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Subutai: Dog of War – Sophisticated Military Strategist Behind Genghis Khan’s Conquering Empire – Part I

There have been many renowned and infamous conquerors and generals such as Sargon of Akkad, Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria, Cyrus the Great of Persia, Alexander the Great of Macedonia, Hannibal of Carthage, Julius Caesar of Rome, Attila the Hun, and Tamerlane, to name a few throughout history. Every one of them has rightfully earned a spot in the history books as a brilliant strategic tactical genius or an uncompromising, bloodthirsty sociopath. However, for some, names and actions have gone largely unnoticed through the annals of history. One such man of great influence but little renown went by the name of Subutai.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing.

Drawing of a mobile Mongol soldier with bow and arrow wearing deel, traditional clothing. (Public Domain)

The Powerful Mongol Army

The Mongols were a steppe people who lived mostly to the north of China. They were a conglomeration of various clans and tribes that were not united but rather a loose confederation. Nevertheless, a Mongol by the name of Temujin united the various tribes into a single nation. Temujin would take this nation and turn it into a powerful empire. His name would also change to the name many of us know today— Genghis Khan. This name/title was given to Temujin when he united the Mongols in 1206.

Statue of Genghis Khan

Statue of Genghis Khan (CC BY 2.0)

The Mongols were a cavalry-based system comprised of heavy and light elements. Mongol forces were assembled into arbans, jagun, minghans, and finally tuman. Arbans consisted of seven to 10 troops, jagun consisted of 100 troops while the minghan consisted on 1,000 troops.

10 units of 1,000 troops made one tuman. A tuman was 10,000 troops the second to largest unit in the Mongol army. The largest was three tuman, which would equal 30,000 troops and thus formed an army.

Shock and Awe

Mongol tactics were pure and simple; play a game of cat and mouse and finally when the time is right, switch roles with the enemy.

Mongol warrior on horseback, preparing a mounted archery shot.

Mongol warrior on horseback, preparing a mounted archery shot. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Mongols were masters of deception and ambushing. As for Mongol arms, their primary weapon was the bow. The Mongol bow was larger than normal for a composite bow, but had a pull weight of up to 165 pounds and a range of 350 yards (320 meters). In addition, they also carried a large number of arrows of various types to accompany their bow. The mixture of arrows was due to the types of combat they might encounter, whether close or far range, or for single combat, and psychological combat. Either way, the Mongol arrow system was indeed unique among others.

As for body armor, light Mongol cavalrymen wore padded armor in thick leather, but nothing heavy, while heavy cavalrymen wore leather with metal plates attached, including a metal helmet. His horse was also covered in strong armor. The cavalrymen also carried either a long, 12-foot (3.6 meter) lance, battle-axe, or curved or straight sword.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow.

Mongol cavalry archery from using the Mongol bow. (Public Domain)

The Mongol mix of light and heavy cavalry employing various weapon systems produced a shock-and-awe combination. Missile cavalry provided the shock, while heavy cavalry provided the awe. Overall, the Mongols were all about blitzing; enveloping and swarming the enemy—but only when the enemy showed itself vulnerable.

Subutai, from Humble Beginnings

Subutai, or Subotai “Bagatur” (the Valiant), may have been born sometime around 1176/77 AD. We only know this for it is said that he left home at the age of 14 to join Genghis Khan’s army in 1190 AD. Others suggest that maybe he was born either in 1172 or 1175 AD.

Subutai was the son of a blacksmith who lived in the forest around the western edge of Lake Baikai. He came from a tribe that was not considered Mongol, known as the Uriangkhai tribe. The Uriangkhai were a people who preferred to live in the forest within their mud or wood huts. They were not horsemen and their trade was fur, and they specialized in blacksmithing. Nevertheless, they offered their services to the Mongols, season permitting, to fix anything broken such as weapons, pots, or pans. Subutai most likely encountered the Mongols in his early years while helping his father to fix whatever needed repair. Because of this encounter, Subutai grew to understand them and their way of life by the season-to-season interaction with them.

In 1190 AD, Subutai left home to join the Mongol armies under Genghis Khan. He was just fourteen years old, but he had youth and energy, and the stories he’d heard from his brother Jelme, who rode with Khan, excited the boy. He was very young for a person looking for combat, but his older brother Jelme vouched for him to Genghis and Genghis agreed—but his job was door attendant to the Khan. In other words, Subutai made sure the felt flap kept cool steppe air out and the Khan’s warm words in. But it was also here at the door that Subutai began to learn the Mongol art of war.

Genghis Khan seated in the center in tent and his attendants, sons, and generals surrounding.

Genghis Khan seated in the center in tent and his attendants, sons, and generals surrounding. (Public Domain)

Subutai, as far as we know, knew nothing of horsemanship. In the eyes of the Mongols, he was a mere amateur. Now, besides his duty of guarding the Khan’s doorway, he was duty-bound to a Mongol officer who was in charge of him. Subutai had to learn how to ride a horse. It was felt that any man could ride a horse, but to ride a horse into combat with command precision was a far different mastery, especially when learning to use the bow. Subutai went on to learn how to master the horse and bow. His skills grew, including absorbing strategy and tactics he learned at the Khan’s doorway, and after some years went by, Subotai went from doorkeeper to Khan’s inner circle, discussing the military issues he once overheard.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition.

The recreated interior of an ancient Mongolian ger (also known as a yurt), from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Desperate and Blind Merkits (1197)

Subutai’s first battle came in the year 1197 AD. Genghis offered Subutai a hundred of his finest warriors for the operation against the rival Merkit tribe who had a camp set up that the Khan wished to attack. Instead, Subutai went by himself to the Merkit camp and told them that he had deserted Genghis. The Merkits believed Subutai and made him one of their own. They wanted to know where Genghis forces were and Subutai assured them they are far off. However, this was not true, once the Merkits let their guard and suspicion down, the Mongols attacked. This convincing ruse would become the staple of Subutai’s tactics: that is, to attack the enemy indirectly by whatever means available and necessary.

Subutai understood the situation well, for the Merkits had set up camp and were blind to what was going on around them. Subutai quenched their thirst for knowledge by poisoning their wells of thought. Subutai seemed to know that desperate men like the Merkits would believe in anything thrown their way, just like a man in need of water only to discover a deceptive mirage in front of him.

Breeching the Wall of the Jin (1211)

In March 1211, Genghis Khan had assembled a very large fighting force fixed for conquest. Their goal was to take over the Jin Empire, but an obstacle lay in the way and that obstacle was the Great Wall of China.

Location of Jin dynasty, 1115–1234

Location of Jin dynasty, 1115–1234 (CC BY 3.0)

Word reached the Jin officials that the Mongols were coming. Jin scouts, careful to made sure the Mongol scouts did not see them, reported a large Mongol force of 30,000 led by Subutai. The force was making its way towards eastern end of the Great Wall. By taking this route, one arrives close to the Jin capital having once crossed.

The Jin quickly sent men to reinforce the wall along with secondary defenses, but the attack never came. Subutai and his 30,000 men were nowhere.

Instead, another report surfaced that Genghis Khan was leading a much larger Mongol army towards the western edge of the Great Wall. Garrisoning the western edge of the wall was a people known as the Onguts; the Onguts were Mongols who had been defeated by the Jin earlier and been placed under their command. However, the Onguts were not going to fight when they saw their kin arrive, for Genghis and his Mongols were looking to attack and vanquish the Jin Empire who conquered their very tribe.

Because of the absence of Subutai, the Jin forces had to hurry, for the main Mongol army was well on its way. Genghis learned that the Jin forces were responding, but very slowly; this gave Genghis time to choose the battle site, which was the northern passes in what is now Shanxi province.

Once the Jin arrived they saw the Mongols and quickly assembled themselves into battle formations. The Jin used a typical battle formation that is also used in the west as it was in the east and that was: infantry front and center, cavalry to the sides.

The Mongols were all cavalry, both light and heavy, built for speed and terror. The Mongols made the first move by sending in their horse archers, showering the Jin infantry with armor piercing arrows, and then sending in their heavy cavalry to break the enemy ranks, causing panic and desertion. In the meantime, the Jin cavalry could do little, for they were far heavier and less agile when compared to the Mongol heavy horse. However, the battle was far from over as both armies traded blow for blow until Subutai arrived. No one knows how Subutai did this and what route he took, but he was able to flank the Jin cavalry and attack their rear forces, and as such the Mongols completely collapsed the Jin army on all sides causing a bloody mess.

Deception played a large part in the battle, once again. In fact, the battle contained two deceptions: the first being the report of Subutai’s army approaching the edge of the eastern wall, and the second deception was allowing the enemy to dismiss or forget about Subutai.

Whoever orchestrated this maneuver is unknown, but I would not doubt that it was between Genghis and Subutai, if not Subutai alone. However, the Jin army broke a rule regarding the Art of War, in which Sun Tzu says, “One who sets the entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it.” The Jin were chasing a phantom, only to be conquered by it when they looked away.

Battle of Kalka River (1222/1223?)

In 1222, Jebe, a prominent general of Gehghis Khan, and Subutai took a route that led through a pass called Derbent, on the Caspian Sea in Russia. As the Mongols were riding through, various nomadic tribes such as the Alans, Cherkesses, Lezgians and Cumans were uniting as one against the Mongols who were largely unknown to these alarmed groups. After the nomadic alliance united, a battle soon followed between the nomadic coalition and the Mongols. The results of the battle remain unknown, for some suggest there is not enough evidence to support victory for either side.

Jebe and Subutai licked their wounds and pushed back at the Alans, soundly defeating them. The Mongol armies next attacked the Cumans and defeated them, chasing them to the Crimea. The Cuman khan, named Kotian, was the father-in-law of Prince Mstislav of Galich. Kotian along with Mstislav sent out a call to unite the various Russian principalities to fight off the Mongol invasion. All involved in this operation were against the Mongols, but knew nothing about them, their way of life, language, or what god they worshipped—all they knew is that this army was strange and serious.

Detail from the Millennium of Russia Monument: Mstislav Mstislavich, left, and Daniel of Galicia, his son-in-law.

Detail from the Millennium of Russia Monument: Mstislav Mstislavich, left, and Daniel of Galicia, his son-in-law.  (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Mongols soon realized that the Cumans had gained Russian support. Jebe and Subutai wanted nothing to do with the various Russian forces. Therefore, they sent ten ambassadors in to parlay and none came out alive. The subsequent message from the Mongols to the Russians was simple: go home, this is not your fight. The Mongols showed no interest in Russian lands, but had issue with the Cumans. However, as you have read, the Russians had every intention of defending the Cumans. Jebe and Subotai saw the Russian and Cuman forces and decided to retreat.

Battle of Kernek was between Volga Bulgaria and the Mongols, 1223.

Battle of Kernek was between Volga Bulgaria and the Mongols, 1223. Representational image. (Public Domain)

The Mongols fell back from the Russian and Cuman forces for nine days before the Mongols sent ambassadors to the Russians. These ambassadors brought the same message as the previous, but the Russians sent them back with a message that they would only be happy once the Mongols returned to their own land and were out of sight. This reasoning is also understandable, who is to say that once the Cumans were defeated, the Mongols will not set their sights on Russia?

Daniel of Galicia: King of Galicia and Volhynia (King of Rus')

Daniel of Galicia: King of Galicia and Volhynia (King of Rus’) (Public Domain)

The first battle between the two resulted in a victory for the Russians, as they soundly attacked the rear guard and defeated the Mongols. Once this was accomplished, the Russian Prince Mstislav of Galich, along with the Cumans, crossed the little Kalka River. Prince Mstislav made a terrible mistake for not communicating his intensions and falling right into a Mongol trap. The main Russian army under the Prince of Kiev were a distances always from Prince Mstislav and if something were to go wrong, they could not help them.

Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Mstislavich (Daniel of Galicia and Mstislav of Galich) with their troops.

Daniil Romanovich and Mstislav Mstislavich (Daniel of Galicia and Mstislav of Galich) with their troops. (Public Domain)

Jebe and Subotai took advantage of the situation; their retreat had paid off. The Russians split, and Prince Mstislav, along with the Cumans, became too confident. The Mongols quickly enveloped the enemy causing the Cumans to panic and Prince Mstislav of Galich to retreat home. The Mongols followed through by attacking the main Russian force, causing them to retreat to a hilltop where they tried to prepare defenses against the Mongols, but Prince Mstislav of Kiev could not, and after three days of fight, surrendered. He asked if he and his forces could return to Kiev, but Jebe and Subotai had a better idea.

Instead of letting them go, they killed the prisoners and built wooden planks to cover Prince Mstislav as they dined on top of him, hearing him scream, as the weight of the party slowly crushed him.

Jebe and Subutai then pursued the Prince Mstislav of Galich, but with no real gain. The Mongols did plunder some towns, but Mstislav of Galich had every boat burned in order to hinder the Mongols’ movement.

Jebe and Subutai finally relented, and return back home to prepare for the future – an ambitious and dangerous future which would lead to Genghis Khan naming Subutai one of his fierce ‘dogs of war’.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing.

Subutai. Medieval Chinese drawing. (Public Domain)

Featured image: A Mongolian Cavalry recreation, from Genghis Khan: The Exhibition (CC BY-SA 2.0)

By Cam Rea

References

Bevin, Alexander. How Great Generals Win. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

Carey, Brian Todd, Allfree, Joshua B and Cairns John. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2009.

Chambers, James. The Devil’s Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe. Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 2003.

Craughwell, Thomas J. The Rise and Fall of the Second Largest Empire in the World: How 88 Years of Mongol Domination Reshaped the World from the Pacific to the Mediterranean Sea. Gloucester, Maine: Fair Winds Press, 2010.

Crompton, Samuel Willard. 100 Military Leaders Who Shaped World History. San Mateo, CA: Bluewood Books, 1999.

Cummins, Joseph. History’s Great Untold Stories: The Larger Than Life Characters and Dramatic Events That Changed the World. Washington DC: National Geographic, 2007.

Curtin, Jeremiah. The Mongols A History. Boston: DA CAPO PRESS, 2003.

Dupuy, Trevor N. Johnson, Curt. Bongard, David L. The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography. New York: Castle Books, 1995.

Edwards, Sean J. Swarming on the Battlefield” Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica: Rand Coporation, 2000.

Gabriel, Richard A. Subotai the Valiant: Genghis Khan’s Greatest General. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2004.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Great Captains Unveiled. New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 1996.

Hartog, Leo De. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. London, New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004.

Kennedy, Hugh. Mongols, Huns & Vikings. London: Cassell, 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190-1400. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.

Tzu, Sun, Griffith, B. Samuel (translator). The Art Of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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The Military Campaigns of Cyaxares

Tomb of Cyaxares, Qyzqapan, Sulaymaniyah. Iraqi Kurdistan

Tomb of Cyaxares, Qyzqapan, Sulaymaniyah. Iraqi Kurdistan. (Public Domain)

For information about Cyaraxes’ background click HERE

Cyaxares on the March

When Cyaxares took power in Media, a Scythian chieftain by the name of Madyes conquered the Scythians of Media and dethroned Cyaxares. Madyes ruled for 28 years. Once he died, Cyaxares returned to power and regained his territory. Cyaxares would not have had been able to do this without an army capable of regaining and stabilizing the region, and with the ability to expand his borders. The armies at his disposal came from many backgrounds. It is safe to say that the armies of Cyaxares were a combination of horse archers and foot soldiers; one can assume he had siege craft to scale or take down the walls of the major cities in his way. In any case, the Median army was a force multiplier that could compete on the battlefield with any of the major powers in the region. In doing so, Cyaxares eventually helped the Babylonians defeat and conquer Assyria according to The Fall of NinevehChronicle.

