The Fall of the Arsacid Dynasty Started with a Wedding – Part 1

 

Incredibly, the end of the Parthian Empire started with a fake wedding.

Before the wedding took place, a civil war had been raging in Parthia between Vologases VI and his brother Artabanus V. After much warring between the two contesting parties, Artabanus came out as the winner and inherited the Empire. While Artabanus was enjoying his new throne, many miles to the west, the Roman Emperor Caracalla moved his headquarters to Antioch in the summer of 215 CE. The reason for Caracalla’s temporary move was that he was desirous of the title ‘Parthicus’, which would grant him great renown throughout the Roman Empire, and so he devised a plan in 216 CE.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

He decided that the best way to win over the Parthians was to write Artabanus a letter. Once the last scribbles were written, he gave it to his embassy, along with expensive gifts of fine workmanship.

Artabanus enjoyed the gifts, and when he opened the letter, Caracalla made it very clear that he wished to marry one of his daughters. Caracalla’s objective was to unite two empires under one great power, which would benefit both men, since not only would a much stronger army emerge from this union, but the trade restrictions could be lifted. Artabanus at first did not approve of the request, saying, “that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman” and “it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.”

Bust of the emperor Caracalla.

Bust of emperor Caracalla. (CC BY 2.5)

Therefore, Artabanus declined the offer. Artabanus was no fool; he knew of Caracalla’s deceitfulness when dealing with other nations. But this was not the end of the matter. Caracalla persisted, offering more gifts and showing enthusiasm for the marriage and for the union between the two powers. Artabanus finally believed that Caracalla was telling the truth. Artabanus felt that a permanent peace had finally arrived and publicly announced the wedding.

Caracalla crossed the rivers and was welcomed with sacrifices, decorated altars, incense scattered in his path, and all sorts of entertainment. Once he was near the palace at Ctesiphon, Artabanus came out to meet his future son-in-law in the plain before the city, with his daughter nearby. With an entire city jubilant over the event, crowned with flowers in their hair and wearing the finest robes, the populace danced to the music of flutes and drums. The men left their horses and their bows to partake in the drinking. Nothing out of the ordinary was suspected. When the Parthians were good and drunk, especially the men, the decisive moment was to be unveiled.

Caracalla gave the signal, and the happy party—celebrating what they thought was to be a peaceful end to many centuries of bloodshed—was slaughtered. Artabanus nearly died, but was helped onto a horse and escaped with a few men. The Roman troops took much booty and many prisoners. Caracalla then gave the order to pull out, and marched away unopposed. However, this was not to be the end, for Caracalla gave his men permission to loot and burn all the towns and villages they came across and to carry as much as they could, for it was all theirs for the taking. How far they went into Parthian territory remains unknown.

Caracalla’s great raid across the western portion of the Parthian Empire was short lived, for as soon as he enjoyed his spoils, one of his own men assassinated him. For roughly three days, the Romans were without an emperor until they chose a Praetorian Prefect, Macrinus, who was not a soldier by any means. There was no time for mourning Caracalla’s death or rejoicing in Macrinus’ ascension, for the Parthians were fast approaching.

Medallion with Roman Emperor Caracalla, circa 215 and circa 243 (Imperial Roman).

Medallion with Roman Emperor Caracalla, circa 215 and circa 243 (Imperial Roman). (Walters Art Museum/Public Domain)

The Bloody Battle of Nisibis 217 CE

Artabanus was seeking retribution, and once he entered Roman territory, he burned several cities in Mesopotamia.  Word eventually reached Macrinus of the coming Parthians, who were great in number, “including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.”

A Westerner on a camel. (386 – 534 CE)

A Westerner on a camel. (386 – 534 CE) (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Macrinus assembled his forces and moved out. The new emperor understood the severity of the situation and took to diplomacy in the hope it could avert battle and restore peace in the region. Macrinus sent the captives and a friendly message to Artabanus, urging him to accept peace and arguing that he was not to be blamed for Caracalla’s actions. Artabanus looked over the letter and rejected it immediately. He responded to Macrinus that if peace were to exist between the two, Rome must “rebuild the forts and the demolished cities, abandon Mesopotamia entirely, and make reparation for the injury done to the royal tombs as well as for other damage.” Further deliberation ceased when the Parthian army arrived outside the Roman headquarters at Nisibis.

