulegu sent back a wrathful reply, stating, “God the eternal elevated Genghis Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life…. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them.”

 

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