When Assyria finally fell at Harran around 610-609 BCE, Cyaxares and his forces returned home back to the region of Media. The Babylonians, on the other hand, were now the masters of Mesopotamia, or at least some of it, since Cyaxares seems to have conquered portions of northern Assyria for himself according to The Fall of Nineveh Chronicle. Once back in Media, Cyaxares and his forces are all too silent among written records for a period. However, the relationship between the Scythians, Cimmerians of Media, and the Babylonians, appears to have a taken a turn for the worse. Whatever caused these two kingdoms to distrust one another is not known. Keep in mind that Nabopolassar’s son Nebuchadnezzar and Cyaxares’ daughter (or possibly his granddaughter Amytis), supposedly tied the knot as husband and wife, thus uniting the two nations in friendly relations. This may be more romanticism than fact, but one should also consider that there is probably some truth behind this. However, this did not seem to work out, whether it was a marriage to seal a deal, or just negotiations to form an alliance. The fallout between the two powers may have been due to Cyaxares’ campaigns to the north of Babylonian kingdom.

Cylinder of Nabopolassar from Babylon, Mesopotamia.

Cylinder of Nabopolassar from Babylon, Mesopotamia. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

The date when Cyaxares went on his campaign is unknown, but it must have been shortly after the fall of Assyria at Harran. Cyaxares’ reason may have been to recapture former territories that once belonged to his ancestors. In addition, Cyaxares knew that the time was right to take advantage of the weaker northern nations once allied to Assyria. The reason for this is that Nabopolassar defeated a force of Manneans in the tenth year of his reign and later invaded the region of Urartu, only to burn and pillage the area during the seventeenth year of his reign. Thus, Nabopolassar’s invasion of Urartian regions and the previous defeat of the Mannean forces most likely weakened – if not discombobulated – the northern nations from being able to go on the offensive at that time, thus making them desirable targets for Cyaxares’ expanding empire.

Cyaxares’ campaign toward the north and northwest of Media may have begun around 591-590 BCE. They had the upper hand, and his forces were confident that if they could beat down the might of Assyria then they could beat down anybody—and so they did. Cyaxares led his forces on a campaign to conquer the Kingdom of Urartu, but with some help.

Cyaxares and the Urartian forces are said to have been equal in number. Once both armies were in the arena, they gazed upon one another from a distance in the valley of Ararat. The Urartian army launched itself in a massive charge and concentrated its full power at the center of the Umman-manda/Scythian army. Cyaxares had his left and right cavalry flanks move forward and his infantry in the center move back. This formation, known as the bull’s horns or horseshoe pattern, was a common maneuver among nomadic steppe people. The purpose of this formation was to encompass and smother the enemy army in the center, and that is exactly what happened to the Urartian forces. They charged full speed ahead, screaming into the abyss with their kingdom in hand, only to come out the other side as echoes in the wind. However, not all the forces ended up that way due to the Urartian commanders retreating and on the second day surrendering to Cyaxares. Cyaxares and the Urartian commanders decided that no more bloodshed was needed. Once the two-day battle had finished, it is said that Cyaxares incorporated the Urartian cavalry into his forces, and from then on, we hear of the Urartian kingdom no more.

 Deriv; 5th century BC Achaemenid-era carving of Persian and Median soldiers in traditional costume (CC BY-SA 3.0) and eclilpse (CC BY 2.0).

Once Cyaxares had finalized the conquest of Urartu, he handed it over to a certain tribe of Scythians who had inhabited the region of Armenia beforehand and thus extended their domain.

Kingdom of Urartu 715–713 BC

Kingdom of Urartu 715–713 BC (Sémhur/CC BY-SA 3.0)

It is said that the Scythians who inhabited the region of Armenia helped him in his campaign against Assyria, that a certain chieftain by the name of Paroyr, son of Skayordi, assisted Cyaxares in his invasion and the sacking of Nineveh in 612 BCE. Afterwards, Cyaxares’ viceroy Varbakes crowned Paroyr king of Armenia. However, what becomes even more interesting is the name of Paroyr, son of Skayordi.

The name Paroyr has been suggested to be the Assyrian equivalent of Partatua (or Bartatua), who was a famous Scythian chieftain who made an alliance with Esarhaddon, king of Assyria. Thus it becomes quite possible that Paroyr was named after the great Scythian warrior due to legendary reason or it was just a common name among Scythian groups.

Gold Scythian belt title, Mingachevir (ancient Scythian kingdom), Azerbaijan, 7th century BC.

Gold Scythian belt title, Mingachevir (ancient Scythian kingdom), Azerbaijan, 7th century BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The name next mentioned is Skayordi, which is said to mean “son of a Scythian,” “a good Saka,” or “son of the Saka”. Thus, Paroyr was a Scythian whom Cyaxares must have regarded highly and in turn gave Paroyr’s Scythian tribe domain over Urartu. Whether Paroyr was alive during the conquest of Urartu by Cyaxares is debatable. It is certain that sometime after the conquest, around 570 BCE, a Scythian by the name of Yervand Sakavakyats came to the throne, thus establishing the Yervandunis Dynasty, also known as the Orontid Dynasty in Greek. Now whether Yervand was the first of this dynasty is not known and is debatable, for one would think it was Paroyr who had initially founded the dynasty, but that is another subject for another time. Once the Kingdom of Armenia was established, it became more or less a vassal to Cyaxares’ Umman-manda Empire.

An Armenian tribute bearer carrying a metal vessel with griffin handles. 5th century BC.

An Armenian tribute bearer carrying a metal vessel with griffin handles. 5th century BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

In addition, it becomes quite possible that Cyaxares created it to not only to pay tribute to the Umman-manda, but also provide protection as a buffer state between the Umman-manda and possible threats of invasions from nomadic Scythians to the north in the Caucasus Mountains. Cyaxares had already experienced this once before, when Madyes and his Scythian forces invaded and subdued him for a time. Also, keep in mind that Babylonians to the south were just as much of a threat to Cyaxares as the Scythians were to the north. The only difference – and one speculates – is that the Babylonians were a visible enemy that could be dealt with in a time of crisis, while the Scythian/Saka tribes to the north of the Umman-manda Empire were in Terra incognita. In other words, they knew who the people were but did not know the strength of their forces nor the land in which they dwelt for sure. This is not to say that Cyaxares knew nothing about them; it was just better to avoid them due to unknown circumstances.

The Babylonians in turn seemed to feel the same about the Umman-manda; for it was during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar that a great wall was built known as the “Median Wall,” otherwise known as the “Wall of Babylon.” This wall was placed between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to the northwest of Babylonia with the fortress of Opis at the end of the Tigris to the right and the fortress of Sippar guarding the left at the end of the Euphrates. This wall in many ways symbolized a divorce of friendly relations between the two powers. However, the wall also suggests that Nebuchadnezzar was fearful of the uncivilized, but this very wall also allowed him to go on campaigns to conquer the civilized.

Charging West

After the conquest of Urartu and the creation of the puppet kingdom of Armenia, Cyaxares continued to look west and next on his list was Cappadocia. When Cyaxares and his forces entered Cappadocia, the Cappadocians were not ready for a war. Instead, they sent the elders of their tribes to meet with Cyaxares and his commanders, and explained to them that they wanted no war and surrendered without a fight. They offered only bread and salt as their gift to the Umman-manda along with their kingdom. However, the reasons for their surrender may be due more to relations between the two than the inability to organize forces to wage combat. Scythians possibly inhabited Cappadocia when Cyaxares and his forces arrived.

After the peaceful submission of Cappadocia, Cyaxares and his forces remained in the region for the winter and prepared for the invasion of Lydia. These Lydians are said to have been very patriotic, but not experts in the conduct of war, and that the only strong element among their ranks was the cavalry. However, the Lydians did incorporate many Greek mercenaries into their ranks, not only for fighting but also for instructing Lydia’s forces. King Alyatts most likely knew that the Umman-manda was coming. After all, Cappadocia/Gamir was an area of interest to the Lydians, which Cyaxares had now swallowed up into his own empire. After the winter cold had passed, the Umman-manda pushed on into Lydia.

The edge of the brown area is the border of Lydia at the middle of the 6th century BC. The red line is a possible different border of Lydia.

The edge of the brown area is the border of Lydia at the middle of the 6th century BC. The red line is a possible different border of Lydia. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Once inside the borders, Cyaxares is said to have sent envoys to conduct a peace treaty with King Alyatts of Lydia. The terms of the treaty were clear and quite simple: “Surrender!” Cyaxares was hoping that the Lydians would be pushovers just as their Cimmerian kin in Cappadocia. Nevertheless, things were different now. The Lydians would rather put up a fight and die if need be, than to surrender to these Umman-manda barbarians from the east. Thus began the start of a five- to six-year war between the two powers.

Both the Umman-manda and Lydia won and lost engagements until a strange thing happed on May 28, 585 BCE. The sun went dark, a total eclipse occurred, and both sides stopped fighting due to their superstitious and eerie feeling that “maybe the gods are warning us?”

A total solar eclipse stopped a battle.

A total solar eclipse stopped a battle. (CC BY 2.0)

Thus, the battle ended at the Halys River and that river became the border between the two powers. The terms to the peace agreement included that Cyaxares’ son Astyages would marry the daughter of King Alyatts. Not only would the river Halys be the border between the two powers but so would the marriage act as a border as well. Cyaxares returned home, but he died the following year. His son Astyages would ascend to the throne of the Umman-manda.

Astyages’ Dream

Astyages was the second ruler according to most historians of the Umman-manda. However, what is quite interesting is his name. Astyages is the Greek form of his name, but the other versions of his name are Aztiag, Ajhdahak, Astiag, Sahak, Astiak, and Aspadas. The name Ajhdahak is of interest, for the word “Dahak” is another form of the name Dahae, and the Dahae were a Saka tribe also known as the Dasa in the Vedic, and in old Iranian they are known as Daha. In addition, the Iranian Avestan word “Azis” is applied to the word Dahak/Dahaka and becomes Azis-Dahaka/Dahak and means serpent or dragon. The Azis Dahaka is a mythological dragon or serpent, but also the term was applied to anyone who was a tyrant. However, there seems to be a grain of truth to this in terms of symbolism. The Dahak are said to be the Scythian Dahae, and remember that the name Dahak/Dahae are one in the same. Then is it possible to say that the serpent and dragon are the symbols of the Dahae?

According to Herodotus, Astyages’ reign was long and prosperous. His empire stretched from the Halys River in the west to quite possibly Hara in the east.

The Median Empire during both Cyaxares the Great, and Astyages.

The Median Empire during both Cyaxares the Great, and Astyages. (Public Domain)

Astyages was so prosperous and his force so strong that after a while it is said they became lazy and were more concerned with the collection of taxes than securing and governing the regions they controlled. But Astyages was living the good life until he had a dream that seemed to haunt him.

Astyages dreamed that his daughter Mandane was urinating so much that she flooded Asia. Therefore, Astyages ran to the Magi and asked them what it meant. The Magi told him that Mandane’s son would overthrow him. Astyages went on the hunt to find a suitable husband for his daughter Mandane. That man would be an Achaemenid vassal prince by the name of Cambyses of Anshan. The reason for selecting Cambyses was due to his peaceful and loyal nature. Surely, no son of Cambyses would ever think of taking the throne.

Then Astyages had a second dream. This time a vine grew from Mandane’s womb when she was pregnant and the vine grew so much it took over the world.

Astyages's dream (France, 15th century).

Astyages’s dream (France, 15th century). (Public Domain)

This drove Astyages mad enough to give the order to search out and kill the boy! Astyages sent his loyal court retainer Harpagus to do the job but once Harpagus found the child he decided he could not spill royal blood and decided against it.

Painting of king Astyages sending Harpagus to kill young Cyrus.

Painting of king Astyages sending Harpagus to kill young Cyrus. (Public Domain)

Instead, Harpagus hid the child by giving him over to a shepherd by the name of Mithradates. Mithradates’ wife also gave birth to a son, but the child was stillborn. Therefore, Harpagus took the stillborn child to Astyages and pawned it off as the dead son of Mandane. As the years passed, this young boy would become none other than the famed Cyrus the Great, and young Cyrus’ first order of business once powerful enough was to challenge his grandfather Astyages for the throne.

Illustration of relief depicting Cyrus the Great

Illustration of relief depicting Cyrus the Great (Public Domain)

Mysterious Media

The origins of the Median Empire are a mystery. Understand that men like Cyaxares who founded his dynasty in the region of Media, came from an unknown tribe, perhaps Scythian or not. Whether Cyaxares was the son of Dugdammi is also up for debate.  However, the evidence brought forth indicates that the Median Empire was not predominantly Median/Medes, but an amalgamation of various nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes, which came to be known by those outside of Media as “Umman-manda.” The only reason why Cyaxares and the future rulers of Media were called Medes was that they settled and established a political and military powerbase in the region.

Just like when Cyrus established his rule over Persia, the west from that point on would slowly come to call Cyrus and the future rulers of the House of Achaemenid the Persian Empire, because Cyrus established his rule in the province of Persis (Persia). However, Cyrus’ legacy is like that of Cyaxares’ when it comes to the empires they governed. The writers in the near east were correct in calling them Umman-manda and not Median. Umman-manda was a better term in describing the ethnic and tribal smorgasbord since they are silent in naming the area after the ruling house of Cyaxares, which could suggest that his empire was still politically unstable and its future uncertain due to this instability. Whereas, Cyrus the Great was able to defeat his grandfather Astyages and take the throne. What is fascinating about this is that Cyrus did not create a new empire. Instead, he continued to rule as an Umman-manda/Median overlord. Nothing changed except for the ruling house and the location from which they ruled.

By Cam Rea 

 

References

Ayatollahi, Habibollah. “The Book of Iran: The History of Iranian Art”, Center for International-Cultural Studies (2003).

Bamban, Robert. The Military History of Parsiks. Woodland Hills, CA: Institute of Historical Studies, 1998.

Brosius, Maria. Women in Ancient Persia, 559-331 B.C. . Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

Chahin, M. The Kingdom of Armenia. New York: Dorset Press, 1991.

Chavalas, Mark. Ancient Near East: Historical Sources in Translation. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Dandamaev, Muhammad A., and Vladimir G. Lukonin. The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Glassner, Jean-Jacques and Benjamin R. Foster. Mesopotamian Chronicles. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004.

Hackmann, Heinrich Friedrich. Buddhism as a Religion: Its Historical Development and its Present Conditions. London: W. C., Probsthain & CO., 1910.

Hovannisian, Richard G. “The Armenian people from ancient to modern times”, Macmillan Press, 1996.

Kuhrt, Amelie. “The Ancient Near East 3000-330 BC, Vol II”, Routledge, 1997.

Mackenzie, Donald A. Myths of Babylonia and Assyria:. London: Gersham Publishing Company Limited, 2004.

Narain, A. K. Later Indo-Scythians. Varanasi: U.P., 1962.

Ouzounian, Nourhan. Hacikyan, Agop J. Basmajian, Gabriel. Franchuk, Edward S. “The Heritage of Armenian Literature: From the Oral Tradition to the Golden Age”, Wayne State University Press, 2000.