At sunrise, the vast Parthian army appeared. Artabanus, along with his men, saluted the sun, as was their custom, and with loud cheers, the cataphract charged while the horse archers fired over their heads. The cataphract horsemen and dromedary riders inflicted considerable damage to the Roman ranks along with the relentless shower of arrows from above.

A Chinese terracotta figurine of a cataphract horse and rider. (386–534 CE)

A Chinese terracotta figurine of a cataphract horse and rider. (386–534 CE) (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Parthian horseman.

Parthian horseman. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

But even the Parthians suffered considerable losses since the Romans were at their best in close combat. After a while, the Romans began to feel the pressure and had to make a quick decision while the Parthians were regrouping. The Romans pretended to retreat, and as they did, they threw down caltrops and other pointed devices, which the sand concealed, making them nearly invisible. The Parthians, thinking that the Romans were fleeing the battlefield, gave chase, and when the horses and the soft-footed camels stepped on the sharp devices, they suffered great injury and would throw the rider. The rider was now vulnerable to be captured or killed since his armor weighed him down. Or, if he were to get up, he could not run far, for his robe would trip him.

Antique Roman Caltrop made of iron.

Antique Roman Caltrop made of iron. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

For two days, the armies fought in this manner, with disastrous results from morning until night, both celebrating in their camps as if they had won. On the third day, the Parthians tried to encircle the Romans, but the Romans had given their divisions and extended their front line to avoid this. The Romans were being worn down by the relentless attacks of the Parthians, who had numerical superiority. But, they could extend their lines to avoid being outflanked for only so long. The consistent Parthian onslaught eventually wore down and demoralized the Romans, causing their lines to collapse and Macrinus to flee, but the arrival of night saved them. With nothing left to gain, especially with the piled-up dead bodies creating barriers, the Romans acknowledged defeat and retired to their camp.

The slaughter of both men and animals was so great that the entire plain was covered. Bodies were piled in huge mounds; camels lay in heaps. The number of corpses that littered the battlefield hampered any further attacks, for not only could one not gain a foothold without stumbling but even finding the enemy was a problem since the piled remains of dead comrades blocked each other’s view.

Macrinus, who had lost the respect of his men, knew that he had lost something else, a victory. Macrinus forgot that the forces of Artabanus were merely a militia, as Parthia had no standing army, and he could only hold onto his men for so long because they were unaccustomed to sustained efforts. Having been in the field for some months now, the Parthians had grown weary and wished to return home. With a temporary armistice in place, Macrinus could rethink his plans.

The Parthians carried off their dead and the Romans carried theirs off the field as well. Once the battlefield had been cleared, it was just a matter of time before a renewal of combat was to ensue. Macrinus was not going to let that happen, but it would not have mattered anyway because his men had lost faith in their newly crowned emperor.

Macrinus offered friendship to Artabanus and explained that Caracalla was dead and that he, Macrinus, was the new emperor. To secure peace, Macrinus offered the Parthian king gifts and 200 million sesterces (approximately fifty million denarii). Artabanus thought it over carefully and agreed to peace, since the Romans had “suffered a suitable punishment.” Besides, Artabanus’ own army was terribly wounded. Afterward, Artabanus returned to Parthia while Macrinus hurried to Antioch.

Even though Macrinus had lost the battle, the entire affair was presented as if he’d won. The Roman Senate offered Macrinus the title of “Parthicus,” but he refused it, and rightfully so. But regardless of his feelings, coins were still minted bearing the legend Victoria Parthica. Even though Rome held him as the victor, the fact of the matter is, he shamefully lost, costing Rome much money, but more importantly, prestige.

Roman coin featuring Macrinus

Roman coin featuring Macrinus (CC BY-ND 2.0)

The Rise of the House of Sasan and Mighty King Ardashir

Parthia never would recover from this Pyrrhic victory over Rome in 217 CE. Due to losses in 116, 164, and 198/99 CE, Parthia had lost much prestige. While it is true that Parthia kept Rome in check, and did not allow themselves to be destroyed by the Romans like the Celts and Carthaginians, the Romans were still able to dictate politically and penetrate Parthian territory militarily. Parthia’s inability to fend off the Romans allowed others, like its own family and those who held a considerable amount of power within their own regions, make a bid for the throne. When there is regime uncertainty, expect political upheaval. Even though Artabanus V had defeated Rome, the war with his brother Vologases VI resumed.

