The Battle of Ankara – Part II

 

What happens when two great conquerors of the ancient world and their mighty forces go head to head? A successful but unpredictable Ottoman Sultan was matched against a charismatic Mongol leader of an empire – leading to the Battle of Ankara, fought on 20 July 1402.  The Ottomans were led by Bayezid I, who brought his troops against the Turkic Mongols (Timurids), led by Timur, also known as Tamerlane. Two great empires, two powerful leaders, with only one outcome…

Bust of Timur [left] (CC BY-SA 3.0), and a portrait of Bayezid I [right]. (Public Domain)

Troubles on the Eve of Battle

After Timur had rampaged throughout Russia and the Caucasus, he struck deeply into Anatolia by sacking and destroying the city of Sivas before pushing further south. One would think that Bayezid would have countered this loss for Sivas but he did nothing. Bayezid could have attempted to placate Timur, but given his nature, would he accept it? Bayezid could have taken his large army and counter-attacked Timur’s forces as they headed south. However, none of the above happened. Instead, Bayezid waited for Timur to enter his domain before reacting.

[Read Part I here]

In the summer of 1402, Timur moved his armies west to Sivas. This caused Bayezid to stir. Bayezid called off the siege against Constantinople and headed southeast to the fortress of Angora, in central Anatolia.

Timur is said to have prayed all night. When morning arrived, he ordered the drums to sound. The sound of the drums in the early morning would have had a psychological effect on the Ottomans nearby. No matter how battle hardened a soldier becomes, new unknowns bring about unease.

The army Timur had with him is said to have numbered between 140,000 and 200,000 troops. His army consisted primarily of cavalry but he had 32 war elephants at his disposal.

The troop size of Bayezid’s army consisted of 85,000 men. Bayezid’s forces were mostly infantry, including the elite Janissaries, with archers and cavalry (including Serbian knights). However, a quarter of his men were Tatars who were recently conquered, and thus their loyalty was in question.

Tatar soldiers at the vanguard of a battle (1620) (Public Domain)

Matters only got worse for Bayezid as discontent spread throughout the Ottoman ranks. For starters, they were tired after the long march and their pay was overdue. Compounding that, Bayezid’s scouts reported back to Bayezid that Timur had circled in behind the Ottomans and was now approaching from the rear. Yet more problems arose when Bayezid’s men needed access to water. Timur had built a reservoir and, on the day of the battle, diverted the principal water source for the area, Cubuk Creek, denying its use to the Ottoman army, which was now advancing from the east.

The Day of Battle

The terrain of the battlefield consisted of a large plain cornered by mountains on two sides. This is perfect for cavalry attacks. Moreover, it allows both armies to maneuver with fluidity.

The Prince Shah Rukh and Khalil Sultan led Timur’s left wing. Miran Shah led the right wing, with Amir Sheikh Nur ad-Din as his lieutenant general. The main body consisted of the greatest lords of Asia and Timur’s son, Prince Muhammad Sultan led them. Timur led the reserves that consisted of forty companies. In front of Timur’s army was the war elephants armed with towers on their backs with archers and throwers of flame.

Manuscript showing war elephants with archers and soldiers on their backs. The Battle of Avarayr, Sharaknots, 1482 (Public Domain)

Sultan Bayezid arranged his troops in battle order with Pesir, a European Serbian, leading the right wing. The left wing was under the command of Suleiman Chelebi, son of Bayezid. Bayezid led the main body. Muhammad Chelebi commanded the Ottoman reserves.

After Timur had met with his military counsel, he mounted his horse and gave the order to attack. Around 10 a.m. on the morning of 28 July 1402, Miran, commander of the right wing, began the battle by discharging a volley of arrows on the Ottoman left wing.

The Surprising Turns of Battle

It was during the initial stages of the battle that Bayezid made his first error. He placed his newly conquered Tatar cavalry on the front line to take the brunt of the initial attack. Once the battle commenced, they deserted to Timur, and cavalry from the recently subjugated emirates followed suit. This changing of sides reduced the Ottoman army by a quarter and, for all practical purposes, decided the battle.

Battle of Ankara. Mughal painting.

Battle of Ankara. Mughal painting. (Public Domain)

Bayezid ordered his left wing to attack, covering it by an attack of his Anatolian cavalry. However, it was all for nothing; even though the cavalry fought bravely, they encountered hailstorms of arrows as well as Greek fire (a form of naphtha) and were driven back in confusion, losing some 15,000 men.

Timur then pressed on the attack by pushing at the Ottoman left wing and defeating the cavalry. While the Ottoman cavalry were in disarray, the Serbian kings on the right wing fought heroically.

Timur’s attack was well executed— just as Bayezid’s defenses were well planned. The only difference is that Bayezid lost a substantial amount of his forces due to placing newly conquered men on the front line to take the brunt of the attack. This was a big mistake. The Tartar’s fleeing from the Ottomans to join Timur did not help the psyche of the Ottoman troops. Because of this, the morale of Timur’s troops greatly increased, and so did their numbers. According to what the primary sources suggest, Timur commenced the attack by sending in one wing before sending in the next wing, and in doing so he was able to perform a “pincer movement or double envelopment.”

While Timur’s left and right wings placed tremendous pressure on the Ottoman wings, this opened up the center. The Ottoman center would be at times required to provide aid to the wings in trouble. In doing so, the center deteriorated substantially. Seeing this, Timur committed the remainder of his forces to attacking the center. By placing pressure on the center, it took pressure off his left and right cavalry wings. Moreover, it allowed his central forces to split once they had pushed aside the Ottoman forces, allowing them to converge on the rear of the left and right wings. In doing so, not only did they perform a well-executed pincer movement in the initial stages, they were able to perform with perfection two more to neutralize the Ottoman wings to achieve total victory.

Map by SAİT71 (CC BY-SA 4.0) giving a glimpse into the positions and commanders at the Battle of Ankara (Battle of Angora). Timur performed a pincer movement, flanking the enemy and finally overwhelming them.

Seeing his Serbian cavalry fighting with great fervor yet beginning to succumb to the overwhelming numbers, he sent the remaining Janissaries to support them. The Ottoman forces eventually fled to a small hilltop and continued the fight. The battle raged well into the evening as they beat back several Mongol attacks until nightfall, with Bayezid in the thick of the fight. Late into the night, Bayezid looked to the remainder of his forces and together they attempted to break free, but he was overtaken, unhorsed, and captured.

Bayezid I held captive by Timur (Public Domain)

Aftermath

Once the dust cleared and most of the moans from men and beasts subsided, the Ottomans were seen to have lost between 40,000 and 50,000 troops while the Turko-Mongols had lost 40,000.  Besides the great cost of life and supplies lost on the field of battle, came more issues. The Ottoman defeat at Ankara pushed the Ottoman state into a crisis from which the Empire fractured and nearly collapsed when Bayezid’s sons fought for the throne. This Ottoman civil war lasted for 11 years (1402 – 1413). Furthermore, the capture of Bayezid was a first in Ottoman history.

So, what happened to Bayezid?

Some say he was captured and placed in a birdcage. This is false. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II, r. 1458-64), Asiae Europaeque elegantissima descriptio, written between 1450-1460 and published in Paris in 1509. According to Marcus Milwright and Evanthia Baboula, they state:

“This piece (Asiae Europaeque elegantissima description) brought together the key elements that were to remain fundamental to the European narrative for some two centuries: first, the sultan (often known in European writings as Bajazet) was placed in an iron cage; second, he was forced, like a dog, to eat scraps from under the table of Temur; and, third, Bayezid was employed as the ‘Scythian’ ruler’s mounting block when the latter got onto his horse.”

“Timur the Great’s imprisonment of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid”: The Sultan tied by his waist with a golden rope to Timur’s table, top, and the Sultan bound and on all fours, being used as a mounting-block by Timur, and similarly bound in his gilded cage, bottom. (Public Domain)

The truth of the matter is that Timur treated Bayezid with great respect according to Timur’s court historians. Timur is even said to have mourned the death of Bayezid that occurred on 8 March 1403; He was either 48 or 49.

As for Timur, news of his victory spread far throughout Europe. When the Genoese heard of the victory, they raised flags of Timur at Pera over the city. Interestingly enough, there were plans for a European fleet to help in the fight against the Ottomans. Furthermore, the battle and victory brought relief to the city of Constantinople. However, 51 years later the city would fall to the same besiegers.

Strange Bedfellows

Three days after Bayezid had been captured; Timur’s son Miran Shah sent many letters to the monarchs of Europe, offering trade and friendship.

A miniature of Miran Shah (Public Domain)

Surprisingly (and yet not so surprisingly), Charles VI of France and Henry IV of England responded with great joy to Timur. Another interesting aspect is that British playwright Christopher Marlowe wrote Tamburlaine in 1587, which portrays Timur humiliating Bayezid and burning the Quran. Timur was made into what a model king should be throughout Europe However, all this would end by the eighteenth century when the anti-Timur literature and works began to change his image.

Timur (Tamerlane, Tamburlaine). (Wellcome Image/CC BY 4.0)

As for the man himself, Timur would not live much longer. As he was leading his massive army to conquer Ming China, he grew ill and died on 19 February 1405 (aged 68) at Otrar, Farab, near Shymkent, Syr Darya (now in Kazakhstan). With Timur’s death, his empire did not last much longer as it fractured and finally collapsed by 1507. However, his future seed would carry on his legacy with the establishment of the Mughal Empire founded by Babur. The Timurid Empire did not last, and the Ottoman Empire nearly fell apart. However, once the Ottoman civil war was over, Bayezid’s conquests in Anatolia that had been lost to Timur were brought back under the Ottoman fold.

As for the campaign leading up to battle itself, it displayed how strong and unrelenting Timur’s forces were as he marched from one end of his empire to another to defend and go on the offensive to reclaim rebellious lands, or push far north into the lands of the Golden Horde. His ability to defend and expand his lands was tremendous. The battle itself pitted two great leaders but Timur was the smarter of the two. He was able to take advantage of the Ottoman forces by diverting a river and making good use of the defecting Tartar army that came to his side at the initial stages of the battle.