Parpola, Asko. “The Coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the Cultural and Ethnic Identity of the Dasas; The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, Studia Orientalia 64: 195-302. Helsinki: The Finnish Oriental Society (1988).

Tsetskhladze, Gocha. Ancient West & East, Volume 3, Issue 2. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Russel, James R. “Scythians and Avesta in an Armenian Vernacular Paternoster and a Zok Paternoster”, Le Muséon 1997

Smith, William. “Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology”, I. B. Tauris; 1 edition, 2007.

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Kings of the Umman Manda (Media): Their Hidden Origins and History

The term Medes, as a single ethnic group that encompasses all Media, is generic. It seems that the region of Media encompassed many smaller and independent principalities ruled by chieftains instead of kings, and was a makeup of various peoples of different ethnic backgrounds.

As for the Median region, the extent of its boundaries towards the east is unknown. The Median territory did border the Zagros Mountains to the west and the Caucasus to the north, while its southern neighbor was Ellipi.

The Assyrians and Babylonians called them Madayu, the Persians called them Mada, and the Greeks called them Medes. In addition, the Assyrians and Babylonians also equate the Medes with the Umman-manda in the Fall of Nineveh Chronicle. The meaning of Umman-manda could be “Manda-host” or “host of the Manda.” It has also been suggested that Umman-manda could mean “Who Knows,” “Barbarous people,” or “Nomads;” one could say a mixed multitude of uncivilized people from the north.

The term Umman-manda has been subject to change with the regional people that mentioned them. Take for instance the name Tidal or Tudkhul. Tidal/Tudkhul is said to be the king of the Hittites but is also called king of the Umman-manda or “Nations of the North.” Consider also, a much older event in which Naram-Sin, king of the Akkadian empire, defeated the Umman-manda and he states, “the powers of the Umman-manda are struck down.”

Medes and Persians at the eastern stairs of the Apadana in Persepolis, Iran.

Medes and Persians at the eastern stairs of the Apadana in Persepolis, Iran. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

From the time the Umman-manda was mentioned by Naram-Sin up to the time of Nabopolassar, over 1500 years had elapsed between events. This suggests that the term Umman-manda is generic and does not identify one particular people but rather a horde of many tribes with various names. These tribes resembled more of a fractured federation rather than an invading army looking to expand their empire. In addition, consider the term Umman-manda was just a Mesopotamian stereotype when referring to people not native to the civilized powers in the region. The Umman-manda of Narma-Sin and the Umman-manda of Nabopolassar were two different hordes that most likely had no relationship to each other.

King Cyaxares and his Possible Ancestral Origins

 In old Iranian/Persian, Cyaxares’ name is “Hvakhshathra” or “Uaksatar,” as well as “Uksatar,” which is interesting, for if Cyaxares was a Mede, then why is his name in Old Iranian/Persian Hvakhshathra? Hvakh is most likely a rendering of the Old Iranian name Hakha, which is a variation of the Sanskrit word Sakha; both Sakha and Hakha mean Saka, and Saka is another name for a nomadic tribe. Now shathra, or hathra, seems to be derived from the word satra in Sanskrit, which means “together, collectively united, and dominion.” In addition, Hathra in Parthian means “city or country.” Also, consider that shathra/hathra could also be a rendering of the Persian word “shah,” which means king. Now if we look at the other renderings of Cyaxares’ name – like Uksatar and Uaksatar – notice that his name carries the word “satar,” which also seems to be a rendering of the word “satra.” Therefore, it is plausible that Cyaxares was of Saka/Scythian stock due to his name but it remains uncertain.

What is about to be presented fixes the issue but adds another piece to the puzzle to consider. Before the name of Cyaxares is mentioned in historical record, there was a man by the name of Sandakkurru/Sandaksatru. Sandakkurru/Sandaksatru was the son of Dugdammi. Dugdammi was not only king of the Sacae or Scythians, but also of the Guti – and the term Guti was applied to the region of Media. Now because of this, Dugdammi’s title suggests that he was king of the Saka (Scythians) and the Guti. If one takes it fully into account, then the fact that the very title Dugdammi is addressed by could suggest that he was king over a vast number of Scythians/Cimmerians including those not of the same ethnic group, and that his home was in Guti (Media).

Modern Artistic portrayal "Mede" Nobleman, "Persian" Nobleman, Persian.

Modern Artistic portrayal “Mede” Nobleman, “Persian” Nobleman, Persian.  (Public Domain)

If so, then Sandakkurru/Sandaksatru is a good candidate to be the famed Cyaxares found in Herodotus’ Histories. However, according to Herodotus, Cyaxares is the son of the man named Phraortes. This seems unlikely since there is no other information known about Cyaxares’ father other than what Herodotus has documented for us. Herodotus says that Cyaxares invaded Assyria, defeating one of their armies and had laid siege to Nineveh, when all of the sudden Madyes invaded Media in pursuit of Cimmerians, and in turn ended up battling the Medes who were just defending their land (in which they were defeated and lost their empire. Cyaxares in turn lifted the siege on Nineveh and returned home only to find it occupied. He thus submitted to Madyes, only to become his puppet king.

The Apadana Palace in Persepolis, Iran, northern stairway (detail) – fifth-century BC Achaemenid bas-relief shows a Mede soldier in traditional Mede costume (behind Persian soldier). (Public Domain)

Now that we have examined both names and the possible meanings of Cyaxares and Sandakuru/Sandaksatru, it seems possible that Cyaxares was Dugdammi’s son. I do believe there is a connection between the two as being the same person, and I have one more name that might be the cornerstone in linking the two names and that name is: “Shaushatra.” The name Shaushatra is said to be another name for Cyaxares. Notice the similarities between Shaushatra and Sandaksatru. Both names seem the same, phonetically. Therefore, it is possible that once Madyes was dead, Sandaksatru/Shaushatra was able to retake his former kingdom and thus was named Hvkhashathra, which sounds more like a title than a name. However, this is mere speculation and Herodotus could be right. Nevertheless, an alternative has been provided and should be considered and investigated further.

By  Cam Rea

References

Bamban, Robert. The Military History of Parsiks. Woodland Hills, CA: Institute of Historical Studies, 1998.

Brosius, Maria. Women in Ancient Persia, 559-331 B.C. . Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

Chahin, M. The Kingdom of Armenia. New York: Dorset Press, 1991.

Chavalas, Mark. Ancient Near East: Historical Sources in Translation. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Dandamaev, Muhammad A., and Vladimir G. Lukonin. The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Glassner, Jean-Jacques and Benjamin R. Foster. Mesopotamian Chronicles. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004.

Hackmann, Heinrich Friedrich. Buddhism as a Religion: Its Historical Development and its Present Conditions. London: W. C., Probsthain & CO., 1910.

Hovannisian, Richard G. “The Armenian people from ancient to modern times”, Macmillan Press, 1996.

Kuhrt, Amelie. “The Ancient Near East 3000-330 BC, Vol II”, Routledge, 1997.

Mackenzie, Donald A. Myths of Babylonia and Assyria:. London: Gersham Publishing Company Limited, 2004.

Ouzounian, Nourhan. Hacikyan, Agop J. Basmajian, Gabriel. Franchuk, Edward S. “The Heritage of Armenian Literature: From the Oral Tradition to the Golden Age”, Wayne State University Press, 2000.

Parpola, Asko. “The Coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the Cultural and Ethnic Identity of the Dasas; The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, Studia Orientalia 64: 195-302. Helsinki: The Finnish Oriental Society (1988).

Tsetskhladze, Gocha. Ancient West & East, Volume 3, Issue 2. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Russel, James R. “Scythians and Avesta in an Armenian Vernacular Paternoster and a Zok Paternoster”, Le Muséon 1997

 

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The Sumerian Military: Professionals of Weaponry and Warfare

Between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, lies a land once known as Mesopotamia. It was here that humanity found suitable land to rip open and seed. Once the seeds took root, civilization was born.

With food slowly becoming abundant, the population increased and branched out. With prosperity, came external threats. Nomadic elements seeking further wealth encountered these communities and pillaged them. In doing so, they spread their parasitic-like sphere of influence, causing instability throughout the regions and cities of Mesopotamia. This instability gave rise to two things: the rise of the city-state and the professional soldier.

Creating a Civilization

Unlike pastoral societies that roam around looking for food, agriculturalists by teamed together, settling in one spot and growing their food.  In doing so they created a village, a society of their own. However, it takes more than farming to create a state.

After a few generations, people slowly began to build upon their knowledge of agriculture, animal husbandry, and writing. With all these skills and many more, villages gained a greater sense of the self. Such awareness allowed for the creation of law, trade, private property, social interest, internal order and a sense of self-identity. This allowed the Mesopotamian villages that dotted the landscape to evolve into a series of city-states.

Map showing the Tigris–Euphrates river system, which defines Mesopotamia.

Map showing the Tigris–Euphrates river system, which defines Mesopotamia. (CC BY-SA 2.5)

The Sumerians were the first to carve out a civilization in Mesopotamia. By the third millennium BCE, the land of Sumer consisted of a dozen or more city-states. These city-states were walled, and surrounded by suburban villages and hamlets.

Map with the locations of the main cities of Sumer and Elam. (Modern Iraq)

Map with the locations of the main cities of Sumer and Elam. (Modern Iraq) (CC BY-SA 3.0)

A reconstruction in the British Museum of headgear and necklaces worn by the women in some Sumerian graves.

A reconstruction in the British Museum of headgear and necklaces worn by the women in some Sumerian graves. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The city-states of Sumer were centralized. Their centrally controlled society needed an administration to conduct the day-to-day redistribution of resources and to direct all social activity.

During the early period of Sumer history, there was a shared control over resources and social actives between the palace and temple. The temple controlled a great amount of land and exerted a powerful influence over the people. The palace authority controlled as much, if not more land than the temple.

This was fine until the palace was able to wield an even greater influence over the people. In doing so, the king was able to amalgamate the palace with the temple, in which the king saw himself as god’s own representative on earth. If god chooses the king, then the temple must obey. This placed the temple in a predicament. However, this does not mean there would never be strife again between the palace and temple authorities. So long as they existed side by side, the desire to control and hold a monopoly over the other’s institution was desirable, especially if one wished to control the masses.

Sumerian Military Structure

The earliest known evidence of a professional organized military comes from the Standard of Ur.  The Sumerian military structure in terms of rank is unknown. However, it is obvious that the king headed the army as depicted on “The Stele of Vultures.” Others who rode in chariots were likely, princes, nobles, and wealthy landowners, while the main body was primarily infantry.

Detail from the Standard of Ur – Infantrymen and High ranking chariot riders

Detail from the Standard of Ur – Infantrymen and High ranking chariot riders (Public Domain)

Conscription

The organization of the Sumerian forces is somewhat silent. The conscription of troops was comprised of corve’e (obligated) labor levied by the temple and palace to maintain the city-state. Not only was levied labor used for public works, it was also allocated for military service. The Shulgi inscription indicates that the allocation of levied labor for military service during times of war was common.

Tablet of Shulgi. This tablet glorifies king Shulgi and his victories on the Lullubi people and it mentions the modern-city of Erbil and the modern-district of Sulaymaniayh. 2111-2004 BCE.

Tablet of Shulgi. This tablet glorifies king Shulgi and his victories on the Lullubi people and it mentions the modern-city of Erbil and the modern-district of Sulaymaniayh. 2111-2004 BCE. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

One inscription from the 21st/20th century BCE, during the Third Dynasty of Ur, also known as the Neo-Sumerian Empire, gives one a glimpse in the recruitment. A king named Shulgi recorded that ‘‘the year the citizens of Ur were conscripted as spearmen.’’ He continues and describes his ‘‘conscription with the bow and arrow; nobody evaded it – the levy being one man per family.’’ Even though this inscription came later in Sumer’s history, it does provide a glimpse in military recruitment.

A half-mina weight (248 g.), bearing the name of king Shulgi.

A half-mina weight (248 g.), bearing the name of king Shulgi. (Public Domain)

The amount of men capable of being conscripted varied. A city-state, including the surrounding territory under the local king’s control, with a population roughly between 30,000 to 35,000 people could field an army between 4,000 and 5,000 men during an emergency. However, the men conscripted into service were not capable of fighting on a professional level, for training, organizing, and disciplining the men to enable them to fight as a cohesive unit would have taken far too long. The training of a conscript was very short and rudimentary in both arms and tactics.

The Professional

Summary account of silver for the governor written in Sumerian Cuneiform on a clay tablet. From Shuruppak, Iraq, circa 2500 BCE.

Summary account of silver for the governor written in Sumerian Cuneiform on a clay tablet. From Shuruppak, Iraq, circa 2500 BCE. (Public Domain)

The professional fighting force consisted of infantry and chariots. The Tablets of Shuruppak (2600 BC) is a much earlier Sumerian text, which describes that the kings of the city-states provided for the full-time maintenance of 600 to 700 soldiers. Sumerian city-states were roughly 1,800 square miles (4660 sq km). Such space could sustain a population size between 30,000 to 35,000 people. A population this size could field a fighting force of 4,000 to 5,000. To gain a better picture of the Sumerian infantry, look no further than to “The Stele of the Vultures” from the Early Dynastic III period (2600–2350 BCE).

Fragment of the Stele of the Vultures showing marching warriors, Early Dynastic III period, 2600–2350 BC

Fragment of the Stele of the Vultures showing marching warriors, Early Dynastic III period, 2600–2350 BC (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The Stele of the Vultures shows a victory celebration of King Eannatum of Lagash over his neighbor Umma. This stele displays a well-organized, professional infantry in the phalanx-like formation. Notice that they wear helmets, have large shields that cover the body from chin to ankle, and they wear leather-armored cloaks with what appears to have copper or bronze disks attached. Notice that some of the infantry are carrying long spears while others carry axes. The king in front of the formation carries a throwing stick.

Stele of the Vultures detail.

Stele of the Vultures detail.

Sumerian Arms

The basic arms carried were maces, daggers, spears, javelins, throwing sticks and much more.

The mace is one of the oldest weapons in mankind’s arsenal and a direct descendent of the club. The Sumerian mace was made of stone and often had the shape of a pear. The mace was effective in crushing bone, particularly the skull of the enemy. However, the utilization of the mace would fall out of favor as a preferred weapon with the donning of the helmet.

“This is a variegated red stone, globular mace head. Similar to the piriform mace head, this style was commonly used in Mesopotamia around 2450-1900 BC. These type mace heads would have been attached to a wooden shaft and used as a weapon to strike an enemy.”

“This is a variegated red stone, globular mace head. Similar to the piriform mace head, this style was commonly used in Mesopotamia around 2450-1900 BC. These type mace heads would have been attached to a wooden shaft and used as a weapon to strike an enemy.” (Aaron Newcomer/CC BY-ND 2.0)

The dagger was a double-edged blade weapon used for close combat. The length of the dagger was between eight to 12 inches (20 to 30 cm). This weapon was eventually replaced by the sword.

The spear was the same height or slightly smaller than a man. It had a socketed blade and the spearhead was made of either bronze or copper. Other spears had blunted ends. The purpose for this weapon was twofold. Its first purpose is not to inflict injury but to push back against the enemy’s shields, thus keeping distance between the two combatants. Its second purpose and most important, was the hook on the blunted spear was used to hook the rim of the enemy’s shield and dislodge it, thus leaving the combatant unprotected and as such he could be slain with the dagger or sword.