Iran would never find stability while the Arsacids were in charge. It would take a person of non-Arsacid birth to stabilize and unite Iran, and his name was Ardashir I of Persia. But who was Ardashir?

Coin of Ardashir I. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc.

Coin of Ardashir I. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com/CC BY-SA 3.0)

Ardashir was born in Tirdeh, Persia, in 180 CE. He was the son of Badag (Papak or Papag) a Zoroastrian priest and Princess Rodak. However, Ardashir’s father may have been Sassan, a Zoroastrian priest who served in the temple of Anahita. Many historians regard this alternative, and suspect that Badag adopted Ardashir after the death of Sassan. According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir, Sassan is claimed to be a descendent of the Achaemenids, who were a former ruling house of Persia. Ardashir, from a purely political position, legitimized this claim in order to unite Persia. Before Ardashir became king of Persia, his father took him to a man named Tire, in the city of Darabgerd (modern Iran), to be educated when he was seven. Tire agreed and took him for a son of his own.

According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir son of Babag, Ardashir was proficient and accomplished in learning and riding at the age of fifteen. When Artabanus V received word of this accomplished man, he wrote a letter to Babag requesting him to send his son to Artabanus to his court “so that he will associate with our sons and princes, and we might order for him position and reward according to the learning which he possesses.”

Relief of the Coronation of Ardashir I at Naghsh-e-Rostam. Ardashir is receiving the Kingship's ring from Ahuramazda.

Relief of the Coronation of Ardashir I at Naghsh-e-Rostam. Ardashir is receiving the Kingship’s ring from Ahuramazda. (CC BY 2.5)

Babag could not refuse his Lord and immediately “sent Ardashir well-equipped with ten servants and a superb present of many marvelous, magnificent, and suitable things for the acceptance of Ardavan (Aratabanus V).” Every day Ardashir was immersed in the art of horsemanship and hunting alongside the sons and princes of Artabanus. After some time, Ardashir proved better than his competition. Not only did he surpass the Arsacid nobility in horsemanship and hunting, he was more “warlike than them all, on the polo and the riding (ground), at Chatrang (chess) and Vine-Ardashir, and in (several) other arts.” However, the nobility became jealous of Ardashir and decided to use their privilege to undermine him during a hunting trip.

One day Ardavan went a hunting with his chevaliers and Ardashir. An elk which happened to be running in the desert was (then) pursued by Ardashir and the eldest son of Ardavan. And Ardashir, on reaching close to the elk, struck him with an arrow in such a manner that the arrow pierced through the belly as far as its feathers, passed through the other side, and the animal died instantly.

When Ardavan and the chevaliers approached them, they expressed wonder at such a dart and asked: — “Who struck that arrow?” — Ardashir replied: “I did it.” The son of Ardavan said: — “No, because I did it.”

Ardashir became angry and spoke thus to the son of Ardavan: “It is not possible to appropriate the art and heroism (of another) through tyranny, unpleasantness, falsehood, and injustice.” This is an excellent forest, and the wild asses here are many. Let us try here a second time, and bring into display (our) goodness or evil nature and dexterity.”

When Artabanus heard this, he was offended and banned Ardashir from riding horses, and punished the young man by sending him to his stables, with the task to take care of those animals so “that you do not go in the day or night from before those horses and cattle a hunting, to the playground or the college of learning.” Ardashir, upset by this, wrote a letter to his father. Upon reading the letter, Babag responded to his son:

“You did not act wisely in disputing with great men on a matter from which no harm could have reached you, and in addressing them with coarse words in public. Now speak out excuses for your relief and feel humble repentance, for the sages have said: It is not possible for an enemy to do that for an enemy, which, is brought on himself by an ignorant man from his own actions. Do not be grieved narrow-mindedly from a person at the time when you cannot pass your life (happily) without him. And you yourself know that Ardavan is a king more powerful than I, you, or many people in this world with reference to (our) bodies, lives, riches, and estates. And now, too, such is my strictest advice to you that you should act in unison with and obediently (towards them), and not deliver up your own glory to annihilation.”