Overall, the Battle of Ankara in 1402 brought an empire to its knees, temporarily freed an ancient empire now reduced to the size of a city after many centuries of defeat, and Europe praised a man who in many ways was no different from the Ottoman Turks they faced. However, the Ottomans would recover and pick up right where they left off in conquering portions of southeast Europe, and the Timurid Empire would fade away only to reestablish themselves further to the east in India.

Top Image: Sultan Bayezid is defeated by Timur at Ankara (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 1

Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire

Dennis M. Rose, The Campaigns of Tamerlane

Hamad Subani, The Secret History of Iran

J.B. Bury; edited by H.M. Gwatkin, The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol IV

Marcus Milwright and Evanthia Baboula, Bayezid’s Cage: A Re-examination of a venerable academic controversy, [Online] Available at: https://www.academia.edu/10323469/Bayezids_Cage_A_Re-examination_of_a_venerable_academic_controversy

Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Alī Yazd, The History of Timur-Bec: Known by the Name of Tamerlain the Great, https://archive.org/details/TheHistoryOfTimurBec_201409

Spencer Tucker, Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict

Timothy E. Gregory, A History of Byzantium

The House of Arsacid Falls to the House of Sasan – Part 2

 

Ardashir proclaimed himself king of Persis by 208 CE. His brothers protested this and Ardashir disposed of them. If his brother challenges were not enough, many local petty kings of Persis refused to acknowledge Ardashir rule. Ardashir responded by going to war in which he crushed them. He thus solidified his position as the rightful king of Persis. However, Parthian leadership in Ctesiphon thought otherwise, and sounded the alarm. 

[Read Part I here]

The House of Sasan ruled the Sasanian Empire from 224 to 651. Ardashir I named the dynasty in honor of his grandfather, Sasan. The Sassanian Royal Symbol and the Mythology of Persia.

The House of Sasan ruled the Sasanian Empire from 224 to 651. Ardashir I named the dynasty in honor of his grandfather, Sasan. The Sassanian Royal Symbol and the Mythology of Persia. (Public Domain)

Ardashir Challenges the Parthians

Ardashir made his challenge known in 224 CE. While risky, he knew that the Parthian power base at Ctesiphon was impotent and the confederation that supported the Arsacid throne weak and tired of Arsacid rule. Ardashir understood that so long as the Arsacid’s stayed in power, the next Roman invasion of Iranian lands would go roughly unchecked. To avoid this from happening, there was a crucial need for a much stronger central government capable of fielding a tough, well-disciplined army with the ability to meet, engage, discharge, and have the ability to give chase and conquer former territory once under Achaemenid rule.

Ardashir I is receiving the Kingship's ring.

Ardashir I is receiving the Kingship’s ring. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Ardashir, uncertain, but ready for the challenge, soon gained support beyond the borders of Persis. Many supporters from the provinces of Media, Media Atropatene, Adiabene, and Kurdistan, came to join in the rebellion. But that would not be enough if he was to defeat King Artabanus V. To seal the deal, Ardashir needed the support of the Iranian highlanders in the northwest.

This is mentioned in the Arbela Chronicles which state: “And this was recognized by the Persians and the Medes and they closed a union with  Šahrat,  the  king  of  Hedajjab,  and  Domjtana,  the  king  from  Karek Selok and made a hefty  assault  on  the  Parthians  in  spring.” With many nations now backing Ardashir, particularly the western Iranians, which was extremely important (for the Parthian seat of power was right in the middle), Ardashir made his move to battle.

Artabanus V, like any king during a time of crises, assembled his forces and marched on the province of Persis to crush Ardashir.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV.

Coin of the Parthian king Artabanus IV. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. http://www.cngcoins.com /CC BY-SA 3.0)

The fate of the Iranian peoples was decided by three battles. The first battle was won by Ardashir but at a considerable cost for both sides. According to the Book of the Deeds of Ardashir son of Babag, Ardashir “came to battle with Ardavan (Artabanus) but Artabanus was not in command of the Parthian forces. Instead, Bahman, the son of Artabanus, led the forces and was killed along with his entire army. Afterwards, Ardashir “seized their wealth, property, horses; and portable lodges, and settled himself in Stakhar.” Some may view this battle as a draw.

The second battle also was a victory for Ardashir and proved pivotal, for the Parthians suffered a great loss of men. With Parthia wounded, Ardashir took advantage of the situation and pressed on. The final battle between the two powers took place at Hormizdeghan, near the modern city of Bandar Abbas, 28 April 224 CE.

Ardashir chose this area, which gave him access to the water supplies, crucial to quench the thirst of men and horses. As for Artabanus, his force took up a position near an inadequate water supply. In such a hot area and with a lack of water, both man and beast grew weary the longer they waited. This may have been Ardashir’s strategy. Taking advantage of the water supply physically weakened the Parthians, which in turn caused psychological distress.

When both armies formed battle lines, the forces of Ardashir were better equipped, as some of his horsemen were wearing the Roman-style, flexible chain armor. Artabanus fielded a much larger force. However, his forces were hastily assembled, ill equipped, and less prepared for battle, for even the king of the Parthians was wearing the old style lamellar armor considered cumbersome at the time. While details of the final battle are scant, Ardashir was victorious as “He killed Ardavan, whose entire wealth and property fell into the hands of Ardashir, who married Ardavan’s daughter, and went back to Pars.”

Details of this battle can be seen at Firuzabad, Iran. The rock carving shows Ardashir unhorsing and killing Artabanus V from his horse in a joust. This ended the House of Arsaces and established the House of Sasan.

Drawing of French orientalist painter and traveler Eugene Flandin (1840): Sasanian king Ardachir Babakan's rock relief (Firuzabad 1), Scene showing an equestrian victory over Parthian king Artabanus V, province of Fars, Iran.

Drawing of French orientalist painter and traveler Eugene Flandin (1840): Sasanian king Ardachir Babakan’s rock relief (Firuzabad 1), Scene showing an equestrian victory over Parthian king Artabanus V, province of Fars, Iran. (Public Domain)

Ghal'eh Dokhtar (or "The Maiden's Castle") in present-day Fars, Firuzabad, Iran, built by Ardashir in 209, before he was finally able to defeat the Parthian empire.

Ghal’eh Dokhtar (or “The Maiden’s Castle”) in present-day Fars, Firuzabad, Iran, built by Ardashir in 209, before he was finally able to defeat the Parthian empire. (Public Domain)

Ardashir’s Military Reform and Forces

After defeating the Parthians, Ardashir turned his attention towards driving Rome back into the sea and restoring the former glory of Persia when it was under Cyrus the Great. However, Ardashir needed a professional army, an army that was organized, and not only in structure, but also in capability.

Rome was not an easy army to fight, just look at the many battles fought between Rome and Parthia over time. They were equals to one another. However, one was better at going on the offensive while the other excelled at remaining defensive. Ardashir needed an army that could do both, for he could not afford just a defensive army.

Ardashir consolidated and centralized his forces directly under his command. He was absolute, and an absolute monarchy needed a subjective army that would forcefully submit to the nobility without contestation. In order to do this, the command must start at the very top, which was the king himself, Ardashir.

Bust of a Sasanian king, most likely Shapur II (309 to 379 CE) Representative image.

Bust of a Sasanian king, most likely Shapur II (309 to 379 CE) Representative image. (Public Domain)

The Chain of Command

Ardashir was not only King of Persia, but he was the Shahenshah, “King of kings.” Ardashir’s military chain of command started with the Vuzurg-Framander. The Vuzurg-Framander was in charge of state affairs when the Shahenshah was off on a military campaign. The person in charge of the military forces was the Eran-Spahbad. Under the Eran-Spahbad was the Spahbad who was a general and could be a military governor of a province. The Spahbad received help from his assistants, known as the “Padgospan.” The Padgospan, otherwise known as “Padan” were lower officers assisting the Spahbad. Under the Padan was the Framandar, which were the battlefield commanders. This list provides a somewhat clear detail as to the day-to-day duties of the military chain of command whether in peace or in war. However, other titles are mentioned, but many remain unclear as to their job description or role in war.

Artistic rendering of a Sasanian spahbed.

Artistic rendering of a Sasanian spahbed. (Public Domain)

Now that we have a glimpse into the command structure of the Sassanid military, one can see that it was highly organized due to its centralized role. Nevertheless, good command structure needs a good army to function, in order to go on the offensive or stay on the defensive when needed.

The Sassanid military was heavy and built for shock for its sole purpose was to dominate the battlefield and beyond. The Sassanid military force was a mirror image of the Parthian military. In other words, cavalry ruled the day throughout the empire. Cavalry was tradition in these parts and the Sassanids continued in that tradition, but with better organization.

The Sassanids primarily relied on two types of cavalry in combat; the heavy cavalry consisted of cataphracts, the clibanarii, and the lighter horse archer cavalry. In addition to the cavalry, the Sassanids also relied upon infantry and elephants as well as having an effective siege train. However, cavalry was the cornerstone of the Sassanid army.

Historical re-enactment of a Sassanid-era cataphract, complete with a full set of scale armor for the horse.

Historical re-enactment of a Sassanid-era cataphract, complete with a full set of scale armor for the horse. (GFDL)

As mentioned before, the cataphracts and the clibanarii were the cornerstone of the Sassanid army, the reason is that they were heavy. What made them heavy was the use of scale or plate armor. Both horse and rider were covered in an elaborate array of armor. This gave the horse and its rider full protection and provided the Sassanid forces with a shock element that could ride down, fleeing enemy forces or piercing through enemy formations thus breaking enemy cohesion into pieces and exposing them.