Javelins were much shorter than spears, and the points were made of either bronze or copper. Javelins could be thrown by hand while others had a leather throwing thong at the butt called a ankyle.

Axe heads were made of bronze, which slipped over the end of the shaft and was affixed with rivets. This innovation gave the axe a greater degree of strength. However, after 2500 BCE, the Sumerians developed another type of axe, which was heavier. The axe head had a much narrower blade attached to a much stronger socket, giving it the ability to penetrate bronze armor. Studies show that this new axe could generate 77.5 foot-pounds of impact energy. It only required 66 foot-pounds to penetrate the armor.

The throwing stick is a club which can be straight or curved and was designed to be thrown. One end of the stick was made heavier than the other, but both ends were shaved down into points. That gave the weapon a greater degree of momentum when thrown, and provided stability during trajectory. The reason for this is that when the stick made contact with the intended target, the energy upon impact was concentrated, and delivered through the point. An example of this can be found on the Stele of Vultures, which shows King Eannatum carrying an item in his hand that is in dispute.

Detail of the "battle" fragment.

Detail of the “battle” fragment. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

One could say he is represented carrying a mace, scepter, or reins. Upon closer observation, it appears that Eannatum is carrying a throwing stick. Sumerians did use sickle swords but not until the Iron Age.

Sumerian Armor and Chariot

The Sumerian shield appears to be a rectangular body shield as demonstrated by the Stele of Vultures. Unfortunately, no surviving Sumerian shields exist. The closest resemblance to the Sumerian shield was the discovery of the Mari shield. The Mari shield was made of reeds covered in hide but had no boss in the center, unlike the Sumerian shields depicted in the Stele. The Sumerian shield depicted in the stele appears to have six bosses when in fact it only has one. Upon closer examination, each individual is holding the spear with two hands.

Stele of Vultures detail.

Stele of Vultures detail.

However, it is possible that a shield bearer is holding the shield. Another alternative, which appears more plausible, is that the spearman is using a neck strap to hold the shield in place.

Detail of Sumerian stele.

Detail of Sumerian stele. (CC BY-SA 2.0)

The Sumerian helmet was a copper hat that was roughly two to three millimeters thick, fitting over a leather or wool cap, which provided another four millimeters of protection. In total, the helmet was a quarter of an inch thick. Some may speculate as to why the Sumerian soldier was fitted with a copper, rather than a bronze helmet. This may be due to the fact that the Sumerians had not developed the ability due to the difficulty in casting such a mold to fit the shape of a wearers head.

The Sumerian cloak depicted in the Stele of the Vultures appears to be ordinary. On closer inspection, the cloak seems to have been made of cloth or thin leather with metal disks, possibly bronze or copper, sewn into the fabric. The purpose for this is obvious— to thwart spear blows to torso. More importantly, this is the first depiction of body armor.

When it comes to the chariot, one must be careful when using the word ‘chariot’ when dealing with the Sumerians. What appears to be a chariot is not; it lacks the refinements of a true chariot. To the Sumerians, this vehicle was a “battle car.” Another vehicle brought to battle was a “straddle car.” This straddle car was a cabless platform in which the driver had to balance himself by straddling the car. Both vehicles were either four-wheeled or two and required four wild asses to pull them. Very different from their future replacements, but for the time, they did their job.

Detail, Relief of early war wagons on the Standard of Ur, c. 2500 BC

Detail, Relief of early war wagons on the Standard of Ur, c. 2500 BC (Public Domain)

The Sumerian chariot was crude but innovative for its day. In all likelihood its early use was for the king and nobles. There is indication later on that Lugalzagesi (or Lugal-Zage-Si), the last Sumerian king, boasted that his vassals could provide him 600 battle-cars for war. However, it is recorded that the king of city-state of Umma had an elite unit of 60 battle-cars at his beck and call. This is the only evidence which gives detail into the number of vehicles by any state for war.

The Sumerian battle-car, cumbersome and slow as it would have been, was used for shock troops. The arms of the charioteer were the javelin or axe. Moreover, the vehicle likely transported its heavy infantry to the battlefield. Overall, the Sumerian battle-car was indeed slow, but provided mobility for the infantry and delivered shock to the enemy.

Further information on the military organization of the Sumerian military is vague at best. However, understand that the idea of a Sumerian military organization is generic. In other words, the Sumerian civilization was just that—a civilization consisting of a series of independent city-states. Some Sumerian kings controlled just one city-state, while others held multiple city-states under their control. Therefore, the number of troops a single king could field varied. This also applies to the amount of professional troops under the command of the king. Some kings could afford many, while many more could not.

As for battlefield performance, it would not be unreasonable to think that the conscripted men, who made up the bulk of the Sumerian fighting force, were primarily used since the professional soldier was far costlier to lose and fewer in number. Not only was the professional crucial in determining the outcome of the battle, but he also was crucial in keeping the peace within the city and most importantly, needed to protect the king. While increasing the ranks of professionals sounds lucrative from a position of security, it was too expensive. The costs to pay, feed, and equip the professional soldier, especially increasing their numbers, were too much. It was far cheaper to rely on temporary conscription. However, this would not last, for Eannatum, King of Lagash (circa 2455-2425 BCE), established the first Mesopotamian empire in history through constant warring.

Battle scene with horsemen, Assyrian, about 728 BC, from Nimrud.

Battle scene with horsemen, Assyrian, about 728 BC, from Nimrud. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Eannatum’s conquest of Elam gave him the resources needed to provide an army on the march. The lands of Elam were rich in timber, precious metals, and stone. Such lucrative resources brought forth more wealth from which he could draw from to pay his soldiers and to expand the ranks to aid in his desires for further conquest. Eannatum would be the first of many in the history of warfare who conquered to confiscate the wealth of those subjugated to grease the wheels of their armies.

One fragment of the victory stele of the king Eannatum of Lagash over Umma. It depicts severed human heads in the beaks of vultures, and a fragment of cuneiform script.

One fragment of the victory stele of the king Eannatum of Lagash over Umma. It depicts severed human heads in the beaks of vultures, and a fragment of cuneiform script. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Top Image: Standard of Ur, 26th century BC, “War” panel. (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

“Weapons found in the Royal Tombs of Ur”. (2016) SumerianShakespeare.com [Online] Available at:  http://sumerianshakespeare.com/117701/118301.html

Black, Jeremy A. The literature of ancient Sumer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Chew, Sing C. World Ecological Degradation: Accumulation, Urbanization, and Deforestation 3000 B.C. – 2000 A.D. Walnut Greek: AltaMira Press, 2001.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Great Armies of Antiquity. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002.

– The Ancient World. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2007.

Howard, Dan. Bronze Age Military Equipment. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011.

Matossian, Mary Kilbourne. Shaping World History: Breakthroughs in Ecology, Technology, Science, and Politics. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997

Smithsonian Institution. Military History: The Definitive Visual Guide to the Objects of Warfare. New York: DK Publishing, 2012.

Woolley, Leonard. The Sumerians. New York: W.W. Norton, 1965.

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The Forgotten Roman General

General Publius Ventidius is probably one of the most overlooked, if not completely forgotten, generals in military history. Maybe it is because Ventidius grew up poor like most Romans… Or perhaps it was due to the reports that he sold mules and wagons before joining the Roman army.

Despite this, Ventidius would go on to have a distinguished military career, accompanying Julius Caesar during his campaign against Gaul and partaking in the Roman Civil War. Then in 45 BCE, Ventidius took up Caesar’s offer and accepted the post of plebeian tribune when the senate was reorganized and expanded.

Finally, on top of everything else, it may have been this forgotten general, with whom we concern ourselves today, that was responsible for reversing the Parthian tide, for changing the course of Roman History.

We will look at the series of battles now, in an effort to amend the marginal position in the history books that has been designated to poor Ventidus.

Mark Antony

It was in 39 BCE that Mark Antony assigned Ventidius Bassus the mission to retake Asia-Minor. Reports had reached Antony while he was in Greece that the Parthians were finished with their campaign in Asia-Minor for the year. These intelligence reports most likely came from the province of Asia, which was, at the time, loyal to Rome. From this news, Antony was able to draw up his plans.

He probably was aware that the majority of the Parthian army would retire for the winter and return home to their respected nobles. This would mean that those who remained were local militias, with questionable loyalty to garrison the cities throughout Asia-Minor. In addition, Antony understood the need to attack now to inhibit any further Parthian progress coming next spring.

Antony saw this as a perfect opportunity to surprise the enemy.

And so, once the coast was clear, Antony took a chance and placed a few legions under the command of our dear Ventidius, who subsequently set sail for the province of Asia. Vantidius’ mission was simple; establish a beachhead at the province of Asia and push inland.

Battle of the Cilician Gates

Ventidius’ landing was unexpected. This only goes to show the lack of intelligence gathering on the part of Labienus, head of the Roman-Parthian army. Once the Roman forces were accounted for, Ventidius quickly began to push eastward in a ‘search and destroy’ mission.

Word spread rapidly that the Romans had arrived. When the message reached Labienus, he was startled and terrified for he “was without his Parthians.” The only troops available to him were the neighborhood militia.

Labienus quickly fled the province of Asia and headed east, seeking military support from his co-ruler, Pacorus, a Parthian prince and son of king Orodes II.

Meanwhile, Mark Antony’s man, Ventidius, took a chance of his own and abandoned his heavy troops. He pursued Labienus with his lightest forces.

Warrior

Eventually, Ventidius caught up with Labienus and cornered him near the Taurus range. He chose the high ground, so he could look down upon Labienus’ encampment. But there was another, more important, reason why Ventidius took the high ground; he feared the Parthian archers.

It was a standoff as both generals encamped for several days, waiting for the arrival of their main forces. As the bulk of the armies finally arrived, the Romans and the Parthians hunkered down for the night.

Cataphract

At daybreak, the Parthians, over-confident with their numbers and past victories, decided to start the battle before joining forces with Labienus. Unfortunately these were not the famous and deadly Parthian horse archers… but the heavy cavalry, or cataphract. Once they were at the length of the slope, the Romans charged down on top of them and repelled the enemy with ease, for the Romans had the momentum.

While the Romans were able to kill and maim many of the cataphract, the cataphract were, in fact, doing a better job at killing and maiming themselves.

See, the cataphract were at the top of slope, where all the fighting took place, but when they retreated, they ran into their own men coming up the hill. Instead of descending in order to rally around Labienus, they bypassed their general and headed straight for Cilicia. It was absolute chaos.

Ventidius, seeing that the Parthians were scattering all about and fleeing, decided to bring his men down from the hill and march on Labienus’ camp.

Both armies were now face to face… But Ventidius decided to stay put.

Why would Ventidius do this? Well, he was informed from deserters that Labienus was going to flee the camp, come nightfall. Therefore, Ventidius decided that it was better to set up ambushes rather than have an all-out pitch battle, which would result in losing many men and resources during the process.

Once nightfall came, the ambushes set in place worked as planned, killing and capturing many… that is, except for Labienus. Labienus was able to escape by changing clothes… His destination was Cilicia.

However, Labienus was not able to hide for long. Demetrius, a former slave, then “freedman” turned bounty hunter, arrested him. After Demetrius turned Labienus over to the Roman authorities, he was quickly executed.

Battle of Amanus Pass

With Labienus dead, Ventidius was able to secure the province of Cilicia. This did not mean they won; in fact, the mission was far from finished. To complete it, Ventidius devised a plan to trick the Parthians.

Ventidius sent a cavalry, headed by the officer Pompaedius Silo, to scout out the Amanus Pass, a strategic mountain path connecting the province of Cilicia and Syria. Not far behind Silo would be Ventidius, along with a small contingent of troops to aid in the fight.

Horseman

Meanwhile on the Parthian side, Pacorus understood that if the same Amanus pass were not secured, the Romans would march through and invade Syria. Therefore, he felt, the best method was to station a garrison there to bottle up the small mountain road.

So Pacorus stationed Pharnapates, a Parthian lieutenant considered the most capable general of Orodes, to wait for the Romans to come. Once Silo reached the pass, the two sides engaged in battle immediately.

But don’t forget – this was, in fact, an elaborate trick. Silo’s real mission was to lure the Parthians away from their strongest defensive position. In doing so, Ventidius would either attack at the flank or from the rear.

Arrows

In a sense, the Romans were giving the Parthians a taste of their own medicine by using the same tactic that worked so well against them at the Battle of Carrhae. With many of Pharnapates’ cataphract lured away, Ventidius fell upon the Parthians unexpectedly. Pharnapates, along with many of his men, perished during the engagement.

With the Amanus Pass now clear, the invasion of Syria was imminent.

With the Amanus Pass secured, Ventidius, head of the Roman forces, pushed south into Syria. Pacorus, the Parthian prince and co-leader of the Roman-Parthian army, was done fighting… at least for now.

He abandoned the province to the Romans in late 39 BCE. With the Parthians out of the way, Ventidius led his forces to the province of Judea.

Ventidius’ mission in Judea was simple and lucrative; it was to rid the province of any remaining Parthians. He was also there to remove the anti-Roman King, Antigonus, and to restore Herod to the throne.

But Ventidius did neither.

King Herod

Instead, he bypassed Herod’s royal family, who were besieged by the troops of Antigonus on the top of Masada, and went straight for Jerusalem. Ventidius was playing psychological warfare with Antigonus, by making him think that he was going to take Jerusalem.

This, however, was just another ruse.

Ventidius promised not to attack Jerusalem… that is, unless he received vast amounts of wealth from the king. Antigonus had, in his mind, no choice but to capitulate to Ventidius’ demands.

Make no mistake, Ventidius was still going to support Herod and place him on the throne. But while Herod was still far away, and his brother besieged, Ventidius thought he might as well make some money while they wait.

After Ventidius’ coffers were filled, he took the bulk of his forces and headed back for Syria, leaving his second, officer Pompaedius Silo, in charge to deal with the ‘Jewish problem’.

The Ruse

However, King Antigonus would come up with a ploy of his own; he bribed Silo multiple times. Antigonus hoped to buy time so that the Parthians could come to his assistance, while he kept the Romans at bay.

Unfortunately for King Antigonus, this would not happen.

Pacorus

When Ventidius returned to Syria, he sent the bulk of his forces beyond the Taurus Mountains to Cappadocia for winter quarters. It was during this time that the Parthian Prince, Pacorus, planned another invasion of Syria and began to mobilize a substantial number of cavalry from the nearby provinces.

Word of Pacorus’ intentions soon spread, reaching the ears of loyal Roman informants, who then relayed the information to Ventidius. Not only was this information crucial for preparation, it also informed Ventidius that a Syrian noble by the name of Channaeus (also called Pharnaeus), who pretended to be a Roman ally, was, in fact, a spy and Parthian loyalist.

Ventidius likely invited Channaeus over for dinner and during their meeting, Ventidius made it clear that he feared the Parthian would abandon their normal route, “where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near the city of Zeugma.”

Ventidius acted concerned over the issue, making it clear that if Pacorus were to invade Syria much further to the south, he would have the advantage over the Romans for it, “was a plain and convenient for the enemy.”

Like the good spy he was, Channaeus returned to his home after the meeting and quickly sent messengers to inform Pacorus of Ventidius’ fears.

Come early spring 38 BCE, Pacorus, unwilling to let go of Syria, led his forces south along the Euphrates River based on Ventidius’ supposed fears of engaging the enemy on a plain.