After Ardashir’s debacle with the Arsacid nobility, the man who raised him, Tire, died. When Tire passed, the king of Persis (the province of Persia or Fars), Guchehr, declared Ardashir king of Darabgerd. Soon after, Ardashir challenged Guchehr with the aid of his father, Babag, and overthrew the king by 200 CE. However, Ardashir was not granted the kingship of Persis, Babag gave this title and province to his eldest son, Shapur. Ardashir, unhappy playing second fiddle, declared war on his brother. Before the battle could take place, Shapur mysteriously perished. The cause of death was said to have been by a collapsing structure from an old Achaemenid fortress. Afterwards, Ardashir proclaimed himself king of Persis by 208 CE. His brothers protested this and Ardashir disposed of them. If his brother challenges were not enough, many local petty kings of Persis refused to acknowledge Ardashir rule. Ardashir responded by going to war in which he crushed them.

He thus solidified his position as the rightful king of Persis. However, Parthian leadership in Ctesiphon thought otherwise and sounded the alarm.

Top Image: Detail; Emperor Caracalla. (CC BY 2.5), and Cataphracts circa 101 AD. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Al-Tabari. he Conquest of Iran: History of al-Tabari, Volume 14. Edited and translated by G. Rex Smith. Albany, New York: University of New York, 1994.

Bowman, Alan K, Peter Garnsey and Averial Cameron. The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 12: The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Debevoise, Neilson Carel. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Dixon, Karen R., and Pat Southern. The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century AD. London: Batsford, 1992.

Erdkamp, Paul. A Companion to the Roman Army. Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2007.

Falk, Avner. A Psychoanalytic History of the Jews. Lewisburg, PA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996.

Farrokh, Kaveh and Angus McBride. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642 . Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Herodian. Herodian, History of the Roman Empire since the Death of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Edward C. Echols. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.

Plutarch. The Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives. London: Penguin Classics, 1984.

Sheldon, Rose Mary. Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand . London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010.

Sidnell, Phil. Warhorse: Cavalry in the Ancient World. London: Hambledon & London, 2007.

The Forgotten Roman General

General Publius Ventidius is probably one of the most overlooked, if not completely forgotten, generals in military history. Maybe it is because Ventidius grew up poor like most Romans… Or perhaps it was due to the reports that he sold mules and wagons before joining the Roman army.

Despite this, Ventidius would go on to have a distinguished military career, accompanying Julius Caesar during his campaign against Gaul and partaking in the Roman Civil War. Then in 45 BCE, Ventidius took up Caesar’s offer and accepted the post of plebeian tribune when the senate was reorganized and expanded.

Finally, on top of everything else, it may have been this forgotten general, with whom we concern ourselves today, that was responsible for reversing the Parthian tide, for changing the course of Roman History.

We will look at the series of battles now, in an effort to amend the marginal position in the history books that has been designated to poor Ventidus.

Mark Antony

It was in 39 BCE that Mark Antony assigned Ventidius Bassus the mission to retake Asia-Minor. Reports had reached Antony while he was in Greece that the Parthians were finished with their campaign in Asia-Minor for the year. These intelligence reports most likely came from the province of Asia, which was, at the time, loyal to Rome. From this news, Antony was able to draw up his plans.

He probably was aware that the majority of the Parthian army would retire for the winter and return home to their respected nobles. This would mean that those who remained were local militias, with questionable loyalty to garrison the cities throughout Asia-Minor. In addition, Antony understood the need to attack now to inhibit any further Parthian progress coming next spring.

Antony saw this as a perfect opportunity to surprise the enemy.

And so, once the coast was clear, Antony took a chance and placed a few legions under the command of our dear Ventidius, who subsequently set sail for the province of Asia. Vantidius’ mission was simple; establish a beachhead at the province of Asia and push inland.

Battle of the Cilician Gates

Ventidius’ landing was unexpected. This only goes to show the lack of intelligence gathering on the part of Labienus, head of the Roman-Parthian army. Once the Roman forces were accounted for, Ventidius quickly began to push eastward in a ‘search and destroy’ mission.

Word spread rapidly that the Romans had arrived. When the message reached Labienus, he was startled and terrified for he “was without his Parthians.” The only troops available to him were the neighborhood militia.

Labienus quickly fled the province of Asia and headed east, seeking military support from his co-ruler, Pacorus, a Parthian prince and son of king Orodes II.