Horse archers also were pivotal in regards to mounted combat; they provided the heavy cavalry windows of opportunity. Horse archer’s main role was to not only fix an enemy unit or army but to lead them out in open pasture for annihilation by the heavy cavalry once exposed. Nevertheless, horse archers could also be considered psychological warfare, for once the arrows began to rain down the end never seemed to come and when doubt set in, either the enemy fled or its officers made irrational decisions that ultimately exposed the men, which led to certain death.

Cataphracts fighting Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD.

Cataphracts fighting Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD. (Public Domain)

An example of both heavy and light cavalry elements combined comes from the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE. This battle highlights the effective use of both heavy and light cavalries that the Sassanids were accustomed.

Elephants were also deployed upon the field of battle. The elephants the Sassanids used were from India. Every elephant was mounted with howdahs, which carried the armed men including the driver.

Elephant in Battle, Kota, Rajasthan, India circa 1750-70.

Elephant in Battle, Kota, Rajasthan, India circa 1750-70. (Public Domain)

A medieval Armenian miniature representing the Sasanian War elephants in the Battle of Vartanantz.

A medieval Armenian miniature representing the Sasanian War elephants in the Battle of Vartanantz. (Public Domain)

Another aspect that sometimes is easily forgotten, or overlooked, is the fact that elephants scare horses due to their smell. Horses that were not accustom to the beasts’ smell, became upset and restless with fear, causing panic among the ranks. This also prompted fear among the Roman ranks who had never encountered such an intimidating and powerful beast. In many ways, the Sassanid use of the elephant was a psychological shock weapon for both men and animals on the opposing side.

Infantry was the weak link to the Sassanid military structure and organization throughout their long history. The reason was due to the Sassanids being grounded in a cavalry based culture that was very much pastoral as well as agricultural. However, it is the pastoral way of life that controlled the Sassanid Empire and the way it fought. Nevertheless, we are not at a complete loss concerning the role of infantry in the Sassanid military apparatus.

The infantry, for the most part, was not what one would think as a traditional infantryman; frankly, they resembled nothing of an infantryman. The historian Procopius, describes the Sassanid infantry as being, “nothing more than a crowd of pitiful peasants who come into battle for no other purpose than to dig through walls and despoil the slain and in general to serve the other soldiers.” As for weapons, it seems that many had none at all, for Procopius states that the only thing between them and the enemy was, “enormous shields.” However, the Sassanid military did have an infantry unit that was effective and heavy, but not great in numbers. They were known as the Dailamites.

A Sasanian army helmet. “There were several different types of army helmet worn by Sassanian soldiers. This rare helmet likely resembled the tall headdresses (kulah) depicted on Sassanian portrait seals and dates to the 6th century AD.”

A Sasanian army helmet. “There were several different types of army helmet worn by Sassanian soldiers. This rare helmet likely resembled the tall headdresses (kulah) depicted on Sassanian portrait seals and dates to the 6th century AD.”  (Public Domain)

The Dailamites (or Daylamites) were a different breed of infantry warrior men. The Dailamites came from Northern Persia and were spoken highly about among the Romans. They were known for sword and dagger skills, but also carried a battle-axe, a two-pronged spear, and to top it all off, they also carried a rather large decorative shield. In addition, they were hardy and able to fight with the best of them—whomever or whatever was thrown their way. However, the only problem was they lacked numbers, as it seems that only four thousand were employed as the king’s elite guard.

A Daylamite mounted soldier.

A Daylamite mounted soldier. (Public Domain)

Foot archers were another highly prized infantry force among the Sassanid military. An officer known as a “Tribad” led foot archers. Foot archers could add to the already heavy volume of arrows being delivered by the horse archers. It was raining death on a massive scale, as the quantity of arrows would increase and come closer as the foot archers moved forward, showering the enemy with arrows. This tactic did not always work, but it seems to have been effective overall, offsetting the enemy formation on both the offensive and defensive. Nevertheless, foot archers are used for siege operations, as they were placed in the tops of towers to shower arrows down on the enemy protecting the walls and to protect the towers from any would-be saboteur.

Ardashir I was known as the Adashir the Unifier. It was his intelligence, energy, and talent for organization and strategy that enabled him to overthrow an empire and create another, forming a dynasty that would last four hundred years.

The Sasanian Empire at its greatest extent c. 632 CE (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Top Image: Deriv; Sassanid-era Cataphract Renactor (GFDL), and The Battle of Hormozdgan, April 28, 224 CE. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Al-Tabari. he Conquest of Iran: History of al-Tabari, Volume 14. Edited and translated by G. Rex Smith. Albany, New York: University of New York, 1994.

Bowman, Alan K, Peter Garnsey and Averial Cameron. The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 12: The Crisis of Empire, AD 193-337. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Debevoise, Neilson Carel. A Political History of Parthia. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Dixon, Karen R., and Pat Southern. The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century AD. London: Batsford, 1992.

Erdkamp, Paul. A Companion to the Roman Army. Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2007.

Falk, Avner. A Psychoanalytic History of the Jews. Lewisburg, PA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996.

Farrokh, Kaveh and Angus McBride. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642 . Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Herodian. Herodian, History of the Roman Empire since the Death of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Edward C. Echols. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

Mayor, Adrienne. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. London: Duckworth, 2005.

Plutarch. The Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives. London: Penguin Classics, 1984.

Sheldon, Rose Mary. Rome’s Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand . London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010.

Sidnell, Phil. Warhorse: Cavalry in the Ancient World. London: Hambledon & London, 2007.

The Battle of Jaxartes (329 BCE)

 

 

In what is said to be Alexander the Great’s most spectacular battle, the Macedonian king tested their most daring tactics against the fierce Central-Asian mounted Scythian nomads on the banks of the Jaxartes River.

Before charging into the battle, a little geography would not hurt. The Jaxartes River, what is known today as the Syr Darya, originates in the Tian Shan Mountains in Kyrgyzstan and eastern Uzbekistan. The river flows for 2,212 kilometers (1,374 miles) west and northwest through Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan to the remains of the Aral Sea.

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan.

Sunset over Sir-Darya river, Kazakhstan. In Ancient Greek river is called Yaxartes (Ἰαξάρτης). (Petar Milošević /CC BY-SA 3.0)

Map of the Syr Darya Basin watershed, of the Syr Darya and Chu Rivers in Central Asia.

Map of the Syr Darya Basin watershed, of the Syr Darya and Chu Rivers in Central Asia. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The battle of Jaxartes was a result of an earlier rebellion between the Scythians and the Macedonians.

A man named Spitamenes instigated the cause that would lead up to the battle. Spitamenes was famous for his capture of Bessus, in which he put him in chains and left him for Alexander, resulting in Spitamenes becoming the invisible tribal leader among the Sogdiana, an ancient civilization of Iranian people.

The Punishment of Bessus, by Andre Castaigne

The Punishment of Bessus, by Andre Castaigne (Public Domain)

Alexander had targeted Cyropolis in 329 BC in his conquest of Sogdiana.

Beginning with Cyropolis

Spitamenes, now Sogdian warlord, skillfully planned a rebellion of which not even Alexander had a clue. Spitamenes attacked Alexander’s rear, disabling the fortification system on the frontier starting with Cyropolis.

Silk road figure head, thought to be Sogdian.

Silk road figure head, thought to be Sogdian. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Sogdians, depicted on a Chinese Sogdian sarcophagus of the Northern Qi era.

Sogdians, depicted on a Chinese Sogdian sarcophagus of the Northern Qi era. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Spitamenes’ men caught them by surprise, storming the fort and taking no mercy. Spitamenes also garrisoned these fortresses with his own men afterwards. Once word reached Alexander, it must have been a total shock to him, as he was busy building the new city of Alexandria Eschate.

Sogdiana and Alexandria Eschate, in the north of the map.

Sogdiana and Alexandria Eschate, in the north of the map. (Public Domain)

Alexander quickly assembled his men for battle and sent them to the nearest fortress called Gaza. From Gaza, Alexander and his forces captured four fortresses in two days, killing the inhabitants inside. Next, Alexander turned his forces to Cyropolis.

Out of all the forts, Cyropolis was the hardest to take.

Alexander’s plans to march further east were now on hold due to the rebellion. Alexander could not leave with tension existing in his empire. So, Alexander went on a policy of terror as he did at Thebes, but this did not seem to faze the Sogdians, and in doing so, prompted the mighty nomadic confederation of Massagetae to assemble with many horse archers on the right side of Jaxartes River, waiting to invade if the Macedonians failed in stamping out the revolt.

The rebellion became so serious that news came to Alexander that Spitamenes had besieged Maracanda. Alexander quickly sent forces to lift the siege under the command of Pharnuches, who was a diplomat and not a soldier. Once Pharnuches made it to the outskirts of the city, he engaged the enemy and was teased by the Scythians to follow them into the desert.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC. (Public Domain)

Once in the middle of nowhere, Spitamenes and his Sogdiana Scythian nomads enveloped them from all sides. Pharnuches ordered his forces to form a square formation, leaving the center empty during the battle. The Macedonian forces fought well during the battle, but needed to withdraw quickly, and once they spotted the river Polytimetus to cross for safety, they made a mad dash for it. This very act of breaking rank and battle formation is a mistake when fighting the Scythians, for once the Macedonian forces exposed themselves by breaking rank, the heavier Scythian cavalry mowed them down and totally annihilated them.

This would prove to be the worst disaster that any of Alexander forces would ever face in battle. Alexander knew he would have to react quickly in order to put down the rebellion by defeating those responsible with a show of force.

The Men of War

When it came to the size and composition of both military forces, the estimations are relatively unknown. As far as technology, there is no exact information regarding what was used at the battle, but due to the circumstances of the time and what we do know regarding the Macedonian army Alexander led, we have only to look at the main army Alexander brought with him.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon. (Public Domain)

What history books tell us is that Alexander had a mix of Macedonian infantry and cavalry along with Thessalian and Thracian cavalry. In addition, Alexander required the Greek states to provide additional cavalry and infantry alongside his main forces when he invaded Asia. However, we should consider that by the time Alexander’s forces had made it up to this point in history, those men that accompanied him from Macedonia into Persia, and right before the battle of Jaxartes, were not the vast majority, but rather a mix of forces and foreigners in his ranks. Thus, to get an idea of what units partook in the battle is unknown, but assumptions can be made.