Once they came to the point of crossing, Pacorus realized that they needed to construct a bridge, due to the banks being widely separated. It took many men and materials, and the bridge was completed only after forty days.

This is exactly what Ventidius wanted. Ventidius’ disinformation bought him much needed time, allowing his legions to assemble.

Once the Parthian forces were in Syrian territory, Pacorus likely expected an immediate attack during the bridge construction or during the crossing, but neither materialized. With no sign of the enemy, Pacorus became overconfident and began to believe that the Romans were weak and cowardly. Eventually however, Pacorus found Ventidius at the acropolis of the city of Gindarus, in the province of Cyrrhestica.

Ventidius had been at Gindarus for three days preparing his defenses when Pacorus showed up.

Repeated Mistakes

One would have thought that perhaps Pacorus carefully prepared a plan of action in such a situation…. but no. Instead, Pacorus and his officers tossed out the combined arms strategy of utilizing both heavy cavalry and horse archers in unison. This had worked many times, so they thought they could take the high ground with little trouble.

Battle

Moreover, the arrogant and overconfident Pacorus, and his nobles, did not want the commoners and horse archers to steal the show, as they did at Carrhae. So they decided to sally up the slope, as they did at the battle of the Cilician Gates.

Once the cataphracts were within five hundred paces of the Romans, Ventidius took advantage of their elitism and rushed his soldiers to the brim and over, until both armies met at close quarters on the slope.

Ventidius’ strategy here was simple, by engaging the elite Parthian cavalry, he had cover from the infamous Parthian horse archers.

You would think the Parthians would have learned from previous experiences what not to do. The result of their knee-jerk reaction was devastating. As the Parthian cataphract advanced up the slope, they were quickly repelled back… straight into those still coming up, inflicting great suffering to rider and mount.

This is not to mention those who did make it to the brim were met and repulsed by heavy infantry. And if the heavy infantry did not get them, the slingers would.

These slingers were likely on the left and right side of the Roman infantry, giving them a deadly arc of crossfire. This very well could be the reason as to why we do not hear of the Parthian horse archers partaking in the engagement, since any attempt to rush towards the front would put them in grave danger.

Battle

Even though the Parthian cataphracts put up a stiff fight at the foot of the hill, it was not enough.

The Roman infantry likely swarmed the cataphracts forcing them into hand-to-hand combat. With the famous Parthian horse archers neutralized from the fight due to the slingers, there was nothing that could be done to rescue the situation.

In the ensuing chaos, Pacorus likely tried to make one last push. He, along with some of his men, attempted to take Ventidius’ defenseless camp, only to be met by Roman reserves, in which he inevitably lost his life during the melee.

As news spread that Prince Pacorus lay dead, a scramble to recover his body was attempted. While those trying to retrieve his corpse met his same fate, the vast majority of Pacorus’ army quickly retreated. Some attempted to re-cross the bridge that was constructed over the Euphrates but were caught by the Romans and put to death. Meanwhile, others fled to King Antiochus of Commagene for safety.

Victorious Aftermath

This victory shocked Syria. To make sure the Syrians would never rebel against Rome, Ventidius took Pacorus’ corpse, severed the head and ordered that it be sent throughout all the different cities of Syria.

It was a gruesome sight to behold, but the effect it had on the natives was anything other than negative. Instead, “they felt unusual affection for Pacorus on account of his justice and mildness, an affection as great as they had felt for the best kings that had ever ruled them.”

As for the Parthians who sought refuge in Commagene, Ventidius came after them.

Truth be told, Ventidius could care less about the Parthian refugees. Instead, he was much more concerned with how much money he could confiscate from King Antiochus by besieging Samosata, the capital of Commagene, in the summer of 38 BCE.

Mark Antony

Antiochus offered Ventidius a thousand talents if he would just get up and go, but Ventidius refused the offer and proposed that Antiochus send his offer to Antony.

Once Antony got word of the situation, he quickly made his way to the scene of the action.

Ventidius was just about to make peace and take the lucrative offer when Antony barred him from making such a deal. Instead, Antony removed him from his command and took over the operations from there.

Why? Well, Antony was jealous of Ventidius and wanted in on the glory.

But instead of the desired fame, Antony inherited a protracted siege that went nowhere, and indeed hurt him in the end. When Antiochus offered peace again, Antony had little choice but to accept the now lowered offer of three hundred talents.

After the extortion of Commagene, Antony ventured into Syria to take care of some domestic issues before returning to Athens.

As for Ventidius, he went back to Rome where he received honors and a triumph, for “he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.”

The Next Generation

As Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome, Antony seethed in Athens.

Meanwhile, across the Euphrates in Parthia, King Orodes was in grief over the loss of his son and army. Orodes lost the will to speak and eat, and after several days, began to talk to Pacorus as if he was alive.

It was also during this time that the many wives of Orodes began to make bids as to why Orodes should choose their son for next in line to the throne. Each mother understood that there was this nasty habit in Parthia… once a new king was elected he would go out of his way to murder his brothers to secure the safety of his reign.

King Orodes

Orodes eventually made his choice and settled on his son Phraates to succeed him. Soon after Phraates was chosen heir to the throne, he began plotting against his father Orodes.

Phraates’ first attempt in murdering his father was with a poison called aconite. This failed due to Orodes suffering from a disease called dropsy (edema), which absorbed the poison and had little effect. Therefore, Phraates took a much easier route and strangled his father to death. To make sure his throne was safe, he murdered his thirty brothers and any of the nobility that detested him or questioned his motives for his acts of cruelty. Phraates was here to stay.

But while Phraates went on a vicious campaign to secure his throne, Mark Antony, jealous of the success that Ventidius had against Parthia, was prepping and planning an invasion of his own.

It was now Antony’s turn to avenge Crassus to fulfill Caesar’s dream.

By Cam Rea

Reference

Leviathan vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC-217 AD

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Medusa and the Gorgons: The Origins of the Legendary Tale

In the middle is the Gorgon Medusa, an enormous monster about whom snaky locks twist their hissing mouths; her eyes stare malevolently, and under the base of her chin the tail-ends of serpents have tied knots.—Virgil

Most of you reading this had your first acquaintance with the movie “Clash of the Titans” in 1981 or the remake in 2010. While both movies show elements of truth concerning the classical Greek stories, it’s all Hollywood, with no need for an explanation. We shall first examine the classical Greek story to discover the true story of Medusa and the Gorgons.

The Classical Story of Perseus and Medusa

As the story goes, King Acrisius of Argos had one child, a daughter named Danae. Concerned by this, Acrisius traveled to Delphi to consult the oracle. He asked the priestess if he would have a son, and she said no. The priestess did inform the king that his daughter would bear a son. However, the priestess warned Acrisius that Danae’s son would kill him.

Danaë and a shower of gold, representing god Zeus visiting and impregnating Danaë.

Danaë and a shower of gold, representing the god Zeus visiting and impregnating Danaë. (Public Domain)

To prevent this, Acrisius placed his daughter in an underground apartment made of bronze with an open roof. Acrisius, thinking his problem was over, would soon be shocked. As Danae dwells in solitude, Zeus notices the beautiful Danae. Seeing her beauty, Zeus decided to visit Danae in the form of a shower of gold and impregnated her. In due time, a messenger arrived to inform Acrisius that his daughter had given birth to a son. She named the boy Perseus. Acrisius knew that he could not kill the infant, for he would feel the wrath of Zeus. Therefore, to eliminate his problem, he placed his daughter and his grandson in a box and set them adrift on the sea.

Danae and son Perseus were set adrift, and landed at Seriphus.

Danae and son Perseus were set adrift and landed at Seriphus. (Public Domain)

Eventually, the chest made its way to the island of Seriphus. An angler by the name of Dictys discovered the chest and opened it to discover the woman and child trapped inside. Dictys decided to take care of the woman and the child, brought them to his home, and accepted them as a family since he and his wife had no children. As time passed, Perseus grew to manhood.

Dictys had a brother, King Polydectes of Seriphus. Polydectes was a cruel king who had eyes for Danae. Danae refused his advances, as she was already Zeus’s bride. Polydectes bullied her, but as time passed, he grew fearful of Perseus, who had grown into a strong and athletic man. To get rid of Perseus, Polydectes talks to him and informs the young man that he is wasting his time on the island. He should leave and see the world and become a hero since he was the son of Zeus. Intrigued by this, Perseus asked what he could do that would be considered heroic. Polydectes could have named many things, but he wanted to be rid of Perseus and informed the young man that if he wanted to be a hero, he should kill the Gorgon, Medusa, and bring back her head.

Polydectes explained to Perseus that three sisters, known as Gorgons, lived in the west. But of the three, Medusa was the most beautiful. He informed Perseus that Medusa had snakes for hair, and if you looked upon her, you would surely turn to stone. (That doesn’t sound so beautiful).

1895 depiction of Medusa.

1895 depiction of Medusa. (Public Domain)

Nobody knew the Gorgons’ whereabouts, even though they were said to have lived west of Seriphus. Perseus needed more information and consulted the gods. Athena gave Perseus a polished shield, which acted as a mirror. Hades contributed his helmet, making Perseus invisible once he put it on. Last, Hermes tossed Perseus a pair of silver sandals with wings. As for a weapon, a sickle sword was handed to him. While Perseus now had all the essentials to travel and defeat the Gorgon, he still lacked the most crucial information: how to get there.

Athena advised Perseus to seek the Gray Sisters, who would tell him where the Gorgon lived. While this told Perseus little, Hermes would guide him on his first journey. Perseus and Hermes flew to the location of the Gray Sisters.

Terracotta relief of three goddesses. Representational image.

Terracotta relief of three goddesses. Representational image. (Public Domain)

Once Perseus arrived, he encountered the three old women, who were blind and passed around a single eye with which to see. When Perseus asked them where Medusa lived, the Sisters refused to answer his question. Seeing his dilemma, Perseus took the eye of one of the sisters. The Sisters begged Perseus to return it, but he refused until they gave him what he wanted. The Gray Sisters finally gave in and told Perseus the Gorgons’ whereabouts. Perseus thanked the women and returned the eye.

Illustration from a collection of myths.

Illustration from a collection of myths. (Public Domain)

Perseus made this next part of the journey alone. When Perseus landed outside the entrance of Medusa’s lair, what stood before him was a grotesque art scene of warriors who failed to slay the beast due to looking directly into Medusa’s eyes. (As the saying goes, “If looks could kill.”)

In legend, warriors had been turned to stone from the gorgon’s stare. Sculpture from Parthenon Marbles, representational.

In legend, warriors had been turned to stone from the gorgon’s stare. Sculpture from Parthenon Marbles, representational. (CC BY 2.5)

Seeing how each man had been facing forward at the time of death, Perseus put his magical helmet on and turned invisible. Instead of walking forward, he slowly walked backward into the entrance using the shield Athena gave him as a mirror to guide his steps.

Embossed, metal plaque from 1911 featuring Medusa

Embossed, metal plaque from 1911 featuring Medusa (Sailko/CC BY-SA 3.0)

Once inside, Perseus eventually came upon the Gorgon sisters, who were sleeping. Two sisters were ugly and immortal, so he could do little for them, but Medusa was mortal, and her looks were devastating. Perseus approached Medusa slowly. Once he was over her, Athena guided his hand to cut the Gorgon’s head off with one sweeping blow. Perseus recovered the head and placed it in a leather bag.

Perseus Slays the Gorgon, Medusa

Perseus Slays the Gorgon, Medusa (CC BY 2.0)

Early Greek Sources

The description of Medusa and the Gorgons was continuously manufactured by writers starting in Classical Greece and lasting well into the Roman period. The earliest source regarding Medusa and the Gorgons is nothing like what one reads today.

The Greek poet Hesiod, who lived between 750 and 650 BCE, is the first to mention the Gorgons and Medusa in his book Theogony:

Ceto bore to Phorcys the fair-cheeked Graiae, sisters grey from their birth: and both deathless gods and men who walk on earth call them Graiae, Pemphredo well-clad, and saffron-robed Enyo, and the Gorgons who dwell beyond glorious Ocean in the frontier land towards Night where are the clear-voiced Hesperides, Sthenno, and Euryale, and Medusa who suffered a woeful fate: she was mortal, but the two were undying and grew not old. With her lay the Dark-haired One (Poseidon) in a soft meadow amid spring flowers.

Hesiod does not mention Medusa being grotesque, nor does he indicate that she and her Gorgon sisters are beautiful. The term Gorgon comes from the Greek gorgos, meaning grim, fierce, terrible, or anything that is dreadful. From this perspective, the Gorgons are described as ugly without going into detail regarding their physical description.

“Rondanini Medusa”. Marble, Roman copy after a fifth century BC Greek original by Phidias, which was set on the shield of Athena Parthenos.

“Rondanini Medusa”. Marble, Roman copy after a fifth century BC Greek original by Phidias, which was set on the shield of Athena Parthenos. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Furthermore, Hesiod makes no mention of Medusa being seduced by Poseidon in the shrine of Athena or that she was raped as told by Ovid in his bookMetamorphoses, which states:

A chief, one of their number, asked why she alone among her sisters wore that snake-twined hair, and Perseus answered: ‘What you ask is worth the telling; listen and I’ll tell the tale. Her beauty was far-famed, the jealous hope of many a suitor, and of all her charms her hair was loveliest; so I was told by one who claimed to have seen her. She, it’s said, was violated in Minerva’s [Athena’s] shrine by the Lord of the Sea (Rector Pelagi) [Poseidon]. Jove’s (Zeus’) daughter turned away and covered with her shield her virgin’s eyes. And then for fitting punishment transformed the Gorgon’s lovely hair to loathsome snakes. Minerva (Athena) still, to strike her foes with dread, upon her breastplate wears the snakes she made.’”

After Hesiod, Stasinus of Cyprus, or Hegesias of Aegina, Cypria, in Fragment 21, written sometime between the seventh or sixth century BCE, mentions some of what Hesiod states concerning their whereabouts, but adds that the Gorgons were “fearful monsters who lived in Sarpedon, a rocky island in deep-eddying Oceanus.” There is no mention of Medusa. While Hesiod is the oldest source mentioning Medusa, it appears that the eighth-century BCE Greek author Homer, in his famed books, The Iliad and The Odyssey, is a much older source regarding the Gorgons. Homer states in The Iliad 5. 738 ff:

About her (Athena’s) shoulders she flung the tasselled aegis (shield), fraught with terror, all about which Rout is set as a crown, and therein is Strife, therein Valour, and therein Onset, that maketh the blood run cold, and therein is the head of the dread monster, the Gorgon, dread and awful, a portent of Zeus that beareth the aegis.

Furthermore, Homer states in The Iliad 11. 36 ff:

And he (Agamemnon) took up the man-enclosing elaborate stark shield, a thing of splendour. There were ten circles of bronze upon it, and set about it were twenty knobs of tin, pale-shining, and in the very centre another knob of dark cobalt. And circled in the midst of all was the blank-eyed face of the Gorgo with her stare of horror, and Deimos was inscribed upon it, and Phobos.

Homer’s account demonstrates the absolute psychological terror one can impose by displaying the face of the Gorgon painted upon a shield.

Medusa by Carvaggio, circa 1595.

Medusa by Carvaggio, circa 1595. (Public Domain)

However, one must ask if the face of the Gorgon really brought fear to men’s hearts. Perhaps what is overlooked in Homer’s Iliad is that Deimos and his twin brother Phobos, sons of Ares, the god of war, and Aphrodite, the goddess of love, caused men to succumb to the terror brought before them. In other words, the Gorgons face can do little alone, but when combined with Phobos and Deimos, one would recoil in horror.