Meanwhile, Mark Antony’s man, Ventidius, took a chance of his own and abandoned his heavy troops. He pursued Labienus with his lightest forces.

Warrior

Eventually, Ventidius caught up with Labienus and cornered him near the Taurus range. He chose the high ground, so he could look down upon Labienus’ encampment. But there was another, more important, reason why Ventidius took the high ground; he feared the Parthian archers.

It was a standoff as both generals encamped for several days, waiting for the arrival of their main forces. As the bulk of the armies finally arrived, the Romans and the Parthians hunkered down for the night.

Cataphract

At daybreak, the Parthians, over-confident with their numbers and past victories, decided to start the battle before joining forces with Labienus. Unfortunately these were not the famous and deadly Parthian horse archers… but the heavy cavalry, or cataphract. Once they were at the length of the slope, the Romans charged down on top of them and repelled the enemy with ease, for the Romans had the momentum.

While the Romans were able to kill and maim many of the cataphract, the cataphract were, in fact, doing a better job at killing and maiming themselves.

See, the cataphract were at the top of slope, where all the fighting took place, but when they retreated, they ran into their own men coming up the hill. Instead of descending in order to rally around Labienus, they bypassed their general and headed straight for Cilicia. It was absolute chaos.

Ventidius, seeing that the Parthians were scattering all about and fleeing, decided to bring his men down from the hill and march on Labienus’ camp.

Both armies were now face to face… But Ventidius decided to stay put.

Why would Ventidius do this? Well, he was informed from deserters that Labienus was going to flee the camp, come nightfall. Therefore, Ventidius decided that it was better to set up ambushes rather than have an all-out pitch battle, which would result in losing many men and resources during the process.

Once nightfall came, the ambushes set in place worked as planned, killing and capturing many… that is, except for Labienus. Labienus was able to escape by changing clothes… His destination was Cilicia.

However, Labienus was not able to hide for long. Demetrius, a former slave, then “freedman” turned bounty hunter, arrested him. After Demetrius turned Labienus over to the Roman authorities, he was quickly executed.

Battle of Amanus Pass

With Labienus dead, Ventidius was able to secure the province of Cilicia. This did not mean they won; in fact, the mission was far from finished. To complete it, Ventidius devised a plan to trick the Parthians.

Ventidius sent a cavalry, headed by the officer Pompaedius Silo, to scout out the Amanus Pass, a strategic mountain path connecting the province of Cilicia and Syria. Not far behind Silo would be Ventidius, along with a small contingent of troops to aid in the fight.

Horseman

Meanwhile on the Parthian side, Pacorus understood that if the same Amanus pass were not secured, the Romans would march through and invade Syria. Therefore, he felt, the best method was to station a garrison there to bottle up the small mountain road.

So Pacorus stationed Pharnapates, a Parthian lieutenant considered the most capable general of Orodes, to wait for the Romans to come. Once Silo reached the pass, the two sides engaged in battle immediately.

But don’t forget – this was, in fact, an elaborate trick. Silo’s real mission was to lure the Parthians away from their strongest defensive position. In doing so, Ventidius would either attack at the flank or from the rear.

Arrows

In a sense, the Romans were giving the Parthians a taste of their own medicine by using the same tactic that worked so well against them at the Battle of Carrhae. With many of Pharnapates’ cataphract lured away, Ventidius fell upon the Parthians unexpectedly. Pharnapates, along with many of his men, perished during the engagement.

With the Amanus Pass now clear, the invasion of Syria was imminent.

With the Amanus Pass secured, Ventidius, head of the Roman forces, pushed south into Syria. Pacorus, the Parthian prince and co-leader of the Roman-Parthian army, was done fighting… at least for now.

He abandoned the province to the Romans in late 39 BCE. With the Parthians out of the way, Ventidius led his forces to the province of Judea.

Ventidius’ mission in Judea was simple and lucrative; it was to rid the province of any remaining Parthians. He was also there to remove the anti-Roman King, Antigonus, and to restore Herod to the throne.

But Ventidius did neither.

King Herod

Instead, he bypassed Herod’s royal family, who were besieged by the troops of Antigonus on the top of Masada, and went straight for Jerusalem. Ventidius was playing psychological warfare with Antigonus, by making him think that he was going to take Jerusalem.