The Scythians on the other hand, were pure cavalry, carrying the bow and arrow. They may have had some heavy cavalry among their ranks, but it is doubtful. Rather, we can gather that the Scythians were mainly light cavalry archers since there are no descriptions of heavy cavalry mentioned.

As for military doctrine and training, Alexander the Great learned warfare, tactics, and strategy from his father Philip. Before Alexander became king, he had already experienced battles beforehand as the commander of Philips left wing, such as at the battle of Chaeronea. Alexander was a practitioner of his father’s style of organized warfare, which was called the hammer and anvil tactic. The Macedonian phalanx served as the anvil while the cavalry served as the hammer.

Alexander the Great liked to charge head on with his men but always kept a close eye on the situation. His leadership skills were numerous due to the many detailed battles provided in historical chronicles. Alexander was a leader who led his men into battle, charging in head-first at every chance he got. He led by example and bore the scars to prove it. He desired not to sit in the back of his army and shot out orders like a manager. He was a natural leader, with a natural gift. Not many leaders in the annals of war have ever had such a gift as had by Alexander.

As for the Scythian leader Satraces, there is nothing known about him other than by name for being at the battle. Leadership is crucial under such circumstances, but in this case, there is virtually nothing known about Satraces leadership ability. As for skills, he was a true Scythian tactician, wherein swarming and deception was the game. One only knows this due to the battle description provided.

From the info gathered before the battle, Alexander had no choice but to cross the Jaxartes River and engage the Scythians. If he did not, the situation could have gotten out of hand and the number of Scythians may have started to grow. Alexander only had one choice and that was to attack them and win. If he lost, it might have cost him his empire or at least part of it. These Scythians were most likely paid by Spitamenes to harass and engage Alexander. Alexander had no choice but to deal with the enemy.

Feasts and Fights

The opening moves before the battle were actually feasting. Once Alexander founded a new city-fort named after him, he held an elaborate feast with a sacrifice to the gods and even held a gymnastic contest. Alexander was having a merry ole’ time.

But while feasting and having a luxurious time with his men, Scythians on the far side of the bank of the River Jaxartes began to shout insults at Alexander and his men. Alexander knew that if he ignored this and allowed it to continue, the numbers of these men might swell and become too big to handle. Alexander stopped the party and began planning.

Alexander was in no mood for combat, but rather relaxation and celebration. He was still recovering from a leg wound he received from an earlier battle, and the bone splinters were making their way out of Alexander’s leg. Alexander had no choice but to send in his advance cavalry. However, in order to do this, he needed to establish a beachhead first to protect his forces that would be crossing.

The Hammer and Anvil

He moved his artillery to the bank of the river and began to shower the Scythians with projectiles—one of the projectiles said to have killed the Scythian chief Satraces or their champion warrior, nevertheless, it remains unknown, but the outcome seems to have not rattled the Scythians knees.

The artillery Alexander placed on the bank of river worked well for its intended use, which was to push the Scythians back, allowing the Macedonian forces to cross the river safely. Once the river was safe to cross, Alexander sent in a portion of cavalry first. However, some think that the use of cavalry was a military blunder that turned in his favor.

Battle between the Scythians and their enemies.

Battle between the Scythians and their enemies. (Public Domain)

Stephen Tanner, who wrote the popular book, “Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban Insurgency” argues that the Macedonian element (cavalry) advanced to quickly and was surrounded by the Scythians. However, it seems Alexander may have done this intentionally. The tactician knew better than to just send in an attack force for the slaughter. He knew he had to bait the Scythians, for if he did not, the Scythians would play a cat and mouse game of reverse attrition. In other words, the Scythians would lose few while the bigger forces would lose many!

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander crossing river. Battle movement images by Stephen Smith.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander crossing river. Battle movement images by Stephen Smith. (Creative Commons)

As the advance Macedonian cavalry came closer into contact with the Scythians, the Scythians broke themselves up into units and quickly moved into position surrounding the enemy from afar. Each unit began to form a circle and rode around like they were in a race, chasing each other’s tails. This was like how a hurricane is perceived; it is a deadly circle that rotates about, spewing forth projectiles. The high winds represent the bow and whatever the winds spit out are the arrows.

With the advanced Macedonian cavalry now surrounded by many Scythian cavalry circles showering them down with arrows, Alexander began to advance with the rest of his force. Alexander knew that by sending in a small cavalry force as bait, the Scythians would quickly go after it. What the Scythians did not expect was what was coming next.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander luring Scythians to battle.

Battle of the Jaxartes, Alexander luring Scythians to battle. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Alexander then gave the orders for his light infantry to advance towards the Scythian cavalry in front of Alexander. Now, as the light infantry advanced towards the Scythians, Alexander than gave the order for a second part of his cavalry to block any flanking attempt by the Scythian horse archers. Once the pieces were in place, half of the Scythian cavalry found themselves surrounded. Alexander then gave the order to his heavy cavalry to charge at the surrounded Scythian horse archers. The heavy cavalry shot through the gaps between his light infantry and anti-flanking cavalry and plunged right into the Scythian ranks, thus allowing the advance cavalry unit that was sent in as bait to now focus on the Scythians that found themselves surrounded. This allowed Alexander’s anti-flanking cavalry to ward off the remaining Scythian cavalry, thus allowing the light infantry men to advance in quickly in order to dislodge any enemy combatants on horseback. Overall, it was a brilliant maneuver on Alexander behalf.

The Battle of Jaxartes – Alexander traps the nomadic Scythian cavalry.

The Battle of Jaxartes – Alexander traps the nomadic Scythian cavalry. (Creative Commons)

The outcome of the battle was a Macedonian victory through Alexander’s brilliance. As for deaths, the Macedonians only killed a small number, roughly around 1,000 with another 150 captured. The main part of the Scythian cavalry force escaped capture. It was a small battle that produced a new tactic for consideration when facing the Scythians.

The Economy of Force

Assessing the significance of the actions and the lessons learned from the battle of Jaxartes is one-sided. The Scythians deceived themselves with over confidence. They figured that this foreign element was no different than what they had encountered before, thus making themselves one-dimensional. As for Alexander, he quickly looked at the situation, understood what he was facing, and quickly executed his objective with precision.

In order for Alexander to accomplish this, he had confidence in his men and captains, and his men, in turn, showed faith in him and his battle plan. In other words, when it came to the economy of force, every Macedonian was responsible for the other. Because of this, Alexander placed his men in areas that they would be effective against the enemy and allowed his captains and men to build on their effectiveness.

Alexander won many battles before Jaxartes using the hammer and anvil tactic made so famous by the Macedonians. However, the traditional Macedonian way of war came to a standstill when confronting the Scythians and this demonstrated not only their strength but also their weakness. Nevertheless, the strength and simplicity of these tactics are obvious; adapt to your enemy’s method and incorporate some of your own—innovate!

Alexander knew that if he were stay with the same old tactical method it would kill him in the end. Alexander also felt that he and his men were in an ‘unholy land’ and had to fight in ‘unholy ways’ in order to achieve victory.

As for the Scythians, their form of guerrilla-like warfare has gone unnoticed for thousands of years, but every so often hordes (camps) from the east have pushed successfully west. Nevertheless, the methods of these steppe peoples are very unorthodox, innovative, and asymmetrical. They fight without touching you and deceive you without notice. However, the Scythians could have given Alexander a bigger hassle, but they did not. And in turn, Alexander knew that it was best to beat them and leave them alone. Alexander the Great did not want or need the weight of Central Asia pouring down on him like lava from a volcano; it was not worth it. The Scythians would have loved if Alexander had marched into the open fields of Central Asia—but Alexander knew better.

Featured image: Another of Alexander’s important battles – The battle of Issos between Alexander the Great and Darius of Persia. Representative image only (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Arthur Preston, Richard. Roland, Alex. Wise S. F. Men in Arms: A history of warfare and its interrelationships with Western society. Orlando: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1991.

Edwards, Sean J.A. Swarming On The Battlefield: Past, Present, And Future. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000.

Ferrill, Arther. The Origins of war: From the Stone age to Alexander the Great. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.

Fuller, John Frederick Charles. The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004.

Heckel, Waldemar. Who’s who in the age of Alexander the Great: prosopography of Alexander’s empire. Maiden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.

Sekunda, Nick, and John Warry. Alexander the Great: His Armies and Campaigns 334-323 BC. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1998.

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Taliban Insurgency. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2009.

Ward, Steven R. Immortal: a military history of Iran and its armed forces. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

The Iron Army: Assyria – Deadly and Effective Siege Machine – Part II

 

 

While the ram attempted to smash and loosen the rocky walls, Assyrian assault teams with scaling ladders would try to breach walls. The ram, while effective, was also vulnerable to enemy defenders dropping chains to pull the battering pole aside. Because of this issue, the Assyrians deployed men who counter this by hooking the chains with iron grapples. The prophet Joel gives a description of the Assyrian wall scaling:

“They rush upon the city;
they run along the wall.
They climb into the houses;
like thieves they enter through the windows.”

[Read Part I]

Joel’s description is quite accurate. Besides reliance on battering rams to bring down the walls, they also looked to sappers.

Undermining Fortifications

Assyrian sappers (soldiers for building, demolitions, general construction) would approach the walls possibly under the cover of shield bears, the same type that protected the archers one could suspect. If they had no such protection, the Assyrian king made sure his specialized troop had the armor needed to get the job done. The sapper, particularly during the rule of Ashurnasirpal (883-859 BCE), were heavily armored and wore long padded mailed coverings along with a conical helmet with mail protecting the face and neck.  Once at the walls, they would aid in helping the battering rams dislodge blocks from the wall with special flat-topped crowbars, pick axes, hoes, and drills. If the sappers could not get near the walls, they tunneled under them and prop it up with wooden supports until the hole was rather large and deep, after which they would set fire to the structure causing the foundation to weaken and collapse.