Fourth century AD mosaic with mask of Phobos (Fear)

Fourth century AD mosaic with mask of Phobos (Fear)  (CC BY 2.0)

While some Greeks and the goddess Athena were believed to have displayed the Gorgon upon their shields, some Trojans may have also used the image. Hector, a prince of Troy, demonstrated this. According to Homer in The Iliad 8, “Hektor, wearing the stark eyes of a Gorgo, or murderous Ares, wheeled about at the edge his bright-maned horses.” While The Iliad demonstrates the power of imagery on the battle field, Homer’s Odyssey 11. 633, says that Odysseus “feared that august Persephone night send against me from Aides’ house the Gorgon head of some grisly monster.”

Odysseus realized that conjuring apparitions was a bad idea and quickly fled before being confronted by Persephone, Queen of the Underworld and wife of the god Hades. However, Odysseus was not so fearful of Persephone, but what she might bring—the head of a Gorgon. Therefore, the Homeric passages demonstrate that Medusa is nonexistent, at least in name, but the Gorgons are alive and well in the Greek psyche. While Hesiod briefly explains their origins and Homer their terror, questions remain: where did they come from, and how did they become the fearsome threesome described by the Greeks?

Possible Origins

As mentioned, Hesiod, Homer, and others give the reader just a brief origin, possible place of location, and characteristics. The early Greek writers rarely went into detail concerning their stories, unlike the Classical Greeks and later the Romans, who exponentially ran with the tales and rewrote much of them, which turned Medusa into a monster. Because of this, one has to look to the early Greek narratives to find a possible origin.

Hesiod mentions that Medusa and Gorgons lived “beyond the famous stream of Oceanus.” Oceanus, to the Greeks and Romans, was an enormous river encircling the world, as described by Homer in the Iliad. This would indicate that the Gorgons perhaps lived beyond the Pillars of Hercules. The Greek historian Herodotus, who came much later, mentions that Perseus brought the head of Medusa from Libya. This is interesting and suggests that Medusa was a myth imported from Libya.

In Libya, Medusa was worshiped as a serpent goddess representing “female wisdom.” In Egypt, Medusa is closely represented by Ma’at and is associated with the destructive aspect of the triple goddess Neith.

Aegis of Neith, Twenty-sixth dynasty of Egypt.

Aegis of Neith, Twenty-sixth dynasty of Egypt. (Photograph by Rama, Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA-2.0-fr)

Medusa was Athena’s shadow side, and Athena was Neith in Egypt. Neith and Medusa are very similar, for Neith wore a veil, and to lift the veil was certain death, for Neith’s face signified the distance between man and deity. Athena is connected to Neith, for she was known as Ath-enna or Athene in Libya. At Sais, Egypt, an inscription states that she is believed to be the “mother of all the gods, whom she bore before childbirth existed.” In other words, she is the past, present, and future. “No mortal has yet been able to lift the veil that covers me,” for she was death; like Medusa, whoever looks upon her face is turned to stone. This is interesting, for not only can Medusa take life away, but she can also create life from her blood, like Neith, who carried a scepter in one hand, which represents rulership and power, giving her the ability to enforce her will even at the cost of death. The ankh, on the other hand, represented life.

Neith, an ancient Egyptian goddess.

Neith, an ancient Egyptian goddess. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

However, there is another possible alternative as to what Medusa/Gorgons may have been.

Alternative Origin

As mentioned earlier, a Gorgon indicates anything dreadful. Gorgon may have been a hypocoristic of gorgyra, which means “underground chamber” along those lines. A sixth-century Samian inscription lists a gorgyra chryse. The term chryse means “golden.” Therefore, a gorgyra chryse indicates an underground chamber of gold. If correct, the gorgon’s head refers to money or coins. If one uses gargara it means “heaps, lots, plenty.” This interpretation suggests not a living creature but a treasury.

If one takes this interpretation, Perseus comes off as a mere international commercial venture adventurer who undertook a risk involving dangerous uncertainty based on speculation in the hope of profit. Thus, the head Perseus seeks is not literal, but money or coin engraved with the image of the gorgoneion. To procure this great wealth, Perseus headed to the market to acquire certain tools and, more importantly, make contracts to conduct his business in Libya.

Statue of Perseus

Statue of Perseus (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Final Thoughts

In conclusion, the story of Medusa and the Gorgons is intriguing from the classical Greek point of view. Looking further back in Greek literature, the story becomes mysterious, and looking at it from a linguistic point of view becomes fascinating.

Ultimately, no matter how one takes the story, realize that behind every myth is a general truth. For the vast majority of us who have read the story, we realize on closer examination that Medusa had one heck of an art collection; It was a testimony of death, men frozen in stone, crying out for life. The dark, humorous side is that, even though Perseus avoided Medusa’s gaze, he would also suffer the same fate, as the romantics of Greek thought during the Renaissance decided to turn the hero into a statue for all eternity as a reminder of the story.

Perseus with head of Medusa. The stone hero stands frozen in time.

Perseus with the head of Medusa. The stone hero stands frozen in time. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Top Image: The Head of Medusa (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Atsma, Aaron J. “MEDUSA & GORGONES.” http://www.theoi.com. n.d. http://www.theoi.com/Pontios/Gorgones.html.

Bulfinch, Thomas. Bulfinch’s Mythology: The Age of Fable, the Age of Chivalry, Legends of Charlemagne. New York: Crowell, 1970.

Caputi, Jane. Gossips, Gorgons & Crones: The Fates of the Earth. Santa Fe, N.M.: Bear & Co. Pub, 1993.

Corretti, Christine. Cellini’s Perseus and Medusa and the Loggia Dei Lanzi: Configurations of the Body of State. 2015.

Fontenrose, Joseph Eddy. Python; A Study of Delphic Myth and Its Origins. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.

Silver, Morris. Taking Ancient Mythology Economically. Leiden: Brill, 1992.

Virgil. Eclogues. Georgics. Aeneid I-VI. n.d.

Walker, Barbara G. The Woman’s Encyclopedia of Myths and Secrets. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983.

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Roman-Parthian Wars: Battle of Carrhae (53 BCE)

The Roman army was considered to be an unstoppable juggernaut in the ancient world, but the tables were turned by a formidable Parthian Empire general and devastating tactics. This clash led to one of the most crushing defeats in Roman history.

Leading the Romans was Marcus Licinius Crassus, who was a member of the First Triumvirate and the wealthiest man in Rome. He, like many before him, had been enticed by the prospect of riches and military glory and so decided to invade Parthia.

Leading the Parthians was Surena. Very little is known of his background. What is known is that was a Parthian general from the House of Suren. The House of Suren was located in Sistan. Sistan, or Sakastan, “land of the Sakas,” located in what is today southeast Iran.

In 56 BC, Julius Caesar invited Marcus Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus to Luca in Cisalpine Gaul (Luca is the modern day city of Lucca in Italy). Caesar requested that they meet to repair their strained relationship, which had been established around 60 BC and was kept secret from the Senate for some time. During this event, a crowd of 100 or more senators showed up to petition for their sovereign patronage. The men cast lots and chose which areas to govern. Caesar got what he wanted, Gaul; Pompey obtained Spain; and Crassus received Syria. All of this became official when Pompey and Crassus were elected as consuls in 55 BC.

Bust of Marcus Licinius Crassus

Bust of Marcus Licinius Crassus. (Public Domain)

Crassus was delighted that his lot fell on Syria. His grand strategy and desire was to make the campaigns of Lucullus against Tigranes and Pompey’s against Mithridates appear mediocre. Crassus’ grand strategy and desire of conquest and confiscation went beyond Parthia, beyond Bactria and India, reaching the Outer Ocean—easier envisioned than orchestrated.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC. Roman Republic is shown in Purple. The Blue area represents the Seleucid Empire. The Parthian Empire is shown in Yellow.

Roman, Seleucid, and Parthian Empires in 200 BC. Roman Republic is shown in Purple. The Blue area represents the Seleucid Empire. The Parthian Empire is shown in Yellow. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Psychological Warfare: Masters of Disguise

Crassus, the Roman general, arrived in Syria with seven legions (roughly 35,000 heavy infantry) along with 4,000 lightly armed troops and 4,000 cavalry. Caesar had given Crassus an additional 1,000 Gallic cavalry under the command of Crassus’ son Publius. As Crassus pushed on, the enemy slowly came into sight. Crassus gave the order to halt, and to their eyes the enemy were “neither so numerous nor so splendidly armed as they had expected.” However, looks can be deceiving.

What Crassus and his army saw was the front rank of just 1,000 cavalry who were covered in skins and coats. Surena’s main force was hidden behind the front ranks. While the Romans watched in curiosity, Surena gave the order and a thundering sound proceeded forth from the Parthian cavalry. Many unseen drums covered in stretched animal hide and brass bells roared across the field, vibrating Roman armor as well as their hearts. The use of sound as a psychological weapon manipulated human behavior in both the Roman and Parthian armies. In other words, the home team was pumped up while the away team lost confidence quickly.

Parthian bronze statue, attributed to Surena, Parthian spahbed ("General" or "Commander").

Parthian bronze statue, attributed to Surena, Parthian spahbed (“General” or “Commander”).  (Public Domain)

Plutarch mentioned that, “before the Romans had recovered from their consternation at this din, the enemy suddenly dropped the coverings of their armor.” Once the drums were silent, the Roman army, discombobulated by the intense sound of the drums, besides being physically weak, was in for another surprise.

The Parthian heavy cavalry, otherwise known as the cataphract, was charged towards them, with Surena leading the way. As the cataphract thundered across the plain, their coverings dropped from their armor revealing “helmets and breastplates blazing like fire, their Margianian steel glittering keen and bright, their horses armored with plates of bronze and steel.”

The Parthian cataphract was the main and most important military force. These mailed cavalrymen were the aristocracy, who could afford the expensive armor. In return for their service, they demanded a greater degree of autonomy from the Parthian king at the local level, thus ensuring a king (sub-king) of their own to govern their territory.

The Romans, who never had seen well-armored cavalrymen, were in awe, but the veterans who served under Lucullus or Pompey had encountered this type of cavalry during the Mithridatic Wars. As the cataphract closed in, the legionaries locked shields to create a continuous wall. Surena quickly noticed that the Roman line was steady and firm and they were not going to budge. He quickly broke off the charge giving the impression that they lacked confidence in engaging the Romans in a full frontal assault. However, this was just a ruse.

Parthian Horse Archers: Sight, Speed, and Agility

What the Romans saw was Surena retreating, giving the false notion that the cataphract was unable to make a difference and therefore lacked confidence. Unseen were 10,000 Parthian horse archers, who quickly surrounded the Romans, firing on them from all sides. Crassus was stunned. He quickly assessed the situation, seeing that his forces were bogged down by unarmored petty horse archers, who were vulnerable to missile attack, and ordered his light infantry to engage them. As the light infantry left the safety of the hollow square formation to engage the enemy, they were quickly showered with arrows as the Parthian horse archers galloped away, forcing the light infantry to quickly pull back, crashing through the Roman lines seeking safety. The sight, speed, and agility of the Parthian horse archers spooked the Romans. But what really terrified them was the Parthians’ primary weapon, the composite bow.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot.

Relief of Parthian horseman, a highly skilled warrior, performing a Parthian shot. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

Historian Dr. Kaveh Farrokh suggests that the average Parthian horse archer, with a quiver of 30 arrows, loosed between eight to ten arrows a minute at Carrhae. It would take two to three minutes to exhaust his arsenal before needing to be resupplied. The amount of Parthian horse archers at the battle is estimated at 10,000. If all 10,000 fired away for 20 minutes, the amount of arrows fired by an individual horse archer would have been between 160-200 arrows. This meant the amount of arrows fired upon the Roman soldiers are estimated to have been an astounding 1.6 million to two million arrows in a 20-minute timeframe.

The Romans soon realized that they could do nothing to alleviate the situation. If they stayed in their rank and file they would be wounded or killed. But if they made an attempt to counter the horse archers they would suffer the same fate. Any attempt to chase after them resulted in the horse archers retreating at a full gallop, while turning their bodies back to shoot at the pursuing enemy. This is where the term “Parthian Shot” comes from. The Parthians were literally shooting fish in a barrel.

Moreover, the Parthians were exploiting the Roman ways of warfare. For the Romans, to see the enemy retreat was a sign of defeat. Therefore, the Romans felt that they now had the advantage over their nemeses and pursued them. However, they soon realized the truth, and learned from this mistake that the enemy fought by an entirely different method. The Romans could do nothing as death from above rained down on them.

Crassus’ only hope was that as long as they stood still in their shielded square, the Parthians would soon run out of arrows. Once that happened, Crassus felt that the Parthians would have no choice but to engage the Romans at close quarters.

Roman Army reenactors in shielded formation, spears at the ready.

Roman Army reenactors in shielded formation, spears at the ready. (yeowatzup/CC BY 2.)

However, that was not the case. To the astonishment of the Romans, a Parthian camel train was standing by with fresh arrows. Surena proved adept at organization and logistics by using trains of camels to keep his horse archers constantly supplied, keeping continual pressure upon the Romans. This is contrary to Cassius Dio’s claim that the Parthians “do not lay in supplies of food or pay.” Cassius Dio may have felt that since the Parthians were not good at sieges, it must have been due to issues of supply.

A Call for Help

Crassus’ confidence was deteriorating quickly. He sent a message to his son Publius to join the battle by taking 1,300 cavalry, 500 archers, and eight cohorts from the infantry. Crassus’ hope was to draw some of the Parthians away from the square, as they were attempting to encircle the Romans. However, two reasons were given for the Parthians to attempt this. The first was to envelop the Romans completely, that in due time the legions would crowd closer as their numbers dwindled. However, Plutarch mentions that the Parthians had trouble enveloping the Roman rear due to marshy terrain, making it difficult for the horses to maneuver. The second reason Plutarch gave seems more plausible, and that was to leave a window open just big enough to make the Romans think that they had found an advantage. Deceiving the Romans into thinking that the Parthians could not surround them, Crassus’ son Publius took the bait and charged ahead. However, it was an old steppe trick. Thinking they were retreating, Publius shouted excitedly, “’They are on the run,’ and charged after them.” The faked retreat worked, Publius was on the move; and the Parthians, stationed farther ahead and well hidden, were awaiting his arrival.

Depiction of a battle scene of Trajan's Column: On the left, Parthian horsemen in armor, fleeing before Roman riders.

Depiction of a battle scene of Trajan’s Column: On the left, Parthian horsemen in armor, fleeing before Roman riders. (Public Domain)

Publius and the men were full of joy, thinking that they now had the advantage and victory was surely imminent. But moving farther away from the main body, they soon realized the pursuit was nothing more than a trick when the horse archers wheeled around and were joined by fresh troops. Publius ordered the men to halt where the Parthian cataphract was stationed in front of him. He hoped that they would engage in close combat. Instead, the horse archers in loose order rode around the Romans, kicking up so much sand that a mini-sandstorm fell on top of the Romans and it became nearly impossible to see the enemy.

By using nature as a weapon to disguise their movements, the horse archers were able to engage the Romans safely. Using nature as a force multiplier gave them the advantage of fighting uninhibitedly. Publius and his men could not see or breathe very well, inciting fear, which soon led to panic. The Romans in their disarray tripped, stumbled, and fell in each other’s way. The Parthian horse archers quickly took advantage and the shower of arrows began. Publius did what any commander in the field would do — reestablish order among the men. However, it was too late.