This, however, was just another ruse.

Ventidius promised not to attack Jerusalem… that is, unless he received vast amounts of wealth from the king. Antigonus had, in his mind, no choice but to capitulate to Ventidius’ demands.

Make no mistake, Ventidius was still going to support Herod and place him on the throne. But while Herod was still far away, and his brother besieged, Ventidius thought he might as well make some money while they wait.

After Ventidius’ coffers were filled, he took the bulk of his forces and headed back for Syria, leaving his second, officer Pompaedius Silo, in charge to deal with the ‘Jewish problem’.

The Ruse

However, King Antigonus would come up with a ploy of his own; he bribed Silo multiple times. Antigonus hoped to buy time so that the Parthians could come to his assistance, while he kept the Romans at bay.

Unfortunately for King Antigonus, this would not happen.

Pacorus

When Ventidius returned to Syria, he sent the bulk of his forces beyond the Taurus Mountains to Cappadocia for winter quarters. It was during this time that the Parthian Prince, Pacorus, planned another invasion of Syria and began to mobilize a substantial number of cavalry from the nearby provinces.

Word of Pacorus’ intentions soon spread, reaching the ears of loyal Roman informants, who then relayed the information to Ventidius. Not only was this information crucial for preparation, it also informed Ventidius that a Syrian noble by the name of Channaeus (also called Pharnaeus), who pretended to be a Roman ally, was, in fact, a spy and Parthian loyalist.

Ventidius likely invited Channaeus over for dinner and during their meeting, Ventidius made it clear that he feared the Parthian would abandon their normal route, “where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near the city of Zeugma.”

Ventidius acted concerned over the issue, making it clear that if Pacorus were to invade Syria much further to the south, he would have the advantage over the Romans for it, “was a plain and convenient for the enemy.”

Like the good spy he was, Channaeus returned to his home after the meeting and quickly sent messengers to inform Pacorus of Ventidius’ fears.

Come early spring 38 BCE, Pacorus, unwilling to let go of Syria, led his forces south along the Euphrates River based on Ventidius’ supposed fears of engaging the enemy on a plain.

Once they came to the point of crossing, Pacorus realized that they needed to construct a bridge, due to the banks being widely separated. It took many men and materials, and the bridge was completed only after forty days.

This is exactly what Ventidius wanted. Ventidius’ disinformation bought him much needed time, allowing his legions to assemble.

Once the Parthian forces were in Syrian territory, Pacorus likely expected an immediate attack during the bridge construction or during the crossing, but neither materialized. With no sign of the enemy, Pacorus became overconfident and began to believe that the Romans were weak and cowardly. Eventually however, Pacorus found Ventidius at the acropolis of the city of Gindarus, in the province of Cyrrhestica.

Ventidius had been at Gindarus for three days preparing his defenses when Pacorus showed up.

Repeated Mistakes

One would have thought that perhaps Pacorus carefully prepared a plan of action in such a situation…. but no. Instead, Pacorus and his officers tossed out the combined arms strategy of utilizing both heavy cavalry and horse archers in unison. This had worked many times, so they thought they could take the high ground with little trouble.

Battle

Moreover, the arrogant and overconfident Pacorus, and his nobles, did not want the commoners and horse archers to steal the show, as they did at Carrhae. So they decided to sally up the slope, as they did at the battle of the Cilician Gates.

Once the cataphracts were within five hundred paces of the Romans, Ventidius took advantage of their elitism and rushed his soldiers to the brim and over, until both armies met at close quarters on the slope.

Ventidius’ strategy here was simple, by engaging the elite Parthian cavalry, he had cover from the infamous Parthian horse archers.

You would think the Parthians would have learned from previous experiences what not to do. The result of their knee-jerk reaction was devastating. As the Parthian cataphract advanced up the slope, they were quickly repelled back… straight into those still coming up, inflicting great suffering to rider and mount.

This is not to mention those who did make it to the brim were met and repulsed by heavy infantry. And if the heavy infantry did not get them, the slingers would.

These slingers were likely on the left and right side of the Roman infantry, giving them a deadly arc of crossfire. This very well could be the reason as to why we do not hear of the Parthian horse archers partaking in the engagement, since any attempt to rush towards the front would put them in grave danger.