While the battering ram was effective, the Assyrians had a backup plan usually underway during the siege to aid the army if the rams failed to dislodge the walls, and that was siege towers. As these siege towers are pushed forward, archers would accompany them with the duty to pick off any enemy foe threatening to toss an incendiary weapon at the tower. Furthermore, the Assyrians placed hoses on the tower from which water poured over the leather sheets covering the wooden structure to prevent the tower from catching fire. If the water hoses failed and fire did catch, a man holding a large ladle with would extinguish the flames the best he could.

Siege Tower on the Lachish, Relief in the British Museum.

Siege Tower on the Lachish, Relief in the British Museum. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

If the battering rams breached the walls, the Assyrian infantry behind the rams would pour through the hole under the cover of their archers and slingers. The Assyrian infantry were heavy spearmen armed with long, double-bladed spears, straight swords for close combat and they carried a small shield. The armor worn by the infantryman was a conical helmet, a knee-length coat of iron mail which was lined with wool to absorb the blows from weapons and allowed heat to dissipate. To protect his legs, he wore knee-high leather boots that had iron plates attached to the shins.

Heavy-armed archers in action. Assyrian, about 700-692 BC. From Nineveh, South-West Palace. These archers, the front one of whom is beardless, possibly an enuch, are each accompanied by a soldier whose duty it is to hold the tall shield in position and guard against any enemies who come too close.

Heavy-armed archers in action. Assyrian, about 700-692 BC. From Nineveh, South-West Palace. These archers, the front one of whom is beardless, possibly an enuch, are each accompanied by a soldier whose duty it is to hold the tall shield in position and guard against any enemies who come too close. (Mike Peel www.mikepeel.net/CC BY-SA 4.0)

Plunder and Refugees

Inside the city, the Assyrian infantry would slash and plunder their way through. Once the slaughter and pillaging were over, those still alive (as at Samaria, which was sacked in 721 BCE), would feed the deported refugees during the journey back into Assyria, while also being treated by physicians to keep hygiene up and disease out. Furthermore, the Assyrians provided footwear if needed, along with carts for the longer journeys for women and children. Families were not separated for the most part. The Assyrians wanted to keep the families and communities together, as well as their national identity. Assyria was not a melting pot of nations. The Assyrians wanted to preserve the identity of the deportees for social and military strength and to lessen the possible acts of rebellion.

Judean people being deported into exile after the capture of Lachish. his relief depicts a man, 2 women, and 2 (male and female) children being deported with their household belongings.

Judean people being deported into exile after the capture of Lachish. his relief depicts a man, 2 women, and 2 (male and female) children being deported with their household belongings. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

After the people had been gathered and exported, the Assyrians, like a swarm of army ants, took the captured fortified cities, or even a villages, and would destroy and take everything. Trees that were in or around the city or village were usually cut down and the timber taken back as spoils of war. Trees such as date palms were stripped naked and then cut down, leaving only the stump behind so they could not grow again. Other trees would be uprooted and replanted back in Assyria. Farmlands also did not escape Assyrian plunder, for they too were likely stripped bare leaving the farmland as it was before planting. When Tiglath-pileser conquered most of Syria and Lebanon, he took many of the trees for his palace and as tribute:

With the keen understanding and grasp of intellect with which the Master of the gods, the prince Nudimmut (Ea) endowed me, a palace of cedar… and a portico (bit hilanni) patterned after a Hittite (Syrian) palace, for my enjoyment, I built in Kalal (Kahi).”

A palace of cedar “Their (the palaces) doorways, of ivory, maple box-wood, mulberry, cedar… juniper, tribute of the Hittitte kings of the princes of the Aramaeans and of Chaldea, which I brought in submission to my feet through my valorous heroism. I made and I richly adorned them with tall cedar beams, whose fragrance is as good as that of the cypress tree, products of Amanus, Lebanon, and Ammanana (Anti – Lebanon) … The doorleaves of cedar and cypress, which give unbounded joy to the one entering them (and) whose odor penetrates to the heart, I bound with a sheathing of shining zahalu and (sariru) and hung (them) in the door-(ways).

People’s valuables were taken as well, apart from the things the captives needed in their day-to-day life. Even the temples’ valuables such as gold or silver were stripped. Idols in these temples were transported back to Assyria and paraded as weak gods of the conquered host; they could not compete with the gods that favored Assyria.

Once the refugees made it into the Assyrian homeland, they were sent to deportee camps before being sent to the region assigned to them. This was almost like a debriefing center. To give an example, one could look to Sargon II and the place of Dur-Sharrukin:

Peoples of the four quarters, of strange tongues and different speech, dwelling in mountains and plains…. I took as spoil at the word of Ashur my lord. I made of them one purpose, I made them take up abode therein [i.e., inside Dur-Sharrukin]. I sent natives of Assyria, competent in everything, as overseers and supervisors, to instruct them in custom and to serve the gods and the king.

After the Assyrians settled the captives in their assigned regions, the Assyrian monarch would make them feel welcome and comfortable. This was to keep any attempt of rebellion down. As the Assyrian monarch took the role as spokesman for the gods, it was his duty to accept all nations and to keep the peace within the Assyrian empire. Bustenay Oded writes well when referring to the role of the deported once they had been settled:

“..the exiled communities played a role very similar to that of the Assyrian garrisons stationed in all parts of the Assyrian empire, or to that of Assyrian citizens who were settled in conquered countries either as city dwellers, farmers, or officials. This explains the favorable treatment the deportees generally enjoyed, and the great concern shown by the Assyrian rulers for their welfare.”

After a long siege, the city of Lachish surrendered and the Assyrian army entered the city. King Sennacherib sits on his royal chair, surrounded by attendants and greets a high-ranking official. The king reviews Judean prisoners.

After a long siege, the city of Lachish surrendered and the Assyrian army entered the city. King Sennacherib sits on his royal chair, surrounded by attendants and greets a high-ranking official. The king reviews Judean prisoners. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

In conclusion, the Assyrians were indeed the first iron army but more important than that, was the fact that they were in many ways the first professionalized fighting force that integrated and effectively used command and control along with the combined arms (conventional and specialized) apparatus to their advantage long before anyone else. While this new professional army had its way with its neighbors, they too would succumb to those seeking to make a name in the wild near east. However, unlike those who would come after, only a few could match the Assyrian fighting force in name and merit when it came to war machine known as Assyria.

Top Image: Assyrian relief of a horseman from Nimrud, now in the British Museum (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Campbell, Duncan B. Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.

David, Richard, Barnett and Margarete Falkner. The sculptures of Aššur-nasir-apli II, 883-859 B.C., Tiglath-pileser III, 745-727 B.C. [and] Esarhaddon, 681-669 B.C., from the central and south-west palaces at Nimrud. (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1962.

Eadie, John W., “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1/2 (1967), 161-173.

Fagan, Garrett G., and Matthew Trundle. New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Gabriel, Richard A. Great Captains of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Soldiers’ Lives through History – The Ancient World. Westport, Conn:    Greenwood Press, 2006.

Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. London: Osprey, 1991.

Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient Siege Warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Nosov, K., and V. Golubev. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2005.

Oded, Bustenay. Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979.

Rawlinson, George, Ancient Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World Vol I, (New York: Lovell, Coryell & CO, 1881.

Roberts, Janet “Centering the World”: Trees as Tribute in the Ancient Near East.” Transoxiana Journal Libre de Estudios Orientales.http://www.transoxiana.com.ar/11/roberts-near_east_trees.html (accessed August 11, 2016, 2011).

Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Vuksic, V. & Z. Grbasic, Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, (London: Cassell, 1993

The Iron Army: Assyria – Terrifying Military of the Ancient World – Part I

 

 

Before the famed Persian Empire, whose borders spanned from India to Thrace, there was another empire—the Assyrians. The Assyrian Empire, while much smaller than the future Persian Empire to come, made up for its lack of territorial mass with a well-greased, organized fighting machine.

In the book of Nahum 3:1, the prophet Nahum made it clear that Assyria was a “city of blood, full of lies, full of plunder, never without victims! The crack of whips, the clatter of wheels, galloping horses and jolting chariots! Charging cavalry, flashing swords and glittering spears!”

What made the Assyrian Empire one of the most terrifying militaries in the ancient world was that they were organized, well led, well fed, well supplied, and had the tools to crack into just about any city they so desired. When it comes to warfare, sieges dominate the vast array of Assyrian reliefs. The siege we will focus on is that of Lachish in 701 BCE.

In order to understand how the Neo-Assyrian military organization functioned one must first focus on the head of the army, the king. From there, we can gather the role of the nobility in military affairs and finally those who formed the bulk of the army.

King: Despotic Commander in Chief

Sargon II and dignitary. Palace of Sargon II at Dur Sharrukin in Assyria (now Khorsabad in Iraq), c. 716–713 BC. (Public Domain)

The Assyrian king wasn’t just directly involved with state affairs on all levels; he was the state. Every aspect of state affairs, whether international, political, military, and religious, was directly linked to him. The king was absolute, but even he had limitations. The Assyrian king, unlike the pharaoh of Egypt, was not divine but despotic. He was a mediator between the gods and his subjects through his ritual purification by both divine and human attendants. Besides the day-to-day domestic and foreign affairs dealt with by the king, he was commander and chief of the Assyrian army. Middle Assyrian inscriptions attest to this, as the Assyrian king on his coronation would swear an oath that they would lead their armies, in person, on annual campaigns of conquest to extend their borders. Even though he was the head of his army, he was a figurehead to a certain degree, for his military duties were diffused and delegated to lesser officials.