In the convulsion and agony of their pain they writhed as the arrows struck them; the men broke them off in their wounds and then lacerated and disfigured their own bodies by trying to tear out by main force the barbed arrow heads that had pierced through their veins and muscles.

Many of the men died a slow, agonizing death in this fashion. Publius needed to act quickly. The Romans could not engage the horse archers in close combat while the Parthian chain of command, the cataphract, remained nearby. If the Romans could make a break for the cataphract and engage them in close combat, they might have a chance to turn the tide of battle, especially if they could reach the Parthian commander, Surena, and kill him.

Tangling with the Dangerous Cataphract

Publius gave the order to attack the cataphract, but reality set in. The Roman infantrymen who heard Publius showed him that they were unable to go on any further, for their “hands pinioned to their shields, feet nailed through into the ground, so that they were incapable of either running away or defending themselves.”

Roman Army reenactors holding shields in a protective formation.

Roman Army reenactors holding shields in a protective formation. (yeowatzup/CC BY 2.0)

Publius was so in touch with the battle that he was out of touch with his men. He soon realized the carnage that had been inflicted upon his forces. Once Publius assessed the situation, he gathered what remained of his Gallic cavalry and charged toward the cataphract.

Publius’ Gallic cavalry was light, wore little armor, and carried small light spears. One would think Publius would have known better than to charge toward cavalrymen who were better armored than his. They would soon realize this as their light spears broke against the cataphract breastplates. The Gallic cavalry was no match for the armored cataphract, who thrusted their long pikes into the horses or riders. In order to overcome, or at least have a fighting chance, the Gallic cavalryman, if the opportunity presented itself, would grab the pike of the cataphract and hope to use his own weight against him by pulling him off his horse. Many of the cataphract were smart enough to know that being weighed down by their armor made movement cumbersome. Once unseated from his mount, it was best to be on foot or in this case, on his back or knees, as he could get underneath the Gallic cavalryman’s horse and thrust his sword into the animal’s belly. This would cause the horse to rear up, throwing the rider off, and trampling whoever was underneath or nearby before collapsing.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan's Column in Rome (Public Domain). One man has fallen from his horse, the greatest danger for a cataphract.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan’s Column in Rome (Public Domain). One man has fallen from his horse, the greatest danger for a cataphract.

Perhaps some cataphract died in this fashion. With so many Gallic cavalry now dead, the only option for the Romans was to retreat. What was left of the Gallic cavalry pulled back, taking a badly wounded Publius and what remained of the infantry to higher ground. This would also prove to be a mistake.

Publius and his men retreated to a nearby sandy hill. However, the sandy hill provided little protection. With the Roman infantry placed in the front, those behind the infantry stuck out like a sore thumb due to the elevation. The horse archers once again pelted the Romans relentlessly with arrows. The Romans could do little more than watch their troops fall.

As the situation quickly deteriorated, two Greeks from the nearby town of Carrhae, Hieronymus and Nicomachus, offered to help Publius escape to a neighboring town, Ichnae, friendly to Rome. Publius refused the offer since so many men were either dead or dying on his account. Like a Roman commander, he attempted to take his own life, but was unable since an arrow had pierced his hand. Thus, he ordered his shield bearer to run him through with his gladius.

The Parthians eventually made it up the hill after the horse archers had softened the Romans a bit more. Once on the hill, the Parthian cataphract charged through the Romans, breaking their bodies and spirits. The remaining Romans surrendered; about five hundred were taken prisoner. As for the body of Publius, the Parthians took the body and severed his head.

When Publius had gone charging off after the Parthian horse archers in an attempt to give the Roman army both breathing room and time to assess the situation, the Parthian attack on the main body slackened. The reason, of course, was that Publius was a high profile target with little protection. Surena understood that if he could get Publius as far away as possible from the main Roman body, he could fix, engage, and defeat the target, which would send shockwaves throughout the Roman army. The Parthian Commander was correct in his judgment.

The Fall of Crassus

As Crassus waited for his son Publius to return from the pursuit, he began to gain confidence that his son was doing all right. Crassus placed his men in regular order and moved them to sloping ground.

During Publius’ engagement, he attempted to send messages to Crassus. The first never made it through, as the messenger was killed, but other messages indicating that Publius needed his help immediately made it through to Crassus. Crassus’ hopes that his son was doing well all came crashing down when it was evident his son needed him. It was at this point that Crassus was unable to make a clear judgment on what to do; either assist his son or stay put. On top of that, he began to lose confidence and feared the worst possible outcome for his army. Crassus waged a tug of war in his head, and finally made the decision to move the Roman army in an attempt to help Publius; Crassus did not know that his son, Publius, was already dead.

Just as Crassus’ army moved forward, the Parthians swooped in again, beating their drums and shouting aloud, but with even greater ferocity than before. As the Roman army prepared for the second wave of attack, some of the Parthian cavalry approached the Roman line. One of the cataphract had a nasty surprise for Crassus; it was the head of Publius on the tip of a spear. But before the battle was to commence again, the cataphract had a message for Crassus saying, “it was impossible, they said, that such a brave and gallant soldier could be the son of such a miserable coward as Crassus.” If the Roman army had any confidence left in them, that very moment sucked the life’s blood out of them.

Crassus, who suffered the most from this tragedy, rode up and down the ranks, shouting, “this grief is a private thing of my own. But in you, who are safe and sound, abide the great fortune and the glory of Rome. And now, if you feel any pity for me, who have lost the best son that any father has ever had, show it in the fury with which you face the enemy.” Crassus’ encouraging speech to fight on and think of their ancestors who fought hard battles did little to lift up the men’s spirits, for Plutarch mentions that “while he was speaking these words of encouragement, Crassus could see how few there were who were listening to him with enthusiasm.” When Crassus wanted to hear the war cry of his men, it was a “weak, feeble, and unsteady shout.” The battle was lost.

After Crassus had finished preparing the men for the second wave of battle, the Parthians quickly got to work by surrounding the Romans and showering them with arrows. As the horse archers began to pelt the enemy to death, Surena decided to up the carnage by unleashing the cataphract. The strategy was simple. With Roman confidence withering away, the cataphract would have a much greater chance of driving the Roman infantry closer together and into each other’s way. The strategy paid off! With each charge, the cataphract was successful in penetrating the Roman lines and quickly breaking from engagement, which allowed the horse archers to concentrate their arrows on a compacted target.

The Romans lost men quickly during this second wave of attack as the arrows continually rained down and the cataphract kept crushing and driving back the troops. Crassus had no choice but to retreat; but to do so in the daylight was more risky, and the night could not come soon enough.

In the end, Crassus made his way down the hill to meet with Surena. The Romans were on foot and the Parthians were on horseback. Surena was so shocked that Crassus, the imperator of Rome was on foot that he quickly offered him a horse, but Crassus declined the offer, saying he was merely following the custom of his own country. Surena quickly went straight to the point and informed Crassus that peace existed between King Orodes and the Romans. In order to make this deal final, an agreement must be signed near the Euphrates River. Surena than spoke to Crassus and said, “We find that you Romans have not got very good memories about the terms of treaties.” Afterwards, Crassus called for a horse and suddenly Surena offered him a horse with a golden bridle as a present. The grooms lifted Crassus up onto the saddle and ran alongside the horse, whipping the horse to make the animal go faster. Octavius quickly charged after Crassus and got hold of the bridle. Petronius, along with the men, hurriedly surrounded the horse to slow the animal. It was during this struggle with the horse that a brawl broke out. It seems that the grooms of the horse did little to slow the beast down, so Octavius drew his sword and killed one of the grooms; this in turn caused himself to be killed. Petronius also was struck, but his breastplate saved him.

It was during this struggle that Crassus was killed by a Parthian named Pomaxathres.

The Death of Crassus

“The Death of Crassus” (Public Domain)

However, Cassius Dio expresses that Crassus did not die by the hands of a Parthian, rather a fellow Roman killed him to prevent him from being captured alive.  What is most important and overlooked is that Parthia had a body but no treaty.

Featured image: Deriv; Roman cavalryman (CC BY 3.0) and Cataphracts dueling with lances (Public Domain)

By Cam Rea

References

Click on the red book titles below.

Boak, Arthur. A History of Rome to 565 A.D. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan, 1955.

Brosius, Maria. The Persians: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2006.

Cary, Max and Howard Hayes Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. London: Macmillan, 1995.

Dio Cocceianus, Cassius. Dio’s Roman History, trans. E Cary, Loeb Classical Library, 9 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Farrokh, Kaveh. Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Rea, Cam. Leviathan Vs. Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC – 217 AD. Charlestone, SC: CreateSpace, 2014.

Plutarch. Moralia. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.

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Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Scorched Earth Victories – Part II

Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century

Feinting

Scythian tactics included feinting or withdrawing from either the battlefield or even the region. An example of feinting comes from a battle mentioned in Part I (Scythian Tactics and Strategy – Part I ), the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE.

The Roman historian Plutarch mentions that the Parthian horse archers would not engage the Roman forces during battle, but would retreat, luring the Roman forces to follow. The trap was set and the Romans thought victory was in hand. However, the fleeing horse archers turned and loosed arrows upon the pursuing Romans. The Romans in the pursuit soon realized they had made a terrible mistake, but it was too late. Nothing could be done but to make a defensive stand. Withdrawal allowed the feinting tactic to be used with proficiency due to Roman ignorance of their enemy. The Romans would try to advance, but with every attempt, the Parthian horse archers’ constant pelting with what seemed to be an endless supply of arrows would keep them in place.

Parthian horseman

Parthian horseman. ( Creative Commons )

Parthian camel units resupplied the horse archers by exchanging empty quivers for full ones, then and returning to their position. During this monotonous, never-ending event, the Romans would try to break the horse archer formations, only to be countered by heavy Parthian cavalry known as cataphract, which acted as the anvil to the Parthian hammer (arrows). The Battle of Carrhae was death by pieces for the Romans.

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan's Column in Rome

A depiction of Sarmatian cataphracts fleeing from Roman cavalry during the Dacian wars circa 101 AD, at Trajan’s Column in Rome ( Wikimedia Commons ).

Therefore, when it comes to the feinting tactic, do not watch for the visible hand, but rather the invisible one. The Parthians and Scythians were notoriously successful in the feinting technique before the battle of Carrhae. Afterward, the countering measure to this tactic went largely ignored until Alexander the Great demonstrated a reversal.

One could make the argument that the Romans had faulty intelligence before Carrhae, but this would be unfair, although true to a certain extent. The truth of the matter is that the Romans invaded a land they did not know, looking to conquer a people they did not understand. In the end, both Rome and Parthia would continue to bash each other as the years turned into centuries, but neither side truly dominated the other.

Defense in Depth

Defense in Depth is most successful if your nation is rather large and unproductive, as in the case of the Scythians, who valued land and the ability to roam, rather than the luxuries of the cities, like Athens or Nineveh. The Scythians did seem to have cities but mobile villages may be a more accurate description. As for the lazy luxuries of life, some settled, but the majority roamed about.

According to Herodotus: “We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to fight with you.” But Herodotus also stated: “Having neither cities nor forts, and carrying their dwellings with them wherever they go; accustomed, moreover, one and all of them, to shoot from horseback; and living not by husbandry but on their cattle, their wagons the only houses that they possess.” The Scythians did have slaves, according to Herodotus, who were blind and whose primary task was being a shepherd. Additionally, Herodotus also mentioned Scythians who grew corn and onions, which indicates that agriculture was common among some of the tribes. Therefore, the notion that the Scythians did not have cities or villages is partially untrue, depending on the Scythic tribe, of course.

The Scythians that Darius the Great attacked did not have cultivated lands or towns that could be beneficial to Darius’ forces. The Scythians conducted a scorched earth policy as Darius’s army marched further inland, following after them. The Scythians understood that an army marches on its belly and so do the animals accompanying them. What Darius could not use would be a weapon against his forces. The strategy would be defense in depth, scorched earth policy the tactic, and the outcome would be starvation. Starvation through burning was the preferred method used to rid of the Persians. The Scythians understood that they could defeat the enemy by allowing the land to swallow them both physically and mentally.

Darius was ignorant of the people he wished to conquer; he showed no knowledge of the people or terrain he was about to invade. Because of this attitude by Darius, his brother, Artabanus, warned that the proposed campaign to conquer the European Scythians was far too risky, and even if it was successful, the economic benefits were limited. Nevertheless, Darius had to learn the hard way. For the Scythians, it was a good way to prevent a possible second invasion.

As mentioned, the Scythians used the land to their advantage, knowing that Darius would follow as long as the bait was present. The Scythians burnt all that grew, causing Darius to follow his enemy across burnt terrain in hopes of finding food for both his men and animals. The Scythians conducted hit and run attacks during mealtime and even at night, preventing the men from eating or even sleeping, irritating them even more. The Scythians knew that as long as Darius followed in pursuit, he would gain nothing, not even an engagement. Psychological and physical attrition would set in by attacking the enemy’s stomach and his need for rest, causing irrationality among the troops and further deteriorating the chain of command.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy.

Scorched earth tactics, or burning anything useful to the enemy while withdrawing, was an effective military strategy. Public Domain

In the end, the Scythians won a great victory by not engaging the enemy in conventional warfare, but beat the Persians through starvation and sleep deprivation, since an army can move only for so long before it needs to fuel up again in both rest and food. By denying both, the Scythians utilized a form of defense in depth that saved them from Persian conquest.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul'Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king.

Scythian warriors, drawn after figures on an electrum cup from the Kul’Oba kurgan burial near Kerch. The warrior on the right is stringing his bow, bracing it behind his knee. Hair seems normally to have been worn long and loose, and beards were apparently worn by all adult men. The other two warriors on the left are conversing, both holding spears or javelins. The man on the left is wearing a diadem and therefore is likely to be the Scythian king. Public Domain

Featured image: Detail, decorative comb depicting weapons and dress of Scythian Warriors 5th Century BC. Public Domain

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Farrokh,133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.

 

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Scythian Tactics and Strategy: Devastating Guerrilla Archers – Part I

Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs

Featured image: Battle between the Scythians and the Slavs ( Wikimedia Commons ).

The Scythians may not be the original inventors of asymmetrical warfare, but one could argue that they perfected it. Before and during the Scythian arrival, many nations fought by conventional methods. In other words, the established civilizations of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, used taxes to feed, equip, and maintain their large armies. Overall, one can see the massive expense it is to arm and defend a nation when war comes a-knocking. Lives and money are lost, doubly so if you go on the offensive at the expense of your nation’s pocket.

The Scythians, on the other hand, needed none of these, for they were tribal based and seemed to come together only in a time of war. Thus, most issues did not hinder them, such as the laws of supply and demand in the military-economic sense, which would affect an established kingdom or empire. The land was their supplier and demand was when they were in need of resources. For Scythians to sustain life, they had to move to new regions in search of ample pastures suited for their horses to graze and abundant with game, while the land they moved from was left to rest. But one has to be cautious as well, for even though the Scythians moved around, many stayed within their tribal territory. In some cases, they ventured into another tribal territory due to the need to sustain life for both tribe and livestock.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC.