Battle

Even though the Parthian cataphracts put up a stiff fight at the foot of the hill, it was not enough.

The Roman infantry likely swarmed the cataphracts forcing them into hand-to-hand combat. With the famous Parthian horse archers neutralized from the fight due to the slingers, there was nothing that could be done to rescue the situation.

In the ensuing chaos, Pacorus likely tried to make one last push. He, along with some of his men, attempted to take Ventidius’ defenseless camp, only to be met by Roman reserves, in which he inevitably lost his life during the melee.

As news spread that Prince Pacorus lay dead, a scramble to recover his body was attempted. While those trying to retrieve his corpse met his same fate, the vast majority of Pacorus’ army quickly retreated. Some attempted to re-cross the bridge that was constructed over the Euphrates but were caught by the Romans and put to death. Meanwhile, others fled to King Antiochus of Commagene for safety.

Victorious Aftermath

This victory shocked Syria. To make sure the Syrians would never rebel against Rome, Ventidius took Pacorus’ corpse, severed the head and ordered that it be sent throughout all the different cities of Syria.

It was a gruesome sight to behold, but the effect it had on the natives was anything other than negative. Instead, “they felt unusual affection for Pacorus on account of his justice and mildness, an affection as great as they had felt for the best kings that had ever ruled them.”

As for the Parthians who sought refuge in Commagene, Ventidius came after them.

Truth be told, Ventidius could care less about the Parthian refugees. Instead, he was much more concerned with how much money he could confiscate from King Antiochus by besieging Samosata, the capital of Commagene, in the summer of 38 BCE.

Mark Antony

Antiochus offered Ventidius a thousand talents if he would just get up and go, but Ventidius refused the offer and proposed that Antiochus send his offer to Antony.

Once Antony got word of the situation, he quickly made his way to the scene of the action.

Ventidius was just about to make peace and take the lucrative offer when Antony barred him from making such a deal. Instead, Antony removed him from his command and took over the operations from there.

Why? Well, Antony was jealous of Ventidius and wanted in on the glory.

But instead of the desired fame, Antony inherited a protracted siege that went nowhere, and indeed hurt him in the end. When Antiochus offered peace again, Antony had little choice but to accept the now lowered offer of three hundred talents.

After the extortion of Commagene, Antony ventured into Syria to take care of some domestic issues before returning to Athens.

As for Ventidius, he went back to Rome where he received honors and a triumph, for “he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.”

The Next Generation

As Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome, Antony seethed in Athens.

Meanwhile, across the Euphrates in Parthia, King Orodes was in grief over the loss of his son and army. Orodes lost the will to speak and eat, and after several days, began to talk to Pacorus as if he was alive.

It was also during this time that the many wives of Orodes began to make bids as to why Orodes should choose their son for next in line to the throne. Each mother understood that there was this nasty habit in Parthia… once a new king was elected he would go out of his way to murder his brothers to secure the safety of his reign.

King Orodes

Orodes eventually made his choice and settled on his son Phraates to succeed him. Soon after Phraates was chosen heir to the throne, he began plotting against his father Orodes.

Phraates’ first attempt in murdering his father was with a poison called aconite. This failed due to Orodes suffering from a disease called dropsy (edema), which absorbed the poison and had little effect. Therefore, Phraates took a much easier route and strangled his father to death. To make sure his throne was safe, he murdered his thirty brothers and any of the nobility that detested him or questioned his motives for his acts of cruelty. Phraates was here to stay.

But while Phraates went on a vicious campaign to secure his throne, Mark Antony, jealous of the success that Ventidius had against Parthia, was prepping and planning an invasion of his own.

It was now Antony’s turn to avenge Crassus to fulfill Caesar’s dream.

By Cam Rea

Reference

Leviathan vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC-217 AD

Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Scorched Earth Victories – Part II

Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century

Feinting

Scythian tactics included feinting or withdrawing from either the battlefield or even the region. An example of feinting comes from a battle mentioned in Part I (Scythian Tactics and Strategy – Part I ), the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE.