Turtānu: Leader of Armies

This lesser official, who would lead armies, was the turtanu. The turtanu was second in military command right under the king. While the king was in fact the commander in chief of the army, the real responsibility executing his majesty’s orders lay in the hands of the turtanu. Assyrian kings did participate in campaigns but when unable, the turtanu was firmly in charge. Eventually either Tiglath-Pileser III or Sargon II reorganized the office of the turtanu. In the past, one man held the position. However, this changed. Instead of having one man take charge of the military forces there was be two. One man was in charge “of the left” and the other “of the right.” While not definitive in all cases, the post of the turtanu were assigned to eunuchs. The reason for this was to limit power by ensuring that the man in charge could not pass his office down to his son through inheritance, which in turn limited the power of the office and avoided the possibility of a coup.

Army Organization and Officers

Information on the military organization of the Assyrian army is fragmented and murky. But a word of caution before proceeding: what is about to be presented is based on what is known and what can be considered from what information survives.

The Assyrians do provide some history concerning the framework of their military apparatus. During the eighth century BCE the Assyrian king could mobilize a force of between 150,000-200,000 men and in extreme cases, 1,000,000. This seems a bit farfetched but was not impossible. In times of war, the Assyrians could field between 20,000-50,000 troops, which would be the equivalent of two or five modern American divisions. Each division consisted of 120 officers. Therefore, two divisions would consist of 240 officers while five divisions consisted roughly of 416 officers. When further broken down, a squad of ten men was under the control of a noncommissioned officer. Five or twenty squads were formed into a “company” (kirsu) under the command of a “captain” (rab kisri or rab hanle). The amount of men in an Assyrian company probably was made up of five squads totaling 250 men and would take at least four of them to form a battalion. A regiment possibly consisted of and three battalions totaling 3,000 men, which seems possible based on the Urartian system, similar to that of Assyria, and it was under the command of a prefect, or what would be today the equivalent of a modern colonel. As for the size of an Assyrian division, it would seem possible that one division consisted of three if not more regiments.

By the time of Sargon, they had become a truly iron army. Sargon reorganized and integrated the fighting force, starting with the conventional units such as infantry, chariots, cavalry, and siege machinery. Next were specialized units to aid support to the conventional, such as scouts, engineers, intelligence officers, and sappers (soldiers for building, demolitions, general construction). To support and supply such an army with the amount of iron needed, Sargon constructed a single weapons room called Dur-Sharrukin (Fort Sargon) which contained 200 tons of weapons and body armor.

Plan of Dur-Sharrukin, 1867.  Victor Place excavated Khorsabad (Iraq) from 1852 to 1855. The Palace of Sargon is represented at North East. (Public Domain)

Reconstructed model of Palace of Sargon at Khorsabad, 1905. (Public Domain)

Soldiers and Engines of War

The Assyrian military consisted of four main units: cavalry, charioteers, infantry, and archers.

When it came to mobility, the Assyrians relied on charioteers like most Near Eastern nations. However, during the reign of Ashurbanipal II in the ninth century BCE, reliefs depict the Assyrians as already having cavalry but in small numbers; they were light by standard and their only function was to ward off other horse archer units during an engagement. What the Assyrians did to combat this was to take regular foot archers and place them on horseback. The Assyrians now had their own version of a horse archer, but the problem was they wore little or no armor. This made the Assyrian horse archer vulnerable to attacks from other horse archers better armored and trained in the rudiments of archery from horseback.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle.

Ashurbanipal II meets a high official after a successful battle. (Public Domain)

Tiglath-pileser III took note of what is already in use pertaining to his own force and admired what could be adopted and improved upon into his own cavalry units. Tiglath-pileser invested in developing better cavalry units whereas their enemies later on (such as the Cimmerians and Scythians) continued to evolve into much better fighting forces that adapted to the natural conditions and to the conduct of their enemies— in other words, to improvise, adapt, overcome.

After conquering a portion of western Media, Tiglath-pileser incorporated Median cavalry into his own army and from then on, effectively changed the nature of the Assyrian cavalry from charioteer teams to mounted warriors armed with bow and spear. The days of the chariot as master of the battlefield were nearing an end but were not yet over. Over time, the Assyrian army had three types of cavalry. The first type was light cavalry, which consisted of Medes and other nomads who were quick and who primarily used the bow and javelin. Next were the Assyrian heavy archers. This unit consisted of men in heavy scale body armor. Finally, the heavy cavalrymen were fully armored and designed for fighting heavy infantry. However, the Assyrian use of heavy cavalry for shock is uncertain. Cavalry under Tiglath-pileser III on through to Sargon II seem to be primarily skirmishers. There is, however, cavalry depicted during the time of Sargon II on reliefs which are shown to be carrying spears and charging into battle, which may suggest the evolution of the Assyrian shock cavalry was well underway. Tiglath-pileser III and his successors loved the new cavalry so much that they replaced most of the chariot units with elite cavalry units over time. To put this into perspective, the king, his nobles, and the warrior elite were the only ones permitted to use the chariot.

Assyrian artwork from ninth century BC at British Museum. (CC BY 2.0)

Assyrian infantry can be divided into three types: spearmen, archers, and slingers. Spearmen were well armored and are the foundation of the Assyrian army. Their primary function was to provide defense and offense. When on the defensive it was the spearmen’s job to support the skirmishing and cavalry units, to maneuver around them and find targets that could be softened up, which would take pressure off the lines and allow the infantry to go on the offensive. These Spearmen were armed with a shield, spear, and a dagger or short sword.

Assyrian Soldier with Standing Shield, Soldier with Small Shield, Archer. (Public Domain)

Archers were also well armored and used a recurve bow. In some reliefs, Assyrian archers are accompanied by a shield bearer who provided protection as the archer discharged his arrow. Archers in battle were usually placed in front of the heavy infantry ranks to shower arrows down upon the enemy before retreating behind the spearmen once the enemy was too close for comfort. Assyrian archers in the reliefs also appear to be wearing short swords as well.

Another skirmishing unit utilized to harass the enemy was slingers. Slingers, as their name applies, slung well-rounded rocks at the enemy. While the distance was not as great as an archer, the power generated upon release caused tremendous damage as it was meant to crush, unlike the arrow, which was used to pierce. Slingers, like archers, would be out in front of the spearmen harassing the enemy infantry or, engaging the enemy skirmishing detachments.

Sling Stones, Tel Lachish, 701 BCE. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

However, Assyrian horse archers and those carrying javelins could and did act as skirmishing detachments who could, with the right covering fire from the archers, could quickly ride up on the enemy lines, whether infantry or skirmishers, and discharge their projectiles before riding off.

The Siege of Lachish will be our Example

Once they set up camp outside their intended target, the Assyrian military force, when arrayed, occupied roughly an area of 2,500 yards across and 100 yards deep. The supplies for such a force would have been massive. The number of calories and amount of water a single Assyrian soldier would need to function comes to 3,402 calories a day and nine quarts of water. This does not include the amount of food needed to feed the pack animals haul the equipment. Once the Assyrian army was finally in place before the walls of an enemy city, the consuming and waste began and the need to finish the job quickly set in.

Assyrian War Camp Relief.

Assyrian War Camp Relief. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

So how did the Assyrians deploy for a siege? An Assyrian siege begins with a messenger. According to 2 Kings 18:17-37 they would send a messenger to deliver the ultimatum, which was ‘surrender or die’. However, it seems most cities chose to fight than give in to the attacker.

Once the Assyrian army had isolated the city, they would begin to construct siege works on the spot. At the siege of Lachish in 701 BCE, Sennacherib’s siege crew deployed prefabricated battering rams, which required assembly on the spot. While the construction of siege engines was underway, the Assyrian infantry would begin to build earthen ramps leading to the weakest point in the city walls. The men building the ramps were likely under the protection of Assyrian archers and slingers.

Assyrian archers during a siege would push forward, wearing a long coat of mail and carrying a man-sized reed shield with a bent back to protect him from enemy fire. The Archer would carry an Assyrian composite bow, which required two to string. These heavy bowmen could easily get into position and pelt the enemy on the walls, thus negating interference with the men below who were constructing the siege ramps.

The same goes for the Assyrian slingers, who also were good at harassing the enemy with projectiles as the ramp drew closer to the city walls as they could hit high-angled targets who hid behind the parapets.

Assyrian attack on a town with archers and a wheeled battering ram, 865–860 BC. (Public Domain)

Chariots were deployed as light mobile artillery that could aid in hitting targets on the walls. In one sense, they were a great addition to keeping the defenders from firing back too often, for each volley the archers and slingers could fire, the charioteer archers could deliver another volley and quickly get out of harm’s way.

After the earthen ramps were finished, teams of infantry, aided with the protection of archers to cover their approach, began to push the heavy siege machines forward into position. One such siege engine that was very effective against enemy fortification was the Assyrian battering ram. During the siege of Lachish, King Sennacherib (704-681 BCE) deployed several battering rams simultaneously towards the weakest points of the walls. One of the big differences when comparing these rams with those of the past is that Sennacherib had the battering pole extended. This allowed a greater degree of reach and leverage. When looking at the reliefs depicting the siege of Lachish, one will notice archers atop the device as it moves forward. There are two likely reasons for this. First, as the battering ram is moved forward, enemy along the wall could possibly throw an incendiary device, which could cause the ram to catch fire. Placing archers atop the vehicle allows them to pick off those wishing to set the ram a blaze. The second reason is to protect the infantry moving behind the ram.

Assyrian troops attacking a besieged city using a battering ram on a siege ramp. Enemy archers are returning fire. Headless corpses lie at the foot of the city walls. (Public Domain)

While the ram attempted to smash and loosen the rocky walls, Assyrian assault teams with scaling ladders would try to breach walls. The ram, while effective, was also vulnerable to enemy defenders dropping chains to pull the battering pole aside. Because of this issue, the Assyrians deployed men who counter this by hooking the chains with iron grapples. The prophet Joel gives a description of the Assyrian wall scaling:

 They charge like warriors;

    they scale walls like soldiers.

They all march in line,

    not swerving from their course.

They do not jostle each other;

    each marches straight ahead.