Scythian Horseman depicted on felt artifact, circa 300 BC. Public Domain

When one examines the Scythian lifestyle, one can easily gain an understanding of the type of warfare necessarily carried on against more sedentary (non-migratory) people, like those in Mesopotamia. The Scythian took a guerilla approach to warfare as their method, not to be confused with terrorism. The term guerrilla warfare means irregular warfare and its doctrine advocates for the use of small bands to conduct military operations. Herodotus mentions their method of warfare when King Darius of Persia campaigned against them:

“It is thus with me, Persian: I have never fled for fear of any man, nor do I now flee from you; this that I have done is no new thing or other than my practice in peace. But as to the reason why I do not straightway fight with you, this too I will tell you. For we Scythians have no towns or planted lands, that we might meet you the sooner in battle, fearing lest the one be taken or the other wasted. But if nothing will serve you but fighting straightway, we have the graves of our fathers; come, find these and essay to destroy them; then shall you know whether we will fight you for those graves or no. Till then we will not join battle unless we think it good.”

The description indicates that the Scythians against whom Darius is warring have no center of gravity; more on this later.

Swarming

The Scythians are best known for swarming the enemy, like at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE, where they demonstrated this tactic during the initial stages of the attack. The swarming tactic is the first stage before any other mechanism is executed, like feinting or defense in depth.

To summarize, the definition of swarming would be a battle involving several or more units pouncing on an intended target simultaneously.  The whole premise of swarming in guerrilla warfare, as indicated in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-8 on the topic of counterguerrilla operations, is to locate, fix, and engage the enemy, but to avoid larger forces unless you possess units capable of countering the other. This would allow other units to take advantage of the enemy, which is rare in most battles involving the Scythians. The key principle of swarming is that it does not matter if you win the battle so long as you do not lose the war. It is designed to disorient the enemy troops.

The swarming tactic comprises many units converging on the intended target; however, the swarm moves with the target in order to fracture it. Thus, the method of swarming is to dislodge the enemy piecemeal, causing rank and file to implode. This is due to longstanding, snail-like movement during battle, meantime being continuously pelted from afar by projectiles; fear takes over, demoralizing an army. Roman soldiers were to have a taste of this, for they had a space of three feet all around them to allow for movement and maneuvering in battle. The Scythians took advantage of their three feet, as Plutarch mentions, at the battle of Carrhae: “Huddled together in a narrow space and getting into each other’s way, they were shot down by arrows.”

The heavy barrage of arrows would cause some to wander off, bit-by-bit, thus allowing horse archers to concentrate fully on the wandering enemy. In this scenario, one can argue that the initial battle tactic is to pelt the enemy with a volley of arrows, keeping the target tight in order to fracture it, which allows the horse archers to go from random pelting to accurately killing the enemy. In other words, they switch from firing up into the air to firing forward at the enemy, as demonstrated at Carrhae in 53 BCE.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC.

Scythians shooting with the Scythian bow, Kerch (ancient Panticapeum), Crimea, 4th century BC. (CC BY-SA 3.0 )

Now, before we go any further, let me briefly make the case that swarming has many different methods or tactics, but the Scythian swarm is not like that of others. However, a swarm is a swarm, but the method varies. Case in point, “mass swarming” is the most sought- after method in both the ancient and medieval world, demonstrated by massive conventional armies that would eventually separate or disassemble and perform convergent attacks over a region or province from its initial phase. The “dispersed swarm” is the preferred tactic in guerrilla warfare, where the body separates and converges on the battlefield without forming a single body.

The whole premise of swarming in guerilla warfare is to engage quickly but to avoid larger forces. Pharnuches, one of Alexander’s generals, made the fatal mistake by falling for the Scythian feinting tactic, in which he chased after the Scythians, only to find himself ambushed and swarmed. Pharnuches should have never been given command, because he was a diplomat, not an experienced officer.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon.

Mosaic detailing the famous military leader and conqueror Alexander the Great/Alexander III of Macedon. Public Domain

The Battle of Jaxartes is a fine example of the swarming tactic, but rather small in scale. The Scythians harassing the forces of Alexander did not appear to be a large force. Rather, the Scythians at the battle intended to demoralize the enemy, and if that did not work, they could always lead the enemy farther inland and begin the strategy of defense in depth. Alexander knew better after he defeated the Scythians at Jaxartes in 329 BCE. Alexander understood quite well that if he were to pursue the Scythians further inland, his forces would be open to hit and run attacks, famine, and psychological attrition, none of which is desirable. Even Alexander understood the limits of empire, especially when his worldview did not incorporate the lands to the north.

The Battle of Jaxartes was a loss for the Scythians and a victory for the Macedonians. However, two important demonstrations of the tactics are visible at the battle. The first tactic is swarming, the second is what I like to call the swarm-anti-swarm tactic developed by Alexander, commonly referred to as “anti-swarming.” In fact, Alexander had to swarm in order to achieve victory. The swarm-anti-swarm counters the enemy with a bait-unit. Once the enemy converged from several sides, the remainder of the forces would converge on the area and swarm the enemy. Alexander learned quickly to adopt this tactic of closing in on the enemy and attacking from all directions for future use.

By Cam Rea

References

Ian Morris, Why the West rules–for Now: the Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 277-279.

Herodotus, The Histories, 4. 127.

Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), xii.

U.S. Department of Defense, Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, FM 90-8, August 1986), Chapter 4, Section III. 4-10.

Polybius. 18.30.6

Plutarch, Crassus, 25.5

Kaveh Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War (Oxford: Osprey, 2007), 133.

John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great, (New York and Washington D.C.: Da Capo Press, 2004), 118-120.

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Abraham’s Special Military Operation

Image result for Abraham rescue of Lot

It all started over grazing lands. Both Lot and Abraham had flocks and herds and when they came to a piece of land that could not sustain both their flocks and herds, arguments broke out among the herdsmen working for them. Lot decided to leave and head east into the fertile plain of Siddim and established his tent before Sodom, while Abraham stayed in Canaan and moved to the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron. After some years had passed, a group of refugees brought news to Abraham that the armies of Mesopotamia had marched on Sodom, a great battle took place, and Lot had been captured afterward.

This brings us to a few questions to ask. What caused the armies of Mesopotamia to occupy the cities of the Jordan River plain? Who were these rulers, and what was their objective?

The Bible is silent concerning the Mesopotamian invasion of the Jordanian land. However, this should not stop us from trying to figure it out. Why would a vast army from a collection of nations invade the region? The answer is instability. With the absence of a foe strong enough to challenge them, the armies of Mesopotamia marched in, almost unopposed, confiscated untapped resources, and expanded their political influence throughout the region.

The leaders involved were Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Chedorlaomer king of Elam, and Tidal king of nations (Umman Manda). These four made war on the five kings of the plain. These five kings were Bera king of Sodom, and with Birsha king of Gomorrah, Shinab king of Admah, and Shemeber king of Zeboiim, and the king of Bela, which is Zoar. What can be gathered given the timing of the event is that the power in charge of this operation is none other than the Mesopotamian Empire of Ur III. The king responsible for the mobilizing and executing the operation may have been none other than Amraphel of Shinar (Sumer) otherwise known as King Amar-Sin of Ur. Amar-Sin ruled Ur for 9 years from 1834-1826 BCE.

During his reign, Ur achieved the highest economic production, which allowed for the continued construction of public buildings. When it came to controlling his empire, instead of stationing military troops throughout the imperial state, Amar-Sin decided it would be best to use peaceful and constructive socio-economic incentives to extend the revamped Sumerian city-states on the outer edges. Amar-Sin established ensi or governors, who enjoyed almost complete independence, such as in the cities of Alalak, Mari, and Assur. Ensi’s for the most part were natives of the area they controlled. Amar-Sin’s policy not only encouraged local cultural development but also cemented the imperial structure by doing so. With such freedom came economic and social creativity.

Amar-Sin’s treasury was bursting at the seams, so he decided to go on another tour to expand his state. During his nine years, he conducted war in the northeasterly districts, but when it comes to how far he, like his father Shulgi, expanded the state, the extent remains hazy. What can be identified is that Mari and Elam were within the sphere of Ur’s influence by a policy of matrimonial alliances introduced by his grandfather Ur-Nammu at Mari. Such alliances, allowed Amar-Sin to utilize their armies for political and economic expansion by force.

After twelve years had passed, Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboiim, and Zoar said no more. They grew tired of paying tribute to Amar-Sin and knew that war was inevitable. King Amar-Sin, angered over the news, mobilized the forces. Leading this army to punish the people in eastern Canaan (western part of Jordan) was the king’s extortionist, King Chedorlaomer of Elam, according to the Bible, but also identified as King Kutir-Lagamar, loyal vassal of Amar-Sin.

In the spring of the fourteenth year, the armies of Ur marched out. The number of troops partaking in this military operation may have been around 10,000, perhaps a bit less. As Chedorlaomer’s armies moved from north to south, they would have taken the King’s Highway along the east side of the Jordan River in the hill country to reach their targets that dotted the plateau.

The first phase of Chedorlaomer’s campaign focused not on attacking the kings of the valley because that was too risky. Rather, he focused his attack on those who were their vassals or allies to the east. Chedorlaomer chose this strategy to knock out the eastern allies of the kings, securing his eastern flank with the desert. He could then focus on neutralizing all potential threats to the south.

Chedorlaomer first struck the city of Ashteroth Karnaim in Rephaim, laying waste to the city of Ham in Zuzims and the city of Shaveh Kiriathaim in Emim. Chedorlaomer continued to push into Mount Seir of the Horites and continued until he reached Elparan at the edge of the desert. There are two possibilities as to why Chedorlaomer stopped there. The first reason from a military perspective is obvious; it’s the desert. To proceed any farther spelled disaster. If not the desert, then it has to be political. It could be that Chedorlaomer encountered the important trade route that leads to Egypt, and to cause any upheaval along that commercial route would cause Egypt to take issue. Egypt had commercial interests throughout the Levant.

News of the disasters traveled quickly to each city, causing many citizens and rulers to panic and fear the worst. This was exactly what the invaders wanted, psychological warfare to bend the knees of their enemies. While many of the inhabitants were taken prisoner, many others fled before Chedorlaomer’s arrival and sought refuge behind the walls of Sodom, or behind any walls large enough for that matter, hoping that the armies of Mesopotamia would eventually turn back and head home. However, they were going to be disappointed. Chedorlaomer turned north and sacked the Enmishpat, which is Kadesh, smote the Amalekites and the Amorites that dwelt in Hazezontamar.

The five kings of the plain knew that they would be picked off individually if they stayed behind their walls. However, if they united, it would give them a fighting chance. Both armies would meet for battle on the southern end of the Dead Sea just south of Sodom in the Valley of Siddim. The battle, even though not recorded in any detail, was no doubt prolonged, bloody, and downright messy. The kings of the Plain were defeated. There is no way of knowing for sure if any of the kings died in battle as the Bible is silent on the matter. However, the Dead Sea Scrolls do mention that King Birsha of Gomorrah fell into the slime pits. The remaining kings, Shinab, Bera, Shemeber, and Bela fled into the hills. But not only did the surviving kings flee, but many others seeking safety from the marauding armies of Mesopotamia also fled.

There is no doubt that Abraham and the inhabitants living to the west of the Dead Sea knew of the events taking place east of the Jordan. They received news from refugees, trade caravans, and possibly their spies sent out to investigate, keeping a close eye on a potential threat, carefully preparing for the worst, but taking no action until war arrives at their doorstep. Abraham was concerned, but he knew that Lot was a capable adult able to make his own decisions. Unfortunately, Lot, for whatever reason, did not pack up and move out of harm’s way. No reason is given as to why Lot stayed. Perhaps he thought that the power vacuum sweeping throughout the Jordan River plain would bypass him. Whatever the case was, Lot’s clan and belongings were captured. While Abraham was going about his business, a refugee, perhaps one of Lot’s kinfolk, told Abraham what had happened, that Lot had been taken captive, and if he didn’t do something soon, Lot would be sold into slavery.

Abraham did not hesitate and sent messengers to his confederate Amorite allies, Mamre, Eshcol, and Aner informing them of the situation and asking for assistance. While the messengers were on their way, Abraham informed his household of what just happened. Abraham quickly mustered his forces of three hundred and eighteen men.

Abraham and his forces traveled north for five days, possibly taking the King’s Highway for a time, gathering intelligence and keeping an eye on the enemy’s movements. Eventually, the enemy encamped near the town of Laish (Dan). While the armies of Mesopotamia continued their victorious celebration, Abraham kept a watchful eye on the festivities, keeping track of the guards, their movements, and perhaps collecting information on the exact location of where the prisoners and loot were held from people not aligned with the army who were able to come in and out of the encampment. Abraham waited for many hours, allowing the alcohol drunk by the enemy to take full effect before storming in. Once the army began to succumb to intoxication, Abraham divided his men, into two groups of 159. While the enemy slept and their fires flickered, casting shadows, Abraham and his men infiltrated the camp in silence and smote many. Once Lot and the loot were found, they quickly packed up and moved out before any alarm could be made. The Bible does mention that they pursued them as far as “unto Hobah, which is on the left hand of Damascus,” which could suggest that Abraham was still making hit and run raids. One can assume that Abraham and his men were the only ones making these raids or perhaps they were now receiving help from their Amorite allies. Whatever the case, Abraham was successful in his special operations mission.

Abraham along with his men camped at the Valley of Shaveh. The new king of Sodom, who was in hiding, along with the other kings, came out after he received word that Abraham defeated the Mesopotamian kings and retrieved the property of the people and that of the five kings. Before the Kings of the Plain arrived, Melchizedek, the priest-king of Salem (Jerusalem) visited Abraham. Melchizedek, who had no part in the war, recognized kindness when he saw it and came out to Abraham and his men, bringing food and drink. Melchizedek thanked Abraham and blessed him for his good deed. Abraham, seeing the sincerity of Melchizedek, responded to the priest-king by giving him a tithe.

While Melchizedek responded with hospitality, wanting nothing but to say thank you, the king of Sodom was rather political in his approach. He didn’t say thank you or offer food and drink. Instead, the king of Sodom wanted to strike a deal. He offered all the loot to Abraham, as long as he returns the people to the king. The problem with this is that the Mesopotamian kings captured the people and looted the cities of the plains. Abraham had not taken anything from them, thus technically he owed the king’s of the Plain nothing legally or morally. It was legally Abraham’s by the fair fortunes of war. But Abraham was not like that. Instead of making a deal with the king and his royal entourage, Abraham’s response surprised the king by refusing to keep loot or people, for Abraham was entitled,

I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, That I will not take from a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take any thing that is thine, lest thou shouldest say, I have made Abram rich.

In other words, Abraham’s riches will come from God, not from some politician seeking to strike a deal. Besides, saving the lives and their property and not taking a single item is far more rewarding. Abraham’s rescue of Lot is technically the first recorded special operations mission.

By Cam Rea

References 

Genesis

Garcia, Juan Carlos Moreno. Ancient Egyptian Administration. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Rohl, David. From Eden to Exile: The Epic History of the People of the Bible. London: Arrow, 2003.

Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. 3rd ed., New ed. London: Penguin Books, 1992.

Thomson, Gary Arthur. First Market: The Genesis of Wall Street in Ancient Iraq. New York: IUniverse, 2010.

Schwartz, Matthew B. Politics in the Hebrew Bible: God, Man, and Government. Lanham, MD: Jason Aronson, Inc, 2013.

Vermès, Géza. The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English. London: Penguin, 2004.

 Abraham Makes the Enemies Flee Who Hold His Nephew (Public Domian)