The Roman historian Plutarch mentions that the Parthian horse archers would not engage the Roman forces during battle, but would retreat, luring the Roman forces to follow. The trap was set and the Romans thought victory was in hand. However, the fleeing horse archers turned and loosed arrows upon the pursuing Romans. The Romans in the pursuit soon realized they had made a terrible mistake, but it was too late. Nothing could be done but to make a defensive stand. Withdrawal allowed the feinting tactic to be used with proficiency due to Roman ignorance of their enemy. The Romans would try to advance, but with every attempt, the Parthian horse archers’ constant pelting with what seemed to be an endless supply of arrows would keep them in place.

Parthian horseman

Parthian horseman. ( Creative Commons )

Parthian camel units resupplied the horse archers by exchanging empty quivers for full ones, then and returning to their position. During this monotonous, never-ending event, the Romans would try to break the horse archer formations, only to be countered by heavy Parthian cavalry known as cataphract, which acted as the anvil to the Parthian hammer (arrows). The Battle of Carrhae was death by pieces for the Romans.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan's Column in Rome

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan’s Column in Rome ( Wikimedia Commons ).

Therefore, when it comes to the feinting tactic, do not watch for the visible hand, but rather the invisible one. The Parthians and Scythians were notoriously successful in the feinting technique before the battle of Carrhae. Afterward, the countering measure to this tactic went largely ignored until Alexander the Great demonstrated a reversal.

One could make the argument that the Romans had faulty intelligence before Carrhae, but this would be unfair, although true to a certain extent. The truth of the matter is that the Romans invaded a land they did not know, looking to conquer a people they did not understand. In the end, both Rome and Parthia would continue to bash each other as the years turned into centuries, but neither side truly dominated the other.

Defense in Depth

Defense in Depth is most successful if your nation is rather large and unproductive, as in the case of the Scythians, who valued land and the ability to roam, rather than the luxuries of the cities, like Athens or Nineveh. The Scythians did seem to have cities but mobile villages may be a more accurate description. As for the lazy luxuries of life, some settled, but the majority roamed about.

According to Herodotus: “We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to fight with you.” But Herodotus also stated: “Having neither cities nor forts, and carrying their dwellings with them wherever they go; accustomed, moreover, one and all of them, to shoot from horseback; and living not by husbandry but on their cattle, their wagons the only houses that they possess.” The Scythians did have slaves, according to Herodotus, who were blind and whose primary task was being a shepherd. Additionally, Herodotus also mentioned Scythians who grew corn and onions, which indicates that agriculture was common among some of the tribes. Therefore, the notion that the Scythians did not have cities or villages is partially untrue, depending on the Scythic tribe, of course.

The Scythians that Darius the Great attacked did not have cultivated lands or towns that could be beneficial to Darius’ forces. The Scythians conducted a scorched earth policy as Darius’s army marched further inland, following after them. The Scythians understood that an army marches on its belly and so do the animals accompanying them. What Darius could not use would be a weapon against his forces. The strategy would be defense in depth, scorched earth policy the tactic, and the outcome would be starvation. Starvation through burning was the preferred method used to rid of the Persians. The Scythians understood that they could defeat the enemy by allowing the land to swallow them both physically and mentally.

Darius was ignorant of the people he wished to conquer; he showed no knowledge of the people or terrain he was about to invade. Because of this attitude by Darius, his brother, Artabanus, warned that the proposed campaign to conquer the European Scythians was far too risky, and even if it was successful, the economic benefits were limited. Nevertheless, Darius had to learn the hard way. For the Scythians, it was a good way to prevent a possible second invasion.

As mentioned, the Scythians used the land to their advantage, knowing that Darius would follow as long as the bait was present. The Scythians burnt all that grew, causing Darius to follow his enemy across burnt terrain in hopes of finding food for both his men and animals. The Scythians conducted hit and run attacks during mealtime and even at night, preventing the men from eating or even sleeping, irritating them even more. The Scythians knew that as long as Darius followed in pursuit, he would gain nothing, not even an engagement. Psychological and physical attrition would set in by attacking the enemy’s stomach and his need for rest, causing irrationality among the troops and further deteriorating the chain of command.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy. Public Domain

In the end, the Scythians won a great victory by not engaging the enemy in conventional warfare, but beat the Persians through starvation and sleep deprivation, since an army can move only for so long before it needs to fuel up again in both rest and food. By denying both, the Scythians utilized a form of defense in depth that saved them from Persian conquest.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul'Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul’Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king. Public Domain

Featured image: Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century BC. Public Domain

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Farrokh,133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.