They plunge through defenses

    without breaking ranks.

They rush upon the city;

    they run along the wall.

They climb into the houses;

    like thieves they enter through the windows. – Joel 2:7-9.

Top Image: Assyrian relief of horsemen with spears. Bodies fly in their wake. From Nimrud, now in the British Museum (CC BY-SA 3.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Archer, Christon I. World History of Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Campbell, Duncan B. Besieged: Siege Warfare in the Ancient World. Oxford: Osprey, 2006.

Carey, Brian Todd, Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Warfare in the Ancient World. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2005.

David, Richard, Barnett and Margarete Falkner. The sculptures of Aššur-nasir-apli II, 883-859 B.C., Tiglath-pileser III, 745-727 B.C. [and] Esarhaddon, 681-669 B.C., from the central and south-west palaces at Nimrud. (London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1962.

Eadie, John W., “The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry” The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1/2 (1967), 161-173.

Fagan, Garrett G., and Matthew Trundle. New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Gabriel, Richard A. Great Captains of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Military History of Ancient Israel. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003.

Soldiers’ Lives through History – The Ancient World. Westport, Conn:    Greenwood Press, 2006.

Healy, Mark, and Angus McBride. The Ancient Assyrians. London: Osprey, 1991.

Kern, Paul Bentley. Ancient Siege Warfare. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Nosov, K., and V. Golubev. Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons: A Fully Illustrated Guide to Siege Weapons and Tactics. Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2005.

Oded, Bustenay. Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1979.

Rawlinson, George, Ancient Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World Vol I, (New York: Lovell, Coryell & CO, 1881.

Roberts, Janet “Centering the World”: Trees as Tribute in the Ancient Near East.” Transoxiana Journal Libre de Estudios Orientales.http://www.transoxiana.com.ar/11/roberts-near_east_trees.html (accessed August 11, 2016, 2011).

Saggs, H. W. F. The Might That Was Assyria. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.

Vuksic, V. & Z. Grbasic, Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, (London: Cassell, 1993

Roman-Parthian Wars: Battle of Carrhae (53 BCE)

The Roman army was considered to be an unstoppable juggernaut in the ancient world, but the tables were turned by a formidable Parthian Empire general and devastating tactics. This clash led to one of the most crushing defeats in Roman history.

Leading the Romans was Marcus Licinius Crassus, who was a member of the First Triumvirate and the wealthiest man in Rome. He, like many before him, had been enticed by the prospect of riches and military glory and so decided to invade Parthia.

Leading the Parthians was Surena. Very little is known of his background. What is known is that was a Parthian general from the House of Suren. The House of Suren was located in Sistan. Sistan, or Sakastan, “land of the Sakas,” located in what is today southeast Iran.

In 56 BC, Julius Caesar invited Marcus Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus to Luca in Cisalpine Gaul (Luca is the modern day city of Lucca in Italy). Caesar requested that they meet to repair their strained relationship, which had been established around 60 BC and was kept secret from the Senate for some time. During this event, a crowd of 100 or more senators showed up to petition for their sovereign patronage. The men cast lots and chose which areas to govern. Caesar got what he wanted, Gaul; Pompey obtained Spain; and Crassus received Syria. All of this became official when Pompey and Crassus were elected as consuls in 55 BC.

Bust of Marcus Licinius Crassus

Bust of Marcus Licinius Crassus. (Public Domain)

Crassus was delighted that his lot fell on Syria. His grand strategy and desire was to make the campaigns of Lucullus against Tigranes and Pompey’s against Mithridates appear mediocre. Crassus’ grand strategy and desire of conquest and confiscation went beyond Parthia, beyond Bactria and India, reaching the Outer Ocean—easier envisioned than orchestrated.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC. Roman Republic is shown in Purple. The Blue area represents the Seleucid Empire. The Parthian Empire is shown in Yellow.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC. Roman Republic is shown in Purple. The Blue area represents the Seleucid Empire. The Parthian Empire is shown in Yellow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Psychological Warfare: Masters of Disguise

Crassus, the Roman general, arrived in Syria with seven legions (roughly 35,000 heavy infantry) along with 4,000 lightly armed troops and 4,000 cavalry. Caesar had given Crassus an additional 1,000 Gallic cavalry under the command of Crassus’ son Publius. As Crassus pushed on, the enemy slowly came into sight. Crassus gave the order to halt, and to their eyes the enemy were “neither so numerous nor so splendidly armed as they had expected.” However, looks can be deceiving.

What Crassus and his army saw was the front rank of just 1,000 cavalry who were covered in skins and coats. Surena’s main force was hidden behind the front ranks. While the Romans watched in curiosity, Surena gave the order and a thundering sound proceeded forth from the Parthian cavalry. Many unseen drums covered in stretched animal hide and brass bells roared across the field, vibrating Roman armor as well as their hearts. The use of sound as a psychological weapon manipulated human behavior in both the Roman and Parthian armies. In other words, the home team was pumped up while the away team lost confidence quickly.

Parthian bronze statue, attributed to Surena, Parthian spahbed ("General" or "Commander").

Parthian bronze statue, attributed to Surena, Parthian spahbed (“General” or “Commander”).  (Public Domain)

Plutarch mentioned that, “before the Romans had recovered from their consternation at this din, the enemy suddenly dropped the coverings of their armor.” Once the drums were silent, the Roman army, discombobulated by the intense sound of the drums, besides being physically weak, was in for another surprise.

The Parthian heavy cavalry, otherwise known as the cataphract, was charged towards them, with Surena leading the way. As the cataphract thundered across the plain, their coverings dropped from their armor revealing “helmets and breastplates blazing like fire, their Margianian steel glittering keen and bright, their horses armored with plates of bronze and steel.”

The Parthian cataphract was the main and most important military force. These mailed cavalrymen were the aristocracy, who could afford the expensive armor. In return for their service, they demanded a greater degree of autonomy from the Parthian king at the local level, thus ensuring a king (sub-king) of their own to govern their territory.

The Romans, who never had seen well-armored cavalrymen, were in awe, but the veterans who served under Lucullus or Pompey had encountered this type of cavalry during the Mithridatic Wars. As the cataphract closed in, the legionaries locked shields to create a continuous wall. Surena quickly noticed that the Roman line was steady and firm and they were not going to budge. He quickly broke off the charge giving the impression that they lacked confidence in engaging the Romans in a full frontal assault. However, this was just a ruse.

Parthian Horse Archers: Sight, Speed, and Agility

What the Romans saw was Surena retreating, giving the false notion that the cataphract was unable to make a difference and therefore lacked confidence. Unseen were 10,000 Parthian horse archers, who quickly surrounded the Romans, firing on them from all sides. Crassus was stunned. He quickly assessed the situation, seeing that his forces were bogged down by unarmored petty horse archers, who were vulnerable to missile attack, and ordered his light infantry to engage them. As the light infantry left the safety of the hollow square formation to engage the enemy, they were quickly showered with arrows as the Parthian horse archers galloped away, forcing the light infantry to quickly pull back, crashing through the Roman lines seeking safety. The sight, speed, and agility of the Parthian horse archers spooked the Romans. But what really terrified them was the Parthians’ primary weapon, the composite bow.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Historian Dr. Kaveh Farrokh suggests that the average Parthian horse archer, with a quiver of 30 arrows, loosed between eight to ten arrows a minute at Carrhae. It would take two to three minutes to exhaust his arsenal before needing to be resupplied. The amount of Parthian horse archers at the battle is estimated at 10,000. If all 10,000 fired away for 20 minutes, the amount of arrows fired by an individual horse archer would have been between 160-200 arrows. This meant the amount of arrows fired upon the Roman soldiers are estimated to have been an astounding 1.6 million to two million arrows in a 20-minute timeframe.

The Romans soon realized that they could do nothing to alleviate the situation. If they stayed in their rank and file they would be wounded or killed. But if they made an attempt to counter the horse archers they would suffer the same fate. Any attempt to chase after them resulted in the horse archers retreating at a full gallop, while turning their bodies back to shoot at the pursuing enemy. This is where the term “Parthian Shot” comes from. The Parthians were literally shooting fish in a barrel.

Moreover, the Parthians were exploiting the Roman ways of warfare. For the Romans, to see the enemy retreat was a sign of defeat. Therefore, the Romans felt that they now had the advantage over their nemeses and pursued them. However, they soon realized the truth, and learned from this mistake that the enemy fought by an entirely different method. The Romans could do nothing as death from above rained down on them.

Crassus’ only hope was that as long as they stood still in their shielded square, the Parthians would soon run out of arrows. Once that happened, Crassus felt that the Parthians would have no choice but to engage the Romans at close quarters.

Roman Army reenactors in shielded formation, spears at the ready.

Roman Army reenactors in shielded formation, spears at the ready. (yeowatzup/CC BY 2.)

However, that was not the case. To the astonishment of the Romans, a Parthian camel train was standing by with fresh arrows. Surena proved adept at organization and logistics by using trains of camels to keep his horse archers constantly supplied, keeping continual pressure upon the Romans. This is contrary to Cassius Dio’s claim that the Parthians “do not lay in supplies of food or pay.” Cassius Dio may have felt that since the Parthians were not good at sieges, it must have been due to issues of supply.

A Call for Help

Crassus’ confidence was deteriorating quickly. He sent a message to his son Publius to join the battle by taking 1,300 cavalry, 500 archers, and eight cohorts from the infantry. Crassus’ hope was to draw some of the Parthians away from the square, as they were attempting to encircle the Romans. However, two reasons were given for the Parthians to attempt this. The first was to envelop the Romans completely, that in due time the legions would crowd closer as their numbers dwindled. However, Plutarch mentions that the Parthians had trouble enveloping the Roman rear due to marshy terrain, making it difficult for the horses to maneuver. The second reason Plutarch gave seems more plausible, and that was to leave a window open just big enough to make the Romans think that they had found an advantage. Deceiving the Romans into thinking that the Parthians could not surround them, Crassus’ son Publius took the bait and charged ahead. However, it was an old steppe trick. Thinking they were retreating, Publius shouted excitedly, “’They are on the run,’ and charged after them.” The faked retreat worked, Publius was on the move; and the Parthians, stationed farther ahead and well hidden, were awaiting his arrival.

Depiction of a battle scene of Trajan's Column: On the left, Parthian horsemen in armor, fleeing before Roman riders.

Depiction of a battle scene of Trajan’s Column: On the left, Parthian horsemen in armor, fleeing before Roman riders. (Public Domain)

Publius and the men were full of joy, thinking that they now had the advantage and victory was surely imminent. But moving farther away from the main body, they soon realized the pursuit was nothing more than a trick when the horse archers wheeled around and were joined by fresh troops. Publius ordered the men to halt where the Parthian cataphract was stationed in front of him. He hoped that they would engage in close combat. Instead, the horse archers in loose order rode around the Romans, kicking up so much sand that a mini-sandstorm fell on top of the Romans and it became nearly impossible to see the enemy.

By using nature as a weapon to disguise their movements, the horse archers were able to engage the Romans safely. Using nature as a force multiplier gave them the advantage of fighting uninhibitedly. Publius and his men could not see or breathe very well, inciting fear, which soon led to panic. The Romans in their disarray tripped, stumbled, and fell in each other’s way. The Parthian horse archers quickly took advantage and the shower of arrows began. Publius did what any commander in the field would do — reestablish order among the men. However, it was too late.

In the convulsion and agony of their pain they writhed as the arrows struck them; the men broke them off in their wounds and then lacerated and disfigured their own bodies by trying to tear out by main force the barbed arrow heads that had pierced through their veins and muscles.

Many of the men died a slow, agonizing death in this fashion. Publius needed to act quickly. The Romans could not engage the horse archers in close combat while the Parthian chain of command, the cataphract, remained nearby. If the Romans could make a break for the cataphract and engage them in close combat, they might have a chance to turn the tide of battle, especially if they could reach the Parthian commander, Surena, and kill him.

Tangling with the Dangerous Cataphract

Publius gave the order to attack the cataphract, but reality set in. The Roman infantrymen who heard Publius showed him that they were unable to go on any further, for their “hands pinioned to their shields, feet nailed through into the ground, so that they were incapable of either running away or defending themselves.”

Roman Army reenactors holding shields in a protective formation.

Roman Army reenactors holding shields in a protective formation. (yeowatzup/CC BY 2.0)

Publius was so in touch with the battle that he was out of touch with his men. He soon realized the carnage that had been inflicted upon his forces. Once Publius assessed the situation, he gathered what remained of his Gallic cavalry and charged toward the cataphract.

Publius’ Gallic cavalry was light, wore little armor, and carried small light spears. One would think Publius would have known better than to charge toward cavalrymen who were better armored than his. They would soon realize this as their light spears broke against the cataphract breastplates. The Gallic cavalry was no match for the armored cataphract, who thrusted their long pikes into the horses or riders. In order to overcome, or at least have a fighting chance, the Gallic cavalryman, if the opportunity presented itself, would grab the pike of the cataphract and hope to use his own weight against him by pulling him off his horse. Many of the cataphract were smart enough to know that being weighed down by their armor made movement cumbersome. Once unseated from his mount, it was best to be on foot or in this case, on his back or knees, as he could get underneath the Gallic cavalryman’s horse and thrust his sword into the animal’s belly. This would cause the horse to rear up, throwing the rider off, and trampling whoever was underneath or nearby before collapsing.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan's Column in Rome (Public Domain). One man has fallen from his horse, the greatest danger for a cataphract.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan’s Column in Rome (Public Domain). One man has fallen from his horse, the greatest danger for a cataphract.

Perhaps some cataphract died in this fashion. With so many Gallic cavalry now dead, the only option for the Romans was to retreat. What was left of the Gallic cavalry pulled back, taking a badly wounded Publius and what remained of the infantry to higher ground. This would also prove to be a mistake.

Publius and his men retreated to a nearby sandy hill. However, the sandy hill provided little protection. With the Roman infantry placed in the front, those behind the infantry stuck out like a sore thumb due to the elevation. The horse archers once again pelted the Romans relentlessly with arrows. The Romans could do little more than watch their troops fall.

As the situation quickly deteriorated, two Greeks from the nearby town of Carrhae, Hieronymus and Nicomachus, offered to help Publius escape to a neighboring town, Ichnae, friendly to Rome. Publius refused the offer since so many men were either dead or dying on his account. Like a Roman commander, he attempted to take his own life, but was unable since an arrow had pierced his hand. Thus, he ordered his shield bearer to run him through with his gladius.

The Parthians eventually made it up the hill after the horse archers had softened the Romans a bit more. Once on the hill, the Parthian cataphract charged through the Romans, breaking their bodies and spirits. The remaining Romans surrendered; about five hundred were taken prisoner. As for the body of Publius, the Parthians took the body and severed his head.

When Publius had gone charging off after the Parthian horse archers in an attempt to give the Roman army both breathing room and time to assess the situation, the Parthian attack on the main body slackened. The reason, of course, was that Publius was a high profile target with little protection. Surena understood that if he could get Publius as far away as possible from the main Roman body, he could fix, engage, and defeat the target, which would send shockwaves throughout the Roman army. The Parthian Commander was correct in his judgment.

The Fall of Crassus

As Crassus waited for his son Publius to return from the pursuit, he began to gain confidence that his son was doing all right. Crassus placed his men in regular order and moved them to sloping ground.

During Publius’ engagement, he attempted to send messages to Crassus. The first never made it through, as the messenger was killed, but other messages indicating that Publius needed his help immediately made it through to Crassus. Crassus’ hopes that his son was doing well all came crashing down when it was evident his son needed him. It was at this point that Crassus was unable to make a clear judgment on what to do; either assist his son or stay put. On top of that, he began to lose confidence and feared the worst possible outcome for his army. Crassus waged a tug of war in his head, and finally made the decision to move the Roman army in an attempt to help Publius; Crassus did not know that his son, Publius, was already dead.

Just as Crassus’ army moved forward, the Parthians swooped in again, beating their drums and shouting aloud, but with even greater ferocity than before. As the Roman army prepared for the second wave of attack, some of the Parthian cavalry approached the Roman line. One of the cataphract had a nasty surprise for Crassus; it was the head of Publius on the tip of a spear. But before the battle was to commence again, the cataphract had a message for Crassus saying, “it was impossible, they said, that such a brave and gallant soldier could be the son of such a miserable coward as Crassus.” If the Roman army had any confidence left in them, that very moment sucked the life’s blood out of them.

Crassus, who suffered the most from this tragedy, rode up and down the ranks, shouting, “this grief is a private thing of my own. But in you, who are safe and sound, abide the great fortune and the glory of Rome. And now, if you feel any pity for me, who have lost the best son that any father has ever had, show it in the fury with which you face the enemy.” Crassus’ encouraging speech to fight on and think of their ancestors who fought hard battles did little to lift up the men’s spirits, for Plutarch mentions that “while he was speaking these words of encouragement, Crassus could see how few there were who were listening to him with enthusiasm.” When Crassus wanted to hear the war cry of his men, it was a “weak, feeble, and unsteady shout.” The battle was lost.

After Crassus had finished preparing the men for the second wave of battle, the Parthians quickly got to work by surrounding the Romans and showering them with arrows. As the horse archers began to pelt the enemy to death, Surena decided to up the carnage by unleashing the cataphract. The strategy was simple. With Roman confidence withering away, the cataphract would have a much greater chance of driving the Roman infantry closer together and into each other’s way. The strategy paid off! With each charge, the cataphract was successful in penetrating the Roman lines and quickly breaking from engagement, which allowed the horse archers to concentrate their arrows on a compacted target.

The Romans lost men quickly during this second wave of attack as the arrows continually rained down and the cataphract kept crushing and driving back the troops. Crassus had no choice but to retreat; but to do so in the daylight was more risky, and the night could not come soon enough.

In the end, Crassus made his way down the hill to meet with Surena. The Romans were on foot and the Parthians were on horseback. Surena was so shocked that Crassus, the imperator of Rome was on foot that he quickly offered him a horse, but Crassus declined the offer, saying he was merely following the custom of his own country. Surena quickly went straight to the point and informed Crassus that peace existed between King Orodes and the Romans. In order to make this deal final, an agreement must be signed near the Euphrates River. Surena than spoke to Crassus and said, “We find that you Romans have not got very good memories about the terms of treaties.” Afterwards, Crassus called for a horse and suddenly Surena offered him a horse with a golden bridle as a present. The grooms lifted Crassus up onto the saddle and ran alongside the horse, whipping the horse to make the animal go faster. Octavius quickly charged after Crassus and got hold of the bridle. Petronius, along with the men, hurriedly surrounded the horse to slow the animal. It was during this struggle with the horse that a brawl broke out. It seems that the grooms of the horse did little to slow the beast down, so Octavius drew his sword and killed one of the grooms; this in turn caused himself to be killed. Petronius also was struck, but his breastplate saved him.

It was during this struggle that Crassus was killed by a Parthian named Pomaxathres.

The Death of Crassus

“The Death of Crassus” (Public Domain)

However, Cassius Dio expresses that Crassus did not die by the hands of a Parthian, rather a fellow Roman killed him to prevent him from being captured alive.  What is most important and overlooked is that Parthia had a body but no treaty.

Featured image: Deriv; Roman cavalryman (CC BY 3.0) and Cataphracts dueling with lances (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Click on the red book titles below.

Boak, Arthur. A History of Rome to 565 A.D. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan, 1955.

Brosius, Maria. The Persians: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2006.

Cary, Max and Howard Hayes Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. London: Macmillan, 1995.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Rea, Cam. Leviathan Vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC – 217 AD. Charlestone, SC: CreateSpace, 2014.

Plutarch. Moralia. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.